Concupiscentia non causat involuntarium, sed magis facit aliquid voluntarium, quia dicitur aliquid voluntarium ex eo quod voluntas in id fertur.
Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but on the contrary makes something to be voluntary, because a thing is said to be voluntary, from the fact that the will is moved to it.
Per concupiscentiam autem voluntas inclinatur ad volendum id quod concupiscitur.
Concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence.
Nam incontinens concupiscentiae agit contra id quod prius proponebat, non autem contra id quod nunc vult; sed timidus agit contra id quod etiam nunc secundum se vult.
The man who yields to concupiscence acts counter to that which he purposed at first, but not counter to that which he desires now; whereas the timid man acts counter to that which in itself he desires now.