Q43 A8: Whether a divine person is sent only by the person whence He proceeds eternally?

No. If the person sending is understood as the principle of the effect implied in the mission, in that sense the whole Trinity sends the person sent because a divine person is sent by one from Whom He does not proceed.

Q43 A7: Whether it is fitting for the Holy Ghost to be sent visibly?

Yes. The Son has been sent visibly as the author of sanctification and the Holy Ghost as the sign of sanctification because it belongs to the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds as Love, to be the gift of sanctification; to the Son as the principle of the Holy Ghost, it belongs to the author of this sanctification.

Q43 A6: Whether the invisible mission is to all who participate grace?

Yes. The invisible mission is sent to all in whom there is the indwelling of grace and a certain renewal by grace because mission in its very meaning implies that he who is sent either begins to exist where he was not before, as occurs to creatures, or begins to exist where he was before, but in a new way, in which sense mission is ascribed to the divine persons.

The invisible mission is directed to the blessed at the very beginning of their beatitude. The invisible mission is made to them subsequently, not by "intensity" of grace, but by the further revelation of mysteries; which goes on till the day of judgment. Such an increase is by the "extension" of grace, because it extends to a greater number of objects. To Christ the invisible mission was sent at the first moment of His conception; but not afterwards, since from the beginning of His conception He was filled with all wisdom and grace.

Q43 A5: Whether it is fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly?

Yes. It belongs to both the Son and to the Holy Ghost to be invisibly sent because it belongs to both to dwell in the soul by grace.

The whole Trinity dwells in the mind by sanctifying grace, according to Jn. 14:23: "We will come to him, and will make Our abode with him." But that a divine person be sent to anyone by invisible grace signifies both that this person dwells in a new way within him and that He has His origin from another.

The soul is made like to God by grace. Hence for a divine person to be sent to anyone by grace, there must needs be a likening of the soul to the divine person Who is sent, by some gift of grace. Because the Holy Ghost is Love, the soul is assimilated to the Holy Ghost by the gift of charity: hence the mission of the Holy Ghost is according to the mode of charity. Whereas the Son is the Word, not any sort of word, but one Who breathes forth Love. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. ix 10): "The Word we speak of is knowledge with love."

Q43 A3: Whether the invisible mission of the divine person is only according to the gift of sanctifying grace?

Yes. The Holy Ghost Himself is given and sent and He proceeds temporally only according to sanctifying grace because the rational creature by its operation of knowledge and love attains to God Himself, and according to this special mode God is said not only to exist in the rational creature but also to dwell therein as in His own temple, and no other effect can be put down as the reason why the divine person is in the rational creature in a new mode, except sanctifying grace.

God is in all things by His essence, power and presence, according to His one common mode, as the cause existing in the effects which participate in His goodness. Above and beyond this common mode, however, there is one special mode belonging to the rational nature wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in the knower, and the beloved in the lover.

We are said to possess only what we can freely use or enjoy: and to have the power of enjoying the divine person can only be according to sanctifying grace. And yet the Holy Ghost is possessed by man, and dwells within him, in the very gift itself of sanctifying grace. Hence the Holy Ghost Himself is given and sent.

By the gift of sanctifying grace the rational creature is perfected so that it can freely use not only the created gift itself, but enjoy also the divine person Himself; and so the invisible mission takes place according to the gift of sanctifying grace; and yet the divine person Himself is given.

Q43 A2: Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal?

Both. The Son may proceed eternally as God; but temporally, by becoming man, according to His visible mission, or likewise by dwelling in man according to His invisible mission because "mission" and "giving" have only a temporal significance in God; but "generation" and "spiration" are exclusively eternal; whereas "procession" and "giving," in God, have both an eternal and a temporal signification.

Q43 A1: Whether a divine person can be properly sent?

Yes. The mission of a divine person is a fitting thing, as meaning in one way the procession of origin from the sender, and as meaning a new way of existing in another because the Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world, inasmuch as He began to exist visibly in the world by taking our nature; whereas "He was" previously "in the world" (John 1:1).

Mission implies inferiority in the one sent, when it means procession from the sender as principle, by command or counsel: the one commanding is the greater, and the counsellor is the wiser. In God, however, it means only procession of origin, which is according to equality (Q42, A4; Q42, A6).

The divine person sent neither begins to exist where he did not previously exist, nor ceases to exist where He was. Hence such a mission takes place without a separation, having only distinction of origin.

Q43: The mission of the divine persons

1. Is it suitable for a divine person to be sent?
2. Is mission eternal, or only temporal?
3. In what sense is a divine person invisibly sent?
4. Is it fitting that each person be sent?
5. Are both the Son and the Holy Ghost invisibly sent?
6. To whom is the invisible mission directed?
7. The visible mission
8. Does any person send Himself visibly or invisibly?

Q42 A6: Whether the Son is equal to the Father in power?

Yes. The Son is equal to the Father in power (and the same applies to the Holy Ghost in relation to both) because the very notion of the divine paternity and filiation requires that the Son should be the Father's equal in greatness: that is, in perfection of nature.

Power of action is a consequence of perfection in nature. In creatures, for instance, we see that the more perfect the nature, the greater power is there for action.

As the same essence is paternity in the Father and filiation in the Son, so by the same power the Father begets, and the Son is begotten.

Hence it is clear that the Son can do whatever the Father can do; yet it does not follow that the Son can beget; for to argue thus would imply transition from substance to relation, for generation signifies a divine relation.

So the Son has the same omnipotence as the Father, but with another relation: the Father possessing power as "giving" (signified when we say that He is able to beget); while the Son possesses the power of "receiving" (signified by saying that He can be begotten).

Q42 A5: Whether the Son is in the Father, and conversely?

Yes. According to each of three points of consideration the Son and the Father are in each other: the essence, the relation, and the origin.

The Father is in the Son by His essence, forasmuch as the Father is His own essence, and communicates His essence to the Son not by any change on His part. Hence it follows that as the Father's essence is in the Son, the Father Himself is in the Son; likewise, since the Son is His own essence, it follows that He Himself is in the Father in Whom is His essence.

It is also manifest that as regards the relations, each of two relative opposites is in the concept of the other.

Regarding origin also, it is clear that the procession of the intelligible word is not outside the intellect, inasmuch as it remains in the utterer of the word. What also is uttered by the word is therein contained. And the same applies to the Holy Ghost.

Q42 A4: Whether the Son is equal to the Father in greatness?

Yes. We must say that the Son was eternally equal to the Father in greatness because the greatness of God is nothing but the perfection of His nature and belongs to the essence.

In God there exist real true paternity and filiation.

As, therefore, the same essence, which in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation, so the same dignity which, in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation.

Q42 A3: Whether in the divine persons there exists an order of nature?

Yes. In God order exists according to origin, without priority, and this is called 'the order of nature' because principle, according to origin, without priority, exists in God (Q33, A1).

In things created, even when what is derived from a principle is co-equal in duration with its principle, the principle still comes first in the order of nature and reason, if formally considered as principle.

If, however, we consider the relations of cause and effect, or of the principle and the thing proceeding therefrom, it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous in the order of nature and reason, inasmuch as the one enters the definition of the other.

But in God the relations themselves are the persons subsisting in one nature. So, neither on the part of the nature, nor on the part the relations, can one person be prior to another, not even in the order of nature and reason.

Q42 A2: Whether the person proceeding is co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father?

Yes. The Son existed whensoever the Father existed and thus the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and likewise the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with both because the Father does not beget the Son by will, but by nature, and the Father's nature was perfect from eternity, and the action whereby the Father produces the Son is not successive (because otherwise the Son would be successively generated, and this generation would be material, and accompanied with movement: which is quite impossible).

Athanasius declares that "all the three persons are co-eternal with each other."

In time there is something indivisible--namely, the instant; and there is something else which endures--namely, time. But in eternity the indivisible "now" stands ever still, as we have said above (Q10, A2 ad 1, A4 ad 2).

But the generation of the Son is not in the "now" of time, or in time, but in eternity.

And so to express the presentiality and permanence of eternity, we can say that "He is ever being born," as Origen said (Hom. in Joan. i). But as Gregory [Moral. xxix, 21] and Augustine [Super Ps. 2:7 said, it is better to say "ever born," so that "ever" may denote the permanence of eternity, and "born" the perfection of the only Begotten.

Thus, therefore, neither is the Son imperfect, nor "was there a time when He was not," as Arius said.

Q42 A1: Whether there is equality in God?

Yes. We must admit equality among the divine persons because if there were any inequality in the divine persons, they would not have the same essence (and thus the three persons would not be one God, which is impossible).

Athanasius says that "the three persons are co-eternal and co-equal to one another."

In the divine persons there is nothing for us to consider but the essence which they have in common and the relations in which they are distinct. Now equality implies both --namely, distinction of persons (for nothing can be said to be equal to itself) and unity of essence (since for this reason are the persons equal to one another, that they are of the same greatness and essence).

Now it is clear that the relation of a thing to itself is not a real relation. Nor, again, is one relation referred to another by a further relation: for when we say that paternity is opposed to filiation, opposition is not a relation mediating between paternity and filiation. For in both these cases relation would be multiplied indefinitely.

Therefore equality and likeness in the divine persons is not a real relation distinct from the personal relations: but in its concept it includes both the relations which distinguish the persons, and the unity of essence.

Q42: Equality and likeness among the divine persons

1. Is there equality among the divine persons?
2. Is the person who proceeds equal to the one from Whom He proceeds in eternity?
3. Is there any order among the divine persons?
4. Are the divine persons equal in greatness?
5. Is the one divine person in another?
6. Are they equal in power?

Q41 A6: Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?

No. In God there is only one Father, one Son, and one Holy Ghost because divine perfection and the total absence of matter in God require that there cannot be several Sons in God, etc.

That there are not several Sons, for example, is not due to any lack of begetting power in the Father.

Thus several persons cannot be the term of one notional act; for this four reasons may be given.

The first reason is in regard to the relations by which alone are the Persons distinct. For since the divine Persons are the relations themselves as subsistent, there would not be several Fathers, or several Sons in God, unless there were more than one paternity, or more than one filiation. And this, indeed, would not be possible except owing to a material distinction: since forms of one species are not multiplied except in respect of matter, which is not in God. Wherefore there can be but one subsistent filiation in God: just as there could be but one subsistent whiteness.

The second reason is taken from the manner of the processions. For God understands and wills all things by one simple act. Wherefore there can be but one person proceeding after the manner of word, which person is the Son; and but one person proceeding after the manner of love, which person is the Holy Ghost.

The third reason is taken from the manner in which the persons proceed. For the persons proceed naturally, as we have said (Q41, A2), and nature is determined to one.

The fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the divine persons. For this reason is the Son perfect, that the entire divine filiation is contained in Him, and that there is but one Son. The argument is similar in regard to the other persons.

Q41 A5: Whether the power of begetting signifies a relation, and not the essence?

No. The power of begetting signifies principally the divine essence and not the relation only (nor does it signify the essence as identified with the relation, so as to signify both equally) because that by which the Father begets is the divine nature, in which the Son is like to Him.

The power of begetting signifies the divine nature directly, but the relation indirectly.

For although paternity is signified as the form of the Father, nevertheless it is a personal property, being in respect to the person of the Father, what the individual form is to the individual creature.

Now the individual form in things created constitutes the person begetting, but is not that by which the begetter begets, otherwise Socrates would beget Socrates. So neither can paternity be understood as that by which the Father begets, but as constituting the person of the Father, otherwise the Father would beget the Father.

Q41 A4: Whether in God there is a power in respect of the notional acts?

Yes. As the notional acts exist in God, so must there be also a power in God regarding these acts because power only means the principle of act.

As we understand the Father to be principle of generation, and the Father and the Son to be the principle of spiration, we must attribute the power of generating to the Father, and the power of spiration to the Father and the Son.

In every generator we must suppose the power of generating, and in the spirator the power of spirating.

As a person, according to notional acts, does not proceed as if made, so the power in God as regards the notional acts has no reference to a person as if made, but only as regards the person as proceeding.

Power signifies a principle: and a principle implies distinction from that of which it is the principle. Now we must observe a double distinction in things said of God: one is a real distinction, the other is a distinction of reason only.

By a real distinction, God by His essence is distinct from those things of which He is the principle by creation: just as one person is distinct from the other of which He is principle by a notional act.

But in God the distinction of action and agent is one of reason only, otherwise action would be an accident in God.

With regard to the actions "to understand" and "to will", we cannot ascribe power to God in its proper sense, but only after our way of understanding and speaking: inasmuch as we designate by different terms the intellect and the act of understanding in God, whereas in God the act of understanding is His very essence which has no principle.

Q41 A3: Whether the notional acts proceed from something?

Yes. The Son was not begotten from nothing, but from the Father's substance because if the Son of God proceeds from the Father out of nothing, He could not be properly and truly called the Son.

It was explained above (Q27, A2; Q33, AA2-3) that paternity, filiation and nativity really and truly exist in God.

The true Son of God is not from nothing; nor is He made, but begotten.

That certain creatures made by God out of nothing are called sons of God is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a certain likeness of assimilation to Him Who is the true Son.

The Son of God is begotten of the substance of the Father, but not in the same way as man is born of man; for a part of the human substance in generation passes into the substance of the one begotten, whereas the divine nature cannot be parted.

The Father in begetting the Son does not transmit any part of His nature, but communicates His whole nature to Him, the distinction only of origin remaining.

Q41 A2: Whether the notional acts are voluntary?

No. The notional acts are not voluntary because the Father begot the Son neither by will, nor by necessity.

What can exist in different ways is far from the divine nature, whereas it belongs to the nature of a created being (because God is of Himself necessary being, whereas a creature is made from nothing).

The Arians, wishing to prove the Son to be a creature, said that the Father begot the Son by will, taking will in the sense of principle. But we, on the contrary, must assert that the Father begot the Son, not by will, but by nature.