Yes. The powers of the soul proceed from its essence as their cause because the composite is actual by the soul.
Potentiae animae procedunt ab eius essentia sicut a causa quia compositum est in actu per animam.
All the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the soul alone, or the composite, flow from the essence of the soul, as from their principle.
Omnes potentiae animae, sive subiectum earum sit anima sola, sive compositum, fluunt ab essentia animae sicut a principio.
From the one essence of the soul many and various powers proceed; both because order exists among these powers, and also by reason of the diversity of the corporeal organs.
Ab una essentia animae procedunt multae et diversae potentiae; tum propter ordinem potentiarum, tum etiam secundum diversitatem organorum corporalium.
The powers of the soul are its natural properties. But the subject is the cause of its proper accidents; whence also it is included in the definition of accident, as is clear from Metaph. vii (Did. vi, 4).
Potentiae animae sunt quaedam proprietates naturales ipsius. Sed subiectum est causa propriorum accidentium, unde et ponitur in definitione accidentis, ut patet in VII Metaphys.
The accident is caused by the subject according as it is actual, and is received into it according as it is in potentiality.
Accidens causatur a subiecto secundum quod est actu, et recipitur in eo inquantum est in potentia.
Now it is clear, from what has been said (Q77, A5), that either the subject of the soul's powers is the soul itself alone, which can be the subject of an accident, forasmuch as it has something of potentiality, as we have said above (Q77, A1, RO6); or else this subject is the composite.
Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod potentiarum animae subiectum est vel ipsa anima sola, quae potest esse subiectum accidentis secundum quod habet aliquid potentialitatis, ut supra dictum est; vel compositum.
The substantial and the accidental form partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this, that each is an act; and that by each of them something is after a manner actual. They differ, however, in two respects.
Forma substantialis et accidentalis partim conveniunt, et partim differunt. Conveniunt quidem in hoc, quod utraque est actus, et secundum utramque est aliquid quodammodo in actu. Differunt autem in duobus.
First, because the substantial form makes a thing to exist absolutely, and its subject is something purely potential.
Primo quidem, quia forma substantialis facit esse simpliciter, et eius subiectum est ens in potentia tantum.
But the accidental form does not make a thing to exist absolutely but to be such, or so great, or in some particular condition; for its subject is an actual being.
Forma autem accidentalis non facit esse simpliciter; sed esse tale, aut tantum, aut aliquo modo se habens, subiectum enim eius est ens in actu.
Hence it is clear that actuality is observed in the substantial form prior to its being observed in the subject, and since that which is first in a genus is the cause in that genus, the substantial form causes existence in its subject.
Unde patet quod actualitas per prius invenitur in forma substantiali quam in eius subiecto, et quia primum est causa in quolibet genere, forma substantialis causat esse in actu in suo subiecto.
On the other hand, actuality is observed in the subject of the accidental form prior to its being observed in the accidental form; wherefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject.
Sed e converso, actualitas per prius invenitur in subiecto formae accidentalis, quam in forma accidentali, unde actualitas formae accidentalis causatur ab actualitate subiecti.
So the subject, forasmuch as it is in potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form; but forasmuch as it is in act, it produces it. This I say of the proper and "per se" accident; for with regard to the extraneous accident, the subject is receptive only: the accident being caused by an extrinsic agent.
Ita quod subiectum, inquantum est in potentia, est susceptivum formae accidentalis; inquantum autem est in actu, est eius productivum. Et hoc dico de proprio et per se accidente; nam respectu accidentis extranei, subiectum est susceptivum tantum: productivum vero talis accidentis est agens extrinsecum.
Secondly, substantial and accidental forms differ, because, since that which is the less principal exists for the sake of that which is the more principal, matter therefore exists on account of the substantial form; while on the contrary, the accidental form exists on account of the completeness of the subject.
Secundo autem differunt substantialis forma et accidentalis, quia, cum minus principale sit propter principalius, materia est propter formam substantialem; sed e converso, forma accidentalis est propter completionem subiecti.
The emanation of proper accidents from their subject is not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance; thus one thing results naturally from another.
Emanatio propriorum accidentium a subiecto non est per aliquam transmutationem, sed per aliquam naturalem resultationem; sicut ex uno naturaliter aliud resultat.
From one simple thing many things may proceed naturally, in a certain order; or again if there be diversity of recipients.
Ab uno simplici possunt naturaliter multa procedere ordine quodam. Et iterum propter diversitatem recipientium.
The subject is both the final cause, and in a way the active cause, of its proper accident. It is also as it were the material cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident.
Subiectum est causa proprii accidentis et finalis, et quodammodo activa; et etiam ut materialis, inquantum est susceptivum accidentis.
From this we may gather that the essence of the soul is the cause of all its powers, as their end, and as their active principle; and of some as receptive thereof.
Et ex hoc potest accipi quod essentia animae est causa omnium potentiarum sicut finis et sicut principium activum; quarundam autem sicut susceptivum.