Saturday, May 27, 2006

Q19 A5: Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?

No. God wills this [A] to be as means to that [B]; but does not will this [A] on account of that [B] because, in Him, to will an end [B] is not the cause of His willing the means [A], yet He wills the ordering of the means [A] to the end [B] (as in God to understand the cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause).

Consider the analogy to human understanding and will:

If anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end.

Since the will follows from the intellect, there is cause of the will in the human person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the human person that understands.

But as God by one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness.

Note that this theological truth is a guarantee for rational scientific inquiry (RO3):

Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. (It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such causes were considered as primary, and not as dependent on the will of God.)