Q41 A2: Whether the notional acts are voluntary?

No. The notional acts are not voluntary because the Father begot the Son neither by will, nor by necessity.

What can exist in different ways is far from the divine nature, whereas it belongs to the nature of a created being (because God is of Himself necessary being, whereas a creature is made from nothing).

The Arians, wishing to prove the Son to be a creature, said that the Father begot the Son by will, taking will in the sense of principle. But we, on the contrary, must assert that the Father begot the Son, not by will, but by nature.

Q41 A1: Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?

Yes. We must attribute notional acts to the persons to signify the order of origin in the divine persons because in the divine persons distinction is founded on origin and origin can be properly designated only by certain acts.

Every origin is designated by an act. In God there is a twofold order of origin: one, inasmuch as the creature proceeds from Him, and this is common to the three persons; and so those actions which are attributed to God to designate the proceeding of creatures from Him, belong to His essence.

Another order of origin in God regards the procession of person from person; wherefore the acts which designate the order of this origin are called notional; because the notions of the persons are the mutual relations of the persons (Q32, A2).

The notional acts differ from the relations of the persons only in their mode of signification; and in reality are altogether the same.

Q41: The persons in reference to the notional acts

1. Are the notional acts to be attributed to the persons?
2. Are these acts necessary, or voluntary?
3. As regards these acts, does a person proceed from nothing or from something?
4. Does there exist in God a power as regards the notional acts?
5. What does this power mean?
6. Can several persons be the term of one notional act?

Q40 A4: Whether the properties presuppose the notional acts?

Yes. The relations in our mode of understanding follow upon the notional acts because the properties do not distinguish and constitute the hypostases in God, but only manifest them as already distinct and constituted.

Generation is the operation of the person of the Father. But paternity constitutes the person of the Father. Therefore in the order of intelligence, paternity is prior to generation.

Q40 A3: Whether the hypostases remain if the relations are mentally abstracted from the persons?

No. If the personal relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostases no longer remain because relation distinguishes and constitutes the hypostases.

As regards the abstraction of the form from the matter, if the non-personal properties are removed, then the idea of the hypostases and persons remains; as, for instance, if the fact of the Father's being unbegotten or spirating be mentally abstracted from the Father, the Father's hypostasis or person remains.

If, however, the personal property be mentally abstracted, the idea of the hypostasis no longer remains. For the personal properties are not to be understood as added to the divine hypostases, as a form is added to a pre-existing subject: but they carry with them their own "supposita," inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting persons; thus paternity is the Father Himself. For hypostasis signifies something distinct in God, since hypostasis means an individual substance.

Person does not add to hypostasis a distinguishing property absolutely, but a distinguishing property of dignity, all of which must be taken as the difference. Now, this distinguishing property is one of dignity precisely because it is understood as subsisting in a rational nature. Hence, if the distinguishing property be removed from the person, the hypostasis no longer remains; whereas it would remain were the rationality of the nature removed; for both person and hypostasis are individual substances. Consequently, in God the distinguishing relation belongs essentially to both.

Q40 A2: Whether the persons are distinguished by the relations?

Yes. It is better to say that the persons or hypostases are distinguished rather by relations than by origin because, although in both ways they are distinguished, nevertheless in our mode of understanding they are distinguished chiefly and firstly by relations.

The persons are the subsisting relations themselves. Hence it is not against the simplicity of the divine persons for them to be distinguished by the relations.

The divine persons are not distinguished as regards being, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only as regards something relative. Hence relation suffices for their distinction.

Relation presupposes the distinction of the subjects, when it is an accident; but when the relation is subsistent, it does not presuppose, but brings about distinction. For when it is said that relation is by nature to be towards another, the word "another" signifies the correlative which is not prior, but simultaneous in the order of nature.

Q40 A1: Whether relation is the same as person?

Yes. We must say that the properties are in the persons, and yet that they are the persons because the nature of a form requires it to be "in" that of which it is the form (as we say that the essence is in God, and yet is God).

There are properties in God designated by abstract terms, being forms, as it were, of the persons.

Since relation, considered as really existing in God, is the divine essence Itself, and the essence is the same as person (Q39, A1), relation must necessarily be the same as person.

Person and property are really the same, but differ in concept. Consequently, it does not follow that if one is multiplied, the other must also be multiplied. We must, however, consider that in God, by reason of the divine simplicity, a twofold real identity exists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For, since the divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter and form, it follows that in God the abstract is the same as the concrete, as "Godhead" and "God." And as the divine simplicity excludes the composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is attributed to God, is His essence Itself; and so, wisdom and power are the same in God, because they are both in the divine essence.

According to this twofold identity, property in God is the same person. For personal properties are the same as the persons because the abstract and the concrete are the same in God; since they are the subsisting persons themselves, as paternity is the Father Himself, and filiation is the Son, and procession is the Holy Ghost.

But the non-personal properties are the same as the persons according to the other reason of identity, whereby whatever is attributed to God is His own essence. Thus, common spiration is the same as the person of the Father, and the person of the Son; not that it is one self-subsisting person; but that as there is one essence in the two persons, so also there is one property in the two persons (Q30, A2).

Q40: The persons as compared to the relations or properties

1. Is relation the same as person?
2. Do the relations distinguish and constitute the persons?
3. Do mental abstraction of the relations from the persons leave the hypostases distinct?
4. According to our mode of understanding, do the relations presuppose the acts of the persons, or contrariwise?

Q39 A8: Whether the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons in a fitting manner by the holy doctors?

Yes. Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God from creatures, must consider God according to the mode derived from creatures.

In considering any creature four points present themselves to us in due order.

Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely is considered as a being.

Secondly, it is considered as one.

Thirdly, its intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered.

The fourth point of consideration embraces its relation to its effects.

Hence this fourfold consideration comes to our mind in reference to God.

Q39 A7: Whether the essential names should be appropriated to the persons?

Yes. For the manifestation of our faith, it is fitting that the essential attributes should be appropriated to the persons because although the trinity of persons cannot be proved by demonstration, nevertheless it is fitting that it be declared by things which are more known to us.

Now the essential attributes of God are more clear to us from the standpoint of reason than the personal properties; because we can derive certain knowledge of the essential attributes from creatures which are sources of knowledge to us, such as we cannot obtain regarding the personal properties.

As, therefore, we make use of the likeness of the trace or image found in creatures for the manifestation of the divine persons, so also in the same manner do we make use of the essential attributes. And such a manifestation of the divine persons by the use of the essential attributes is called "appropriation."

If the essential attributes were appropriated to the persons as exclusively belonging to each of them, then it would follow that one person would be as a form as regards another; which Augustine altogether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing that the Father is wise, not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only the Son were Wisdom; so that the Father and the Son together only can be called wise, but not the Father without the Son.

But the Son is called the Wisdom of the Father, because He is Wisdom from the Father Who is Wisdom. For each of them is of Himself Wisdom; and both together are one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten by Him, but by the wisdom which is His own essence.

Q39 A6: Whether the persons can be predicated of the essential terms?

Yes. Although adjectival terms, whether personal or notional, cannot be predicated of the essence, nevertheless substantive terms can be so predicated because of the real identity of essence and person.

The divine essence is not only really the same as one person, but it is really the same as the three persons.

Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be predicated of the essence as if we were to say, "The essence is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost."

Q39 A5: Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person?

No. What properly belongs to the persons whereby they are distinguished from each other, cannot be attributed to the essence because that would imply distinction in the divine essence, in the same way as there exists distinction in the "supposita."

The difference between substantive and adjectival names consist in this, that the former carry their subject with them, whereas the latter do not, but add the thing signified to the substantive. Whence logicians are wont to say that the substantive is considered in the light of "suppositum," whereas the adjective indicates something added to the "suppositum."

Therefore substantive personal terms can be predicated of the essence, because they are really the same; nor does it follow that a personal property makes a distinct essence; but it belongs to the "suppositum" implied in the substantive.

But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence unless we add some substantive. We cannot say that the "essence is begetting"; yet we can say that the "essence is a thing begetting," or that it is "God begetting," if "thing" and God stand for person, but not if they stand for essence. Consequently there exists no contradiction in saying that "essence is a thing begetting," and "a thing not begetting"; because in the first case "thing" stands for person, and in the second it stands for the essence.

Q39 A4: Whether the concrete essential names can stand for the person?

Yes. This name "God" need not always stand for the essence it signifies because it agrees with singular terms as regards the form signified not being multiplied; nevertheless it agrees also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be found in several "supposita."

This word "God" sometimes stands for the essence, as when we say "God creates"; because this predicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form signified--that is, Godhead.

But sometimes it stands for the person, either for only one, as when we say, "God begets," or for two, as when we say, "God spirates"; or for three, as when it is said: "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God," etc. (1 Timothy 1:17).

Q39 A3: Whether essential names should be predicated in the singular of the three persons?

Yes. Names which signify the divine essence in a substantive manner are predicated of the three persons in the singular, and not in the plural because in God the divine essence is signified by way of a form which, indeed, is simple and supremely one.

Some essential names signify the essence after the manner of substantives; while others signify it after the manner of adjectives. Those which signify it as substantives are predicated of the three persons in the singular only, and not in the plural. Those which signify the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three persons in the plural.

We say that Socrates, Plato and Cicero are "three men"; whereas we do not say the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are "three Gods," but "one God"; forasmuch as in the three "supposita" of human nature there are three humanities, whereas in the three divine Persons there is but one divine essence.

On the other hand, the names which signify essence in an adjectival manner are predicated of the three persons plurally, by reason of the plurality of "supposita." For we say there are three "existent" or three "wise" beings, or three "eternal," "uncreated," and "immense" beings, if these terms are understood in an adjectival sense.

But if taken in a substantive sense, we say "one uncreated, immense, eternal being," as Athanasius declares.

Q39 A2: Whether it must be said that the three persons are of one essence?

Yes. We speak of one essence of the three persons, and three persons of the one essence, provided that these genitives be understood as designating the form because in God the persons are multiplied, and the essence is not multiplied.

Form, in the absolute sense, is wont to be designated as belonging to that of which it is the form, as we say "the virtue of Peter." On the other hand, the thing having form is not wont to be designated as belonging to the form except when we wish to qualify or designate the form. In which case two genitives are required, one signifying the form, and the other signifying the determination of the form, as, for instance, when we say, "Peter is of great virtue [magnae virtutis]," or else one genitive must have the force of two, as, for instance, "he is a man of blood"--that is, he is a man who sheds much blood [multi sanguinis].

So, because the divine essence signifies a form as regards the person, it may properly be said that the essence is of the person; but we cannot say the converse, unless we add some term to designate the essence; as, for instance, the Father is a person of the "divine essence"; or, the three persons are "of one essence."

In the objects of the senses (whence the intellect derives its knowledge) the nature of the species is made individual by the matter, and thus the nature is as the form, and the individual is the "suppositum" of the form.

So also in God the essence is taken as the form of the three persons, according to our mode of signification. (Divine things are named by our intellect, not as they really are in themselves -- for in that way it knows them not -- but in a way that belongs to things created.)

Only those things can be said to be of "one essence" which have one being. So the divine unity is better described by saying that the three persons are "of one essence," than by saying they are "of one nature."

Because "nature" designates the principle of action while "essence" comes from being [essendo], things may be said to be of one nature which agree in some action, as all things which give heat.

Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii) that the word homoousion, which the Council of Nicaea adopted against the Arians, means that the three persons are of one essence.

Hilary says (De Synod.): "It would be prejudicial to holy things, if we had to do away with them, just because some do not think them holy. So if some misunderstand homoousion, what is that to me, if I understand it rightly? . . . The oneness of nature does not result from division, or from union or from community of possession, but from one nature being proper to both Father and Son."

Q39 A1: Whether in God the essence is the same as the person?

Yes. In God, essence is not really distinct from person, and yet the persons are really distinguished from each other because person signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature, but relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking, while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition.

In creatures, relations are accidental, whereas in God they are the divine essence itself.

Thence it follows that in God essence is not really distinct from person, and yet that the persons are really distinguished from each other.

There cannot be a distinction of "suppositum" in creatures by means of relations, but only by essential principles, because in creatures relations are not subsistent.

But in God relations are subsistent, and so by reason of the opposition between them they distinguish the "supposita", and yet the essence is not distinguished, because the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the essence.

Divine things are named by us after the way of created things. And since created natures are individualized by matter which is the subject of the specific nature, it follows that individuals are called "subjects," "supposita," or "hypostases." So the divine persons are named "supposita" or "hypostases," but not as if there really existed any real "supposition" or "subjection."

Q39: The persons in relation to the essence

1. Is the essence in God the same as the person?
2. Should we say that the three persons are of one essence?
3. Should essential names be predicated of the persons in the plural, or in the singular?
4. Can notional adjectives, or verbs, or participles, be predicated of the essential names taken in a concrete sense?
5. Can the same be predicated of essential names taken in the abstract?
6. Can the names of the persons be predicated of concrete essential names?
7. Can essential attributes be appropriated to the persons?
8. Which attributes should be appropriated to each person?

Q38 A2: Whether "Gift" is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?

Yes. Gift, taken personally in God, is the proper name of the Holy Ghost because the Holy Ghost receives His proper name from the fact that He proceeds from Father and Son.

A gift is properly an unreturnable giving, as Aristotle says (Topic. iv, 4)--i.e. a thing which is not given with the intention of a return--and it thus contains the idea of a gratuitous donation.

Now, the reason of donation being gratuitous is love; since therefore do we give something to anyone gratuitously forasmuch as we wish him well.

So what we first give him is the love whereby we wish him well.

Hence it is manifest that love has the nature of a first gift, through which all free gifts are given. So since the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, He proceeds as the first gift.

Q38 A1: Whether "Gift" is a personal name?

Yes. The Holy Ghost is a personal name and so also therefore is "Gift" because that is said to be given to us which we have from another source.

In one sense, "gift" is the same as "the giver," but not the same as the one to whom it is given. The Holy Ghost gives Himself in that sense.

In another sense, a thing is another's as a possession, or as a slave; and in that sense gift is essentially distinct from the giver; and the gift of God so taken is a created thing.

In a third sense, "this is this one's" through its origin only; and in this sense the Son is the Father's; and the Holy Ghost belongs to both.

Therefore, so far as gift in this way signifies the possession of the giver, it is personally distinguished from the giver, and is a personal name.

The divine essence is the Father's gift in the first sense, as being the Father's by way of identity.

Gift is not so called from being actually given, but from its aptitude to be given. Hence the divine person is called Gift from eternity, although He is given in time.

Nor does it follow that it is an essential name because it imports relation to the creature, but that it includes something essential in its meaning, as the essence is included in the idea of person (Q34, A3).

Q38: The name of the Holy Ghost, as Gift

1. Can "Gift" be a personal name?
2. Is it the proper name of the Holy Ghost?