Consideratio circumstantiarum pertinet ad theologum quia theologus considerat actus humanos secundum quod sunt meritorii vel demeritorii, quod convenit actibus humanis; ad quod requiritur quod sint voluntarii.
The theologian has to consider circumstances because the theologian considers human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is proper to human acts; and for this it is requisite that they be voluntary.
Ignorantia circumstantiarum causat involuntarium, ut Damascenus et Gregorius Nyssenus dicunt. Sed involuntarium excusat a culpa, cuius consideratio pertinet ad theologum.
Ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be involuntary, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.]. But involuntariness excuses from sin, the consideration of which belongs to the theologian.
Accidentia quae omnino per accidens se habent, relinquuntur ab omni arte, propter eorum incertitudinem et infinitatem. Sed talia accidentia non habent rationem circumstantiae, quia, ut dictum est, sic circumstantiae sunt extra actum, quod tamen actum aliquo modo contingunt, ordinatae ad ipsum. Accidentia autem per se cadunt sub arte.
Accidents which are altogether accidental are neglected by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity. But such like accidents do not have the formal aspect of circumstances; because circumstances although, as stated above (q7 a1), they are extrinsic to the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being related to it. Proper accidents, however, come under the consideration of art.
Bonum ordinatum ad finem dicitur utile, quod importat relationem quandam, unde philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod "in ad aliquid bonum est utile". In his autem quae ad aliquid dicuntur, denominatur aliquid non solum ab eo quod inest, sed etiam ab eo quod extrinsecus adiacet, ut patet in dextro et sinistro, aequali et inaequali, et similibus. Et ideo, cum bonitas actuum sit inquantum sunt utiles ad finem, nihil prohibet eos bonos vel malos dici secundum proportionem ad aliqua quae exterius adiacent.
Good directed to the end is said to be useful; and this implies some kind of relation: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that "the good in the genus 'relation' is the useful." Now, in the genus "relation" a thing is denominated not only according to that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to that which is extrinsic to it: as may be seen in the expressions "right" and "left," "equal" and "unequal," and such like. Accordingly, since the goodness of acts consists in their utility to the end, nothing hinders their being called good or bad according to their proportion to extrinsic things that are adjacent to them.