Yes. God can do something outside this order created by Him, when He chooses (for instance by producing the effects of secondary causes without them, or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend), because a higher cause is not contained by a cause of a lower order, but conversely.
Deus potest praeter hunc ordinem institutum agere, cum voluerit (puta agendo effectus secundarum causarum sine ipsis, vel producendo aliquos effectus ad quos causae secundae non se extendunt), quia causa superior non continetur sub ordine causae inferioris, sed e converso.
God fixed a certain order in things in such a way that at the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this order, He is not changed.
Deus sic rebus certum ordinem indidit, ut tamen sibi reservaret quid ipse aliquando aliter ex causa esset facturus. Unde cum praeter hunc ordinem agit, non mutatur.
Since the order of nature is given to things by God, if He does anything outside this order, it is not against nature. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "That is natural to each thing which is caused by Him from Whom is all mode, number, and order in nature."
Cum igitur naturae ordo sit a Deo rebus inditus, si quid praeter hunc ordinem faciat, non est contra naturam. Unde Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod "id est cuique rei naturale, quod ille fecerit a quo est omnis modus, numerus et ordo naturae."
If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for, if He did so, He would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness.
Si ergo ordo rerum consideretur prout dependet a prima causa, sic contra rerum ordinem Deus facere non potest, sic enim si faceret, faceret contra suam praescientiam aut voluntatem aut bonitatem.
But if we consider the order of things depending on any secondary cause, thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not subject to the order of secondary causes; but, on the contrary, this order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural necessity, but by the choice of His own will, for He could have created another order of things.
Si vero consideretur rerum ordo prout dependet a qualibet secundarum causarum, sic Deus potest facere praeter ordinem rerum. Quia ordini secundarum causarum ipse non est subiectus; sed talis ordo ei subiicitur, quasi ab eo procedens non per necessitatem naturae, sed per arbitrium voluntatis, potuisset enim et alium ordinem rerum instituere.
So Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God acts against the wonted course of nature; but by no means does He act against the supreme law, because He does not act against Himself."
Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod "Deus contra solitum cursum naturae facit; sed contra summam legem tam nullo modo facit, quam contra seipsum non facit."
"It is because the contemporary alternatives seem so one-sided and are not more evidently solutions to the problems which Thomas faced, and partly solved, that we return to him and to the tradition of theology and philosophy in which his Summa Theologiae appears: theology as the science of the first principle and this as the total knowledge of reality in its unity." -- Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself (Oxford University Press, 1987), p.159.
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
Q105 A5: Whether God works in every agent?
Yes. God works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation because God not only gives things their form, but He also preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover the end of every action.
Intelligendum est Deum operari in rebus, quod tamen ipsae res propriam habeant operationem, quia Deus non solum dat formas rebus, sed etiam conservat eas in esse, et applicat eas ad agendum, et est finis omnium actionum.
God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is superfluous.
Deus sufficienter operatur in rebus ad modum primi agentis, nec propter hoc superfluit operatio secundorum agentium.
In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few kinds of causes, matter is not a principle of action, but is the subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art.
Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, cum sint causarum quatuor genera, materia quidem non est principium actionis, sed se habet ut subiectum recipiens actionis effectum. Finis vero et agens et forma se habent ut actionis principium, sed ordine quodam. Nam primo quidem, principium actionis est finis, qui movet agentem; secundo vero, agens; tertio autem, forma eius quod ab agente applicatur ad agendum (quamvis et ipsum agens per formam suam agat); ut patet in artificialibus.
Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three things.
Sic igitur secundum haec tria Deus in quolibet operante operatur.
It is written (Isaiah 26:12): "Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in us."
Dicitur Isaiae XXVI, omnia opera nostra operatus es in nobis, domine.
Intelligendum est Deum operari in rebus, quod tamen ipsae res propriam habeant operationem, quia Deus non solum dat formas rebus, sed etiam conservat eas in esse, et applicat eas ad agendum, et est finis omnium actionum.
God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is superfluous.
Deus sufficienter operatur in rebus ad modum primi agentis, nec propter hoc superfluit operatio secundorum agentium.
In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few kinds of causes, matter is not a principle of action, but is the subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art.
Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, cum sint causarum quatuor genera, materia quidem non est principium actionis, sed se habet ut subiectum recipiens actionis effectum. Finis vero et agens et forma se habent ut actionis principium, sed ordine quodam. Nam primo quidem, principium actionis est finis, qui movet agentem; secundo vero, agens; tertio autem, forma eius quod ab agente applicatur ad agendum (quamvis et ipsum agens per formam suam agat); ut patet in artificialibus.
Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three things.
Sic igitur secundum haec tria Deus in quolibet operante operatur.
It is written (Isaiah 26:12): "Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in us."
Dicitur Isaiae XXVI, omnia opera nostra operatus es in nobis, domine.
Sunday, June 28, 2009
Q105 A4: Whether God can move the created will?
Yes. The will can be moved by good as its object, but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously, because nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover surpasses or at least equals the passive power of the thing movable.
Potest autem voluntas moveri sicut ab obiecto, a quocumque bono, non tamen sufficienter et efficaciter nisi a Deo, quia non sufficienter aliquid potest movere aliquod mobile, nisi virtus activa moventis excedat, vel saltem adaequet, virtutem passivam mobilis.
God, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural inclination.
Deus, movendo voluntatem, non cogit ipsam, quia dat ei eius propriam inclinationem.
To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another.
Moveri voluntarie est moveri ex se, idest a principio intrinseco, sed illud principium intrinsecum potest esse ab alio principio extrinseco. Et sic moveri ex se non repugnat ei quod movetur ab alio.
If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated, it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.
Si voluntas ita moveretur ab alio quod ex se nullatenus moveretur, opera voluntatis non imputarentur ad meritum vel demeritum. Sed quia per hoc quod movetur ab alio, non excluditur quin moveatur ex se, ut dictum est, ideo per consequens non tollitur ratio meriti vel demeriti.
Now the passive power of the will extends to the universal good: for its object is universal good, just as the object of the intellect is universal being. But every created good is some particular good; God alone is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills [the capacity of] the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object.
Virtus autem passiva voluntatis se extendit ad bonum in universali: est enim eius obiectum bonum universale, sicut et intellectus obiectum est ens universale. Quodlibet autem bonum creatum est quoddam particulare bonum; solus autem Deus est bonum universale. Unde ipse solus implet voluntatem, et sufficienter eam movet ut obiectum.
In like manner the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will is nothing but a kind of inclination towards the object of the will, which is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate end is proportionate, just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects to the common weal.
Similiter autem et virtus volendi a solo Deo causatur. Velle enim nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedam in obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum universale. Inclinare autem in bonum universale est primi moventis, cui proportionatur ultimus finis, sicut in rebus humanis dirigere ad bonum commune est eius qui praeest multitudini.
Wherefore in both ways it belongs to God to move the will, but especially in the second way, by an interior inclination of the will.
Unde utroque modo proprium est Dei movere voluntatem, sed maxime secundo modo, interius eam inclinando.
It is written (Philippians 2:13): "It is God who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish."
Dicitur ad Philipp. II, "Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere."
Potest autem voluntas moveri sicut ab obiecto, a quocumque bono, non tamen sufficienter et efficaciter nisi a Deo, quia non sufficienter aliquid potest movere aliquod mobile, nisi virtus activa moventis excedat, vel saltem adaequet, virtutem passivam mobilis.
God, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural inclination.
Deus, movendo voluntatem, non cogit ipsam, quia dat ei eius propriam inclinationem.
To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another.
Moveri voluntarie est moveri ex se, idest a principio intrinseco, sed illud principium intrinsecum potest esse ab alio principio extrinseco. Et sic moveri ex se non repugnat ei quod movetur ab alio.
If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated, it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.
Si voluntas ita moveretur ab alio quod ex se nullatenus moveretur, opera voluntatis non imputarentur ad meritum vel demeritum. Sed quia per hoc quod movetur ab alio, non excluditur quin moveatur ex se, ut dictum est, ideo per consequens non tollitur ratio meriti vel demeriti.
Now the passive power of the will extends to the universal good: for its object is universal good, just as the object of the intellect is universal being. But every created good is some particular good; God alone is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills [the capacity of] the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object.
Virtus autem passiva voluntatis se extendit ad bonum in universali: est enim eius obiectum bonum universale, sicut et intellectus obiectum est ens universale. Quodlibet autem bonum creatum est quoddam particulare bonum; solus autem Deus est bonum universale. Unde ipse solus implet voluntatem, et sufficienter eam movet ut obiectum.
In like manner the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will is nothing but a kind of inclination towards the object of the will, which is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate end is proportionate, just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects to the common weal.
Similiter autem et virtus volendi a solo Deo causatur. Velle enim nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedam in obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum universale. Inclinare autem in bonum universale est primi moventis, cui proportionatur ultimus finis, sicut in rebus humanis dirigere ad bonum commune est eius qui praeest multitudini.
Wherefore in both ways it belongs to God to move the will, but especially in the second way, by an interior inclination of the will.
Unde utroque modo proprium est Dei movere voluntatem, sed maxime secundo modo, interius eam inclinando.
It is written (Philippians 2:13): "It is God who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish."
Dicitur ad Philipp. II, "Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere."
Saturday, June 27, 2009
Q105 A3: Whether God moves the created intellect immediately?
Yes. God moves the created intellect, because He gives it the power to understand (whether natural, or superadded) and because He impresses intelligible species on it: and maintains and preserves both power and species in be-ing.
Deus movet intellectum creatum, inquantum dat ei virtutem ad intelligendum (vel naturalem vel superadditam) et inquantum imprimit ei species intelligibiles: et utrumque tenet et conservat in esse.
The intellectual operation is indeed performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds from God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the one who understands.
Operatio intellectualis est quidem ab intellectu in quo est, sicut a causa secunda; sed a Deo sicut a causa prima. Ab ipso enim datur intelligenti quod intelligere possit.
The intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle.
Lumen intellectuale, simul cum similitudine rei intellectae, est sufficiens principium intelligendi; secundarium tamen, et a primo principio dependens.
The intelligible object moves our human intellect, inasmuch as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient to enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence, as we have seen above (Q12, A2; Q56, A3). Hence He moves the created intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we have explained (Q12, A4).
Intelligibile movet intellectum nostrum, inquantum quodammodo imprimit ei suam similitudinem, per quam intelligi potest. Sed similitudines quas Deus imprimit intellectui creato, non sufficiunt ad ipsum Deum intelligendum per essentiam, ut supra habitum est. Unde movet intellectum creatum, cum tamen non sit ei intelligibilis, ut dictum est.
As in corporeal movement that is called the mover which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement of the intellect.
Sicut in motibus corporalibus movens dicitur quod dat formam quae est principium motus, ita dicitur movere intellectum, quod causat formam quae est principium intellectualis operationis, quae dicitur motus intellectus.
Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the intelligent being: one which is the intellectual power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality; while the other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands. So a thing is said to move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding, or impresses on him the likeness of the thing understood.
Operationis autem intellectus est duplex principium in intelligente: unum scilicet quod est ipsa virtus intellectualis, quod quidem principium est etiam in intelligente in potentia; aliud autem est principium intelligendi in actu, scilicet similitudo rei intellectae in intelligente. Dicitur ergo aliquid movere intellectum, sive det intelligenti virtutem ad intelligendum, sive imprimat ei similitudinem rei intellectae.
Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the first immaterial being; and as intellectuality is a result of immateriality, it follows that He is the first understanding being. Therefore since the first in each order is the cause of all that follows, we must conclude that from Him proceeds all power of understanding.
Utroque autem modo Deus movet intellectum creatum. Ipse enim est primum ens immateriale. Et quia intellectualitas consequitur immaterialitatem, sequitur quod ipse sit primum intelligens. Unde cum primum in quolibet ordine sit causa eorum quae consequuntur, sequitur quod ab ipso sit omnis virtus intelligendi.
In like manner, since He is the first being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him as in their first cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly in Him, after the mode of His own Essence. For as the intelligible formal aspects of all things exist first of all in God, and are derived from Him by other intellects, in order that these may actually understand, so also are they derived by creatures that they may subsist.
Similiter cum ipse sit primum ens, et omnia entia praeexistant in ipso sicut in prima causa, oportet quod sint in eo intelligibiliter secundum modum eius. Sicut enim omnes rationes rerum intelligibiles primo existunt in Deo, et ab derivantur in alios intellectus, ut actu intelligant, sic etiam derivantur in creaturas ut subsistant.
Deus movet intellectum creatum, inquantum dat ei virtutem ad intelligendum (vel naturalem vel superadditam) et inquantum imprimit ei species intelligibiles: et utrumque tenet et conservat in esse.
The intellectual operation is indeed performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds from God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the one who understands.
Operatio intellectualis est quidem ab intellectu in quo est, sicut a causa secunda; sed a Deo sicut a causa prima. Ab ipso enim datur intelligenti quod intelligere possit.
The intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle.
Lumen intellectuale, simul cum similitudine rei intellectae, est sufficiens principium intelligendi; secundarium tamen, et a primo principio dependens.
The intelligible object moves our human intellect, inasmuch as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient to enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence, as we have seen above (Q12, A2; Q56, A3). Hence He moves the created intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we have explained (Q12, A4).
Intelligibile movet intellectum nostrum, inquantum quodammodo imprimit ei suam similitudinem, per quam intelligi potest. Sed similitudines quas Deus imprimit intellectui creato, non sufficiunt ad ipsum Deum intelligendum per essentiam, ut supra habitum est. Unde movet intellectum creatum, cum tamen non sit ei intelligibilis, ut dictum est.
As in corporeal movement that is called the mover which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement of the intellect.
Sicut in motibus corporalibus movens dicitur quod dat formam quae est principium motus, ita dicitur movere intellectum, quod causat formam quae est principium intellectualis operationis, quae dicitur motus intellectus.
Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the intelligent being: one which is the intellectual power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality; while the other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands. So a thing is said to move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding, or impresses on him the likeness of the thing understood.
Operationis autem intellectus est duplex principium in intelligente: unum scilicet quod est ipsa virtus intellectualis, quod quidem principium est etiam in intelligente in potentia; aliud autem est principium intelligendi in actu, scilicet similitudo rei intellectae in intelligente. Dicitur ergo aliquid movere intellectum, sive det intelligenti virtutem ad intelligendum, sive imprimat ei similitudinem rei intellectae.
Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the first immaterial being; and as intellectuality is a result of immateriality, it follows that He is the first understanding being. Therefore since the first in each order is the cause of all that follows, we must conclude that from Him proceeds all power of understanding.
Utroque autem modo Deus movet intellectum creatum. Ipse enim est primum ens immateriale. Et quia intellectualitas consequitur immaterialitatem, sequitur quod ipse sit primum intelligens. Unde cum primum in quolibet ordine sit causa eorum quae consequuntur, sequitur quod ab ipso sit omnis virtus intelligendi.
In like manner, since He is the first being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him as in their first cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly in Him, after the mode of His own Essence. For as the intelligible formal aspects of all things exist first of all in God, and are derived from Him by other intellects, in order that these may actually understand, so also are they derived by creatures that they may subsist.
Similiter cum ipse sit primum ens, et omnia entia praeexistant in ipso sicut in prima causa, oportet quod sint in eo intelligibiliter secundum modum eius. Sicut enim omnes rationes rerum intelligibiles primo existunt in Deo, et ab derivantur in alios intellectus, ut actu intelligant, sic etiam derivantur in creaturas ut subsistant.
Friday, June 26, 2009
Q105 A2: Whether God can move a body immediately?
Yes. God can move any body whatever, in respect of any movement whatever, because God can imprint form immediately in matter.
Deus possit, secundum quemcumque motum, corpus quodcumque movere, quia Deus possit immediate formam materiae imprimere.
There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor is touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by moving them; but He is not touched, because the natural power of no creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the words, "There is no contact with God"; that is, so that God Himself be touched.
Duplex est tactus, scilicet corporalis, sicut duo corpora se tangunt; et virtualis, sicut dicitur quod contristans tangit contristatum. Secundum igitur primum contactum, Deus, cum sit incorporeus, nec tangit nec tangitur. Secundum autem virtualem contactum, tangit quidem movendo creaturas, sed non tangitur, quia nullius creaturae virtus naturalis potest ad ipsum pertingere. Et sic intellexit Dionysius quod non est tactus Dei, ut scilicet tangatur.
God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and apprehended by that which is moved; but as being desired and known by Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness.
Movet Deus sicut desideratum et intellectum. Sed non oportet quod semper moveat sicut desideratum et intellectum ab eo quod movetur; sed sicut desideratum et notum a seipso; quia omnia operatur propter suam bonitatem.
Deus possit, secundum quemcumque motum, corpus quodcumque movere, quia Deus possit immediate formam materiae imprimere.
There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor is touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by moving them; but He is not touched, because the natural power of no creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the words, "There is no contact with God"; that is, so that God Himself be touched.
Duplex est tactus, scilicet corporalis, sicut duo corpora se tangunt; et virtualis, sicut dicitur quod contristans tangit contristatum. Secundum igitur primum contactum, Deus, cum sit incorporeus, nec tangit nec tangitur. Secundum autem virtualem contactum, tangit quidem movendo creaturas, sed non tangitur, quia nullius creaturae virtus naturalis potest ad ipsum pertingere. Et sic intellexit Dionysius quod non est tactus Dei, ut scilicet tangatur.
God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and apprehended by that which is moved; but as being desired and known by Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness.
Movet Deus sicut desideratum et intellectum. Sed non oportet quod semper moveat sicut desideratum et intellectum ab eo quod movetur; sed sicut desideratum et notum a seipso; quia omnia operatur propter suam bonitatem.
Thursday, June 25, 2009
Q105 A1: Whether God can move the matter immediately to the form?
Yes. God can move matter immediately to form, because a being in passive potentiality can be led into act by the active power which contains that potentiality under its power.
Deus immediate potest movere materiam ad formam, quia ens in potentia passiva reduci potest in actum, a potentia activa quae eam sub sua potestate continet.
Therefore, since matter is contained under the Divine power, as brought forth by God, it can be led into act by the Divine power. And this is what is meant by matter being moved to a form, for a form is nothing else but the act of matter.
Cum igitur materia contineatur sub potestate divina, utpote a Deo producta, potest reduci in actum per divinam potentiam. Et hoc est moveri materiam ad formam, quia forma nihil aliud est quam actus materiae.
If a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by way of a virtual containment, or it is likened to the composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating a composite thing like itself, so also can God. But no other form not existing in matter can do this, because matter is not contained by the power of any other separate substance. Hence angels and demons operate on these visible things, not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds.
Unde compositum quod generatur, similatur Deo secundum virtualem continentiam, sicut similatur composito generanti per similitudinem speciei. Unde sicut compositum generans potest movere materiam ad formam generando compositum sibi simile, ita et Deus. Non autem aliqua alia forma non in materia existens, quia materia non continetur in virtute alterius substantiae separatae. Et ideo Daemones et Angeli operantur circa haec visibilia, non quidem imprimendo formas, sed adhibendo corporalia semina.
Since God acts by His will and intellect, which knows the particular formal aspects and not only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that He can determinately imprint this or that form on matter.
Quia Deus agit per voluntatem et intellectum, qui cognoscit rationes proprias omnium formarum, et non solum universales, inde est quod potest determinate hanc vel illam formam materiae imprimere.
The fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to God; wherefore, since God ordains other causes to determinate effects, He can also bring forth determinate effects by Himself [without any other cause].
Hoc ipsum quod causae secundae ordinantur ad determinatos effectus est illis a Deo. Unde Deus, quia alias causas ordinat ad determinatos effectus, potest etiam determinatos effectus producere per seipsum.
It is written (Genesis 2:7): "God formed man of the slime of the earth."
Dicitur Gen. II, "formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae."
Deus immediate potest movere materiam ad formam, quia ens in potentia passiva reduci potest in actum, a potentia activa quae eam sub sua potestate continet.
Therefore, since matter is contained under the Divine power, as brought forth by God, it can be led into act by the Divine power. And this is what is meant by matter being moved to a form, for a form is nothing else but the act of matter.
Cum igitur materia contineatur sub potestate divina, utpote a Deo producta, potest reduci in actum per divinam potentiam. Et hoc est moveri materiam ad formam, quia forma nihil aliud est quam actus materiae.
If a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by way of a virtual containment, or it is likened to the composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating a composite thing like itself, so also can God. But no other form not existing in matter can do this, because matter is not contained by the power of any other separate substance. Hence angels and demons operate on these visible things, not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds.
Unde compositum quod generatur, similatur Deo secundum virtualem continentiam, sicut similatur composito generanti per similitudinem speciei. Unde sicut compositum generans potest movere materiam ad formam generando compositum sibi simile, ita et Deus. Non autem aliqua alia forma non in materia existens, quia materia non continetur in virtute alterius substantiae separatae. Et ideo Daemones et Angeli operantur circa haec visibilia, non quidem imprimendo formas, sed adhibendo corporalia semina.
Since God acts by His will and intellect, which knows the particular formal aspects and not only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that He can determinately imprint this or that form on matter.
Quia Deus agit per voluntatem et intellectum, qui cognoscit rationes proprias omnium formarum, et non solum universales, inde est quod potest determinate hanc vel illam formam materiae imprimere.
The fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to God; wherefore, since God ordains other causes to determinate effects, He can also bring forth determinate effects by Himself [without any other cause].
Hoc ipsum quod causae secundae ordinantur ad determinatos effectus est illis a Deo. Unde Deus, quia alias causas ordinat ad determinatos effectus, potest etiam determinatos effectus producere per seipsum.
It is written (Genesis 2:7): "God formed man of the slime of the earth."
Dicitur Gen. II, "formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae."
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
Q104 A4: Whether anything is annihilated?
No. Nothing at all will be annihilated because the divine power and goodness of God are manifested more by the preservation of things in be-ing.
Simpliciter dicendum est quod nihil omnino in nihilum redigetur quia magis per hoc divina potentia et bonitas ostendatur, quod res in esse conservat.
This fact that things are brought into be-ing, after they have not been, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them. But that they should be reduced to nothing would hinder this sort of manifestation, since the power of God is conspicuously shown in this fact that He preserves all things in be-ing, according to the Apostle: "Upholding all things by the word of His power" (Hebrews 1:3).
Hoc quod res in esse productae sunt, postquam non fuerunt, declarat potentiam producentis. Sed quod in nihilum redigerentur, huiusmodi manifestationem impediret, cum Dei potentia in hoc maxime ostendatur, quod res in esse conservat, secundum illud apostoli Heb. I, "portans omnia verbo virtutis suae".
The natures of creatures show this fact that none of them is annihilated: for, either they are immaterial, and therefore there is in them no potentiality to non-be-ing; or they are material, and thus in all events they remain at least in matter, which is incorruptible, since it is the existing subject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does not pertain to the manifestation of grace.
Creaturarum autem naturae hoc demonstrant, ut nulla earum in nihilum redigatur: quia vel sunt immateriales, et sic in eis non est potentia ad non esse; vel sunt materiales, et sic saltem remanent semper secundum materiam, quae incorruptibilis est, utpote subiectum existens generationis et corruptionis. Redigere etiam aliquid in nihilum, non pertinet ad gratiae manifestationem.
A creature's potentiality to be-ing a being is receptive only; but the active potentiality belongs to God Himself, from Whom there is the in-flow of the be-ing of a being. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the infinity of the Divine power.
Potentia creaturae ad essendum est receptiva tantum; sed potentia activa est ipsius Dei, a quo est influxus essendi. Unde quod res in infinitum durent, sequitur infinitatem divinae virtutis.
Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one of them is something "of a being"; for it is called a being, because by it something is.
Formae et accidentia non sunt entia completa, cum non subsistant: sed quodlibet eorum est aliquid "entis", sic enim ens dicitur, quia eo aliquid est.
Yet so far as the way in which they are is concerned, they are not entirely reduced to nothingness: not that any part of them survives, but they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of the subject.
Et tamen eo modo quo sunt, non omnino in nihilum rediguntur: non quia aliqua pars eorum remaneat, sed remanent in potentia materiae vel subiecti.
It is written (Ecclesiastes 3:14): "I have learned that all the works that God hath made continue for ever."
Dicitur Eccle. III. "Didici quod omnia opera quae fecit Deus, perseverant in aeternum."
Simpliciter dicendum est quod nihil omnino in nihilum redigetur quia magis per hoc divina potentia et bonitas ostendatur, quod res in esse conservat.
This fact that things are brought into be-ing, after they have not been, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them. But that they should be reduced to nothing would hinder this sort of manifestation, since the power of God is conspicuously shown in this fact that He preserves all things in be-ing, according to the Apostle: "Upholding all things by the word of His power" (Hebrews 1:3).
Hoc quod res in esse productae sunt, postquam non fuerunt, declarat potentiam producentis. Sed quod in nihilum redigerentur, huiusmodi manifestationem impediret, cum Dei potentia in hoc maxime ostendatur, quod res in esse conservat, secundum illud apostoli Heb. I, "portans omnia verbo virtutis suae".
The natures of creatures show this fact that none of them is annihilated: for, either they are immaterial, and therefore there is in them no potentiality to non-be-ing; or they are material, and thus in all events they remain at least in matter, which is incorruptible, since it is the existing subject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does not pertain to the manifestation of grace.
Creaturarum autem naturae hoc demonstrant, ut nulla earum in nihilum redigatur: quia vel sunt immateriales, et sic in eis non est potentia ad non esse; vel sunt materiales, et sic saltem remanent semper secundum materiam, quae incorruptibilis est, utpote subiectum existens generationis et corruptionis. Redigere etiam aliquid in nihilum, non pertinet ad gratiae manifestationem.
A creature's potentiality to be-ing a being is receptive only; but the active potentiality belongs to God Himself, from Whom there is the in-flow of the be-ing of a being. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the infinity of the Divine power.
Potentia creaturae ad essendum est receptiva tantum; sed potentia activa est ipsius Dei, a quo est influxus essendi. Unde quod res in infinitum durent, sequitur infinitatem divinae virtutis.
Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one of them is something "of a being"; for it is called a being, because by it something is.
Formae et accidentia non sunt entia completa, cum non subsistant: sed quodlibet eorum est aliquid "entis", sic enim ens dicitur, quia eo aliquid est.
Yet so far as the way in which they are is concerned, they are not entirely reduced to nothingness: not that any part of them survives, but they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of the subject.
Et tamen eo modo quo sunt, non omnino in nihilum rediguntur: non quia aliqua pars eorum remaneat, sed remanent in potentia materiae vel subiecti.
It is written (Ecclesiastes 3:14): "I have learned that all the works that God hath made continue for ever."
Dicitur Eccle. III. "Didici quod omnia opera quae fecit Deus, perseverant in aeternum."
Tuesday, June 23, 2009
Q104 A3: Whether God can annihilate anything?
Yes. God's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on created things, but [exercises causality] through His free will.
Bonitas Dei est causa rerum, non quasi ex necessitate naturae, quia divina bonitas non dependet ex rebus creatis, sed per liberam voluntatem.
Wherefore, as without prejudice to His goodness, He might not have brought forth things into be-ing, so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in be-ing.
Unde sicut potuit sine praeiudicio bonitatis suae, res non producere in esse; ita absque detrimento suae bonitatis, potest res in esse non conservare.
If God were to annihilate anything, this would not imply any action on God's part, but a mere cessation of His action.
Si Deus rem aliquam redigeret in nihilum, hoc non esset per aliquam actionem, sed per hoc quod ab agendo cessaret.
Non-be-ing has no direct causality, for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it is a being; and being, strictly speaking, is the cause of be-ing a being. Therefore God is not able to be the cause of a thing to tend to non-be-ing: but a creature has this tendency of itself, inasmuch as it is [brought forth] from nothing. But indirectly God is able to be the cause which annihilates things: i.e., by withdrawing His action from things.
Non esse non habet causam per se, quia nihil potest esse causa nisi inquantum est ens; ens autem, per se loquendo, est causa essendi. Sic igitur Deus non potest esse causa tendendi in non esse: sed hoc habet creatura ex seipsa, inquantum est de nihilo. Sed per accidens Deus potest esse causa quod res in nihilum redigantur: subtrahendo scilicet suam actionem a rebus.
It is written (Jeremiah 10:24): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing."
Dicitur Ierem. X, "corripe me, domine, verumtamen in iudicio, et non in furore tuo, ne forte ad nihilum redigas me."
Bonitas Dei est causa rerum, non quasi ex necessitate naturae, quia divina bonitas non dependet ex rebus creatis, sed per liberam voluntatem.
Wherefore, as without prejudice to His goodness, He might not have brought forth things into be-ing, so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in be-ing.
Unde sicut potuit sine praeiudicio bonitatis suae, res non producere in esse; ita absque detrimento suae bonitatis, potest res in esse non conservare.
If God were to annihilate anything, this would not imply any action on God's part, but a mere cessation of His action.
Si Deus rem aliquam redigeret in nihilum, hoc non esset per aliquam actionem, sed per hoc quod ab agendo cessaret.
Non-be-ing has no direct causality, for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it is a being; and being, strictly speaking, is the cause of be-ing a being. Therefore God is not able to be the cause of a thing to tend to non-be-ing: but a creature has this tendency of itself, inasmuch as it is [brought forth] from nothing. But indirectly God is able to be the cause which annihilates things: i.e., by withdrawing His action from things.
Non esse non habet causam per se, quia nihil potest esse causa nisi inquantum est ens; ens autem, per se loquendo, est causa essendi. Sic igitur Deus non potest esse causa tendendi in non esse: sed hoc habet creatura ex seipsa, inquantum est de nihilo. Sed per accidens Deus potest esse causa quod res in nihilum redigantur: subtrahendo scilicet suam actionem a rebus.
It is written (Jeremiah 10:24): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing."
Dicitur Ierem. X, "corripe me, domine, verumtamen in iudicio, et non in furore tuo, ne forte ad nihilum redigas me."
Monday, June 22, 2009
Q104 A2: Whether God preserves every creature immediately?
No. God gives be-ing by means of certain intermediate causes because a thing is kept the same by that which gives it be-ing.
Deus dat esse rebus mediantibus aliquibus causis mediis quia per idem conservatur res, per quod habet esse.
An effect depends on a creature as to its be-ing. For when we have a series of causes depending on one another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first and principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the principal cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way.
Invenitur etiam quod ab aliqua creatura dependet aliquis effectus secundum suum esse. Cum enim sunt multae causae ordinatae, necesse est quod effectus dependeat primo quidem et principaliter a causa prima, secundario vero ab omnibus causis mediis. Et ideo principaliter quidem prima causa est effectus conservativa, secundario vero omnes mediae causae.
No created nature can be the cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue of some change: for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form or disposition.
Nulla creatura potest esse causa alterius, quantum ad hoc quod acquirat novam formam vel dispositionem, nisi per modum alicuius mutationis: quia semper agit praesupposito aliquo subiecto. Sed postquam formam vel dispositionem induxit in effectu, absque alia immutatione effectus, huiusmodi formam vel dispositionem conservat.
God created all things immediately, but in the creation itself of things He established an order among things, so that some depend on others, by which they are preserved in be-ing; however, He remains the principal cause of their preservation.
Deus immediate omnia creavit, sed in ipsa rerum creatione ordinem in rebus instituit, ut quaedam ab aliis dependerent, per quas secundario conservarentur in esse; praesupposita tamen principali conservatione, quae est ab ipso.
Deus dat esse rebus mediantibus aliquibus causis mediis quia per idem conservatur res, per quod habet esse.
An effect depends on a creature as to its be-ing. For when we have a series of causes depending on one another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first and principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the principal cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way.
Invenitur etiam quod ab aliqua creatura dependet aliquis effectus secundum suum esse. Cum enim sunt multae causae ordinatae, necesse est quod effectus dependeat primo quidem et principaliter a causa prima, secundario vero ab omnibus causis mediis. Et ideo principaliter quidem prima causa est effectus conservativa, secundario vero omnes mediae causae.
No created nature can be the cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue of some change: for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form or disposition.
Nulla creatura potest esse causa alterius, quantum ad hoc quod acquirat novam formam vel dispositionem, nisi per modum alicuius mutationis: quia semper agit praesupposito aliquo subiecto. Sed postquam formam vel dispositionem induxit in effectu, absque alia immutatione effectus, huiusmodi formam vel dispositionem conservat.
God created all things immediately, but in the creation itself of things He established an order among things, so that some depend on others, by which they are preserved in be-ing; however, He remains the principal cause of their preservation.
Deus immediate omnia creavit, sed in ipsa rerum creatione ordinem in rebus instituit, ut quaedam ab aliis dependerent, per quas secundario conservarentur in esse; praesupposita tamen principali conservatione, quae est ab ipso.
Sunday, June 21, 2009
Q104 A1: Whether creatures need to be kept in being by God?
Yes. Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by God because God alone is being through His own essence, since His essence is His be-ing; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that its essence is not its be-ing.
Et secundum fidem et secundum rationem, quod creaturae conservantur in esse a Deo, quia solus Deus est ens per essentiam suam, quia eius essentia est suum esse; omnis autem creatura est ens participative, non quod sua essentia sit eius esse.
God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in be-ing after the cessation of the Divine operation; as neither can He grant it not to have received its be-ing from Himself. For the creature needs to be preserved by God, insofar as the be-ing of an effect depends on the cause of its be-ing a being.
Deus non potest communicare alicui creaturae ut conservetur in esse, sua operatione cessante; sicut non potest ei communicare quod non sit causa esse illius. Intantum enim indiget creatura conservari a Deo, inquantum esse effectus dependet a causa essendi.
The preservation of things by God is not through some new action, but through a continuation of that action whereby He gives be-ing: which action is without either motion or time.
Conservatio rerum a Deo non est per aliquam novam actionem, sed per continuationem actionis qua dat esse: quae quidem actio est sine motu et tempore.
Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): "If the power of God were somehow withdrawn from His creatures who are to be ruled, their form would at once cease, and every nature would collapse."
Et ideo, ut Augustinus dicit IV super Gen. ad Litt., "virtus Dei ab eis quae creata sunt regendis si cessaret aliquando, simul et illorum cessaret species, omnisque natura concideret."
Et secundum fidem et secundum rationem, quod creaturae conservantur in esse a Deo, quia solus Deus est ens per essentiam suam, quia eius essentia est suum esse; omnis autem creatura est ens participative, non quod sua essentia sit eius esse.
God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in be-ing after the cessation of the Divine operation; as neither can He grant it not to have received its be-ing from Himself. For the creature needs to be preserved by God, insofar as the be-ing of an effect depends on the cause of its be-ing a being.
Deus non potest communicare alicui creaturae ut conservetur in esse, sua operatione cessante; sicut non potest ei communicare quod non sit causa esse illius. Intantum enim indiget creatura conservari a Deo, inquantum esse effectus dependet a causa essendi.
The preservation of things by God is not through some new action, but through a continuation of that action whereby He gives be-ing: which action is without either motion or time.
Conservatio rerum a Deo non est per aliquam novam actionem, sed per continuationem actionis qua dat esse: quae quidem actio est sine motu et tempore.
Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): "If the power of God were somehow withdrawn from His creatures who are to be ruled, their form would at once cease, and every nature would collapse."
Et ideo, ut Augustinus dicit IV super Gen. ad Litt., "virtus Dei ab eis quae creata sunt regendis si cessaret aliquando, simul et illorum cessaret species, omnisque natura concideret."
Saturday, June 20, 2009
Q103 A8: Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government?
No. Nothing can resist the order of the Divine government because every inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover.
Nihil contranititur ordini divinae gubernationis quia omnis inclinatio alicuius rei, vel naturalis vel voluntaria, nihil est aliud quam quaedam impressio a primo movente.
From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause: but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things.
Ex hoc quod una res alteri contrapugnat, ostenditur quod aliquid reniti potest ordini qui est ex aliqua causa particulari: non autem ordini qui dependet a causa universali totius.
Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly," as is said (Wisdom 8) of Divine wisdom.
Dicit Boetius, in III de Consol., "non est aliquid quod summo huic bono vel velit vel possit obsistere. Est igitur summum bonum quod regit cuncta fortiter, suaviterque disponit"; ut dicitur Sap. VIII, de divina sapientia.
Nihil contranititur ordini divinae gubernationis quia omnis inclinatio alicuius rei, vel naturalis vel voluntaria, nihil est aliud quam quaedam impressio a primo movente.
From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause: but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things.
Ex hoc quod una res alteri contrapugnat, ostenditur quod aliquid reniti potest ordini qui est ex aliqua causa particulari: non autem ordini qui dependet a causa universali totius.
Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly," as is said (Wisdom 8) of Divine wisdom.
Dicit Boetius, in III de Consol., "non est aliquid quod summo huic bono vel velit vel possit obsistere. Est igitur summum bonum quod regit cuncta fortiter, suaviterque disponit"; ut dicitur Sap. VIII, de divina sapientia.
Friday, June 19, 2009
Q103 A7: Whether anything can happen outside the order of the Divine government?
No. It is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause, because no effect results outside the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding cause, which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause.
Praeter ordinem alicuius particularis causae, aliquis effectus evenire potest, non autem praeter ordinem causae universalis, quia praeter ordinem particularis causae nihil provenit, nisi ex aliqua alia causa impediente, quam quidem causam necesse est reducere in primam causam universalem.
Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; but not as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the Divine government.
Aliqui effectus contingentes, per comparationem ad proximas causas, quae in suis effectibus deficere possunt; non propter hoc quod aliquid fieri possit extra totum ordinem gubernationis divinae. Quia hoc ipsum quod aliquid contingit praeter ordinem causae proximae, est ex aliqua causa subiecta gubernationi divinae.
Therefore as God is the first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all be-ing in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of the Divine government.
Cum igitur Deus sit prima causa universalis, non unius generis tantum, sed universaliter totius entis, impossibile est quod aliquid contingat praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis.
There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above (Q48, A3). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist.
Nihil invenitur in mundo quod sit totaliter malum, quia malum semper fundatur in bono, ut supra ostensum est. Et ideo res aliqua dicitur mala, per hoc quod exit ab ordine alicuius particularis boni. Si autem totaliter exiret ab ordine gubernationis divinae, totaliter nihil esset.
Things are said to be fortuitous, as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the order of Divine providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance," as Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
Aliqua dicuntur esse casualia in rebus, per ordinem ad causas particulares, extra quarum ordinem fiunt. Sed quantum ad divinam providentiam pertinet, "nihil fit casu in mundo," ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest.
Praeter ordinem alicuius particularis causae, aliquis effectus evenire potest, non autem praeter ordinem causae universalis, quia praeter ordinem particularis causae nihil provenit, nisi ex aliqua alia causa impediente, quam quidem causam necesse est reducere in primam causam universalem.
Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; but not as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the Divine government.
Aliqui effectus contingentes, per comparationem ad proximas causas, quae in suis effectibus deficere possunt; non propter hoc quod aliquid fieri possit extra totum ordinem gubernationis divinae. Quia hoc ipsum quod aliquid contingit praeter ordinem causae proximae, est ex aliqua causa subiecta gubernationi divinae.
Therefore as God is the first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all be-ing in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of the Divine government.
Cum igitur Deus sit prima causa universalis, non unius generis tantum, sed universaliter totius entis, impossibile est quod aliquid contingat praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis.
There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above (Q48, A3). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist.
Nihil invenitur in mundo quod sit totaliter malum, quia malum semper fundatur in bono, ut supra ostensum est. Et ideo res aliqua dicitur mala, per hoc quod exit ab ordine alicuius particularis boni. Si autem totaliter exiret ab ordine gubernationis divinae, totaliter nihil esset.
Things are said to be fortuitous, as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the order of Divine providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance," as Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
Aliqua dicuntur esse casualia in rebus, per ordinem ad causas particulares, extra quarum ordinem fiunt. Sed quantum ad divinam providentiam pertinet, "nihil fit casu in mundo," ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest.
Thursday, June 18, 2009
Q103 A6: Whether all things are immediately governed by God?
No. As to the formal aspect of government, God governs all things immediately, whereas in its execution, He governs some things by means of others, because as God is the very essence of goodness, so everything must be attributed to God in its highest degree of goodness, but it is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself and also the cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself.
Quantum igitur ad rationem gubernationis pertinet, Deus immediate omnia gubernat, quantum autem pertinet ad executionem gubernationis, Deus gubernat quaedam mediantibus aliis cum Deus sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, unumquodque attribuendum est Deo secundum sui optimum, sed, quia maior perfectio est quod aliquid in se sit bonum, et etiam sit aliis causa bonitatis, quam si esset solummodo in se bonum.
If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality, wherefore all that is effected by many would not be accomplished by one.
Si solus Deus gubernaret, subtraheretur perfectio causalis a rebus. Unde non totum fieret per unum, quod fit per multa.
Therefore God so governs things that He makes some of them to be causes of others in government: like a teacher, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of teaching others.
Et ideo sic Deus gubernat res, ut quasdam aliarum in gubernando causas instituat: sicut si aliquis magister discipulos suos non solum scientes faceret, sed etiam aliorum doctores.
Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts: The first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to watch over generation and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to certain spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions.
Gregorius enim Nyssenus reprehendit opinionem Platonis, qui divisit providentiam in tria: primam quidem primi Dei, qui providet rebus caelestibus, et universalibus omnibus; secundam vero providentiam esse dixit secundorum deorum, qui caelum circumeunt, scilicet respectu eorum quae sunt in generatione et corruptione; tertiam vero providentiam dixit quorundam Daemonum, qui sunt custodes circa terram humanarum actionum.
Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that God did not govern all things immediately, even in the formal aspect of government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the formal aspect of government, into three parts.
Opinio Platonis reprehenditur, quia etiam quantum ad rationem gubernationis, posuit Deum non immediate omnia gubernare. Quod patet per hoc, quod divisit in tria providentiam, quae est ratio gubernationis.
Quantum igitur ad rationem gubernationis pertinet, Deus immediate omnia gubernat, quantum autem pertinet ad executionem gubernationis, Deus gubernat quaedam mediantibus aliis cum Deus sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, unumquodque attribuendum est Deo secundum sui optimum, sed, quia maior perfectio est quod aliquid in se sit bonum, et etiam sit aliis causa bonitatis, quam si esset solummodo in se bonum.
If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality, wherefore all that is effected by many would not be accomplished by one.
Si solus Deus gubernaret, subtraheretur perfectio causalis a rebus. Unde non totum fieret per unum, quod fit per multa.
Therefore God so governs things that He makes some of them to be causes of others in government: like a teacher, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of teaching others.
Et ideo sic Deus gubernat res, ut quasdam aliarum in gubernando causas instituat: sicut si aliquis magister discipulos suos non solum scientes faceret, sed etiam aliorum doctores.
Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts: The first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to watch over generation and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to certain spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions.
Gregorius enim Nyssenus reprehendit opinionem Platonis, qui divisit providentiam in tria: primam quidem primi Dei, qui providet rebus caelestibus, et universalibus omnibus; secundam vero providentiam esse dixit secundorum deorum, qui caelum circumeunt, scilicet respectu eorum quae sunt in generatione et corruptione; tertiam vero providentiam dixit quorundam Daemonum, qui sunt custodes circa terram humanarum actionum.
Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that God did not govern all things immediately, even in the formal aspect of government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the formal aspect of government, into three parts.
Opinio Platonis reprehenditur, quia etiam quantum ad rationem gubernationis, posuit Deum non immediate omnia gubernare. Quod patet per hoc, quod divisit in tria providentiam, quae est ratio gubernationis.
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
Q103 A5: Whether all things are subject to the Divine government?
Yes. According to the same formal aspect is God the ruler of things as He is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection; and this belongs to government.
Secundum eandem rationem competit Deo esse gubernatorem rerum, et causam earum, quia eiusdem est rem producere, et ei perfectionem dare, quod ad gubernantem pertinet.
As there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government.
Sicut nihil potest esse quod non sit a Deo creatum, ita nihil potest esse quod eius gubernationi non subdatur.
As there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine goodness as its end, so it is impossible for anything to escape from the Divine government.
Cum nihil esse possit quod non ordinetur in divinam bonitatem sicut in finem, impossibile est quod aliquod entium subtrahatur gubernationi divinae.
The very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they are subject to government of some kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would tend to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which constitutes the formal aspect of chance.
Et hoc ipsum quod aliquid casuale invenitur in huiusmodi rebus, demonstrat ea alicuius gubernationi esse subiecta. Nisi enim huiusmodi corruptibilia ab aliquo superiori gubernarentur, nihil intenderent, maxime quae non cognoscunt, et sic non eveniret in eis aliquid praeter intentionem, quod facit rationem casus.
The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act, it requires to be governed by God.
Creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam per intellectum et voluntatem, quorum utrumque indiget regi et perfici ab intellectu et voluntate Dei. Et ideo supra gubernationem qua creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam tanquam domina sui actus, indiget gubernari a Deo.
Secundum eandem rationem competit Deo esse gubernatorem rerum, et causam earum, quia eiusdem est rem producere, et ei perfectionem dare, quod ad gubernantem pertinet.
As there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government.
Sicut nihil potest esse quod non sit a Deo creatum, ita nihil potest esse quod eius gubernationi non subdatur.
As there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine goodness as its end, so it is impossible for anything to escape from the Divine government.
Cum nihil esse possit quod non ordinetur in divinam bonitatem sicut in finem, impossibile est quod aliquod entium subtrahatur gubernationi divinae.
The very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they are subject to government of some kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would tend to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which constitutes the formal aspect of chance.
Et hoc ipsum quod aliquid casuale invenitur in huiusmodi rebus, demonstrat ea alicuius gubernationi esse subiecta. Nisi enim huiusmodi corruptibilia ab aliquo superiori gubernarentur, nihil intenderent, maxime quae non cognoscunt, et sic non eveniret in eis aliquid praeter intentionem, quod facit rationem casus.
The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act, it requires to be governed by God.
Creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam per intellectum et voluntatem, quorum utrumque indiget regi et perfici ab intellectu et voluntate Dei. Et ideo supra gubernationem qua creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam tanquam domina sui actus, indiget gubernari a Deo.
Q103 A4: Whether the effect of government is one?
No. There are two effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness, and the moving of things to good, because the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to the participation and similarity of which all things tend.
Duo sunt effectus gubernationis, scilicet conservatio rerum in bono, et motio earum ad bonum, quia finis gubernationis mundi est bonum essentiale, ad cuius participationem et assimilationem omnia tendunt.
For the creature is assimilated to God in two things: first, with regard to this, that God is good, and so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and secondly, with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others, and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to be good.
Creatura enim assimilatur Deo quantum ad duo: scilicet quantum ad id, quod Deus bonus est, inquantum creatura est bona; et quantum ad hoc, quod Deus est aliis causa bonitatis, inquantum una creatura movet aliam ad bonitatem.
Duo sunt effectus gubernationis, scilicet conservatio rerum in bono, et motio earum ad bonum, quia finis gubernationis mundi est bonum essentiale, ad cuius participationem et assimilationem omnia tendunt.
For the creature is assimilated to God in two things: first, with regard to this, that God is good, and so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and secondly, with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others, and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to be good.
Creatura enim assimilatur Deo quantum ad duo: scilicet quantum ad id, quod Deus bonus est, inquantum creatura est bona; et quantum ad hoc, quod Deus est aliis causa bonitatis, inquantum una creatura movet aliam ad bonitatem.
Monday, June 15, 2009
Q103 A3: Whether the world is governed by one?
Yes. The world is governed by one because the government of the world must be the best kind of government; but the best government is the government by one.
Mundus gubernatur ab uno quia necesse est quod mundi gubernatio sit optima; optima autem gubernatio est quae fit per unum.
The reason of this is that government is nothing but the directing of the things governed to the end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the formal aspect of goodness, as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they desire unity, without which they would cease to exist.
Cuius ratio est, quia gubernatio nihil aliud est quam directio gubernatorum ad finem, qui est aliquod bonum. Unitas autem pertinet ad rationem bonitatis, ut Boetius probat, in III de Consol., per hoc quod, sicut omnia desiderant bonum, ita desiderant unitatem, sine qua esse non possunt.
For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that things resist division, as far as they can; and the dissolution of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is unity, or peace. Now the proper cause of unity is one.
Nam unumquodque intantum est, inquantum unum est, unde videmus quod res repugnant suae divisioni quantum possunt, et quod dissolutio uniuscuiusque rei provenit ex defectu illius rei. Et ideo id ad quod tendit intentio multitudinem gubernantis, est unitas sive pax. Unitatis autem causa per se est unum.
For it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord, except so far as they are united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several things united. Therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the government of the world, being the best form of government, must be by one.
Manifestum est enim quod plures multa unire et concordare non possunt, nisi ipsi aliquo modo uniantur. Illud autem quod est per se unum, potest convenientius et melius esse causa unitatis, quam multi uniti. Unde multitudo melius gubernatur per unum quam per plures. Relinquitur ergo quod gubernatio mundi, quae est optima, sit ab uno gubernante.
This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10): "Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler."
Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit in XII Metaphys., "entia nolunt disponi male, nec bonum pluralitas principatuum, unus ergo princeps".
Mundus gubernatur ab uno quia necesse est quod mundi gubernatio sit optima; optima autem gubernatio est quae fit per unum.
The reason of this is that government is nothing but the directing of the things governed to the end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the formal aspect of goodness, as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they desire unity, without which they would cease to exist.
Cuius ratio est, quia gubernatio nihil aliud est quam directio gubernatorum ad finem, qui est aliquod bonum. Unitas autem pertinet ad rationem bonitatis, ut Boetius probat, in III de Consol., per hoc quod, sicut omnia desiderant bonum, ita desiderant unitatem, sine qua esse non possunt.
For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that things resist division, as far as they can; and the dissolution of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is unity, or peace. Now the proper cause of unity is one.
Nam unumquodque intantum est, inquantum unum est, unde videmus quod res repugnant suae divisioni quantum possunt, et quod dissolutio uniuscuiusque rei provenit ex defectu illius rei. Et ideo id ad quod tendit intentio multitudinem gubernantis, est unitas sive pax. Unitatis autem causa per se est unum.
For it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord, except so far as they are united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several things united. Therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the government of the world, being the best form of government, must be by one.
Manifestum est enim quod plures multa unire et concordare non possunt, nisi ipsi aliquo modo uniantur. Illud autem quod est per se unum, potest convenientius et melius esse causa unitatis, quam multi uniti. Unde multitudo melius gubernatur per unum quam per plures. Relinquitur ergo quod gubernatio mundi, quae est optima, sit ab uno gubernante.
This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10): "Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler."
Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit in XII Metaphys., "entia nolunt disponi male, nec bonum pluralitas principatuum, unus ergo princeps".
Sunday, June 14, 2009
Q103 A2: Whether the end of the government of the world is something outside the world?
Yes. The end of all things is something extrinsic to them because God is outside the entire order of the universe.
Finis rerum est quoddam bonum extrinsecum quia Deus ipse est extra totum ordinem universi.
A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof; this, however, is not its ultimate end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10.
Finis quidem universi est aliquod bonum in ipso existens, scilicet ordo ipsius universi; hoc autem bonum non est ultimus finis, sed ordinatur ad bonum extrinsecum ut ad ultimum finem; sicut etiam ordo exercitus ordinatur ad ducem, ut dicitur in XII Metaphys.
The universal end of all things is the Universal Good, Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness; whereas a particular good is good by participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good which is not such by participation. Wherefore that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good outside the universe.
Bonum autem universale est quod est per se et per suam essentiam bonum, quod est ipsa essentia bonitatis; bonum autem particulare est quod est participative bonum. Manifestum est autem quod in tota universitate creaturarum nullum est bonum quod non sit participative bonum. Unde illud bonum quod est finis totius universi, oportet quod sit extrinsecum a toto universo.
As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning, it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is something outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what has been expounded above (Q44, A1; Q44, A2), that we must conclude that the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved by reason.
Cum finis respondeat principio, non potest fieri ut, principio cognito, quid sit rerum finis ignoretur. Cum igitur principium rerum sit aliquid extrinsecum a toto universo, scilicet Deus, ut ex supra dictis patet, necesse est quod etiam finis rerum sit quoddam bonum extrinsecum. Et hoc ratione apparet.
Finis rerum est quoddam bonum extrinsecum quia Deus ipse est extra totum ordinem universi.
A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof; this, however, is not its ultimate end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10.
Finis quidem universi est aliquod bonum in ipso existens, scilicet ordo ipsius universi; hoc autem bonum non est ultimus finis, sed ordinatur ad bonum extrinsecum ut ad ultimum finem; sicut etiam ordo exercitus ordinatur ad ducem, ut dicitur in XII Metaphys.
The universal end of all things is the Universal Good, Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness; whereas a particular good is good by participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good which is not such by participation. Wherefore that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good outside the universe.
Bonum autem universale est quod est per se et per suam essentiam bonum, quod est ipsa essentia bonitatis; bonum autem particulare est quod est participative bonum. Manifestum est autem quod in tota universitate creaturarum nullum est bonum quod non sit participative bonum. Unde illud bonum quod est finis totius universi, oportet quod sit extrinsecum a toto universo.
As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning, it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is something outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what has been expounded above (Q44, A1; Q44, A2), that we must conclude that the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved by reason.
Cum finis respondeat principio, non potest fieri ut, principio cognito, quid sit rerum finis ignoretur. Cum igitur principium rerum sit aliquid extrinsecum a toto universo, scilicet Deus, ut ex supra dictis patet, necesse est quod etiam finis rerum sit quoddam bonum extrinsecum. Et hoc ratione apparet.
Saturday, June 13, 2009
Q103 A1: Whether the world is governed by anyone?
Yes. The world is governed because it belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence, so to lead them to their end, and this is to govern.
Mundus gubernatur quia ad divinam bonitatem pertinet ut, sicut produxit res in esse, ita etiam eas ad finem perducat, quod est gubernare.
In all created things there is a stable element, at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under movement we include operation. And things need governing as to both: because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing, would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, as will be explained later (Q104, A1).
In omnibus rebus creatis est aliquid stabile, ad minus prima materia; et aliquid ad motum pertinens, ut sub motu etiam operationem comprehendamus. Et quantum ad utrumque, res indiget gubernatione, quia hoc ipsum quod in rebus est stabile, in nihilum decideret (quia ex nihilo est), nisi manu gubernatoris servaretur, ut infra patebit.
The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from God, directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, so the natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence.
Necessitas naturalis inhaerens rebus quae determinantur ad unum, est impressio quaedam Dei dirigentis ad finem, sicut necessitas qua sagitta agitur ut ad certum signum tendat, est impressio sagittantis, et non sagittae. Sed in hoc differt, quia id quod creaturae a Deo recipiunt, est earum natura; quod autem ab homine rebus naturalibus imprimitur praeter earum naturam, ad violentiam pertinet. Unde sicut necessitas violentiae in motu sagittae demonstrat sagittantis directionem; ita necessitas naturalis creaturarum demonstrat divinae providentiae gubernationem.
Mundus gubernatur quia ad divinam bonitatem pertinet ut, sicut produxit res in esse, ita etiam eas ad finem perducat, quod est gubernare.
In all created things there is a stable element, at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under movement we include operation. And things need governing as to both: because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing, would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, as will be explained later (Q104, A1).
In omnibus rebus creatis est aliquid stabile, ad minus prima materia; et aliquid ad motum pertinens, ut sub motu etiam operationem comprehendamus. Et quantum ad utrumque, res indiget gubernatione, quia hoc ipsum quod in rebus est stabile, in nihilum decideret (quia ex nihilo est), nisi manu gubernatoris servaretur, ut infra patebit.
The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from God, directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, so the natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence.
Necessitas naturalis inhaerens rebus quae determinantur ad unum, est impressio quaedam Dei dirigentis ad finem, sicut necessitas qua sagitta agitur ut ad certum signum tendat, est impressio sagittantis, et non sagittae. Sed in hoc differt, quia id quod creaturae a Deo recipiunt, est earum natura; quod autem ab homine rebus naturalibus imprimitur praeter earum naturam, ad violentiam pertinet. Unde sicut necessitas violentiae in motu sagittae demonstrat sagittantis directionem; ita necessitas naturalis creaturarum demonstrat divinae providentiae gubernationem.
Q103: The government of things in general
- Is the world governed by someone?
- What is the end of this government?
- Is the world governed by one?
- What are the effects of this government?
- Are all things subject to Divine government?
- Are all things immediately governed by God?
- Is the Divine government frustrated in anything?
- Is anything contrary to the Divine Providence?
Friday, June 12, 2009
Q102 A4: Whether man was created in paradise?
No. God made man outside of paradise, and afterwards placed him there to live there during the whole of his animal life and, having attained to the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven, because incorruptibility was man's, not by nature, but by a supernatural gift of God.
Deus hominem extra Paradisum fecit, et postea ipsum in Paradiso posuit, ut habitaret ibi toto tempore animalis vitae, postmodum, cum spiritualem vitam adeptus esset, transferendus in caelum, quia incorruptio non erat hominis secundum naturam, sed ex supernaturali Dei dono.
Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the incorruptibility of the primitive state.
Paradisus fuit locus congruus habitationi humanae, quantum ad incorruptionem primi status.
Therefore that this might be attributed to God, and not to human nature: "God took man and placed him in paradise" (Genesis 2:15).
Ut ergo hoc gratiae Dei imputaretur, non humanae naturae: dicitur Gen. II, "tulit Deus hominem, et posuit eum in Paradiso."
Woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her own dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which her body was formed. For the same reason the children would have been born in paradise, where their parents were already.
Mulier facta fuit in Paradiso non propter dignitatem suam, sed propter dignitatem principii ex quo corpus eius formabatur. Quia similiter et filii in Paradiso fuissent nati, in quo parentes iam erant positi.
Deus hominem extra Paradisum fecit, et postea ipsum in Paradiso posuit, ut habitaret ibi toto tempore animalis vitae, postmodum, cum spiritualem vitam adeptus esset, transferendus in caelum, quia incorruptio non erat hominis secundum naturam, sed ex supernaturali Dei dono.
Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the incorruptibility of the primitive state.
Paradisus fuit locus congruus habitationi humanae, quantum ad incorruptionem primi status.
Therefore that this might be attributed to God, and not to human nature: "God took man and placed him in paradise" (Genesis 2:15).
Ut ergo hoc gratiae Dei imputaretur, non humanae naturae: dicitur Gen. II, "tulit Deus hominem, et posuit eum in Paradiso."
Woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her own dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which her body was formed. For the same reason the children would have been born in paradise, where their parents were already.
Mulier facta fuit in Paradiso non propter dignitatem suam, sed propter dignitatem principii ex quo corpus eius formabatur. Quia similiter et filii in Paradiso fuissent nati, in quo parentes iam erant positi.
Thursday, June 11, 2009
Q102 A3: Whether man was placed in paradise to dress it and keep it?
Yes. God placed man in paradise that man might dress and keep paradise (which dressing would not have involved labor, as it did after sin, but would have been pleasant on account of man's practical knowledge of the powers of nature), because paradise was ordered to man's benefit, and not conversely.
Deus posuit hominem in Paradiso, ut homo operaretur et custodiret Paradisum (nec tamen illa operatio esset laboriosa, sicut post peccatum, sed fuisset iucunda, propter experientiam virtutis naturae), quia Paradisus ordinatur ad bonum hominis, et non e converso.
God placed man in paradise that He might Himself work in man and keep him: by sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man at once relapses into darkness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases to shine); and by keeping man from all corruption and evil.
Deus posuit hominem in Paradiso, ut ipse Deus operaretur et custodiret hominem: operaretur, inquam, iustificando ipsum, cuius operatio si ab homine cesset, continuo obtenebratur, sicut aer obtenebratur si cesset influentia luminis; ut custodiret vero ab omni corruptione et malo.
It is written (Genesis 2:15): "The Lord God took man and placed in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it."
Dicitur Gen. II, "tulit dominus Deus hominem, et posuit illum in Paradiso voluptatis, ut operaretur et custodiret illum."
Deus posuit hominem in Paradiso, ut homo operaretur et custodiret Paradisum (nec tamen illa operatio esset laboriosa, sicut post peccatum, sed fuisset iucunda, propter experientiam virtutis naturae), quia Paradisus ordinatur ad bonum hominis, et non e converso.
God placed man in paradise that He might Himself work in man and keep him: by sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man at once relapses into darkness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases to shine); and by keeping man from all corruption and evil.
Deus posuit hominem in Paradiso, ut ipse Deus operaretur et custodiret hominem: operaretur, inquam, iustificando ipsum, cuius operatio si ab homine cesset, continuo obtenebratur, sicut aer obtenebratur si cesset influentia luminis; ut custodiret vero ab omni corruptione et malo.
It is written (Genesis 2:15): "The Lord God took man and placed in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it."
Dicitur Gen. II, "tulit dominus Deus hominem, et posuit illum in Paradiso voluptatis, ut operaretur et custodiret illum."
Wednesday, June 10, 2009
Q102 A2: Whether paradise was a place adapted to be the abode of man?
Yes. Paradise was most fit to be a dwelling-place for man, and in keeping with his original state of immortality, because paradise was situated in a most temperate situation, whether on the equator or elsewhere.
Paradisus est locus conveniens habitationi humanae, secundum primae immortalitatis statum, quia credendum est Paradisum in loco temperatissimo constitutum esse, vel sub aequinoctiali vel alibi.
As above stated (Q97, A1), Man was incorruptible and immortal, not because his body had a disposition to incorruptibility, but because in his soul there was a power preserving the body from corruption. Now the human body may be corrupted from within or from without. From within, the body is corrupted by the consumption of the humors, and by old age, as above explained (Q97, A4), and man was able to ward off such corruption by food. Among those things which corrupt the body from without, the chief seems to be an atmosphere of unequal temperature; and to such corruption a remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature.
Sicut supra dictum est, homo sic erat incorruptibilis et immortalis, non quia corpus eius dispositionem incorruptibilitatis haberet, sed quia inerat animae vis quaedam ad praeservandum corpus a corruptione. Corrumpi autem potest corpus humanum et ab interiori et ab exteriori. Ab interiori quidem corrumpitur per consumptionem humidi, et per senectutem, ut supra dictum est, cui corruptioni occurrere poterat primus homo per esum ciborum. Inter ea vero quae exterius corrumpunt, praecipuum videtur esse distemperatus aer, unde huic corruptioni maxime occurritur per temperiem aeris.
It is ridiculous to assert that any particular place is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though some particular place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual substances. For the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as regards both his body and his soul--that is, inasmuch as in his soul was the force which preserved the human body from corruption. This could not be said of the other animals. Therefore, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "No irrational animal inhabited paradise"; although, by a certain dispensation, the animals were brought thither by God to Adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the complicity of the devil.
Ridiculum est dicere quod animae, aut alicui spirituali substantiae, sit aliquis locus naturalis, sed per congruentiam quandam aliquis specialis locus creaturae incorporali attribuitur. Paradisus ergo terrestris erat locus congruens homini et quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus, inquantum scilicet in anima erat vis praeservandi corpus humanum a corruptione. Quod non competebat aliis animalibus. Et ideo, ut Damascenus dicit, in Paradiso nullum irrationalium habitabat, licet ex quadam dispensatione animalia fuerint illuc divinitus adducta ad Adam, et serpens illuc accesserit per operationem Diaboli.
Paradise did not become useless through being unoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred on man in vain, though he was to lose it. For thereby we learn God's kindness to man, and what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise.
Non propter hoc locus est frustra, quia non est ibi hominum habitatio post peccatum, sicut etiam non frustra fuit homini attributa immortalitas quaedam, quam conservaturus non erat. Per huiusmodi enim ostenditur benignitas Dei ad hominem, et quid homo peccando amiserit. Quamvis, ut dicitur, nunc Enoch et Elias in illo Paradiso habitent.
The empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places, and is outside the region of change. By the first of these two conditions, it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature: for, as Augustine says (De Trin. ii), "God rules corporeal creatures through spiritual creatures."
Caelum Empyreum est supremum corporalium locorum, et est extra omnem mutabilitatem. Et quantum ad primum horum, est locus congruus naturae angelicae, quia, sicut Augustinus dicit in III de Trin., "Deus regit creaturam corporalem per spiritualem".
Paradisus est locus conveniens habitationi humanae, secundum primae immortalitatis statum, quia credendum est Paradisum in loco temperatissimo constitutum esse, vel sub aequinoctiali vel alibi.
As above stated (Q97, A1), Man was incorruptible and immortal, not because his body had a disposition to incorruptibility, but because in his soul there was a power preserving the body from corruption. Now the human body may be corrupted from within or from without. From within, the body is corrupted by the consumption of the humors, and by old age, as above explained (Q97, A4), and man was able to ward off such corruption by food. Among those things which corrupt the body from without, the chief seems to be an atmosphere of unequal temperature; and to such corruption a remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature.
Sicut supra dictum est, homo sic erat incorruptibilis et immortalis, non quia corpus eius dispositionem incorruptibilitatis haberet, sed quia inerat animae vis quaedam ad praeservandum corpus a corruptione. Corrumpi autem potest corpus humanum et ab interiori et ab exteriori. Ab interiori quidem corrumpitur per consumptionem humidi, et per senectutem, ut supra dictum est, cui corruptioni occurrere poterat primus homo per esum ciborum. Inter ea vero quae exterius corrumpunt, praecipuum videtur esse distemperatus aer, unde huic corruptioni maxime occurritur per temperiem aeris.
It is ridiculous to assert that any particular place is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though some particular place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual substances. For the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as regards both his body and his soul--that is, inasmuch as in his soul was the force which preserved the human body from corruption. This could not be said of the other animals. Therefore, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "No irrational animal inhabited paradise"; although, by a certain dispensation, the animals were brought thither by God to Adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the complicity of the devil.
Ridiculum est dicere quod animae, aut alicui spirituali substantiae, sit aliquis locus naturalis, sed per congruentiam quandam aliquis specialis locus creaturae incorporali attribuitur. Paradisus ergo terrestris erat locus congruens homini et quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus, inquantum scilicet in anima erat vis praeservandi corpus humanum a corruptione. Quod non competebat aliis animalibus. Et ideo, ut Damascenus dicit, in Paradiso nullum irrationalium habitabat, licet ex quadam dispensatione animalia fuerint illuc divinitus adducta ad Adam, et serpens illuc accesserit per operationem Diaboli.
Paradise did not become useless through being unoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred on man in vain, though he was to lose it. For thereby we learn God's kindness to man, and what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise.
Non propter hoc locus est frustra, quia non est ibi hominum habitatio post peccatum, sicut etiam non frustra fuit homini attributa immortalitas quaedam, quam conservaturus non erat. Per huiusmodi enim ostenditur benignitas Dei ad hominem, et quid homo peccando amiserit. Quamvis, ut dicitur, nunc Enoch et Elias in illo Paradiso habitent.
The empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places, and is outside the region of change. By the first of these two conditions, it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature: for, as Augustine says (De Trin. ii), "God rules corporeal creatures through spiritual creatures."
Caelum Empyreum est supremum corporalium locorum, et est extra omnem mutabilitatem. Et quantum ad primum horum, est locus congruus naturae angelicae, quia, sicut Augustinus dicit in III de Trin., "Deus regit creaturam corporalem per spiritualem".
Tuesday, June 09, 2009
Q102 A1: Whether paradise is a corporeal place?
Yes. As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 21): "Nothing prevents us from holding, within proper limits, a spiritual paradise; so long as we believe in the truth of the events narrated as having there occurred." For whatever Scripture tells us about paradise is set down as matter of history; and wherever Scripture makes use of this method, we must hold to the historical truth of the narrative as a foundation of whatever spiritual explanation we may offer.
Sicut Augustinus dicit XIII de Civ. Dei, "quae commode dici possunt de intelligendo spiritualiter Paradiso, nemine prohibente dicantur; dum tamen et illius historiae fidelissima veritas rerum gestarum narratione commendata credatur." Ea enim quae de Paradiso in Scriptura dicuntur, per modum narrationis historicae proponuntur, in omnibus autem quae sic Scriptura tradit, est pro fundamento tenenda veritas historiae, et desuper spirituales expositiones fabricandae.
The situation of paradise is shut off from the habitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which cannot be crossed; and so people who have written about topography make no mention of it.
Locus ille seclusus est a nostra habitatione aliquibus impedimentis vel montium, vel marium, vel alicuius aestuosae regionis, quae pertransiri non potest. Et ideo scriptores locorum de hoc loco mentionem non fecerunt.
The tree of life is a material tree, and so called because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power as above stated (Q97, A4). Yet it had a spiritual signification; as the rock in the desert was of a material nature, and yet signified Christ. In like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material tree, so called in view of future events; because, after eating of it, man was to learn, by experience of the consequent punishment, the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of rebellion. It may also be said to signify spiritually the free-will as some say.
Lignum vitae est quaedam materialis arbor, sic dicta quia eius fructus habebat virtutem conservandi vitam, ut supra dictum est. Et tamen aliquid significabat spiritualiter, sicut et petra in deserto fuit aliquod materiale, et tamen significavit Christum. Similiter etiam lignum scientiae boni et mali materialis arbor fuit, sic nominata propter eventum futurum, quia post eius esum homo, per experimentum poenae, didicit quid interesset inter obedientiae bonum et inobedientiae malum. Et tamen spiritualiter potuit significare liberum arbitrium, ut quidam dicunt.
According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5, viii, 3), the plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their seminal virtues; whereas, after the work of the six days, the plants, both of paradise and others, were actually produced.
Secundum Augustinum, tertio die productae sunt plantae non in actu, sed secundum quasdam rationes seminales; sed post opera sex dierum productae sunt plantae tam Paradisi quam aliae in actu.
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 1): "Three general opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place merely corporeal; others a place entirely spiritual; while others, whose opinion, I confess, hold that paradise was both corporeal and spiritual."
Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., "tres sunt de Paradiso generales sententiae, una eorum qui tantummodo corporaliter Paradisum intelligi volunt; alia eorum qui spiritualiter tantum; tertia eorum qui utroque modo Paradisum accipiunt, quam mihi fateor placere sententiam."
Sicut Augustinus dicit XIII de Civ. Dei, "quae commode dici possunt de intelligendo spiritualiter Paradiso, nemine prohibente dicantur; dum tamen et illius historiae fidelissima veritas rerum gestarum narratione commendata credatur." Ea enim quae de Paradiso in Scriptura dicuntur, per modum narrationis historicae proponuntur, in omnibus autem quae sic Scriptura tradit, est pro fundamento tenenda veritas historiae, et desuper spirituales expositiones fabricandae.
The situation of paradise is shut off from the habitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which cannot be crossed; and so people who have written about topography make no mention of it.
Locus ille seclusus est a nostra habitatione aliquibus impedimentis vel montium, vel marium, vel alicuius aestuosae regionis, quae pertransiri non potest. Et ideo scriptores locorum de hoc loco mentionem non fecerunt.
The tree of life is a material tree, and so called because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power as above stated (Q97, A4). Yet it had a spiritual signification; as the rock in the desert was of a material nature, and yet signified Christ. In like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material tree, so called in view of future events; because, after eating of it, man was to learn, by experience of the consequent punishment, the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of rebellion. It may also be said to signify spiritually the free-will as some say.
Lignum vitae est quaedam materialis arbor, sic dicta quia eius fructus habebat virtutem conservandi vitam, ut supra dictum est. Et tamen aliquid significabat spiritualiter, sicut et petra in deserto fuit aliquod materiale, et tamen significavit Christum. Similiter etiam lignum scientiae boni et mali materialis arbor fuit, sic nominata propter eventum futurum, quia post eius esum homo, per experimentum poenae, didicit quid interesset inter obedientiae bonum et inobedientiae malum. Et tamen spiritualiter potuit significare liberum arbitrium, ut quidam dicunt.
According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5, viii, 3), the plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their seminal virtues; whereas, after the work of the six days, the plants, both of paradise and others, were actually produced.
Secundum Augustinum, tertio die productae sunt plantae non in actu, sed secundum quasdam rationes seminales; sed post opera sex dierum productae sunt plantae tam Paradisi quam aliae in actu.
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 1): "Three general opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place merely corporeal; others a place entirely spiritual; while others, whose opinion, I confess, hold that paradise was both corporeal and spiritual."
Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., "tres sunt de Paradiso generales sententiae, una eorum qui tantummodo corporaliter Paradisum intelligi volunt; alia eorum qui spiritualiter tantum; tertia eorum qui utroque modo Paradisum accipiunt, quam mihi fateor placere sententiam."
Monday, June 08, 2009
Q101 A2: Whether children would have had perfect use of reason at birth?
No. Children would not have had the perfect use of reason from the very outset because in all things produced by generation nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect.
Pueri non statim a principio habuissent perfectum usum rationis quia natura procedit ab imperfecto ad perfectum in omnibus generatis.
Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from the fact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be observed in other animals.
Etiam alia animalia non habent ita perfectum usum industriae naturalis statim a principio, sicut postea. Quod ex hoc patet, quod aves docent volare pullos suos, et similia in aliis generibus animalium inveniuntur.
The use of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers; wherefore, while the senses are tired and the interior sensitive powers hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep or delirious.
Usus rationis dependet quodammodo ex usu virium sensitivarum, unde ligato sensu, et impeditis interioribus viribus sensitivis, homo perfectum usum rationis non habet, ut patet in dormientibus et phreneticis.
Now the sensitive powers are situated in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are hindered, the action of the former is of necessity hindered also; and likewise, consequently, the use of reason.
Vires autem sensitivae sunt virtutes quaedam corporalium organorum, et ideo, impeditis earum organis, necesse est quod earum actus impediantur, et per consequens rationis usus.
Now children are hindered in the use of these powers; wherefore they have perfect use neither of these powers nor of reason. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have had the perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later on in life.
In pueris autem est impedimentum harum virium. Et ideo in eis non est perfectus usus rationis, sicut nec aliorum membrorum. Et ideo pueri in statu innocentiae non habuissent perfectum usum rationis, sicut habituri erant in perfecta aetate.
Yet they would have had a more perfect use than they have now, as to matters regarding that particular state, as explained above regarding the use of their limbs (Q99, A1).
Habuissent tamen perfectiorem quam nunc, quantum ad ea quae ad eos pertinebant quantum ad statum illum; sicut et de usu membrorum superius est dictum.
The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to man at all ages.
Aggravatio additur ex corruptione corporis in hoc, quod usus rationis impeditur quantum ad ea etiam quae pertinent ad hominem secundum quamcumque aetatem.
Pueri non statim a principio habuissent perfectum usum rationis quia natura procedit ab imperfecto ad perfectum in omnibus generatis.
Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from the fact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be observed in other animals.
Etiam alia animalia non habent ita perfectum usum industriae naturalis statim a principio, sicut postea. Quod ex hoc patet, quod aves docent volare pullos suos, et similia in aliis generibus animalium inveniuntur.
The use of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers; wherefore, while the senses are tired and the interior sensitive powers hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep or delirious.
Usus rationis dependet quodammodo ex usu virium sensitivarum, unde ligato sensu, et impeditis interioribus viribus sensitivis, homo perfectum usum rationis non habet, ut patet in dormientibus et phreneticis.
Now the sensitive powers are situated in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are hindered, the action of the former is of necessity hindered also; and likewise, consequently, the use of reason.
Vires autem sensitivae sunt virtutes quaedam corporalium organorum, et ideo, impeditis earum organis, necesse est quod earum actus impediantur, et per consequens rationis usus.
Now children are hindered in the use of these powers; wherefore they have perfect use neither of these powers nor of reason. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have had the perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later on in life.
In pueris autem est impedimentum harum virium. Et ideo in eis non est perfectus usus rationis, sicut nec aliorum membrorum. Et ideo pueri in statu innocentiae non habuissent perfectum usum rationis, sicut habituri erant in perfecta aetate.
Yet they would have had a more perfect use than they have now, as to matters regarding that particular state, as explained above regarding the use of their limbs (Q99, A1).
Habuissent tamen perfectiorem quam nunc, quantum ad ea quae ad eos pertinebant quantum ad statum illum; sicut et de usu membrorum superius est dictum.
The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to man at all ages.
Aggravatio additur ex corruptione corporis in hoc, quod usus rationis impeditur quantum ad ea etiam quae pertinent ad hominem secundum quamcumque aetatem.
Sunday, June 07, 2009
Q101 A1: Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge?
No. In the state of innocence, children would not have been born with perfect knowledge, but in course of time they would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or learning, because as regards belief in matters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so, when authority is wanting, we must be guided by the ordinary course of nature; it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses.
Pueri in statu innocentiae non nascerentur perfecti in scientia, sed eam in processu temporis absque difficultate acquisivissent, inveniendo vel addiscendo, quia de his quae sunt supra naturam, soli auctoritati creditur, unde ubi auctoritas deficit, sequi debemus naturae conditionem; sed est naturale homini ut scientiam per sensus acquirat.
The human soul is naturally "like a blank tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4).
Anima nostra per naturam est "sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum", ut dicitur in III de anima.
For this reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for its proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers.
Et ideo anima unitur corpori, quia indiget eo ad suam propriam operationem; quod non esset, si statim a principio scientiam haberet non acquisitam per sensitivas virtutes.
The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot children like himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents which were natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature.
Esse perfectum in scientia fuit individuale accidens primi parentis, inquantum scilicet ipse instituebatur ut pater et instructor totius humani generis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc, non generabat filios similes sibi, sed solum quantum ad accidentia naturalia vel gratuita totius naturae.
Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise their knowledge of other universal principles.
Pueri habuissent sufficientem scientiam ad dirigendum eos in operibus iustitiae in quibus homines diriguntur per universalia principia iuris; quam multo plenius tunc habuissent quam nunc naturaliter habemus, et similiter aliorum universalium principiorum.
Pueri in statu innocentiae non nascerentur perfecti in scientia, sed eam in processu temporis absque difficultate acquisivissent, inveniendo vel addiscendo, quia de his quae sunt supra naturam, soli auctoritati creditur, unde ubi auctoritas deficit, sequi debemus naturae conditionem; sed est naturale homini ut scientiam per sensus acquirat.
The human soul is naturally "like a blank tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4).
Anima nostra per naturam est "sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum", ut dicitur in III de anima.
For this reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for its proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers.
Et ideo anima unitur corpori, quia indiget eo ad suam propriam operationem; quod non esset, si statim a principio scientiam haberet non acquisitam per sensitivas virtutes.
The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot children like himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents which were natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature.
Esse perfectum in scientia fuit individuale accidens primi parentis, inquantum scilicet ipse instituebatur ut pater et instructor totius humani generis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc, non generabat filios similes sibi, sed solum quantum ad accidentia naturalia vel gratuita totius naturae.
Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise their knowledge of other universal principles.
Pueri habuissent sufficientem scientiam ad dirigendum eos in operibus iustitiae in quibus homines diriguntur per universalia principia iuris; quam multo plenius tunc habuissent quam nunc naturaliter habemus, et similiter aliorum universalium principiorum.
Saturday, June 06, 2009
Q100 A2: Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness?
No. It does not seem possible that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness because the rational creature is confirmed in righteousness through the beatitude given by the clear vision of God; and when once it has seen God, it cannot but cleave to Him Who is the essence of goodness, wherefrom no one can turn away, since nothing is desired or loved but under the aspect of good.
Non videtur possibile quod pueri in statu innocentiae nascerentur in iustitia confirmati, quia ex hoc creatura rationalis in iustitia confirmatur: quod efficitur beata per apertam Dei visionem, cui viso non potest non inhaerere, cum ipse sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, a qua nullus potest averti, cum nihil desideretur et ametur nisi sub ratione boni.
(I say this according to the general law; for it may be otherwise in the case of special privilege, such as we believe was granted to the Virgin Mother of God.)
(Et hoc dico secundum legem communem, quia ex aliquo privilegio speciali secus accidere potest, sicut creditur de virgine matre Dei.)
And as soon as Adam had attained to that happy state of seeing God in His Essence, he would have become spiritual in soul and body; and his animal life would have ceased, wherein alone there is generation. Hence it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in righteousness.
Quam cito autem Adam ad illam beatitudinem pervenisset quod Deum per essentiam videret, efficeretur spiritualis et mente et corpore, et animalis vita cessaret, in qua sola generationis usus fuisset. Unde manifestum est quod parvuli non nascerentur in iustitia confirmati.
For it is clear that at their birth they would not have had greater perfection than their parents at the time of begetting. Now the parents, as long as they begot children, would not have been confirmed in righteousness.
Manifestum est enim quod pueri in sua nativitate non habuissent plus perfectionis quam eorum parentes in statu generationis. Parentes autem, quandiu generassent, non fuissent confirmati in iustitia.
For even if our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might have done evil.
Etiam si primi homines non peccassent, aliqui ex eorum stirpe potuissent iniquitatem committere.
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "Happy would have been the whole human race if neither they--that is our first parents--had committed any evil to be transmitted to their descendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which they would have been condemned."
Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, "tam felix universa esset humana societas si nec illi," scilicet primi parentes, "malum quod in posteros traiicerent, nec quisquam ex stirpe eorum iniquitatem committeret, quae damnationem reciperet."
Non videtur possibile quod pueri in statu innocentiae nascerentur in iustitia confirmati, quia ex hoc creatura rationalis in iustitia confirmatur: quod efficitur beata per apertam Dei visionem, cui viso non potest non inhaerere, cum ipse sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, a qua nullus potest averti, cum nihil desideretur et ametur nisi sub ratione boni.
(I say this according to the general law; for it may be otherwise in the case of special privilege, such as we believe was granted to the Virgin Mother of God.)
(Et hoc dico secundum legem communem, quia ex aliquo privilegio speciali secus accidere potest, sicut creditur de virgine matre Dei.)
And as soon as Adam had attained to that happy state of seeing God in His Essence, he would have become spiritual in soul and body; and his animal life would have ceased, wherein alone there is generation. Hence it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in righteousness.
Quam cito autem Adam ad illam beatitudinem pervenisset quod Deum per essentiam videret, efficeretur spiritualis et mente et corpore, et animalis vita cessaret, in qua sola generationis usus fuisset. Unde manifestum est quod parvuli non nascerentur in iustitia confirmati.
For it is clear that at their birth they would not have had greater perfection than their parents at the time of begetting. Now the parents, as long as they begot children, would not have been confirmed in righteousness.
Manifestum est enim quod pueri in sua nativitate non habuissent plus perfectionis quam eorum parentes in statu generationis. Parentes autem, quandiu generassent, non fuissent confirmati in iustitia.
For even if our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might have done evil.
Etiam si primi homines non peccassent, aliqui ex eorum stirpe potuissent iniquitatem committere.
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "Happy would have been the whole human race if neither they--that is our first parents--had committed any evil to be transmitted to their descendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which they would have been condemned."
Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, "tam felix universa esset humana societas si nec illi," scilicet primi parentes, "malum quod in posteros traiicerent, nec quisquam ex stirpe eorum iniquitatem committeret, quae damnationem reciperet."
Friday, June 05, 2009
Q100 A1: Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?
Yes. "As long as man did not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with righteousness together with the rational soul," because man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself.
"Simul cum rationalem haberent animam, iusti essent quos generaret homo, si non peccaret," quia naturaliter homo generat sibi simile secundum speciem.
Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the species, must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in its operation, which would not have occurred in the state of innocence.
Unde quaecumque accidentia consequuntur naturam speciei, in his necesse est quod filii parentibus similentur, nisi sit error in operatione naturae, qui in statu innocentiae non fuisset.
But individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and child. Now original righteousness, in which the first man was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not as caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift conferred by God on the entire human nature.
In accidentibus autem individualibus non est necesse quod filii parentibus similentur. Iustitia autem originalis, in qua primus homo conditus fuit, fuit accidens naturae speciei, non quasi ex principiis speciei causatum, sed sicut quoddam donum divinitus datum toti naturae.
This is clear from the fact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original righteousness, is called the sin of nature, wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for this reason also, the children would have been assimilated to their parents as regards original righteousness.
Et hoc apparet, quia opposita sunt unius generis, peccatum autem originale, quod opponitur illi iustitiae, dicitur esse peccatum naturae; unde traducitur a parente in posteros. Et propter hoc etiam filii parentibus assimilati fuissent quantum ad originalem iustitiam.
Some say that children would have been born, not with the righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with original righteousness. But since the root of original righteousness, which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which subjection results from sanctifying grace, as above explained (Q95, A1), we must conclude that if children were born in original righteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus we have said above that the first man was created in grace (Q95, A1).
Quidam dicunt quod pueri non fuissent nati cum iustitia gratuita, quae est merendi principium, sed cum iustitia originali. Sed cum radix originalis iustitiae, in cuius rectitudine factus est homo, consistat in subiectione supernaturali rationis ad Deum, quae est per gratiam gratum facientem, ut supra dictum est; necesse est dicere quod, si pueri nati fuissent in originali iustitia, quod etiam nati fuissent cum gratia; sicut et de primo homine supra diximus quod fuit cum gratia conditus.
This grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would not have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. In the same way the rational soul, which is not transmitted by the parent, is infused by God as soon as the human body is apt to receive it.
Non tamen fuisset propter hoc gratia naturalis, quia non fuisset transfusa per virtutem seminis, sed fuisset collata homini statim cum habuisset animam rationalem. Sicut etiam statim cum corpus est dispositum infunditur a Deo anima rationalis, quae tamen non est ex traduce.
"Simul cum rationalem haberent animam, iusti essent quos generaret homo, si non peccaret," quia naturaliter homo generat sibi simile secundum speciem.
Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the species, must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in its operation, which would not have occurred in the state of innocence.
Unde quaecumque accidentia consequuntur naturam speciei, in his necesse est quod filii parentibus similentur, nisi sit error in operatione naturae, qui in statu innocentiae non fuisset.
But individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and child. Now original righteousness, in which the first man was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not as caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift conferred by God on the entire human nature.
In accidentibus autem individualibus non est necesse quod filii parentibus similentur. Iustitia autem originalis, in qua primus homo conditus fuit, fuit accidens naturae speciei, non quasi ex principiis speciei causatum, sed sicut quoddam donum divinitus datum toti naturae.
This is clear from the fact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original righteousness, is called the sin of nature, wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for this reason also, the children would have been assimilated to their parents as regards original righteousness.
Et hoc apparet, quia opposita sunt unius generis, peccatum autem originale, quod opponitur illi iustitiae, dicitur esse peccatum naturae; unde traducitur a parente in posteros. Et propter hoc etiam filii parentibus assimilati fuissent quantum ad originalem iustitiam.
Some say that children would have been born, not with the righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with original righteousness. But since the root of original righteousness, which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which subjection results from sanctifying grace, as above explained (Q95, A1), we must conclude that if children were born in original righteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus we have said above that the first man was created in grace (Q95, A1).
Quidam dicunt quod pueri non fuissent nati cum iustitia gratuita, quae est merendi principium, sed cum iustitia originali. Sed cum radix originalis iustitiae, in cuius rectitudine factus est homo, consistat in subiectione supernaturali rationis ad Deum, quae est per gratiam gratum facientem, ut supra dictum est; necesse est dicere quod, si pueri nati fuissent in originali iustitia, quod etiam nati fuissent cum gratia; sicut et de primo homine supra diximus quod fuit cum gratia conditus.
This grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would not have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. In the same way the rational soul, which is not transmitted by the parent, is infused by God as soon as the human body is apt to receive it.
Non tamen fuisset propter hoc gratia naturalis, quia non fuisset transfusa per virtutem seminis, sed fuisset collata homini statim cum habuisset animam rationalem. Sicut etiam statim cum corpus est dispositum infunditur a Deo anima rationalis, quae tamen non est ex traduce.
Thursday, June 04, 2009
Q99 A2: Whether, in the primitive state, women would have been born?
Yes. In the state of innocence, both sexes would have been begotten, because nothing belonging to the completeness of human nature would have been lacking in the state of innocence; and as different grades belong to the perfection of the universe, so also diversity of sex belongs to the perfection of human nature.
In statu innocentiae uterque sexus per generationem productus fuisset, quia nihil eorum quae ad complementum humanae naturae pertinent, in statu innocentiae defuisset; sicut autem ad perfectionem universi pertinent diversi gradus rerum, ita etiam diversitas sexus est ad perfectionem humanae naturae.
Woman is said to be a "fortuitous male," as being a product outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual case: but not against the purpose of universal nature, as above explained (Q92, A1, ad 1).
Femina dicitur mas occasionatus, quia est praeter intentionem naturae particularis, non autem praeter intentionem naturae universalis, ut supra dictum est.
In statu innocentiae uterque sexus per generationem productus fuisset, quia nihil eorum quae ad complementum humanae naturae pertinent, in statu innocentiae defuisset; sicut autem ad perfectionem universi pertinent diversi gradus rerum, ita etiam diversitas sexus est ad perfectionem humanae naturae.
Woman is said to be a "fortuitous male," as being a product outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual case: but not against the purpose of universal nature, as above explained (Q92, A1, ad 1).
Femina dicitur mas occasionatus, quia est praeter intentionem naturae particularis, non autem praeter intentionem naturae universalis, ut supra dictum est.
Wednesday, June 03, 2009
Q99 A1: Whether in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of body as to the use of its members immediately after birth?
No. Children would not have had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the purpose of performing every kind of act, but only for the acts befitting the state of infancy, such as suckling, and the like, because it is as natural as it is befitting to the principles of human nature that children should not have sufficient strength for the use of their limbs immediately after birth.
Pueri mox nati non habuissent sufficientem virtutem ad movendum membra ad quoslibet actus, sed ad actus pueritiae convenientes, puta ad sugendum ubera, et ad alia huiusmodi, quia manifestum est naturale hoc esse, utpote et principiis humanae naturae competens, quod pueri mox nati non habeant sufficientem virtutem ad movendum membra.
By faith alone do we hold truths which are above nature, and what we believe rests on authority. Wherefore, in making any assertion, we must be guided by the nature of things, except in those things which are above nature, and are made known to us by Divine authority.
Ea quae sunt supra naturam, sola fide tenemus; quod autem credimus, auctoritati debemus. Unde in omnibus asserendis sequi debemus naturam rerum, praeter ea quae auctoritate divina traduntur, quae sunt supra naturam.
In the state of innocence man would have been born, yet not subject to corruption. Therefore in that state there could have been certain infantile defects which result from birth; but not senile defects leading to corruption.
Homo in statu innocentiae generatus fuisset, sed non fuisset corruptus. Et ideo in statu illo potuissent esse aliqui defectus pueriles, qui consequuntur generationem; non autem defectus seniles, qui ordinantur ad corruptionem.
Pueri mox nati non habuissent sufficientem virtutem ad movendum membra ad quoslibet actus, sed ad actus pueritiae convenientes, puta ad sugendum ubera, et ad alia huiusmodi, quia manifestum est naturale hoc esse, utpote et principiis humanae naturae competens, quod pueri mox nati non habeant sufficientem virtutem ad movendum membra.
By faith alone do we hold truths which are above nature, and what we believe rests on authority. Wherefore, in making any assertion, we must be guided by the nature of things, except in those things which are above nature, and are made known to us by Divine authority.
Ea quae sunt supra naturam, sola fide tenemus; quod autem credimus, auctoritati debemus. Unde in omnibus asserendis sequi debemus naturam rerum, praeter ea quae auctoritate divina traduntur, quae sunt supra naturam.
In the state of innocence man would have been born, yet not subject to corruption. Therefore in that state there could have been certain infantile defects which result from birth; but not senile defects leading to corruption.
Homo in statu innocentiae generatus fuisset, sed non fuisset corruptus. Et ideo in statu illo potuissent esse aliqui defectus pueriles, qui consequuntur generationem; non autem defectus seniles, qui ordinantur ad corruptionem.
Tuesday, June 02, 2009
Q98 A2: Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation by coition?
Yes. Generation by coition is natural to man by reason of his animal life, which he possessed even before sin (just as it is natural to other perfect animals, as the corporeal members make it clear), so we cannot allow that these members would not have had a natural use, as other members had, before sin, because what is natural to man was neither acquired nor forfeited by sin.
Homini, secundum animalem vitam, quam etiam ante peccatum habebat, naturale est generare per coitum (sicut et ceteris animalibus perfectis, et hoc declarant naturalia membra ad hunc usum deputata), et ideo non est dicendum quod usus horum membrorum naturalium non fuisset ante peccatum, sicut et ceterorum membrorum, quia ea quae sunt naturalia homini, neque subtrahuntur neque dantur homini per peccatum.
In paradise man would have been like an angel in his spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body. After the resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and body.
Homo in Paradiso fuisset sicut Angelus per spiritualem mentem, cum tamen haberet, vitam animalem quantum ad corpus. Sed post resurrectionem erit homo similis Angelo, spiritualis effectus et secundum animam et secundum corpus.
Beasts are without reason. In this way man becomes, as it were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate concupiscence.
Bestiae carent ratione. Unde secundum hoc homo in coitu bestialis efficitur, quod delectationem coitus et fervorem concupiscentiae ratione moderari non potest.
In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened that was not regulated by reason, not because delight of sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight have been the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature and the greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of concupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into such pleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not to lessen sensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving to it immoderately.
Sed in statu innocentiae nihil huiusmodi fuisset quod ratione non moderaretur, non quia esset minor delectatio secundum sensum, ut quidam dicunt (fuisset enim tanto maior delectatio sensibilis, quanto esset purior natura, et corpus magis sensibile); sed quia vis concupiscibilis non ita inordinate se effudisset super huiusmodi delectatione, regulata per rationem, ad quam non pertinet ut sit minor delectatio in sensu, sed ut vis concupiscibilis non immoderate delectationi inhaereat.
By "immoderately" I mean going beyond the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton, but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures.
Et dico immoderate, praeter mensuram rationis. Sicut sobrius in cibo moderate assumpto non minorem habet delectationem quam gulosus; sed minus eius concupiscibilis super huiusmodi delectatione requiescit.
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "We must be far from supposing that offspring could not be begotten without concupiscence. All the bodily members would have been equally moved by the will, without ardent or wanton incentive, with calmness of soul and body."
Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, "absit ut suspicemur non potuisse prolem seri sine libidinis morbo. Sed eo voluntatis nutu moverentur illa membra quo cetera, et sine ardore et illecebroso stimulo, cum tranquillitate animi et corporis."
The words quoted do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind. Therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not because it removes fecundity, but because it excludes inordinate desire. In that state fecundity would have been without lust:
Et hoc sonant verba Augustini, quae a statu innocentiae non excludunt magnitudinem delectationis, sed ardorem libidinis et inquietudinem animi. Et ideo continentia in statu innocentiae non fuisset laudabilis, quae in tempore isto laudatur non propter defectum fecunditatis, sed propter remotionem inordinatae libidinis. Tunc autem fuisset fecunditas absque libidine:
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26), "not of lustful desire, but of deliberate action."
sicut Augustinus dicit XIV de Civ. Dei, "non libidinis appetitus, sed voluntarius usus".
Homini, secundum animalem vitam, quam etiam ante peccatum habebat, naturale est generare per coitum (sicut et ceteris animalibus perfectis, et hoc declarant naturalia membra ad hunc usum deputata), et ideo non est dicendum quod usus horum membrorum naturalium non fuisset ante peccatum, sicut et ceterorum membrorum, quia ea quae sunt naturalia homini, neque subtrahuntur neque dantur homini per peccatum.
In paradise man would have been like an angel in his spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body. After the resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and body.
Homo in Paradiso fuisset sicut Angelus per spiritualem mentem, cum tamen haberet, vitam animalem quantum ad corpus. Sed post resurrectionem erit homo similis Angelo, spiritualis effectus et secundum animam et secundum corpus.
Beasts are without reason. In this way man becomes, as it were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate concupiscence.
Bestiae carent ratione. Unde secundum hoc homo in coitu bestialis efficitur, quod delectationem coitus et fervorem concupiscentiae ratione moderari non potest.
In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened that was not regulated by reason, not because delight of sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight have been the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature and the greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of concupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into such pleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not to lessen sensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving to it immoderately.
Sed in statu innocentiae nihil huiusmodi fuisset quod ratione non moderaretur, non quia esset minor delectatio secundum sensum, ut quidam dicunt (fuisset enim tanto maior delectatio sensibilis, quanto esset purior natura, et corpus magis sensibile); sed quia vis concupiscibilis non ita inordinate se effudisset super huiusmodi delectatione, regulata per rationem, ad quam non pertinet ut sit minor delectatio in sensu, sed ut vis concupiscibilis non immoderate delectationi inhaereat.
By "immoderately" I mean going beyond the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton, but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures.
Et dico immoderate, praeter mensuram rationis. Sicut sobrius in cibo moderate assumpto non minorem habet delectationem quam gulosus; sed minus eius concupiscibilis super huiusmodi delectatione requiescit.
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "We must be far from supposing that offspring could not be begotten without concupiscence. All the bodily members would have been equally moved by the will, without ardent or wanton incentive, with calmness of soul and body."
Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, "absit ut suspicemur non potuisse prolem seri sine libidinis morbo. Sed eo voluntatis nutu moverentur illa membra quo cetera, et sine ardore et illecebroso stimulo, cum tranquillitate animi et corporis."
The words quoted do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind. Therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not because it removes fecundity, but because it excludes inordinate desire. In that state fecundity would have been without lust:
Et hoc sonant verba Augustini, quae a statu innocentiae non excludunt magnitudinem delectationis, sed ardorem libidinis et inquietudinem animi. Et ideo continentia in statu innocentiae non fuisset laudabilis, quae in tempore isto laudatur non propter defectum fecunditatis, sed propter remotionem inordinatae libidinis. Tunc autem fuisset fecunditas absque libidine:
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26), "not of lustful desire, but of deliberate action."
sicut Augustinus dicit XIV de Civ. Dei, "non libidinis appetitus, sed voluntarius usus".
Monday, June 01, 2009
Q98 A1: Whether in the state of innocence generation existed?
Yes. In the state of innocence there would have been generation of offspring for the multiplication of the human race, because in the state of innocence the human body was in itself corruptible, but it could be preserved from corruption by the soul; therefore, since generation belongs to things corruptible, man was not to be deprived thereof.
In statu innocentiae fuisset generatio ad multiplicationem humani generis, quia corpus hominis in statu innocentiae, quantum erat de se, corruptibile erat, sed potuit praeservari a corruptione per animam; et ideo non fuit homini subtrahenda generatio, quae debetur corruptibilibus rebus.
In our present state a division of possessions is necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters, inasmuch as community of possession is a source of strife, as the Philosopher says (Politic. ii, 5). In the state of innocence, however, the will of men would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife they would have used in common, according to each one's need, those things of which they were masters--a state of things to be observed even now among many good men.
In statu isto, multiplicatis dominis, necesse est fieri divisionem possessionum, quia communitas possessionis est occasio discordiae, ut philosophus dicit in II Politic. Sed in statu innocentiae fuissent voluntates hominum sic ordinatae, quod absque omni periculo discordiae communiter usi fuissent, secundum quod unicuique eorum competeret, rebus quae eorum dominio subdebantur, cum hoc etiam modo apud multos bonos viros observetur.
In statu innocentiae fuisset generatio ad multiplicationem humani generis, quia corpus hominis in statu innocentiae, quantum erat de se, corruptibile erat, sed potuit praeservari a corruptione per animam; et ideo non fuit homini subtrahenda generatio, quae debetur corruptibilibus rebus.
In our present state a division of possessions is necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters, inasmuch as community of possession is a source of strife, as the Philosopher says (Politic. ii, 5). In the state of innocence, however, the will of men would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife they would have used in common, according to each one's need, those things of which they were masters--a state of things to be observed even now among many good men.
In statu isto, multiplicatis dominis, necesse est fieri divisionem possessionum, quia communitas possessionis est occasio discordiae, ut philosophus dicit in II Politic. Sed in statu innocentiae fuissent voluntates hominum sic ordinatae, quod absque omni periculo discordiae communiter usi fuissent, secundum quod unicuique eorum competeret, rebus quae eorum dominio subdebantur, cum hoc etiam modo apud multos bonos viros observetur.
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