Dicitur in III Ethic., quod "audaces praevolantes sunt et volentes ante pericula, in ipsis autem discedunt" quia contingit quandoque quod secundum subitam apprehensionem non possunt cognosci omnia quae difficultatem in aliquo negotio afferunt: unde surgit audaciae motus ad aggrediendum periculum; unde quando iam experiuntur ipsum periculum, sentiunt maiorem difficultatem quam aestimaverunt, et ideo deficiunt.
It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that "the daring are precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the midst of dangers they stand aloof" because it happens sometimes that it is impossible for a man to take note in an instant of all the difficulties of a certain situation: hence there arises the movement of daring to face the danger; so that when he comes to experience the danger, he feels the difficulty to be greater than he expected, and so gives way.
Audacia, cum sit quidam motus appetitus sensitivi, sequitur apprehensionem sensitivae virtutis. Virtus autem sensitiva non est collativa nec inquisitiva singulorum quae circumstant rem, sed subitum habet iudicium.
Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite, follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive faculty cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into circumstances; its judgment is instantaneous.
Sed ratio est discussiva omnium quae afferunt difficultatem negotio. Et ideo fortes, qui ex iudicio rationis aggrediuntur pericula, in principio videntur remissi, quia non passi, sed cum deliberatione debita aggrediuntur. Quando autem sunt in ipsis periculis, non experiuntur aliquid improvisum, sed quandoque minora illis quae praecogitaverunt; et ideo magis persistunt.
On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a situation. Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according to the judgment of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the danger not from passion but with due deliberation. Yet when they are in the midst of danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but sometimes the difficulty turns out to be less than they anticipated; wherefore they are more persevering.
Vel etiam quia propter bonum virtutis pericula aggrediuntur, cuius boni voluntas in eis perseverat, quantacumque sint pericula. Audaces autem, propter solam aestimationem facientem spem et excludentem timorem, sicut dictum est.
Moreover, it may be because they face the danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of their will, however great the danger may prove. Whereas men of daring face the danger on account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and banishing fear, as stated above (q45 a3).
Obiectum amoris est simpliciter bonum, unde augmentatum simpliciter augmentat amorem. Sed obiectum audaciae est compositum ex bono et malo; et motus audaciae in malum, praesupponit motum spei in bonum.
The object of love is the good simply, wherefore if it be increased, love is increased simply. But the object of daring is a compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil presupposes the movement of hope towards good.
Et ideo si tantum addatur de arduitate ad periculum quod excedat spem, non sequetur motus audaciae, sed diminuetur. Si tamen sit motus audaciae, quanto maius est periculum, tanto maior audacia reputatur.
If, therefore, so much difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the movement of daring does not ensue, but fails. But if the movement of daring does ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the daring considered to be.