No. It is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause, because no effect results outside the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding cause, which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause.
Praeter ordinem alicuius particularis causae, aliquis effectus evenire potest, non autem praeter ordinem causae universalis, quia praeter ordinem particularis causae nihil provenit, nisi ex aliqua alia causa impediente, quam quidem causam necesse est reducere in primam causam universalem.
Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; but not as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the Divine government.
Aliqui effectus contingentes, per comparationem ad proximas causas, quae in suis effectibus deficere possunt; non propter hoc quod aliquid fieri possit extra totum ordinem gubernationis divinae. Quia hoc ipsum quod aliquid contingit praeter ordinem causae proximae, est ex aliqua causa subiecta gubernationi divinae.
Therefore as God is the first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all be-ing in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of the Divine government.
Cum igitur Deus sit prima causa universalis, non unius generis tantum, sed universaliter totius entis, impossibile est quod aliquid contingat praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis.
There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above (Q48, A3). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist.
Nihil invenitur in mundo quod sit totaliter malum, quia malum semper fundatur in bono, ut supra ostensum est. Et ideo res aliqua dicitur mala, per hoc quod exit ab ordine alicuius particularis boni. Si autem totaliter exiret ab ordine gubernationis divinae, totaliter nihil esset.
Things are said to be fortuitous, as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the order of Divine providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance," as Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
Aliqua dicuntur esse casualia in rebus, per ordinem ad causas particulares, extra quarum ordinem fiunt. Sed quantum ad divinam providentiam pertinet, "nihil fit casu in mundo," ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest.