Ipse intellectus possibilis est in quo est habitus scientiae quo potest considerare etiam cum non considerat, quia intelligere et considerare est proprius actus intellectus.
The possible intellect itself is the subject of the habit of science, by which the intellect, even though it be not actually considering, is able to consider, because to understand and to consider is the proper act of the intellect.
Potentia ad esse sensibile convenit materiae corporali, ita potentia ad esse intelligibile convenit intellectui possibili. Unde nihil prohibet in intellectu possibili esse habitum, qui est medius inter puram potentiam et actum perfectum.
As potentiality to sensible being belongs to corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the possible intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the possible intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and perfect act.
Vires apprehensivae interius praeparant intellectui possibili proprium obiectum, ideo ex bona dispositione harum virium, ad quam cooperatur bona dispositio corporis, redditur homo habilis ad intelligendum. Et sic habitus intellectivus secundario potest esse in istis viribus. Principaliter autem est in intellectu possibili.
Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the possible intellect, therefore it is by the good disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of the body cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand. And so in a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But principally it is in the possible intellect.
Ipsum autem intelligere non dicitur commune esse animae et corpori, nisi ratione phantasmatis, ut dicitur in I de anima. Patet autem quod phantasma comparatur ad intellectum possibilem ut obiectum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde relinquitur quod habitus intellectivus sit principaliter ex parte ipsius intellectus, non autem ex parte phantasmatis, quod est commune animae et corpori.
Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body, except by the aspect of the phantasm, as is stated in De Anima, text. 66. But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the passive intellect (De Anima iii, text. 3,39). Whence it follows that the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself, and not on the part of the phantasm, which is common to soul and body.
Et ideo dicendum est quod intellectus possibilis est subiectum habitus, illi enim competit esse subiectum habitus, quod est in potentia ad multa; et hoc maxime competit intellectui possibili. Unde intellectus possibilis est subiectum habituum intellectualium.
And therefore we must say that the possible intellect is the subject of habit, which is in potentiality to many, and this belongs, above all, to the possible intellect. Wherefore the possible intellect is the subject of intellectual habits.
Philosophus, in VI Ethic., ponit scientiam et sapientiam et intellectum, qui est habitus principiorum, in ipsa intellectiva parte animae.
The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10) puts science, wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first principles, in the intellective part of the soul.