1a 2ae q62 a2: Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues? Yes.

Virtutes theologicae specie distinguuntur a moralibus et intellectualibus quia habitus specie distinguuntur secundum formalem differentiam obiectorum.

The theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues because habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects.

Obiectum autem theologicarum virtutum est ipse Deus, qui est ultimus rerum finis, prout nostrae rationis cognitionem excedit. Obiectum autem virtutum intellectualium et moralium est aliquid quod humana ratione comprehendi potest.

Now the object of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason.

Licet caritas sit amor, non tamen omnis amor est caritas. Cum ergo dicitur quod omnis virtus est ordo amoris, potest intelligi vel de amore communiter dicto; vel de amore caritatis.

Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity.

Si de amore communiter dicto, sic dicitur quaelibet virtus esse ordo amoris, inquantum ad quamlibet cardinalium virtutum requiritur ordinata affectio, omnis autem affectionis radix et principium est amor, ut supra dictum est.

If it be understood of love, commonly so called, then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, insofar as each cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the root and cause of every emotion, as stated above (q27, a4; q28, a6, ad 2; q41, a2, ad 1).

Si autem intelligatur de amore caritatis, non datur per hoc intelligi quod quaelibet alia virtus essentialiter sit caritas, sed quod omnes aliae virtutes aliqualiter a caritate dependeant, ut infra patebit.

If, however, it be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show further on (q65, a2,a5; II-II, q23, a7).

1a 2ae q62 a1: Whether there are any theological virtues? Yes.

Fides, spes et caritas sunt theologicae virtutes in Deum ordinantes quia oportet quod superaddantur homini divinitus aliqua principia, per quae ita ordinetur ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia ordinatur ad finem connaturalem, non tamen absque adiutorio divino.

Faith, hope, and charity are theological virtues directing us to God because it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance.

Et huiusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur theologicae: tum quia habent Deum pro obiecto, inquantum per eas recte ordinamur in Deum; tum quia a solo Deo nobis infunduntur; tum quia sola divina revelatione, in sacra Scriptura, huiusmodi virtutes traduntur.

Such like principles are called "theological virtues": first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God; secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone; thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ.

Ad Deum naturaliter ratio et voluntas ordinatur, prout est naturae principium et finis, secundum tamen proportionem naturae. Sed ad ipsum secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis supernaturalis, ratio et voluntas, secundum suam naturam, non ordinantur sufficienter.

The reason and will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to nature. But the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him insofar as He is the object of supernatural happiness.

1a 2ae q62: The theological virtues

1. Are there any theological virtues?
2. Are the theological virtues distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?
3. How many, and which are they?
4. Their order

1a 2ae q61 a5: Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues? Yes.

Plotinus, inter philosophiae professores cum Platone princeps, quatuor sunt, inquit, quaternarum genera virtutum: ex his primae politicae vocantur; secundae, purgatoriae; tertiae autem, iam purgati animi; quartae, exemplares, quia deserere res humanas ubi necessitas imponitur, vitiosum est; alias est virtuosum.

"Plotinus, together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The four kinds of virtue are fourfold: in the first place there are social virtues; secondly, there are cleansing virtues; thirdly, there are "clean soul" virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.'," because to neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous.

Augustinus dicit in libro de moribus Eccles., oportet quod "anima aliquid sequatur, ad hoc quod ei possit virtus innasci, et hoc Deus est, quem si sequimur, bene vivimus." Oportet igitur quod exemplar humanae virtutis in Deo praeexistat, sicut et in eo praeexistunt omnium rerum rationes. Sic igitur virtus potest considerari vel prout est exemplariter in Deo, et sic dicuntur virtutes exemplares. Ita scilicet quod ipsa divina mens in Deo dicatur prudentia; temperantia vero, conversio divinae intentionis ad seipsum, sicut in nobis temperantia dicitur per hoc quod concupiscibilis conformatur rationi; fortitudo autem Dei est eius immutabilitas; iustitia vero Dei est observatio legis aeternae in suis operibus, sicut Plotinus dixit.

As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something is God: if we follow Him we shall live aright." Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him pre-exist the formal aspects of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing foremost in God, and thus we speak of "exemplar" virtues: so that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called prudence; while temperance is the turning of God's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to reason. God's fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1).

Et quia homo secundum suam naturam est animal politicum, virtutes huiusmodi, prout in homine existunt secundum conditionem suae naturae, politicae vocantur, prout scilicet homo secundum has virtutes recte se habet in rebus humanis gerendis. Secundum quem modum hactenus de his virtutibus locuti sumus.

Again, since man by his nature is a social animal, these virtues, insofar as they are in him according to the condition of his nature, are called "social" virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now.

Sed quia ad hominem pertinet ut etiam ad divina se trahat quantum potest, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in X Ethic.; et hoc nobis in sacra Scriptura multipliciter commendatur, ut est illud Matth. V, "estote perfecti, sicut et pater vester caelestis perfectus est", necesse est ponere quasdam virtutes medias inter politicas, quae sunt virtutes humanae, et exemplares, quae sunt virtutes divinae.

But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in Ethic. x, 7, and as Scripture often admonishes us--for instance: "Be ye perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matthew 5:48), we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine.

Quae quidem virtutes distinguuntur secundum diversitatem motus et termini. Ita scilicet quod quaedam sunt virtutes transeuntium et in divinam similitudinem tendentium, et hae vocantur virtutes purgatoriae. Ita scilicet quod prudentia omnia mundana divinorum contemplatione despiciat, omnemque animae cogitationem in divina sola dirigat; temperantia vero relinquat, inquantum natura patitur, quae corporis usus requirit; fortitudinis autem est ut anima non terreatur propter excessum a corpore, et accessum ad superna; iustitia vero est ut tota anima consentiat ad huius propositi viam.

Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine likeness; and these are called "cleansing" virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow the way thus proposed.

Quaedam vero sunt virtutes iam assequentium divinam similitudinem, quae vocantur virtutes iam purgati animi. Ita scilicet quod prudentia sola divina intueatur; temperantia terrenas cupiditates nesciat; fortitudo passiones ignoret; iustitia cum divina mente perpetuo foedere societur, eam scilicet imitando. Quas quidem virtutes dicimus esse beatorum, vel aliquorum in hac vita perfectissimorum.

Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine likeness: these are called the "clean soul virtues". Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of God; temperance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by an everlasting covenant. Such are the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection.

1a 2ae q61 a4: Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another? Yes.

Has quatuor virtutes sunt diversi habitus, secundum diversitatem obiectorum distincti quia determinantur ad materias speciales; unaquaeque quidem illarum ad unam materiam, in qua principaliter laudatur illa generalis conditio a qua nomen virtutis accipitur, ut supra dictum est:

These four [cardinal] virtues are distinct habits, differentiated in respect of their diverse objects because they have their special determinate matter; indeed, each of these [virtues] is determined to its [own] one [special] matter, in which special commendation is given to that general condition from which the virtue's name is taken, as stated above (I-II, 61, 3; cf. II-II, 141, 2):

"istae virtutes denominantur ab eo quod est praecipuum in unaquaque materia. Et sic sunt speciales virtutes, contra alias divisae. Dicuntur tamen principales respectu aliarum, propter principalitatem materiae: puta quod prudentia dicatur quae praeceptiva est; iustitia, quae est circa actiones debitas inter aequales; temperantia, quae reprimit concupiscentias delectationum tactus; fortitudo, quae firmat contra pericula mortis."

"they may be considered in point of their being denominated, each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter. And thus they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are called principal [i.e., cardinal] in comparison with the other virtues, on account of the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions between equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death."

1a 2ae q61 a3: Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these? No.

Tullius, in sua rhetorica, ad has quatuor omnes alias reducit quia huiusmodi quatuor virtutes cardinales accipiuntur secundum quatuor formales rationes virtutis de qua loquimur.

Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De Invent. Rhet. ii) because these four are reckoned as cardinal virtues in respect of the four formal aspects of virtue about which we now shall speak:

Dicuntur principales, quasi generales ad omnes virtutes: utputa quod omnis virtus quae facit bonum in consideratione rationis, dicatur prudentia; et quod omnis virtus quae facit bonum debiti et recti in operationibus, dicatur iustitia; et omnis virtus quae cohibet passiones et deprimit, dicatur temperantia; et omnis virtus quae facit firmitatem animi contra quascumque passiones, dicatur fortitudo.

They are called the principal formal aspects, since they are general, as it were, in comparison with all the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue that causes the good of right and due in operation, be called justice; every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any passions whatever, be called fortitude.

1a 2ae q61 a2: Whether there are four cardinal virtues? Yes.

Prudentia est simpliciter principalior omnibus; sed aliae ponuntur principales unaquaeque in suo genere, quia quadruplex invenitur subiectum huius virtutis de qua nunc loquimur, scilicet rationale per essentiam, quod prudentia perficit; et rationale per participationem, quod dividitur in tria; idest in voluntatem, quae est subiectum iustitiae; et in concupiscibilem, quae est subiectum temperantiae; et in irascibilem, quae est subiectum fortitudinis.

Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply; the others are principal, each in its own genus, because there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz. the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by "Prudence"; and that which is rational by participation, and is threefold: the will, subject of "Justice"; the concupiscible faculty, subject of "Temperance"; and the irascible faculty, subject of "Fortitude".

Numerus aliquorum accipi potest aut secundum principia formalia, aut secundum subiecta, et utroque modo inveniuntur quatuor cardinales virtutes.

Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are, and either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.

Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., "in quatuor virtutibus tota boni operis structura consurgit".

Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of a good work is built on four virtues".

1a 2ae q61 a1: Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues? Yes.

Convenienter inter virtutes morales ponuntur illae quae dicuntur principales, seu cardinales, quia perfectum est principalius imperfecto. Et ideo virtutes quae continent rectitudinem appetitus, dicuntur principales.

Those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral virtues because the perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal virtues.

Huiusmodi autem sunt virtutes morales; et inter intellectuales, sola prudentia, quae etiam quodammodo moralis est, secundum materiam, ut ex supradictis patet.

Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue, as was clearly shown above (q57 a4).

Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, exponens illud, "beati pauperes spiritu, scimus virtutes esse quatuor cardinales, scilicet temperantiam, iustitiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem". Hae autem sunt virtutes morales. Ergo virtutes morales sunt cardinales.

Ambrose in explaining the words, "Blessed are the poor in spirit" (Luke 6:20) says: "We know that there are four cardinal virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude." But these are moral virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues.

1a 2ae q61: The cardinal virtues

1. Should the moral virtues be called cardinal or principal virtues?
2. Their number
3. Which are they?
4. Do they differ from one another?
5. Are they fittingly divided into social, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?

1a 2ae q60 a5: Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions? Yes.

Secundum Aristotelem, sunt decem virtutes morales circa passiones, scilicet fortitudo, temperantia, liberalitas, magnificentia, magnanimitas, philotimia, mansuetudo, amicitia, veritas et eutrapelia. Et distinguuntur secundum diversas materias vel secundum diversas passiones; vel secundum diversa obiecta. Si igitur addatur iustitia, quae est circa operationes, erunt omnes undecim, quia omnia obiecta eiusdem operationis secundum speciem, eandem habitudinem habent ad rationem; non autem omnia obiecta eiusdem passionis secundum speciem, quia operationes non repugnant rationi, sicut passiones.

According to Aristotle, there are ten moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, "philotimia," gentleness, friendship, truthfulness, and "eutrapelia," all of which differ in respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we add "justice," which is about operations, there will be eleven in all, because all objects of the same specific operation have the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same specific passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do.

Perfectio virtutis ex ratione dependet, perfectio autem passionis, ex ipso appetitu sensitivo. Unde oportet quod virtutes diversificentur secundum ordinem ad rationem, passiones autem, secundum ordinem ad appetitum.

The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason; whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite. Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their relation to reason, but the passions according to their relation to the appetite.

Obiecta igitur passionum, secundum quod diversimode comparantur ad appetitum sensitivum, causant diversas passionum species, secundum vero quod comparantur ad rationem, causant diversas species virtutum.

Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are variously related to the sensitive appetite, cause the different species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason, they cause the different species of virtues.

1a 2ae q60 a4: Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions? Yes.

Non potest dici quod circa omnes passiones sit una sola virtus moralis, sunt enim quaedam passiones ad diversas potentias pertinentes; aliae namque pertinent ad irascibilem, aliae ad concupiscibilem.

It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue about all the passions, because some passions are not in the same power as other passions, since some belong to the irascible, others to the concupiscible faculty.

Nec tamen oportet quod omnis diversitas passionum sufficiat ad virtutes morales diversificandas.

On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues.

1a 2ae q60 a3: Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations? No.

Omnes virtutes morales quae sunt circa operationes, conveniunt in quadam generali ratione iustitiae, quae attenditur secundum debitum ad alterum, distinguuntur autem secundum diversas speciales rationes, quia in operationibus exterioribus ordo rationis instituitur sicut dictum est, non secundum proportionem ad affectionem hominis, sed secundum ipsam convenientiam rei in seipsa.

All the moral virtues that are about operations fit with one general, formal aspect of justice, which is in respect of something due to another, but they differ in respect of various specific formal aspects, because in external operations, the order of formal aspect is established, as we have stated (q60 a2), not according as how man is affected towards such operations, but according to the fittingness itself of the thing itself.

Secundum quam convenientiam accipitur ratio debiti, ex quo constituitur ratio iustitiae; ad iustitiam enim pertinere videtur ut quis debitum reddat. Unde omnes huiusmodi virtutes quae sunt circa operationes, habent aliquo modo rationem iustitiae.

From that fittingness we derive the formal aspect of something due, which is the formal aspect of justice; for it seems to pertain to justice that a man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the formal aspect of justice.

Sed debitum non est unius rationis in omnibus, aliter enim debetur aliquid aequali, aliter superiori, aliter minori; et aliter ex pacto, vel ex promisso, vel ex beneficio suscepto.

But the thing due is not of the same formal aspect in all these virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, in another way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises from a contract, a promise, or a favor already conferred.

Et secundum has diversas rationes debiti, sumuntur diversae virtutes: puta religio est per quam redditur debitum Deo; pietas est per quam redditur debitum parentibus vel patriae; gratia est per quam redditur debitum benefactoribus; et sic de aliis.

And corresponding to these various [specific] formal aspects of debt there are various virtues: e.g. "Religion", whereby we pay our debt to God; "Piety", whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country; "Gratitude", whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth.

1a 2ae q60 a2: Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are about passions? Yes.

In quibusdam virtus est principaliter circa operationem, in quibusdam circa passionem, quia potest comparari operatio ad virtutem moralem, sicut materia circa quam est. Et secundum hoc, oportet alias esse virtutes morales circa operationes, et alias circa passiones.

In some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, in others, about passions, because operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those moral virtues which are about operations must needs differ from those which are about passions.

Cuius ratio est, quia bonum et malum in quibusdam operationibus attenditur secundum seipsas, qualitercumque homo afficiatur ad eas: inquantum scilicet bonum in eis et malum accipitur secundum rationem commensurationis ad alterum. Et in talibus oportet quod sit aliqua virtus directiva operationum secundum seipsas: sicut sunt emptio et venditio, et omnes huiusmodi operationes in quibus attenditur ratio debiti vel indebiti ad alterum.

The reason for this is that good and evil, in certain operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no matter how man may be affected towards them: viz. insofar as good and evil in them depend on the formal aspect of their being in due measure with someone else. In operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the operations in themselves: such are buying and selling, and all such operations in which there is a formal aspect of something due or undue to another.

Et propter hoc, iustitia et partes eius proprie sunt circa operationes sicut circa propriam materiam. In quibusdam vero operationibus bonum et malum attenditur solum secundum commensurationem ad operantem. Et ideo oportet in his bonum et malum considerari, secundum quod homo bene vel male afficitur circa huiusmodi. Et propter hoc, oportet quod virtutes in talibus sint principaliter circa interiores affectiones, quae dicuntur animae passiones, sicut patet de temperantia, fortitudine et aliis huiusmodi.

For this reason justice and its parts are properly about operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, in some operations, good and evil depend only on due measure with the agent. Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in which man is affected to them. And for this reason in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which are called the passions of the soul, as is evidently the case with temperance, fortitude and the like.

Contingit autem quod in operationibus quae sunt ad alterum, praetermittatur bonum virtutis propter inordinatam animi passionem. Et tunc, inquantum corrumpitur commensuratio exterioris operationis, est corruptio iustitiae; inquantum autem corrumpitur commensuratio interiorum passionum, est corruptio alicuius alterius virtutis.

It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that the good of virtue is overlooked on account of some inordinate passion of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed inasmuch as the due measure of the external act is destroyed; while some other virtue is destroyed inasmuch as the internal passions exceed their due measure.

Sicut cum propter iram aliquis alium percutit, in ipsa percussione indebita corrumpitur iustitia; in immoderantia vero irae corrumpitur mansuetudo. Et idem patet in aliis.

Thus when through anger, one man strikes another, justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the immoderate anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues.

Philosophus ponit iustitiam circa operationes; temperantiam autem et fortitudinem et mansuetudinem, circa passiones quasdam.

The Philosopher reckons justice to be about operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions (Ethic. ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq.).

1a 2ae q60 a1: Whether there is only one moral virtue? No.

Virtutes morales sint diversae secundum speciem, et non una tantum, quia appetibilia secundum motionem rationis constituuntur in diversis speciebus, secundum quod diversimode se habent ad rationem.

Moral virtues are of various species and are not one only, because objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong to various species, according to their various relations to reason.

Manifestum est autem quod in moralibus ratio est sicut imperans et movens, vis autem appetitiva est sicut imperata et mota. Non autem appetitus recipit impressionem rationis quasi univoce, quia non fit rationale per essentiam, sed per participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic.

Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved. But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say, because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation (Ethic. i, 13).

Sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales sunt habitus quidam appetitivae partis. Habitus autem specie differunt secundum speciales differentias obiectorum, ut supra dictum est. Species autem obiecti appetibilis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, attenditur secundum formam specificam, quae est ab agente.

As stated above (q58 aa1-3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as stated above (q54 a2). Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the agent.

Obiectum rationis est verum. Est autem eadem ratio veri, in omnibus moralibus, quae sunt contingentia agibilia. Unde est una sola virtus in eis dirigens, scilicet prudentia.

The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence.

Obiectum autem appetitivae virtutis est bonum appetibile. Cuius est diversa ratio, secundum diversam habitudinem ad rationem dirigentem.

On the other hand, the object of the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in formal aspect according to its various relations to reason, the directing formal aspect.

Moralia non habent speciem a fine ultimo sed a finibus proximis, qui quidem, etsi infiniti sint numero, non tamen infiniti sunt specie.

Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends, and these, although they be infinite in number, are not infinite in species.

1a 2ae q60: How the moral virtues differ from one another

1. Is there only one moral virtue?
2. Are those moral virtues which are about operations, distinct from those which are about passions?
3. Is there but one moral virtue about operations?
4. Are there different moral virtues about different passions?
5. Do the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?

1a 2ae q59 a5: Whether there can be moral virtue without passion? No.

Quanto virtus fuerit perfectior, tanto magis passionem causat, quia fiet redundantia usque ad appetitum sensitivum, secundum quod vires inferiores sequuntur motum superiorum, ut supra dictum est.

The more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion, because it will overflow into the sensitive appetite, insofar as the lower powers follow the movement of the higher, as stated above (q17 a7; q24 a3).

Si passiones dicamus inordinatas affectiones, sicut Stoici posuerunt, sic manifestum est quod virtus perfecta est sine passionibus. Si vero passiones dicamus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic planum est quod virtutes morales quae sunt circa passiones sicut circa propriam materiam, sine passionibus esse non possunt.

If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions.

Cuius ratio est, quia secundum hoc, sequeretur quod virtus moralis faceret appetitum sensitivum omnino otiosum. Non autem ad virtutem pertinet quod ea quae sunt subiecta rationi, a propriis actibus vacent, sed quod exequantur imperium rationis, proprios actus agendo.

The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle. Whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts.

"Nullus iustus est qui non gaudet iusta operatione", ut dicitur in I Ethic.

"No man is just who rejoices not in doing justice", as stated in Ethic. i, 8.

Passiones inordinatae inducunt ad peccandum, non autem si sunt moderatae.

It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin.

Virtus passiones inordinatas superat; moderatas autem producit.

Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate passion.

1a 2ae q59 a4: Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions? No.

Non omnis virtus moralis est circa passiones, sed quaedam circa passiones, quaedam circa operationes, quia circa omne id quod contingit ratione ordinari et moderari, contingit esse virtutem moralem.

Not all the moral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some about operations, because there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason's direction and moderation.

Ratio autem ordinat non solum passiones appetitus sensitivi, sed etiam ordinat operationes appetitus intellectivi, qui est voluntas, quae non est subiectum passionis, ut supra dictum est.

Now reason directs, not only the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a passion, as stated above (q22 a3).

Non omnis virtus moralis est circa delectationes et tristitias sicut circa propriam materiam, sed sicut circa aliquid consequens proprium actum. Omnis enim virtuosus delectatur in actu virtutis, et tristatur in contrario.

The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and pains, as being their proper matter, but as being something resulting from their proper acts. For every virtuous man takes pleasure in acts of virtue, and is pained by the contrary.

Rationale per participationem non solum est appetitus sensitivus, qui est subiectum passionum, sed etiam voluntas, in qua non sunt passiones, ut dictum est.

Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where there are no passions.

1a 2ae q59 a3: Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue? Yes.

Tristitia potest esse cum virtute quia ad virtutem pertinet quod tristetur moderate in quibus tristandum est, sicut etiam philosophus dicit in II Ethic.

Sorrow is compatible with virtue because moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful is a mark of virtue, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6,7).

Et hoc etiam utile est ad fugiendum mala: sicut enim bona propter delectationem promptius quaeruntur, ita mala propter tristitiam fortius fugiuntur.

Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow.

Tristitia impedit operationem de qua tristamur, sed adiuvat ad ea promptius exequenda per quae tristitia fugitur.

Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful, but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.

De his quae quocumque modo repugnant virtuti, virtus moderate tristatur.

Virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how.

Tristitia immoderata est animae aegritudo, tristitia autem moderata ad bonam habitudinem animae pertinet, secundum statum praesentis vitae.

Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind, but moderate sorrow, in the present state of life, is the mark of a mind that is in a good state of affairs.

In beatis, in quibus nullum impedimentum sapientiae esse potest, tristitia locum non habet.

There is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom.

1a 2ae q59 a2: Whether there can be moral virtue with passion? Yes.

Virtutes non esse impassibilitates quia passio praeveniens iudicium rationis, si in animo praevaleat ut ei consentiatur, impedit consilium et iudicium rationis. Si vero sequatur, quasi ex ratione imperata, adiuvat ad exequendum imperium rationis.

Virtue is not freedom from passion because when a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and the judgment of reason; but when it follows that judgment, as though being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of reason's command.

Circa hoc fuit discordia inter Stoicos et Peripateticos, sicut Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei. Stoici enim posuerunt quod passiones animae non possunt esse in sapiente, sive virtuoso, Peripatetici vero, quorum sectam Aristoteles instituit, ut Augustinus dicit in IX de Civ. Dei, posuerunt quod passiones simul cum virtute morali esse possunt, sed ad medium reductae.

The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man, whereas the Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral virtue, if they be directed to the mean.

Haec autem diversitas, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, magis erat secundum verba, quam secundum eorum sententias. Quia enim Stoici non distinguebant inter appetitum intellectivum, qui est voluntas, et inter appetitum sensitivum, qui per irascibilem et concupiscibilem dividitur; non distinguebant in hoc passiones animae ab aliis affectionibus humanis, quod passiones animae sint motus appetitus sensitivi, aliae vero affectiones, quae non sunt passiones animae, sunt motus appetitus intellectivi, qui dicitur voluntas, sicut Peripatetici distinxerunt, sed solum quantum ad hoc quod passiones esse dicebant quascumque affectiones rationi repugnantes.

This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one of words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, through not discriminating between the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, and the sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the passions from the other affections of the human soul, in the point of their being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other emotions of the soul, which are not passions, are movements of the intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions being, as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason.

Quae si ex deliberatione oriantur, in sapiente, seu in virtuoso, esse non possunt. Si autem subito oriantur, hoc in virtuoso potest accidere, "eo quod animi visa quae appellant phantasias, non est in potestate nostra utrum aliquando incidant animo; et cum veniunt ex terribilibus rebus, necesse est ut sapientis animum moveant, ita ut paulisper vel pavescat metu, vel tristitia contrahatur, tanquam his passionibus praevenientibus rationis officium; nec tamen approbant ista, eisque consentiunt"; ut Augustinus narrat in IX de Civ. Dei, ab Agellio dictum.

These emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose deliberately, while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man, if they arose suddenly, because, in the words of Aulus Gellius [Noct. Attic. xix, 1, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), "it is not in our power to call up the visions of the soul, known as its fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs disturb the mind of a wise man, so that he is slightly startled by fear, or depressed with sorrow," insofar as "these passions forestall the use of reason without his approving of such things or consenting thereto."

Sic igitur, si passiones dicantur inordinatae affectiones, non possunt esse in virtuoso, ita quod post deliberationem eis consentiatur, ut Stoici posuerunt. Si vero passiones dicantur quicumque motus appetitus sensitivi, sic possunt esse in virtuoso, secundum quod sunt a ratione ordinati.

Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them deliberately, as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous man, insofar as they are subordinate to reason.

Unde Aristoteles dicit, in II Ethic., quod non bene quidam determinant virtutes impassibilitates quasdam et quietes, quoniam simpliciter dicunt, sed deberent dicere quod sunt quietes a passionibus quae sunt ut non oportet, et quando non oportet.

Hence Aristotle says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the assertion should be qualified": they should have said virtue is freedom from those passions "that are not as they should be as to manner and time."

Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, "si perversa est voluntas, perversos habebit hos motus", scilicet passionum, si autem recta est, "non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt".

Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): "If the will is perverse, these movements," viz. the passions, "are perverse also: but if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy."

1a 2ae q59 a1: Whether moral virtue is a passion? No.

Moralis non potest esse passio, quia passio est motus quidam appetitus sensitivi, ut supra dictum est. Virtus autem moralis non est motus aliquis, sed magis principium appetitivi motus, habitus quidam existens.

Moral virtue cannot be a passion because a passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (q22 a3), whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a kind of habit.

Passiones ex seipsis non habent rationem boni vel mali. Bonum enim vel malum hominis est secundum rationem: unde passiones, secundum se consideratae, se habent et ad bonum et ad malum, secundum quod possunt convenire rationi vel non convenire. Nihil autem tale potest esse virtus, cum virtus solum ad bonum se habeat, ut supra dictum est.

Passions do not in themselves have the formal aspect of good or evil. For man's good or evil is something in reference to formal aspect: wherefore the passions, considered in themselves, are referable both to good and evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with formal aspect. Now nothing of this sort can be a virtue, since virtue is referable to good alone, as stated above (q55 a3).

Dato quod aliqua passio se habeat solum ad bonum, vel solum ad malum, secundum aliquem modum, tamen motus passionis, inquantum passio est, principium habet in ipso appetitu, et terminum in ratione, in cuius conformitatem appetitus tendit. Motus autem virtutis est e converso, principium habens in ratione et terminum in appetitu, secundum quod a ratione movetur.

Granted that some passions are, in some way, referable to good only, or to evil only, even then the movement of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite, and ends in the reason, since the appetite tends to conformity with reason. On the other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the appetite, inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason.

Unde in definitione virtutis moralis dicitur, in II Ethic., quod est "habitus electivus in medietate consistens determinata ratione, prout sapiens determinabit".

Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states that it is "a habit of choosing the mean determined by reason, as a prudent man would determine it".

Dicitur in II Ethic., quod "passiones neque virtutes sunt neque malitiae".

It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that "passions are neither virtues nor vices".