Yes. The creation of things was in the beginning of time because things are said to be created in the beginning of time, not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but because together with time heaven and earth were created.
Nothing is made except as it exists. But nothing exists of time except "now." Hence time cannot be made except according to some "now"; not because in the first "now" is time, but because from it time begins.
The words of Genesis, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," are expounded in a threefold sense in order to exclude three errors.
(1) For some said that the world always was, and that time had no beginning; and to exclude this the words "In the beginning" are expounded--viz. "of time."
(2) And some said that there are two principles of creation, one of good things and the other of evil things, against which "In the beginning" is expounded--"in the Son." For as the efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by reason of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated to the Son by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said (Psalm 103:24), "Thou hast made all things in wisdom," it may be understood that God made all things in the beginning--that is, in the Son; according to the word of the Apostle (Colossians 1:16), "In Him"--viz. the Son--"were created all things."
(3) But others said that corporeal things were created by God through the medium of spiritual creation; and to exclude this it is expounded thus: "In the beginning"--i.e. before all things--"God created heaven and earth."
For four things are stated to be created together--viz. the empyrean heaven, corporeal matter (by which is meant the earth), time, and the angelic nature.
"It is because the contemporary alternatives seem so one-sided and are not more evidently solutions to the problems which Thomas faced, and partly solved, that we return to him and to the tradition of theology and philosophy in which his Summa Theologiae appears: theology as the science of the first principle and this as the total knowledge of reality in its unity." -- Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself (Oxford University Press, 1987), p.159.
Monday, October 02, 2006
Q46 A2: Whether it is an article of faith that the world began?
Yes. The newness of the world is known only by revelation because it cannot be proved demonstratively.
The newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself. For the principle of demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is abstracted from "here" and "now"; whence it is said that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always.
Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot be investigated by reason, except as regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures is not among these, as was said above (Q19,A 3).
But the divine will can be manifested by revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or science.
And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of faith.
The newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself. For the principle of demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is abstracted from "here" and "now"; whence it is said that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always.
Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot be investigated by reason, except as regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures is not among these, as was said above (Q19,A 3).
But the divine will can be manifested by revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or science.
And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of faith.
Saturday, September 30, 2006
Q46 A1: Whether the universe of creatures always existed?
No. It is not necessary for God to will that the world should always exist because the world exists inasmuch as God wills it to exist (since the being of the world depends on the will of God, as on its cause).
Nothing except God can be eternal. And this statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown above (Q19, A4) that the will of God is the cause of things.
Therefore things are necessary according as it is necessary for God to will them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause (Metaph. v, text 6).
Now it was shown above (Q19, A3), that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that God should will anything except Himself.
It is not therefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it cannot be proved by demonstration. Note that Aristotle's reasons (Phys. viii) are not simply, but relatively, demonstrative -- viz. in order to contradict the reasons of some of the ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite impossible manner. This appears in three ways.
Nothing except God can be eternal. And this statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown above (Q19, A4) that the will of God is the cause of things.
Therefore things are necessary according as it is necessary for God to will them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause (Metaph. v, text 6).
Now it was shown above (Q19, A3), that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that God should will anything except Himself.
It is not therefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it cannot be proved by demonstration. Note that Aristotle's reasons (Phys. viii) are not simply, but relatively, demonstrative -- viz. in order to contradict the reasons of some of the ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite impossible manner. This appears in three ways.
Firstly, because, both in Phys. viii and in De Coelo i, text 101, he premises some opinions, as those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato, and brings forward reasons to refute them.
Secondly, because wherever he speaks of this subject, he quotes the testimony of the ancients, which is not the way of a demonstrator, but of one persuading of what is probable.
Thirdly, because he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that there are dialectical problems, about which we have nothing to say from reason, as, "whether the world is eternal."
Friday, September 29, 2006
Q45 A8: Whether creation is mingled with works of nature and art?
No. In the works of nature, creation does not enter because creation is presupposed to the work of nature.
The operation of nature takes place only on the presupposition of created principles; and thus the products of nature are called creatures.
The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which, some said, do not come into existence by the action of nature, but previously exist in matter; for they asserted that forms are latent.
This arose from ignorance concerning matter, and from not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and act. For because forms pre-exist in matter, "in potentiality," they asserted that they pre-exist "simply."
Others, however, said that the forms were given or caused by a separate agent by way of creation; and accordingly, that to each operation of nature is joined creation.
But this opinion arose from ignorance concerning form. For they failed to consider that the form of the natural body is not subsisting, but is that by which a thing is.
And therefore, since to be made and to be created belong properly to a subsisting thing alone (A4), it does not belong to forms to be made or to be created, but to be "concreated."
What, indeed, is properly made by the natural agent is the "composite," which is made from matter.
The operation of nature takes place only on the presupposition of created principles; and thus the products of nature are called creatures.
The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which, some said, do not come into existence by the action of nature, but previously exist in matter; for they asserted that forms are latent.
This arose from ignorance concerning matter, and from not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and act. For because forms pre-exist in matter, "in potentiality," they asserted that they pre-exist "simply."
Others, however, said that the forms were given or caused by a separate agent by way of creation; and accordingly, that to each operation of nature is joined creation.
But this opinion arose from ignorance concerning form. For they failed to consider that the form of the natural body is not subsisting, but is that by which a thing is.
And therefore, since to be made and to be created belong properly to a subsisting thing alone (A4), it does not belong to forms to be made or to be created, but to be "concreated."
What, indeed, is properly made by the natural agent is the "composite," which is made from matter.
Thursday, September 28, 2006
Q45 A7: Whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the Trinity?
Yes. In rational creatures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as there is found in them the word conceived, and the love proceeding, because the processions of the divine Persons are referred to the acts of intellect and will (Q27), for the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect, and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love of the will.
In all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch as in every creature are found some things which are necessarily reduced to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being, and has a form, whereby it is determined to a species, and has relation to something else.
Therefore as it is a created substance, it represents the cause and principle; and so in that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the "principle from no principle."
According as it has a form and species, it represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is from the conception of the craftsman.
According as it has relation of order, it represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is love, because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator.
In all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch as in every creature are found some things which are necessarily reduced to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being, and has a form, whereby it is determined to a species, and has relation to something else.
Therefore as it is a created substance, it represents the cause and principle; and so in that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the "principle from no principle."
According as it has a form and species, it represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is from the conception of the craftsman.
According as it has relation of order, it represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is love, because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator.
Wednesday, September 27, 2006
Q45 A6: Whether to create is proper to any person?
No. To create is not proper to any one Person but is common to the whole Trinity because to create belongs to God according to His being, that is, His essence, which is common to the three Persons.
To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle of action can be considered from the effect of the action.
Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature of their procession, have a causality respecting the creation of things. For as was said above (Q14, A8; Q19, A4), when treating of the knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His intellect and will, just as the craftsman is cause of the things made by his craft.
Now the craftsman works through the word conceived in his mind, and through the love of his will regarding some object. Hence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is His Son; and through His Love, which is the Holy Ghost.
And so the processions of the Persons are the type of the productions of creatures inasmuch as they include the essential attributes, knowledge and will.
To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle of action can be considered from the effect of the action.
Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature of their procession, have a causality respecting the creation of things. For as was said above (Q14, A8; Q19, A4), when treating of the knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His intellect and will, just as the craftsman is cause of the things made by his craft.
Now the craftsman works through the word conceived in his mind, and through the love of his will regarding some object. Hence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is His Son; and through His Love, which is the Holy Ghost.
And so the processions of the Persons are the type of the productions of creatures inasmuch as they include the essential attributes, knowledge and will.
Tuesday, September 26, 2006
Q45 A5: Whether it belongs to God alone to create?
Yes. It is impossible for any creature to create, either by its own power or instrumentally (that is, ministerially) because the proper effect of God creating is what is presupposed to all other effects (and that is absolute being).
Hence nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally to this effect, since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed by the action of the instrumental agent.
And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no body acts except by touching or moving; and thus it requires in its action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which is contrary to the very idea of creation.
Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God alone.
Hence nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally to this effect, since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed by the action of the instrumental agent.
And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no body acts except by touching or moving; and thus it requires in its action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which is contrary to the very idea of creation.
Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God alone.
Monday, September 25, 2006
Q45 A4: Whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting things?
Yes. Properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings because, as accidents and forms and non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought to be called rather "concreated" than "created" things.
To be made and to be created properly belong to whatever being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to that which has being--that is, to what subsists in its own being.
In the proposition "the first of created things is being," the word "being" does not refer to the subject of creation, but to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created thing is called created because it is a being, not because it is "this" being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal Being.
To be made and to be created properly belong to whatever being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to that which has being--that is, to what subsists in its own being.
In the proposition "the first of created things is being," the word "being" does not refer to the subject of creation, but to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created thing is called created because it is a being, not because it is "this" being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal Being.
Sunday, September 24, 2006
Q45 A3: Whether creation is anything in the creature?
Yes. Creation in the creature is only a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being because when movement is removed from action and passion, only relation remains.
Creation places something in the thing created according to relation only; because what is created, is not made by movement, or by change. (For what is made by movement or by change is made from something pre-existing.)
And this happens, indeed, in the particular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all being by the universal cause of all beings, which is God. Hence God by creation produces things without movement.
It is greater for a thing to be made according to its entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or accidental form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental form, is something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation, whereby a thing is made according to its whole substance, something in the thing created.
Creation signified actively means the divine action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real relation, as was said above (Q13, A7) in treating of the divine names.
Creation places something in the thing created according to relation only; because what is created, is not made by movement, or by change. (For what is made by movement or by change is made from something pre-existing.)
And this happens, indeed, in the particular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all being by the universal cause of all beings, which is God. Hence God by creation produces things without movement.
It is greater for a thing to be made according to its entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or accidental form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental form, is something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation, whereby a thing is made according to its whole substance, something in the thing created.
Creation signified actively means the divine action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real relation, as was said above (Q13, A7) in treating of the divine names.
Saturday, September 23, 2006
Q45 A2: Whether God can create anything?
Yes. God brings things into being from nothing because if God did only act from something presupposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by Him.
Nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the universal cause of all being.
Creation is not change, except according to a mode of understanding. For change means that the same something should be different now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial change, the subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as different now and before only according to our way of understanding, so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards as existing. But as action and passion coincide as to the substance of motion, and differ only according to diverse relations (Phys. iii), it must follow that when motion is withdrawn, only diverse relations remain in the Creator and in the creature. But because the mode of signification follows the mode of understanding as was said above (Q13, A1), creation is signified by mode of change; and on this account it is said that to create is to make something from nothing. And yet "to make" and "to be made" are more suitable expressions here than "to change" and "to be changed," because "to make" and "to be made" import a relation of cause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and imply change only as a consequence.
Nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the universal cause of all being.
Creation is not change, except according to a mode of understanding. For change means that the same something should be different now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial change, the subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as different now and before only according to our way of understanding, so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards as existing. But as action and passion coincide as to the substance of motion, and differ only according to diverse relations (Phys. iii), it must follow that when motion is withdrawn, only diverse relations remain in the Creator and in the creature. But because the mode of signification follows the mode of understanding as was said above (Q13, A1), creation is signified by mode of change; and on this account it is said that to create is to make something from nothing. And yet "to make" and "to be made" are more suitable expressions here than "to change" and "to be changed," because "to make" and "to be made" import a relation of cause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and imply change only as a consequence.
Friday, September 22, 2006
Q45 A1: Whether to create is to make something from nothing?
Yes. If the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation because creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the "not-being" which is "nothing", just as the generation of a man is from the "not-being" which is "not-man".
We must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation.
Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of creation in that way here.
Now what proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from "not-man," and white from "not-white".
Nothing is the same as no being. Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation.
We must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation.
Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of creation in that way here.
Now what proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from "not-man," and white from "not-white".
Nothing is the same as no being. Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation.
Q45: The mode of emanation of things from the first principle
- What is creation?
- Can God create anything?
- Is creation anything in the very nature of things?
- To what things does it belong to be created?
- Does it belong to God alone to create?
- Is creation common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any one Person?
- Is any trace of the Trinity to be found in created things?
- Is the work of creation mingled with the works of nature and of the will?
Thursday, September 21, 2006
Q44 A4: Whether God is the final cause of all things?
Yes. The divine goodness is the end of all things because it does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to communicate His perfection, which is His goodness.
Every creature, however, intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection and goodness.
It is said (Proverbs 16:4): "The Lord has made all things for Himself."
RO1: To act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not belong to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for His own goodness.
RO3: All things desire God as their end, when they desire some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or sensible, or natural, i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is good and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness to God.
Every creature, however, intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection and goodness.
It is said (Proverbs 16:4): "The Lord has made all things for Himself."
RO1: To act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not belong to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for His own goodness.
RO3: All things desire God as their end, when they desire some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or sensible, or natural, i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is good and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness to God.
Q44 A3: Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God?
No. God Himself is the first exemplar of all things because things made by nature receive determinate forms (and this determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle, for divine wisdom devised the order of the universe, which order consists in the variety of things) and therefore we must say that in the divine wisdom are the types of all things, which types we have called ideas (i.e., exemplar forms existing in the divine mind [Q15, A1]), and these ideas, though multiplied by their relations to things, in reality are not apart from the divine essence (according as the likeness to that essence can be shared diversely by different things).
Moreover, in things created one may be called the exemplar of another by the reason of its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some kind of imitation.
The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which are contained in the divine intelligence." Therefore the exemplars of things are not outside God.
Moreover, in things created one may be called the exemplar of another by the reason of its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some kind of imitation.
The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which are contained in the divine intelligence." Therefore the exemplars of things are not outside God.
Tuesday, September 19, 2006
Q44 A2: Whether primary matter is created by God?
Yes. Primary matter is created by the universal cause of things because whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as they are "such" by accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in any way.
Monday, September 18, 2006
Q44 A1: Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God?
Yes. All things which are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses being most perfectly because all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation.
Though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has being by participation, it follows that it is caused.
Hence such a being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without having the faculty of laughing.
But, since to be caused does not enter into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible for us to find a being uncaused.
The science of mathematics treats its object as though it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not abstract in reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an efficient cause in proportion to its being. And so, although the object of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause is not the reason why it is brought under the consideration of the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that object from its efficient cause. Thus the demonstration of God's efficient causality belongs not to mathematics but to physics.
Though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has being by participation, it follows that it is caused.
Hence such a being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without having the faculty of laughing.
But, since to be caused does not enter into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible for us to find a being uncaused.
The science of mathematics treats its object as though it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not abstract in reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an efficient cause in proportion to its being. And so, although the object of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause is not the reason why it is brought under the consideration of the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that object from its efficient cause. Thus the demonstration of God's efficient causality belongs not to mathematics but to physics.
QQ44-49: Creation
PRODUCTION: The first cause (Q44) of beings. Creation (Q45), which is the mode of emanation of creatures from the first cause. The beginning of the duration (Q46) of creatures.
DISTINCTION: The distinction of things in general(Q47). The distinction of good and evil: evil (Q48) and its cause (Q49).
The distinction of creatures -- spiritual (or angels), corporeal, and man (which is both) -- is outlined below (QQ50-119).
DISTINCTION: The distinction of things in general(Q47). The distinction of good and evil: evil (Q48) and its cause (Q49).
The distinction of creatures -- spiritual (or angels), corporeal, and man (which is both) -- is outlined below (QQ50-119).
Q43 A8: Whether a divine person is sent only by the person whence He proceeds eternally?
No. If the person sending is understood as the principle of the effect implied in the mission, in that sense the whole Trinity sends the person sent because a divine person is sent by one from Whom He does not proceed.
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