Non omnis virtus moralis est circa passiones, sed quaedam circa passiones, quaedam circa operationes, quia circa omne id quod contingit ratione ordinari et moderari, contingit esse virtutem moralem.
Not all the moral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some about operations, because there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason's direction and moderation.
Ratio autem ordinat non solum passiones appetitus sensitivi, sed etiam ordinat operationes appetitus intellectivi, qui est voluntas, quae non est subiectum passionis, ut supra dictum est.
Now reason directs, not only the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a passion, as stated above (q22 a3).
Non omnis virtus moralis est circa delectationes et tristitias sicut circa propriam materiam, sed sicut circa aliquid consequens proprium actum. Omnis enim virtuosus delectatur in actu virtutis, et tristatur in contrario.
The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and pains, as being their proper matter, but as being something resulting from their proper acts. For every virtuous man takes pleasure in acts of virtue, and is pained by the contrary.
Rationale per participationem non solum est appetitus sensitivus, qui est subiectum passionum, sed etiam voluntas, in qua non sunt passiones, ut dictum est.
Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where there are no passions.