In quibusdam virtus est principaliter circa operationem, in quibusdam circa passionem, quia potest comparari operatio ad virtutem moralem, sicut materia circa quam est. Et secundum hoc, oportet alias esse virtutes morales circa operationes, et alias circa passiones.
In some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, in others, about passions, because operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those moral virtues which are about operations must needs differ from those which are about passions.
Cuius ratio est, quia bonum et malum in quibusdam operationibus attenditur secundum seipsas, qualitercumque homo afficiatur ad eas: inquantum scilicet bonum in eis et malum accipitur secundum rationem commensurationis ad alterum. Et in talibus oportet quod sit aliqua virtus directiva operationum secundum seipsas: sicut sunt emptio et venditio, et omnes huiusmodi operationes in quibus attenditur ratio debiti vel indebiti ad alterum.
The reason for this is that good and evil, in certain operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no matter how man may be affected towards them: viz. insofar as good and evil in them depend on the formal aspect of their being in due measure with someone else. In operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the operations in themselves: such are buying and selling, and all such operations in which there is a formal aspect of something due or undue to another.
Et propter hoc, iustitia et partes eius proprie sunt circa operationes sicut circa propriam materiam. In quibusdam vero operationibus bonum et malum attenditur solum secundum commensurationem ad operantem. Et ideo oportet in his bonum et malum considerari, secundum quod homo bene vel male afficitur circa huiusmodi. Et propter hoc, oportet quod virtutes in talibus sint principaliter circa interiores affectiones, quae dicuntur animae passiones, sicut patet de temperantia, fortitudine et aliis huiusmodi.
For this reason justice and its parts are properly about operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, in some operations, good and evil depend only on due measure with the agent. Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in which man is affected to them. And for this reason in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which are called the passions of the soul, as is evidently the case with temperance, fortitude and the like.
Contingit autem quod in operationibus quae sunt ad alterum, praetermittatur bonum virtutis propter inordinatam animi passionem. Et tunc, inquantum corrumpitur commensuratio exterioris operationis, est corruptio iustitiae; inquantum autem corrumpitur commensuratio interiorum passionum, est corruptio alicuius alterius virtutis.
It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that the good of virtue is overlooked on account of some inordinate passion of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed inasmuch as the due measure of the external act is destroyed; while some other virtue is destroyed inasmuch as the internal passions exceed their due measure.
Sicut cum propter iram aliquis alium percutit, in ipsa percussione indebita corrumpitur iustitia; in immoderantia vero irae corrumpitur mansuetudo. Et idem patet in aliis.
Thus when through anger, one man strikes another, justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the immoderate anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues.
Philosophus ponit iustitiam circa operationes; temperantiam autem et fortitudinem et mansuetudinem, circa passiones quasdam.
The Philosopher reckons justice to be about operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions (Ethic. ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq.).
"It is because the contemporary alternatives seem so one-sided and are not more evidently solutions to the problems which Thomas faced, and partly solved, that we return to him and to the tradition of theology and philosophy in which his Summa Theologiae appears: theology as the science of the first principle and this as the total knowledge of reality in its unity." -- Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself (Oxford University Press, 1987), p.159.
Thursday, February 10, 2011
Sunday, February 06, 2011
1a 2ae q60 a1: Whether there is only one moral virtue? No.
Virtutes morales sint diversae secundum speciem, et non una tantum, quia appetibilia secundum motionem rationis constituuntur in diversis speciebus, secundum quod diversimode se habent ad rationem.
Moral virtues are of various species and are not one only, because objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong to various species, according to their various relations to reason.
Manifestum est autem quod in moralibus ratio est sicut imperans et movens, vis autem appetitiva est sicut imperata et mota. Non autem appetitus recipit impressionem rationis quasi univoce, quia non fit rationale per essentiam, sed per participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic.
Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved. But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say, because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation (Ethic. i, 13).
Sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales sunt habitus quidam appetitivae partis. Habitus autem specie differunt secundum speciales differentias obiectorum, ut supra dictum est. Species autem obiecti appetibilis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, attenditur secundum formam specificam, quae est ab agente.
As stated above (q58 aa1-3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as stated above (q54 a2). Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the agent.
Obiectum rationis est verum. Est autem eadem ratio veri, in omnibus moralibus, quae sunt contingentia agibilia. Unde est una sola virtus in eis dirigens, scilicet prudentia.
The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence.
Obiectum autem appetitivae virtutis est bonum appetibile. Cuius est diversa ratio, secundum diversam habitudinem ad rationem dirigentem.
On the other hand, the object of the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in formal aspect according to its various relations to reason, the directing formal aspect.
Moralia non habent speciem a fine ultimo sed a finibus proximis, qui quidem, etsi infiniti sint numero, non tamen infiniti sunt specie.
Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends, and these, although they be infinite in number, are not infinite in species.
Moral virtues are of various species and are not one only, because objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong to various species, according to their various relations to reason.
Manifestum est autem quod in moralibus ratio est sicut imperans et movens, vis autem appetitiva est sicut imperata et mota. Non autem appetitus recipit impressionem rationis quasi univoce, quia non fit rationale per essentiam, sed per participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic.
Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved. But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say, because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation (Ethic. i, 13).
Sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales sunt habitus quidam appetitivae partis. Habitus autem specie differunt secundum speciales differentias obiectorum, ut supra dictum est. Species autem obiecti appetibilis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, attenditur secundum formam specificam, quae est ab agente.
As stated above (q58 aa1-3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as stated above (q54 a2). Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the agent.
Obiectum rationis est verum. Est autem eadem ratio veri, in omnibus moralibus, quae sunt contingentia agibilia. Unde est una sola virtus in eis dirigens, scilicet prudentia.
The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence.
Obiectum autem appetitivae virtutis est bonum appetibile. Cuius est diversa ratio, secundum diversam habitudinem ad rationem dirigentem.
On the other hand, the object of the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in formal aspect according to its various relations to reason, the directing formal aspect.
Moralia non habent speciem a fine ultimo sed a finibus proximis, qui quidem, etsi infiniti sint numero, non tamen infiniti sunt specie.
Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends, and these, although they be infinite in number, are not infinite in species.
1a 2ae q60: How the moral virtues differ from one another
- Is there only one moral virtue?
- Are those moral virtues which are about operations, distinct from those which are about passions?
- Is there but one moral virtue about operations?
- Are there different moral virtues about different passions?
- Do the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?
Saturday, February 05, 2011
1a 2ae q59 a5: Whether there can be moral virtue without passion? No.
Quanto virtus fuerit perfectior, tanto magis passionem causat, quia fiet redundantia usque ad appetitum sensitivum, secundum quod vires inferiores sequuntur motum superiorum, ut supra dictum est.
The more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion, because it will overflow into the sensitive appetite, insofar as the lower powers follow the movement of the higher, as stated above (q17 a7; q24 a3).
Si passiones dicamus inordinatas affectiones, sicut Stoici posuerunt, sic manifestum est quod virtus perfecta est sine passionibus. Si vero passiones dicamus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic planum est quod virtutes morales quae sunt circa passiones sicut circa propriam materiam, sine passionibus esse non possunt.
If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions.
Cuius ratio est, quia secundum hoc, sequeretur quod virtus moralis faceret appetitum sensitivum omnino otiosum. Non autem ad virtutem pertinet quod ea quae sunt subiecta rationi, a propriis actibus vacent, sed quod exequantur imperium rationis, proprios actus agendo.
The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle. Whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts.
"Nullus iustus est qui non gaudet iusta operatione", ut dicitur in I Ethic.
"No man is just who rejoices not in doing justice", as stated in Ethic. i, 8.
Passiones inordinatae inducunt ad peccandum, non autem si sunt moderatae.
It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin.
Virtus passiones inordinatas superat; moderatas autem producit.
Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate passion.
The more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion, because it will overflow into the sensitive appetite, insofar as the lower powers follow the movement of the higher, as stated above (q17 a7; q24 a3).
Si passiones dicamus inordinatas affectiones, sicut Stoici posuerunt, sic manifestum est quod virtus perfecta est sine passionibus. Si vero passiones dicamus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic planum est quod virtutes morales quae sunt circa passiones sicut circa propriam materiam, sine passionibus esse non possunt.
If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions.
Cuius ratio est, quia secundum hoc, sequeretur quod virtus moralis faceret appetitum sensitivum omnino otiosum. Non autem ad virtutem pertinet quod ea quae sunt subiecta rationi, a propriis actibus vacent, sed quod exequantur imperium rationis, proprios actus agendo.
The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle. Whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts.
"Nullus iustus est qui non gaudet iusta operatione", ut dicitur in I Ethic.
"No man is just who rejoices not in doing justice", as stated in Ethic. i, 8.
Passiones inordinatae inducunt ad peccandum, non autem si sunt moderatae.
It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin.
Virtus passiones inordinatas superat; moderatas autem producit.
Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate passion.
Friday, January 28, 2011
1a 2ae q59 a4: Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions? No.
Non omnis virtus moralis est circa passiones, sed quaedam circa passiones, quaedam circa operationes, quia circa omne id quod contingit ratione ordinari et moderari, contingit esse virtutem moralem.
Not all the moral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some about operations, because there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason's direction and moderation.
Ratio autem ordinat non solum passiones appetitus sensitivi, sed etiam ordinat operationes appetitus intellectivi, qui est voluntas, quae non est subiectum passionis, ut supra dictum est.
Now reason directs, not only the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a passion, as stated above (q22 a3).
Non omnis virtus moralis est circa delectationes et tristitias sicut circa propriam materiam, sed sicut circa aliquid consequens proprium actum. Omnis enim virtuosus delectatur in actu virtutis, et tristatur in contrario.
The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and pains, as being their proper matter, but as being something resulting from their proper acts. For every virtuous man takes pleasure in acts of virtue, and is pained by the contrary.
Rationale per participationem non solum est appetitus sensitivus, qui est subiectum passionum, sed etiam voluntas, in qua non sunt passiones, ut dictum est.
Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where there are no passions.
Not all the moral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some about operations, because there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason's direction and moderation.
Ratio autem ordinat non solum passiones appetitus sensitivi, sed etiam ordinat operationes appetitus intellectivi, qui est voluntas, quae non est subiectum passionis, ut supra dictum est.
Now reason directs, not only the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a passion, as stated above (q22 a3).
Non omnis virtus moralis est circa delectationes et tristitias sicut circa propriam materiam, sed sicut circa aliquid consequens proprium actum. Omnis enim virtuosus delectatur in actu virtutis, et tristatur in contrario.
The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and pains, as being their proper matter, but as being something resulting from their proper acts. For every virtuous man takes pleasure in acts of virtue, and is pained by the contrary.
Rationale per participationem non solum est appetitus sensitivus, qui est subiectum passionum, sed etiam voluntas, in qua non sunt passiones, ut dictum est.
Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where there are no passions.
Wednesday, January 26, 2011
1a 2ae q59 a3: Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue? Yes.
Tristitia potest esse cum virtute quia ad virtutem pertinet quod tristetur moderate in quibus tristandum est, sicut etiam philosophus dicit in II Ethic.
Sorrow is compatible with virtue because moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful is a mark of virtue, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6,7).
Et hoc etiam utile est ad fugiendum mala: sicut enim bona propter delectationem promptius quaeruntur, ita mala propter tristitiam fortius fugiuntur.
Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow.
Tristitia impedit operationem de qua tristamur, sed adiuvat ad ea promptius exequenda per quae tristitia fugitur.
Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful, but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.
De his quae quocumque modo repugnant virtuti, virtus moderate tristatur.
Virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how.
Tristitia immoderata est animae aegritudo, tristitia autem moderata ad bonam habitudinem animae pertinet, secundum statum praesentis vitae.
Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind, but moderate sorrow, in the present state of life, is the mark of a mind that is in a good state of affairs.
In beatis, in quibus nullum impedimentum sapientiae esse potest, tristitia locum non habet.
There is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom.
Sorrow is compatible with virtue because moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful is a mark of virtue, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6,7).
Et hoc etiam utile est ad fugiendum mala: sicut enim bona propter delectationem promptius quaeruntur, ita mala propter tristitiam fortius fugiuntur.
Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow.
Tristitia impedit operationem de qua tristamur, sed adiuvat ad ea promptius exequenda per quae tristitia fugitur.
Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful, but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.
De his quae quocumque modo repugnant virtuti, virtus moderate tristatur.
Virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how.
Tristitia immoderata est animae aegritudo, tristitia autem moderata ad bonam habitudinem animae pertinet, secundum statum praesentis vitae.
Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind, but moderate sorrow, in the present state of life, is the mark of a mind that is in a good state of affairs.
In beatis, in quibus nullum impedimentum sapientiae esse potest, tristitia locum non habet.
There is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom.
Tuesday, January 25, 2011
1a 2ae q59 a2: Whether there can be moral virtue with passion? Yes.
Virtutes non esse impassibilitates quia passio praeveniens iudicium rationis, si in animo praevaleat ut ei consentiatur, impedit consilium et iudicium rationis. Si vero sequatur, quasi ex ratione imperata, adiuvat ad exequendum imperium rationis.
Virtue is not freedom from passion because when a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and the judgment of reason; but when it follows that judgment, as though being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of reason's command.
Circa hoc fuit discordia inter Stoicos et Peripateticos, sicut Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei. Stoici enim posuerunt quod passiones animae non possunt esse in sapiente, sive virtuoso, Peripatetici vero, quorum sectam Aristoteles instituit, ut Augustinus dicit in IX de Civ. Dei, posuerunt quod passiones simul cum virtute morali esse possunt, sed ad medium reductae.
The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man, whereas the Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral virtue, if they be directed to the mean.
Haec autem diversitas, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, magis erat secundum verba, quam secundum eorum sententias. Quia enim Stoici non distinguebant inter appetitum intellectivum, qui est voluntas, et inter appetitum sensitivum, qui per irascibilem et concupiscibilem dividitur; non distinguebant in hoc passiones animae ab aliis affectionibus humanis, quod passiones animae sint motus appetitus sensitivi, aliae vero affectiones, quae non sunt passiones animae, sunt motus appetitus intellectivi, qui dicitur voluntas, sicut Peripatetici distinxerunt, sed solum quantum ad hoc quod passiones esse dicebant quascumque affectiones rationi repugnantes.
This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one of words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, through not discriminating between the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, and the sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the passions from the other affections of the human soul, in the point of their being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other emotions of the soul, which are not passions, are movements of the intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions being, as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason.
Quae si ex deliberatione oriantur, in sapiente, seu in virtuoso, esse non possunt. Si autem subito oriantur, hoc in virtuoso potest accidere, "eo quod animi visa quae appellant phantasias, non est in potestate nostra utrum aliquando incidant animo; et cum veniunt ex terribilibus rebus, necesse est ut sapientis animum moveant, ita ut paulisper vel pavescat metu, vel tristitia contrahatur, tanquam his passionibus praevenientibus rationis officium; nec tamen approbant ista, eisque consentiunt"; ut Augustinus narrat in IX de Civ. Dei, ab Agellio dictum.
These emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose deliberately, while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man, if they arose suddenly, because, in the words of Aulus Gellius [Noct. Attic. xix, 1, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), "it is not in our power to call up the visions of the soul, known as its fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs disturb the mind of a wise man, so that he is slightly startled by fear, or depressed with sorrow," insofar as "these passions forestall the use of reason without his approving of such things or consenting thereto."
Sic igitur, si passiones dicantur inordinatae affectiones, non possunt esse in virtuoso, ita quod post deliberationem eis consentiatur, ut Stoici posuerunt. Si vero passiones dicantur quicumque motus appetitus sensitivi, sic possunt esse in virtuoso, secundum quod sunt a ratione ordinati.
Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them deliberately, as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous man, insofar as they are subordinate to reason.
Unde Aristoteles dicit, in II Ethic., quod non bene quidam determinant virtutes impassibilitates quasdam et quietes, quoniam simpliciter dicunt, sed deberent dicere quod sunt quietes a passionibus quae sunt ut non oportet, et quando non oportet.
Hence Aristotle says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the assertion should be qualified": they should have said virtue is freedom from those passions "that are not as they should be as to manner and time."
Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, "si perversa est voluntas, perversos habebit hos motus", scilicet passionum, si autem recta est, "non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt".
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): "If the will is perverse, these movements," viz. the passions, "are perverse also: but if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy."
Virtue is not freedom from passion because when a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and the judgment of reason; but when it follows that judgment, as though being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of reason's command.
Circa hoc fuit discordia inter Stoicos et Peripateticos, sicut Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei. Stoici enim posuerunt quod passiones animae non possunt esse in sapiente, sive virtuoso, Peripatetici vero, quorum sectam Aristoteles instituit, ut Augustinus dicit in IX de Civ. Dei, posuerunt quod passiones simul cum virtute morali esse possunt, sed ad medium reductae.
The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man, whereas the Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral virtue, if they be directed to the mean.
Haec autem diversitas, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, magis erat secundum verba, quam secundum eorum sententias. Quia enim Stoici non distinguebant inter appetitum intellectivum, qui est voluntas, et inter appetitum sensitivum, qui per irascibilem et concupiscibilem dividitur; non distinguebant in hoc passiones animae ab aliis affectionibus humanis, quod passiones animae sint motus appetitus sensitivi, aliae vero affectiones, quae non sunt passiones animae, sunt motus appetitus intellectivi, qui dicitur voluntas, sicut Peripatetici distinxerunt, sed solum quantum ad hoc quod passiones esse dicebant quascumque affectiones rationi repugnantes.
This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one of words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, through not discriminating between the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, and the sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the passions from the other affections of the human soul, in the point of their being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other emotions of the soul, which are not passions, are movements of the intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions being, as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason.
Quae si ex deliberatione oriantur, in sapiente, seu in virtuoso, esse non possunt. Si autem subito oriantur, hoc in virtuoso potest accidere, "eo quod animi visa quae appellant phantasias, non est in potestate nostra utrum aliquando incidant animo; et cum veniunt ex terribilibus rebus, necesse est ut sapientis animum moveant, ita ut paulisper vel pavescat metu, vel tristitia contrahatur, tanquam his passionibus praevenientibus rationis officium; nec tamen approbant ista, eisque consentiunt"; ut Augustinus narrat in IX de Civ. Dei, ab Agellio dictum.
These emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose deliberately, while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man, if they arose suddenly, because, in the words of Aulus Gellius [Noct. Attic. xix, 1, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), "it is not in our power to call up the visions of the soul, known as its fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs disturb the mind of a wise man, so that he is slightly startled by fear, or depressed with sorrow," insofar as "these passions forestall the use of reason without his approving of such things or consenting thereto."
Sic igitur, si passiones dicantur inordinatae affectiones, non possunt esse in virtuoso, ita quod post deliberationem eis consentiatur, ut Stoici posuerunt. Si vero passiones dicantur quicumque motus appetitus sensitivi, sic possunt esse in virtuoso, secundum quod sunt a ratione ordinati.
Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them deliberately, as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous man, insofar as they are subordinate to reason.
Unde Aristoteles dicit, in II Ethic., quod non bene quidam determinant virtutes impassibilitates quasdam et quietes, quoniam simpliciter dicunt, sed deberent dicere quod sunt quietes a passionibus quae sunt ut non oportet, et quando non oportet.
Hence Aristotle says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the assertion should be qualified": they should have said virtue is freedom from those passions "that are not as they should be as to manner and time."
Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, "si perversa est voluntas, perversos habebit hos motus", scilicet passionum, si autem recta est, "non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt".
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): "If the will is perverse, these movements," viz. the passions, "are perverse also: but if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy."
Monday, January 24, 2011
1a 2ae q59 a1: Whether moral virtue is a passion? No.
Moralis non potest esse passio, quia passio est motus quidam appetitus sensitivi, ut supra dictum est. Virtus autem moralis non est motus aliquis, sed magis principium appetitivi motus, habitus quidam existens.
Moral virtue cannot be a passion because a passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (q22 a3), whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a kind of habit.
Passiones ex seipsis non habent rationem boni vel mali. Bonum enim vel malum hominis est secundum rationem: unde passiones, secundum se consideratae, se habent et ad bonum et ad malum, secundum quod possunt convenire rationi vel non convenire. Nihil autem tale potest esse virtus, cum virtus solum ad bonum se habeat, ut supra dictum est.
Passions do not in themselves have the formal aspect of good or evil. For man's good or evil is something in reference to formal aspect: wherefore the passions, considered in themselves, are referable both to good and evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with formal aspect. Now nothing of this sort can be a virtue, since virtue is referable to good alone, as stated above (q55 a3).
Dato quod aliqua passio se habeat solum ad bonum, vel solum ad malum, secundum aliquem modum, tamen motus passionis, inquantum passio est, principium habet in ipso appetitu, et terminum in ratione, in cuius conformitatem appetitus tendit. Motus autem virtutis est e converso, principium habens in ratione et terminum in appetitu, secundum quod a ratione movetur.
Granted that some passions are, in some way, referable to good only, or to evil only, even then the movement of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite, and ends in the reason, since the appetite tends to conformity with reason. On the other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the appetite, inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason.
Unde in definitione virtutis moralis dicitur, in II Ethic., quod est "habitus electivus in medietate consistens determinata ratione, prout sapiens determinabit".
Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states that it is "a habit of choosing the mean determined by reason, as a prudent man would determine it".
Dicitur in II Ethic., quod "passiones neque virtutes sunt neque malitiae".
It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that "passions are neither virtues nor vices".
Moral virtue cannot be a passion because a passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (q22 a3), whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a kind of habit.
Passiones ex seipsis non habent rationem boni vel mali. Bonum enim vel malum hominis est secundum rationem: unde passiones, secundum se consideratae, se habent et ad bonum et ad malum, secundum quod possunt convenire rationi vel non convenire. Nihil autem tale potest esse virtus, cum virtus solum ad bonum se habeat, ut supra dictum est.
Passions do not in themselves have the formal aspect of good or evil. For man's good or evil is something in reference to formal aspect: wherefore the passions, considered in themselves, are referable both to good and evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with formal aspect. Now nothing of this sort can be a virtue, since virtue is referable to good alone, as stated above (q55 a3).
Dato quod aliqua passio se habeat solum ad bonum, vel solum ad malum, secundum aliquem modum, tamen motus passionis, inquantum passio est, principium habet in ipso appetitu, et terminum in ratione, in cuius conformitatem appetitus tendit. Motus autem virtutis est e converso, principium habens in ratione et terminum in appetitu, secundum quod a ratione movetur.
Granted that some passions are, in some way, referable to good only, or to evil only, even then the movement of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite, and ends in the reason, since the appetite tends to conformity with reason. On the other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the appetite, inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason.
Unde in definitione virtutis moralis dicitur, in II Ethic., quod est "habitus electivus in medietate consistens determinata ratione, prout sapiens determinabit".
Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states that it is "a habit of choosing the mean determined by reason, as a prudent man would determine it".
Dicitur in II Ethic., quod "passiones neque virtutes sunt neque malitiae".
It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that "passions are neither virtues nor vices".
Sunday, January 23, 2011
1a 2ae q58 a5: Whether there can be intellectual without moral virtue? No.
Non prudentia potest esse sine virtute morali quia prudentia non solum est bene consiliativa, sed etiam bene iudicativa et bene praeceptiva: quod esse non potest, nisi removeatur impedimentum passionum corrumpentium iudicium et praeceptum prudentiae; et hoc per virtutem moralem.
Prudence cannot be without moral virtue because prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and command well: this is not possible unless the impediment of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue.
Aliae virtutes intellectuales sine virtute morali esse possunt, sed prudentia sine virtute morali esse non potest. Cuius ratio est, quia prudentia est recta ratio agibilium: non autem solum in universali, sed etiam in particulari, in quibus sunt actiones.
Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the right reason about things to be done: and this, not merely in general, but also in particulars, which constitute actions.
Recta autem ratio praeexigit principia ex quibus ratio procedit. Oportet autem rationem circa particularia procedere non solum ex principiis universalibus, sed etiam ex principiis particularibus. Circa principia quidem universalia agibilium, homo recte se habet per naturalem intellectum principiorum, per quem homo cognoscit quod nullum malum est agendum; vel etiam per aliquam scientiam practicam. Sed hoc non sufficit ad recte ratiocinandum circa particularia.
Now right reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue. And when reason argues about particular cases, it needs not only universal but also particular principles. As to universal principles of action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he understands that he should do no evil; or again by some practical science. But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases.
Contingit enim quandoque quod huiusmodi universale principium cognitum per intellectum vel scientiam, corrumpitur in particulari per aliquam passionem: sicut concupiscenti, quando concupiscentia vincit, videtur hoc esse bonum quod concupiscit, licet sit contra universale iudicium rationis.
For it happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a particular case by a passion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason.
Et ideo, sicut homo disponitur ad recte se habendum circa principia universalia, per intellectum naturalem vel per habitum scientiae, ita ad hoc quod recte se habeat circa principia particularia agibilium, quae sunt fines, oportet quod perficiatur per aliquos habitus secundum quos fiat quodammodo homini connaturale recte iudicare de fine.
Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding or of science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action, so, in order that he be rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end.
Et hoc fit per virtutem moralem: virtuosus enim recte iudicat de fine virtutis, quia "qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei", ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo ad rectam rationem agibilium, quae est prudentia, requiritur quod homo habeat virtutem moralem.
This is done by moral virtue: for the virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because "such as a man is, such does the end seem to him" (Ethic. iii, 5). Consequently the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to have moral virtue.
Prudence cannot be without moral virtue because prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and command well: this is not possible unless the impediment of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue.
Aliae virtutes intellectuales sine virtute morali esse possunt, sed prudentia sine virtute morali esse non potest. Cuius ratio est, quia prudentia est recta ratio agibilium: non autem solum in universali, sed etiam in particulari, in quibus sunt actiones.
Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the right reason about things to be done: and this, not merely in general, but also in particulars, which constitute actions.
Recta autem ratio praeexigit principia ex quibus ratio procedit. Oportet autem rationem circa particularia procedere non solum ex principiis universalibus, sed etiam ex principiis particularibus. Circa principia quidem universalia agibilium, homo recte se habet per naturalem intellectum principiorum, per quem homo cognoscit quod nullum malum est agendum; vel etiam per aliquam scientiam practicam. Sed hoc non sufficit ad recte ratiocinandum circa particularia.
Now right reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue. And when reason argues about particular cases, it needs not only universal but also particular principles. As to universal principles of action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he understands that he should do no evil; or again by some practical science. But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases.
Contingit enim quandoque quod huiusmodi universale principium cognitum per intellectum vel scientiam, corrumpitur in particulari per aliquam passionem: sicut concupiscenti, quando concupiscentia vincit, videtur hoc esse bonum quod concupiscit, licet sit contra universale iudicium rationis.
For it happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a particular case by a passion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason.
Et ideo, sicut homo disponitur ad recte se habendum circa principia universalia, per intellectum naturalem vel per habitum scientiae, ita ad hoc quod recte se habeat circa principia particularia agibilium, quae sunt fines, oportet quod perficiatur per aliquos habitus secundum quos fiat quodammodo homini connaturale recte iudicare de fine.
Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding or of science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action, so, in order that he be rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end.
Et hoc fit per virtutem moralem: virtuosus enim recte iudicat de fine virtutis, quia "qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei", ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo ad rectam rationem agibilium, quae est prudentia, requiritur quod homo habeat virtutem moralem.
This is done by moral virtue: for the virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because "such as a man is, such does the end seem to him" (Ethic. iii, 5). Consequently the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to have moral virtue.
Thursday, January 20, 2011
1a 2ae q58 a4: Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue? No.
Gregorius dicit, in XXII Moral., quod "ceterae virtutes, nisi ea quae appetunt, prudenter agant, virtutes esse nequaquam possunt" quia inclinatio virtutis moralis est cum electione, et ideo ad suam perfectionem indiget quod sit ratio perfecta per virtutem intellectualem.
Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that "the other virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real virtues" because the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue.
Naturalis inclinatio ad bonum virtutis, est quaedam inchoatio virtutis, non autem est virtus perfecta. Huiusmodi enim inclinatio, quanto est fortior, tanto potest esse periculosior, nisi recta ratio adiungatur, per quam fiat recta electio eorum quae conveniunt ad debitum finem, sicut equus currens, si sit caecus, tanto fortius impingit et laeditur, quanto fortius currit.
The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more grievously will it be hurt.
Et ideo, etsi virtus moralis non sit ratio recta, ut Socrates dicebat, non tamen solum est secundum rationem rectam, inquantum inclinat ad id quod est secundum rationem rectam, ut Platonici posuerunt, sed etiam oportet quod sit cum ratione recta, ut Aristoteles dicit, in VI Ethic.
And consequently, although moral virtue be not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it "according to right reason," insofar as it inclines man to that which is, according to right reason, as the Platonists maintained [Cf. Plato, Meno xli.], but also it needs to be "joined with right reason," as Aristotle declares (Ethic. vi, 13).
Virtus moralis potest quidem esse sine quibusdam intellectualibus virtutibus, sicut sine sapientia, scientia et arte, non autem potest esse sine intellectu et prudentia.
Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding and prudence.
Sine prudentia quidem esse non potest moralis virtus, quia moralis virtus est habitus electivus, idest faciens bonam electionem. Ad hoc autem quod electio sit bona, duo requiruntur.
Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is a habit of choosing, i.e. making us choose well. Now in order that a choice be good, two things are required.
Primo, ut sit debita intentio finis, et hoc fit per virtutem moralem, quae vim appetitivam inclinat ad bonum conveniens rationi, quod est finis debitus.
First, that the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with reason, which is a due end.
Secundo, ut homo recte accipiat ea quae sunt ad finem, et hoc non potest esse nisi per rationem recte consiliantem, iudicantem et praecipientem; quod pertinet ad prudentiam et ad virtutes sibi annexas, ut supra dictum est.
Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have reference to the end: and this he cannot do unless his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it, as stated above (q57 aa5,6).
Unde virtus moralis sine prudentia esse non potest, et per consequens nec sine intellectu. Per intellectum enim cognoscuntur principia naturaliter nota, tam in speculativis quam in operativis.
Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence, and consequently neither can there be without understanding. For it is by the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident principles both in speculative and in practical matters.
Unde sicut recta ratio in speculativis, inquantum procedit ex principiis naturaliter cognitis, praesupponit intellectum principiorum, ita etiam prudentia, quae est recta ratio agibilium.
Consequently just as right reason in speculative matters, insofar as it proceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so also does prudence, which is the right reason about things to be done.
Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that "the other virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real virtues" because the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue.
Naturalis inclinatio ad bonum virtutis, est quaedam inchoatio virtutis, non autem est virtus perfecta. Huiusmodi enim inclinatio, quanto est fortior, tanto potest esse periculosior, nisi recta ratio adiungatur, per quam fiat recta electio eorum quae conveniunt ad debitum finem, sicut equus currens, si sit caecus, tanto fortius impingit et laeditur, quanto fortius currit.
The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more grievously will it be hurt.
Et ideo, etsi virtus moralis non sit ratio recta, ut Socrates dicebat, non tamen solum est secundum rationem rectam, inquantum inclinat ad id quod est secundum rationem rectam, ut Platonici posuerunt, sed etiam oportet quod sit cum ratione recta, ut Aristoteles dicit, in VI Ethic.
And consequently, although moral virtue be not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it "according to right reason," insofar as it inclines man to that which is, according to right reason, as the Platonists maintained [Cf. Plato, Meno xli.], but also it needs to be "joined with right reason," as Aristotle declares (Ethic. vi, 13).
Virtus moralis potest quidem esse sine quibusdam intellectualibus virtutibus, sicut sine sapientia, scientia et arte, non autem potest esse sine intellectu et prudentia.
Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding and prudence.
Sine prudentia quidem esse non potest moralis virtus, quia moralis virtus est habitus electivus, idest faciens bonam electionem. Ad hoc autem quod electio sit bona, duo requiruntur.
Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is a habit of choosing, i.e. making us choose well. Now in order that a choice be good, two things are required.
Primo, ut sit debita intentio finis, et hoc fit per virtutem moralem, quae vim appetitivam inclinat ad bonum conveniens rationi, quod est finis debitus.
First, that the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with reason, which is a due end.
Secundo, ut homo recte accipiat ea quae sunt ad finem, et hoc non potest esse nisi per rationem recte consiliantem, iudicantem et praecipientem; quod pertinet ad prudentiam et ad virtutes sibi annexas, ut supra dictum est.
Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have reference to the end: and this he cannot do unless his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it, as stated above (q57 aa5,6).
Unde virtus moralis sine prudentia esse non potest, et per consequens nec sine intellectu. Per intellectum enim cognoscuntur principia naturaliter nota, tam in speculativis quam in operativis.
Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence, and consequently neither can there be without understanding. For it is by the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident principles both in speculative and in practical matters.
Unde sicut recta ratio in speculativis, inquantum procedit ex principiis naturaliter cognitis, praesupponit intellectum principiorum, ita etiam prudentia, quae est recta ratio agibilium.
Consequently just as right reason in speculative matters, insofar as it proceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so also does prudence, which is the right reason about things to be done.
Wednesday, January 19, 2011
1a 2ae q58 a3: Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual? Yes.
Omnis virtus humana vel est intellectualis vel moralis quia principium humanorum actuum in homine non est nisi duplex, scilicet intellectus sive ratio, et appetitus, haec enim sunt duo moventia in homine, ut dicitur in III de anima.
Every human virtue is either intellectual or moral because in man there are but two principles of human actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for these are the two principles of movement in man as stated in De Anima iii, text. 48.
Unde omnis virtus humana oportet quod sit perfectiva alicuius istorum principiorum. Si quidem igitur sit perfectiva intellectus speculativi vel practici ad bonum hominis actum, erit virtus intellectualis, si autem sit perfectiva appetitivae partis, erit virtus moralis.
Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one of these principles. Accordingly if it perfects man's speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may be good, it will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his appetite, it will be a moral virtue.
Prudentia, secundum essentiam suam, est intellectualis virtus. Sed secundum materiam, convenit cum virtutibus moralibus, est enim recta ratio agibilium, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc, virtutibus moralibus connumeratur.
Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as stated above (q57 a4).
Every human virtue is either intellectual or moral because in man there are but two principles of human actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for these are the two principles of movement in man as stated in De Anima iii, text. 48.
Unde omnis virtus humana oportet quod sit perfectiva alicuius istorum principiorum. Si quidem igitur sit perfectiva intellectus speculativi vel practici ad bonum hominis actum, erit virtus intellectualis, si autem sit perfectiva appetitivae partis, erit virtus moralis.
Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one of these principles. Accordingly if it perfects man's speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may be good, it will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his appetite, it will be a moral virtue.
Prudentia, secundum essentiam suam, est intellectualis virtus. Sed secundum materiam, convenit cum virtutibus moralibus, est enim recta ratio agibilium, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc, virtutibus moralibus connumeratur.
Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as stated above (q57 a4).
Tuesday, January 18, 2011
1a 2ae q58 a2: Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue? Yes.
Sicut igitur appetitus distinguitur a ratione, ita virtus moralis distinguitur ab intellectuali, quia ad hoc quod homo bene agat, per habitum virtutis intellectualis, requiritur quod non solum ratio sit bene dispositased etiam quod vis appetitiva sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis moralis.
Moral differs from intellectual virtue, even as the appetite differs from the reason, because for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of intellectual virtue, but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue.
Unde sicut appetitus est principium humani actus secundum quod participat aliqualiter rationem, ita habitus moralis habet rationem virtutis humanae, inquantum rationi conformatur.
Hence just as the appetite is the principle of human acts, insofar as it partakes of reason, so are moral habits to be considered virtues insofar as they are in conformity with reason.
Recta ratio, quae est secundum prudentiam, ponitur in definitione virtutis moralis, non tanquam pars essentiae eius, sed sicut quiddam participatum in omnibus virtutibus moralibus, inquantum prudentia dirigit omnes virtutes morales.
Right reason which is in accord with prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence, but as something belonging by way of participation to all the moral virtues, insofar as they are all under the direction of prudence.
Omnium humanorum operum principium primum ratio est, et quaecumque alia principia humanorum operum inveniantur, quodammodo rationi obediunt, diversimode tamen.
Reason is the first principle of all human acts, and whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason somewhat, but diversely, i.e., in various ways.
Nam quaedam rationi obediunt omnino ad nutum, absque omni contradictione: sicut corporis membra, si fuerint in sua natura consistentia; statim enim ad imperium rationis, manus aut pes movetur ad opus. Unde philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod anima regit corpus despotico principatu, idest sicut dominus servum, qui ius contradicendi non habet.
For some obey reason blindly and without any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of the body, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "the soul rules the body like a despot," i.e. as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel.
Posuerunt igitur quidam quod omnia principia activa quae sunt in homine, hoc modo se habent ad rationem. Quod quidem si verum esset, sufficeret quod ratio esset perfecta, ad bene agendum. Unde, cum virtus sit habitus quo perficimur ad bene agendum, sequeretur quod in sola ratione esset, et sic nulla virtus esset nisi intellectualis.
Accordingly some held that all the active principles in man are subordinate to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, since virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that there would be none but intellectual virtues.
Et haec fuit opinio Socratis, qui dixit omnes virtutes esse prudentias, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Unde ponebat quod homo, scientia in eo existente, peccare non poterat; sed quicumque peccabat, peccabat propter ignorantiam.
This was the opinion of Socrates, who said "every virtue is a kind of prudence," as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession of knowledge, he cannot sin; and that everyone who sins, does so through ignorance.
Hoc autem procedit ex suppositione falsi. Pars enim appetitiva obedit rationi non omnino ad nutum, sed cum aliqua contradictione; unde philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod ratio imperat appetitivae principatu politico, quo scilicet aliquis praeest liberis, qui habent ius in aliquo contradicendi.
Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the appetitive faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain power of opposition; wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "reason commands the appetitive faculty by a politic power," whereby a man rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of opposition.
Unde Augustinus dicit, super Psalm., quod interdum praecedit intellectus, et sequitur tardus aut nullus affectus, intantum quod quandoque passionibus vel habitibus appetitivae partis hoc agitur, ut usus rationis in particulari impediatur.
Hence Augustine says on Psalm 118 (Serm. 8) that "sometimes we understand [what is right] while desire is slow, or follows not at all," insofar as the habits or passions of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action.
Et secundum hoc, aliqualiter verum est quod Socrates dixit, quod scientia praesente, non peccatur: si tamen hoc extendatur usque ad usum rationis in particulari eligibili.
And in this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not sin: provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include the use of reason in this individual act of choice.
Moral differs from intellectual virtue, even as the appetite differs from the reason, because for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of intellectual virtue, but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue.
Unde sicut appetitus est principium humani actus secundum quod participat aliqualiter rationem, ita habitus moralis habet rationem virtutis humanae, inquantum rationi conformatur.
Hence just as the appetite is the principle of human acts, insofar as it partakes of reason, so are moral habits to be considered virtues insofar as they are in conformity with reason.
Recta ratio, quae est secundum prudentiam, ponitur in definitione virtutis moralis, non tanquam pars essentiae eius, sed sicut quiddam participatum in omnibus virtutibus moralibus, inquantum prudentia dirigit omnes virtutes morales.
Right reason which is in accord with prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence, but as something belonging by way of participation to all the moral virtues, insofar as they are all under the direction of prudence.
Omnium humanorum operum principium primum ratio est, et quaecumque alia principia humanorum operum inveniantur, quodammodo rationi obediunt, diversimode tamen.
Reason is the first principle of all human acts, and whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason somewhat, but diversely, i.e., in various ways.
Nam quaedam rationi obediunt omnino ad nutum, absque omni contradictione: sicut corporis membra, si fuerint in sua natura consistentia; statim enim ad imperium rationis, manus aut pes movetur ad opus. Unde philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod anima regit corpus despotico principatu, idest sicut dominus servum, qui ius contradicendi non habet.
For some obey reason blindly and without any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of the body, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "the soul rules the body like a despot," i.e. as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel.
Posuerunt igitur quidam quod omnia principia activa quae sunt in homine, hoc modo se habent ad rationem. Quod quidem si verum esset, sufficeret quod ratio esset perfecta, ad bene agendum. Unde, cum virtus sit habitus quo perficimur ad bene agendum, sequeretur quod in sola ratione esset, et sic nulla virtus esset nisi intellectualis.
Accordingly some held that all the active principles in man are subordinate to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, since virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that there would be none but intellectual virtues.
Et haec fuit opinio Socratis, qui dixit omnes virtutes esse prudentias, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Unde ponebat quod homo, scientia in eo existente, peccare non poterat; sed quicumque peccabat, peccabat propter ignorantiam.
This was the opinion of Socrates, who said "every virtue is a kind of prudence," as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession of knowledge, he cannot sin; and that everyone who sins, does so through ignorance.
Hoc autem procedit ex suppositione falsi. Pars enim appetitiva obedit rationi non omnino ad nutum, sed cum aliqua contradictione; unde philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod ratio imperat appetitivae principatu politico, quo scilicet aliquis praeest liberis, qui habent ius in aliquo contradicendi.
Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the appetitive faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain power of opposition; wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "reason commands the appetitive faculty by a politic power," whereby a man rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of opposition.
Unde Augustinus dicit, super Psalm., quod interdum praecedit intellectus, et sequitur tardus aut nullus affectus, intantum quod quandoque passionibus vel habitibus appetitivae partis hoc agitur, ut usus rationis in particulari impediatur.
Hence Augustine says on Psalm 118 (Serm. 8) that "sometimes we understand [what is right] while desire is slow, or follows not at all," insofar as the habits or passions of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action.
Et secundum hoc, aliqualiter verum est quod Socrates dixit, quod scientia praesente, non peccatur: si tamen hoc extendatur usque ad usum rationis in particulari eligibili.
And in this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not sin: provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include the use of reason in this individual act of choice.
Monday, January 17, 2011
1a 2ae q58 a1: Whether every virtue is a moral virtue? No.
Non omnis virtus dicitur moralis, sed solum illa quae est in vi appetitiva, quia omnis actus virtutis potest ex electione agi, sed electionem rectam agit sola virtus quae est in appetitiva parte animae, dictum est enim supra quod eligere est actus appetitivae partis.
Not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are in the appetitive faculty, because every act of virtue can be done from choice, but no virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive part of the soul, for it has been stated above that choice is an act of the appetitive faculty (q13 a1).
Ad huius evidentiam, considerare oportet quid sit mos, sic enim scire poterimus quid sit moralis virtus. Mos autem duo significat. Quandoque enim significat consuetudinem, sicut dicitur Act. XV, "nisi circumcidamini secundum morem Moysi, non poteritis salvi fieri".
In order to answer this question clearly, we must consider the meaning of the Latin word "mos"; for thus we shall be able to discover what a "moral" virtue is. Now "mos" has a twofold meaning. For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read (Acts 15:1): "Except you be circumcised after the manner (morem) of Moses, you cannot be saved."
Quandoque vero significat inclinationem quandam naturalem, vel quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum, unde etiam et brutorum animalium dicuntur aliqui mores; unde dicitur II Machab. XI, quod "leonum more irruentes in hostes, prostraverunt eos". Et sic accipitur mos in Psalmo LXVII, ubi dicitur, "qui habitare facit unius moris in domo".
Sometimes it means a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action, in which sense the word is applied to dumb animals. Thus we read (2 Maccabees 1:2) that "rushing violently upon the enemy, like lions [leonum more, i.e. as lions are in the habit of doing], they slew them": and the word is used in the same sense in Psalm 67:7, where we read: "Who maketh men of one manner [moris] to dwell in a house."
Et hae quidem duae significationes in nullo distinguuntur, apud Latinos, quantum ad vocem. In Graeco autem distinguuntur, nam ethos, quod apud nos morem significat, quandoque habet primam longam, et scribitur per eta, Graecam litteram; quandoque habet primam correptam, et scribitur per epsilon.
For both these significations there is but one word in Latin; but in the Greek there is a distinct word for each, for the word "ethos" is written sometimes with a long, and sometimes a short "e".
Dicitur autem virtus moralis a more, secundum quod mos significat quandam inclinationem naturalem, vel quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum. Et huic significationi moris propinqua est alia significatio, qua significat consuetudinem, nam consuetudo quodammodo vertitur in naturam, et facit inclinationem similem naturali.
Now "moral" virtue is so called from "mos" in the sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. And the other meaning of "mos," i.e. "custom," is akin to this: because custom becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination similar to a natural one.
Manifestum est autem quod inclinatio ad actum proprie convenit appetitivae virtuti, cuius est movere omnes potentias ad agendum, ut ex supradictis patet.
But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs properly to the appetitive power, whose function it is to move all the powers to their acts, as explained above (q9 a1).
Not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are in the appetitive faculty, because every act of virtue can be done from choice, but no virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive part of the soul, for it has been stated above that choice is an act of the appetitive faculty (q13 a1).
Ad huius evidentiam, considerare oportet quid sit mos, sic enim scire poterimus quid sit moralis virtus. Mos autem duo significat. Quandoque enim significat consuetudinem, sicut dicitur Act. XV, "nisi circumcidamini secundum morem Moysi, non poteritis salvi fieri".
In order to answer this question clearly, we must consider the meaning of the Latin word "mos"; for thus we shall be able to discover what a "moral" virtue is. Now "mos" has a twofold meaning. For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read (Acts 15:1): "Except you be circumcised after the manner (morem) of Moses, you cannot be saved."
Quandoque vero significat inclinationem quandam naturalem, vel quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum, unde etiam et brutorum animalium dicuntur aliqui mores; unde dicitur II Machab. XI, quod "leonum more irruentes in hostes, prostraverunt eos". Et sic accipitur mos in Psalmo LXVII, ubi dicitur, "qui habitare facit unius moris in domo".
Sometimes it means a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action, in which sense the word is applied to dumb animals. Thus we read (2 Maccabees 1:2) that "rushing violently upon the enemy, like lions [leonum more, i.e. as lions are in the habit of doing], they slew them": and the word is used in the same sense in Psalm 67:7, where we read: "Who maketh men of one manner [moris] to dwell in a house."
Et hae quidem duae significationes in nullo distinguuntur, apud Latinos, quantum ad vocem. In Graeco autem distinguuntur, nam ethos, quod apud nos morem significat, quandoque habet primam longam, et scribitur per eta, Graecam litteram; quandoque habet primam correptam, et scribitur per epsilon.
For both these significations there is but one word in Latin; but in the Greek there is a distinct word for each, for the word "ethos" is written sometimes with a long, and sometimes a short "e".
Dicitur autem virtus moralis a more, secundum quod mos significat quandam inclinationem naturalem, vel quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum. Et huic significationi moris propinqua est alia significatio, qua significat consuetudinem, nam consuetudo quodammodo vertitur in naturam, et facit inclinationem similem naturali.
Now "moral" virtue is so called from "mos" in the sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. And the other meaning of "mos," i.e. "custom," is akin to this: because custom becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination similar to a natural one.
Manifestum est autem quod inclinatio ad actum proprie convenit appetitivae virtuti, cuius est movere omnes potentias ad agendum, ut ex supradictis patet.
But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs properly to the appetitive power, whose function it is to move all the powers to their acts, as explained above (q9 a1).
Sunday, January 16, 2011
Wednesday, January 12, 2011
1a 2ae q57 a6: Whether "eubulia, synesis, and gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence? Yes.
Convenienter adiungantur prudentiae eubulia, synesis et gnome, quia eubulia est habitus quo bene consiliamur, ut dicitur in VI Ethic, synesis est bene iudicativa, et sicut diversa sunt ea de quibus est iudicandum, ita etiam diversa sunt ea de quibus est consiliandum.
Euboulia, synesis, and gnome are fittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence because "euboulia" is "a habit whereby we take good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9), "synesis" enables us to judge well, and just as there are various matters to pass judgment on, so are there different points on which one has to take counsel ("gnome").
Iudicium de unaquaque re fit per propria principia eius. Inquisitio autem nondum est per propria principia: quia his habitis, non esset opus inquisitione, sed iam res esset inventa. Et ideo una sola virtus ordinatur ad bene consiliandum, duae autem virtutes ad bene iudicandum, quia distinctio non est in communibus principiis, sed in propriis.
Judgment of anything should be based on that thing's proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper principles: because, if we were in possession of these, we should need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, whereas there are two virtues for good judgment, because difference is based not on common but on proper principles.
Unde et in speculativis, una est dialectica inquisitiva de omnibus; scientiae autem demonstrativae, quae sunt iudicativae, sunt diversae de diversis.
Thus even in speculative matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce judgment, differ according to their different objects.
Distinguuntur autem synesis et gnome secundum diversas regulas quibus iudicatur: nam synesis est iudicativa de agendis secundum communem legem; gnome autem secundum ipsam rationem naturalem, in his in quibus deficit lex communis, sicut plenius infra patebit.
"Synesis" and "gnome" differ in respect of the different rules on which judgment is based: for "synesis" judges of actions according to the common law; while "gnome" bases its judgment on the natural formal aspect, in those cases where the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on (II-II q51 a4).
In omnibus potentiis ordinatis, illa est principalior, quae ad principaliorem actum ordinatur. Circa agibilia autem humana tres actus rationis inveniuntur: quorum primus est consiliari, secundus iudicare, tertius est praecipere.
Wherever several powers are subordinate to one another, that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest act. Now there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done by man: the first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the third, command.
Primi autem duo respondent actibus intellectus speculativi qui sunt inquirere et iudicare, nam consilium inquisitio quaedam est. Sed tertius actus proprius est practici intellectus, inquantum est operativus; non enim ratio habet praecipere ea quae per hominem fieri non possunt. Manifestum est autem quod in his quae per hominem fiunt, principalis actus est praecipere, ad quem alii ordinantur.
The first two correspond to those acts of the speculative intellect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel is a kind of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical intellect, insofar as this is ordained to operation; for reason does not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it is evident that in things done by man, the chief act is that of command, to which all the rest are subordinate.
Euboulia, synesis, and gnome are fittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence because "euboulia" is "a habit whereby we take good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9), "synesis" enables us to judge well, and just as there are various matters to pass judgment on, so are there different points on which one has to take counsel ("gnome").
Iudicium de unaquaque re fit per propria principia eius. Inquisitio autem nondum est per propria principia: quia his habitis, non esset opus inquisitione, sed iam res esset inventa. Et ideo una sola virtus ordinatur ad bene consiliandum, duae autem virtutes ad bene iudicandum, quia distinctio non est in communibus principiis, sed in propriis.
Judgment of anything should be based on that thing's proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper principles: because, if we were in possession of these, we should need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, whereas there are two virtues for good judgment, because difference is based not on common but on proper principles.
Unde et in speculativis, una est dialectica inquisitiva de omnibus; scientiae autem demonstrativae, quae sunt iudicativae, sunt diversae de diversis.
Thus even in speculative matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce judgment, differ according to their different objects.
Distinguuntur autem synesis et gnome secundum diversas regulas quibus iudicatur: nam synesis est iudicativa de agendis secundum communem legem; gnome autem secundum ipsam rationem naturalem, in his in quibus deficit lex communis, sicut plenius infra patebit.
"Synesis" and "gnome" differ in respect of the different rules on which judgment is based: for "synesis" judges of actions according to the common law; while "gnome" bases its judgment on the natural formal aspect, in those cases where the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on (II-II q51 a4).
In omnibus potentiis ordinatis, illa est principalior, quae ad principaliorem actum ordinatur. Circa agibilia autem humana tres actus rationis inveniuntur: quorum primus est consiliari, secundus iudicare, tertius est praecipere.
Wherever several powers are subordinate to one another, that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest act. Now there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done by man: the first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the third, command.
Primi autem duo respondent actibus intellectus speculativi qui sunt inquirere et iudicare, nam consilium inquisitio quaedam est. Sed tertius actus proprius est practici intellectus, inquantum est operativus; non enim ratio habet praecipere ea quae per hominem fieri non possunt. Manifestum est autem quod in his quae per hominem fiunt, principalis actus est praecipere, ad quem alii ordinantur.
The first two correspond to those acts of the speculative intellect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel is a kind of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical intellect, insofar as this is ordained to operation; for reason does not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it is evident that in things done by man, the chief act is that of command, to which all the rest are subordinate.
Tuesday, January 11, 2011
1a 2ae q57 a5: Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man? Yes.
Prudentia est virtus necessaria ad bene vivendum quia necesse est in ratione esse aliquam virtutem intellectualem, per quam perficiatur ratio ad hoc quod convenienter se habeat ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Et haec virtus est prudentia.
Prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life because an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence.
Prudentiae bonum attenditur in ipso agente, cuius perfectio est ipsum agere.
The good of prudence is in the active principle, whose activity is its perfection.
Cum homo bonum operatur non secundum propriam rationem, sed motus ex consilio alterius, nondum est omnino perfecta operatio ipsius, quantum ad rationem dirigentem, et quantum ad appetitum moventem. Unde si bonum operetur, non tamen simpliciter bene; quod est bene vivere.
When a man does a good deed, not of his own reason, but moved by the counsel of another, his deed is not yet quite perfect, as regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him. Wherefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well simply; and yet this is required in order that he may lead a good life.
Verum autem intellectus practici accipitur per conformitatem ad appetitum rectum. Quae quidem conformitas in necessariis locum non habet, quae voluntate humana non fiunt, sed solum in contingentibus quae possunt a nobis fieri, sive sint agibilia interiora, sive factibilia exteriora. Et ideo circa sola contingentia ponitur virtus intellectus practici, circa factibilia quidem, ars; circa agibilia vero prudentia.
The truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite. This conformity has no place in necessary matters, which are not affected by the human will, but only in contingent matters which can be effected by us, whether they be matters of interior action, or the products of external work. Hence it is only about contingent matters that an intellectual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect, viz. art, as regards things to be made, and prudence, as regards things to be done.
Dicitur de divina sapientia, "sobrietatem et prudentiam docet, iustitiam et virtutem, quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus".
It is written (Wisdom 8:7) of Divine Wisdom: "She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life."
Prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life because an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence.
Prudentiae bonum attenditur in ipso agente, cuius perfectio est ipsum agere.
The good of prudence is in the active principle, whose activity is its perfection.
Cum homo bonum operatur non secundum propriam rationem, sed motus ex consilio alterius, nondum est omnino perfecta operatio ipsius, quantum ad rationem dirigentem, et quantum ad appetitum moventem. Unde si bonum operetur, non tamen simpliciter bene; quod est bene vivere.
When a man does a good deed, not of his own reason, but moved by the counsel of another, his deed is not yet quite perfect, as regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him. Wherefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well simply; and yet this is required in order that he may lead a good life.
Verum autem intellectus practici accipitur per conformitatem ad appetitum rectum. Quae quidem conformitas in necessariis locum non habet, quae voluntate humana non fiunt, sed solum in contingentibus quae possunt a nobis fieri, sive sint agibilia interiora, sive factibilia exteriora. Et ideo circa sola contingentia ponitur virtus intellectus practici, circa factibilia quidem, ars; circa agibilia vero prudentia.
The truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite. This conformity has no place in necessary matters, which are not affected by the human will, but only in contingent matters which can be effected by us, whether they be matters of interior action, or the products of external work. Hence it is only about contingent matters that an intellectual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect, viz. art, as regards things to be made, and prudence, as regards things to be done.
Dicitur de divina sapientia, "sobrietatem et prudentiam docet, iustitiam et virtutem, quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus".
It is written (Wisdom 8:7) of Divine Wisdom: "She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life."
Monday, January 10, 2011
1a 2ae q57 a4: Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art? Yes.
Philosophus distinguit prudentiam ab arte, in VI Ethic, quia ars facit solum facultatem boni operis, quia non respicit appetitum; prudentia autem non solum facit boni operis facultatem, sed etiam usum: respicit enim appetitum, tanquam praesupponens rectitudinem appetitus.
The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art (Ethic. vi, 5) because art confers the mere aptness for good work, since it does not regard the appetite; whereas prudence confers not only aptness for a good work, but also the use: for it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the rectitude thereof.
Ars est recta ratio factibilium; prudentia vero est recta ratio agibilium.
Art is the "right aspect of things to be made"; whereas prudence is the "right aspect of things to be done".
Diversa genera artificialium omnia sunt extra hominem: et ideo non diversificatur ratio virtutis. Sed prudentia est recta ratio ipsorum actuum humanorum: unde diversificatur ratio virtutis.
The various kinds of things made by art are all external to man: hence they are not constituted by a different formal aspect of virtue. But prudence correctly sees the formal aspect about human acts themselves: hence it is constituted by a unique formal aspect of virtue.
Prudentia est bene consiliativa de his quae pertinent ad totam vitam hominis, et ad ultimum finem vitae humanae. Sed in artibus aliquibus est consilium de his quae pertinent ad fines proprios illarum artium. Unde aliqui, inquantum sunt bene consiliativi in rebus bellicis vel nauticis, dicuntur prudentes duces vel gubernatores, non autem prudentes simpliciter: sed illi solum qui bene consiliantur de his quae conferunt ad totam vitam.
Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man's entire life, and the end of human life. But in some arts there is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts. Hence some men, in so far as they are good counselors in matters of warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots, but not simply prudent: only those are simply prudent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life.
Perfectio autem et rectitudo rationis, in speculativis, dependet ex principiis, ex quibus ratio syllogizat; sicut dictum est quod scientia dependet ab intellectu, qui est habitus principiorum, et praesupponit ipsum. In humanis autem actibus se habent fines sicut principia in speculativis, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.
Perfection and rectitude of aspect, in speculative matters, depends on principles, by which the formal aspect structures syllogisms; thus we have said above (q57 a2 ad 2) that science depends on understanding, which is the habit of principles, and presupposes it. But in human acts, the ends stand as the principles do in speculative matters, as stated in Ethic. vii, 8.
Et ideo ad prudentiam, quae est recta ratio agibilium, requiritur quod homo sit bene dispositus circa fines: quod quidem est per appetitum rectum. Et ideo ad prudentiam requiritur moralis virtus, per quam fit appetitus rectus.
Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, which is right aspect about things to be done, that man be well disposed with regard to the ends: and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence there is need of moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite.
The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art (Ethic. vi, 5) because art confers the mere aptness for good work, since it does not regard the appetite; whereas prudence confers not only aptness for a good work, but also the use: for it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the rectitude thereof.
Ars est recta ratio factibilium; prudentia vero est recta ratio agibilium.
Art is the "right aspect of things to be made"; whereas prudence is the "right aspect of things to be done".
Diversa genera artificialium omnia sunt extra hominem: et ideo non diversificatur ratio virtutis. Sed prudentia est recta ratio ipsorum actuum humanorum: unde diversificatur ratio virtutis.
The various kinds of things made by art are all external to man: hence they are not constituted by a different formal aspect of virtue. But prudence correctly sees the formal aspect about human acts themselves: hence it is constituted by a unique formal aspect of virtue.
Prudentia est bene consiliativa de his quae pertinent ad totam vitam hominis, et ad ultimum finem vitae humanae. Sed in artibus aliquibus est consilium de his quae pertinent ad fines proprios illarum artium. Unde aliqui, inquantum sunt bene consiliativi in rebus bellicis vel nauticis, dicuntur prudentes duces vel gubernatores, non autem prudentes simpliciter: sed illi solum qui bene consiliantur de his quae conferunt ad totam vitam.
Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man's entire life, and the end of human life. But in some arts there is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts. Hence some men, in so far as they are good counselors in matters of warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots, but not simply prudent: only those are simply prudent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life.
Perfectio autem et rectitudo rationis, in speculativis, dependet ex principiis, ex quibus ratio syllogizat; sicut dictum est quod scientia dependet ab intellectu, qui est habitus principiorum, et praesupponit ipsum. In humanis autem actibus se habent fines sicut principia in speculativis, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.
Perfection and rectitude of aspect, in speculative matters, depends on principles, by which the formal aspect structures syllogisms; thus we have said above (q57 a2 ad 2) that science depends on understanding, which is the habit of principles, and presupposes it. But in human acts, the ends stand as the principles do in speculative matters, as stated in Ethic. vii, 8.
Et ideo ad prudentiam, quae est recta ratio agibilium, requiritur quod homo sit bene dispositus circa fines: quod quidem est per appetitum rectum. Et ideo ad prudentiam requiritur moralis virtus, per quam fit appetitus rectus.
Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, which is right aspect about things to be done, that man be well disposed with regard to the ends: and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence there is need of moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite.
Sunday, January 09, 2011
1a 2ae q57 a3: Whether the intellectual habit, art, is a virtue? Yes.
Eo modo ars habet rationem virtutis, sicut et habitus speculativi, quia ars, nec habitus speculativus, faciunt bonum opus quantum ad usum, quod est proprium virtutis perficientis appetitum, sed solum quantum ad facultatem bene agendi.
Art has the formal aspect of a virtue in the same way as the speculative habits, because neither art nor speculative habit makes a good work as regards the use of the habit, which is the property of a virtue that perfects the appetite, but only as regards the aptness to work well.
Ars, proprie loquendo, habitus operativus est. Et tamen in aliquo convenit cum habitibus speculativis, quia etiam ad ipsos habitus speculativos pertinet qualiter se habeat res quam considerant, non autem qualiter se habeat appetitus humanus ad illas.
Art, properly speaking, is an operative habit. And yet it has something in common with the speculative habits, since the quality of the object considered by the latter is a matter of concern to them also, but not how the human appetite may be affected towards that object.
Sicut scientia se habet semper ad bonum, ut dictum est, ita et ars; et secundum hoc dicitur virtus. In hoc tamen deficit a perfecta ratione virtutis, quia non facit ipsum bonum usum, sed ad hoc aliquid aliud requiritur, quamvis bonus usus sine arte esse non possit.
Just as science has always a relation to good, as stated above (q57 a2 ad 3), so it is with art; and it is on account of this that it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of the perfect formal aspect of virtue, because it does not make its possessor to use it well, for which purpose something further is requisite, although there cannot be a good use without the art.
Quia ad hoc ut homo bene utatur arte quam habet, requiritur bona voluntas, quae perficitur per virtutem moralem; ideo philosophus dicit quod artis est virtus: scilicet moralis, inquantum ad bonum usum eius aliqua virtus moralis requiritur. Manifestum est enim quod artifex per iustitiam, quae facit voluntatem rectam, inclinatur ut opus fidele faciat.
In order that man may make good use of the art he has, he needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for this reason the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art: namely, a moral virtue, insofar as the good use of art requires a moral virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully.
Etiam in ipsis speculabilibus est aliquid per modum cuiusdam operis: puta constructio syllogismi aut orationis congruae aut opus numerandi vel mensurandi. Et ideo quicumque ad huiusmodi opera rationis habitus speculativi ordinantur, dicuntur per quandam similitudinem artes, sed liberales, ad differentiam illarum artium quae ordinantur ad opera per corpus exercita, quae sunt quodammodo serviles, inquantum corpus serviliter subditur animae, et homo secundum animam est liber.
Even in speculative matters there is something by way of operation: e.g., the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to such like operations of the speculative reason, are, by a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but "liberal" arts, in order to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained to works done by the body, which arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the body is in servile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free [liber].
Illae vero scientiae quae ad nullum huiusmodi opus ordinantur, simpliciter scientiae dicuntur, non autem artes.
On the other hand, those sciences which are not ordained to any such like work, are simply called sciences, and not arts.
Art has the formal aspect of a virtue in the same way as the speculative habits, because neither art nor speculative habit makes a good work as regards the use of the habit, which is the property of a virtue that perfects the appetite, but only as regards the aptness to work well.
Ars, proprie loquendo, habitus operativus est. Et tamen in aliquo convenit cum habitibus speculativis, quia etiam ad ipsos habitus speculativos pertinet qualiter se habeat res quam considerant, non autem qualiter se habeat appetitus humanus ad illas.
Art, properly speaking, is an operative habit. And yet it has something in common with the speculative habits, since the quality of the object considered by the latter is a matter of concern to them also, but not how the human appetite may be affected towards that object.
Sicut scientia se habet semper ad bonum, ut dictum est, ita et ars; et secundum hoc dicitur virtus. In hoc tamen deficit a perfecta ratione virtutis, quia non facit ipsum bonum usum, sed ad hoc aliquid aliud requiritur, quamvis bonus usus sine arte esse non possit.
Just as science has always a relation to good, as stated above (q57 a2 ad 3), so it is with art; and it is on account of this that it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of the perfect formal aspect of virtue, because it does not make its possessor to use it well, for which purpose something further is requisite, although there cannot be a good use without the art.
Quia ad hoc ut homo bene utatur arte quam habet, requiritur bona voluntas, quae perficitur per virtutem moralem; ideo philosophus dicit quod artis est virtus: scilicet moralis, inquantum ad bonum usum eius aliqua virtus moralis requiritur. Manifestum est enim quod artifex per iustitiam, quae facit voluntatem rectam, inclinatur ut opus fidele faciat.
In order that man may make good use of the art he has, he needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for this reason the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art: namely, a moral virtue, insofar as the good use of art requires a moral virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully.
Etiam in ipsis speculabilibus est aliquid per modum cuiusdam operis: puta constructio syllogismi aut orationis congruae aut opus numerandi vel mensurandi. Et ideo quicumque ad huiusmodi opera rationis habitus speculativi ordinantur, dicuntur per quandam similitudinem artes, sed liberales, ad differentiam illarum artium quae ordinantur ad opera per corpus exercita, quae sunt quodammodo serviles, inquantum corpus serviliter subditur animae, et homo secundum animam est liber.
Even in speculative matters there is something by way of operation: e.g., the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to such like operations of the speculative reason, are, by a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but "liberal" arts, in order to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained to works done by the body, which arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the body is in servile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free [liber].
Illae vero scientiae quae ad nullum huiusmodi opus ordinantur, simpliciter scientiae dicuntur, non autem artes.
On the other hand, those sciences which are not ordained to any such like work, are simply called sciences, and not arts.
Saturday, January 08, 2011
1a 2ae q57 a2: Whether there are only three habits of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding? Yes.
Secundum diversa genera scibilium, sunt diversi habitus scientiarum, cum tamen sapientia non sit nisi una, quia sapientia est quaedam scientia, inquantum habet id quod est commune omnibus scientiis (ut scilicet ex principiis conclusiones demonstret), sed quia habet aliquid proprium supra alias scientias, inquantum scilicet de omnibus iudicat, et non solum quantum ad conclusiones, sed etiam quantum ad prima principia, ideo habet rationem perfectioris virtutis quam scientia.
According to the different kinds of knowable matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge, whereas there is but one wisdom, because wisdom is a kind of science, insofar as it has that which is common to all the sciences (viz., to demonstrate conclusions from principles), but since it has something proper to itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, not only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore it has the formal aspect of a more perfect virtue than science.
Quando ratio obiecti sub uno actu refertur ad potentiam vel habitum, tunc non distinguuntur habitus vel potentiae penes rationem obiecti et obiectum materiale.
When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a power or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit or power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object.
Principia vero demonstrationis possunt seorsum considerari, absque hoc quod considerentur conclusiones. Possunt etiam considerari simul cum conclusionibus, prout principia in conclusiones deducuntur. Considerare ergo hoc secundo modo principia, pertinet ad scientiam, quae considerat etiam conclusiones; sed considerare principia secundum seipsa, pertinet ad intellectum.
Yet the principles of a demonstration can be considered apart, without the conclusion being considered at all. Still, they can be considered together with the conclusions, since the conclusions can be deduced from them. Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second way, belongs to science, which considers the conclusions also; while to consider the principles in themselves, belongs to understanding.
Scientia dependet ab intellectu sicut a principaliori. Et utrumque dependet a sapientia sicut a principalissimo, quae sub se continet et intellectum et scientiam, ut de conclusionibus scientiarum diiudicans, et de principiis earundem.
Science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and both of these depend on wisdom, as obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the conclusions of science, and of the principles on which they are based.
Sapientia considerat altissimas causas, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Unde convenienter iudicat et ordinat de omnibus, quia iudicium perfectum et universale haberi non potest nisi per resolutionem ad primas causas.
Wisdom considers the highest causes, as stated in Metaph. i, 1,2. Wherefore it fittingly judges all things and sets them in order, because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is not resolvable to the first causes.
According to the different kinds of knowable matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge, whereas there is but one wisdom, because wisdom is a kind of science, insofar as it has that which is common to all the sciences (viz., to demonstrate conclusions from principles), but since it has something proper to itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, not only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore it has the formal aspect of a more perfect virtue than science.
Quando ratio obiecti sub uno actu refertur ad potentiam vel habitum, tunc non distinguuntur habitus vel potentiae penes rationem obiecti et obiectum materiale.
When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a power or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit or power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object.
Principia vero demonstrationis possunt seorsum considerari, absque hoc quod considerentur conclusiones. Possunt etiam considerari simul cum conclusionibus, prout principia in conclusiones deducuntur. Considerare ergo hoc secundo modo principia, pertinet ad scientiam, quae considerat etiam conclusiones; sed considerare principia secundum seipsa, pertinet ad intellectum.
Yet the principles of a demonstration can be considered apart, without the conclusion being considered at all. Still, they can be considered together with the conclusions, since the conclusions can be deduced from them. Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second way, belongs to science, which considers the conclusions also; while to consider the principles in themselves, belongs to understanding.
Scientia dependet ab intellectu sicut a principaliori. Et utrumque dependet a sapientia sicut a principalissimo, quae sub se continet et intellectum et scientiam, ut de conclusionibus scientiarum diiudicans, et de principiis earundem.
Science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and both of these depend on wisdom, as obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the conclusions of science, and of the principles on which they are based.
Sapientia considerat altissimas causas, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Unde convenienter iudicat et ordinat de omnibus, quia iudicium perfectum et universale haberi non potest nisi per resolutionem ad primas causas.
Wisdom considers the highest causes, as stated in Metaph. i, 1,2. Wherefore it fittingly judges all things and sets them in order, because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is not resolvable to the first causes.
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