Secundum delectationem voluntatis humanae, praecipue iudicatur homo bonus vel malus, quia est bonus et virtuosus qui gaudet in operibus virtutum, malus autem qui in operibus malis.
Man is reckoned to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will, because that man is good and virtuous, who takes pleasure in the works of virtue, and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works.
Omnis delectatio in hoc est uniformis, quod est quies in aliquo bono, et secundum hoc potest esse regula vel mensura. Nam ille bonus est cuius voluntas quiescit in vero bono; malus autem, cuius voluntas quiescit in malo.
All pleasures are uniform in the point of their being the repose of the appetite in something good, and in this respect pleasure can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose will rests in the true good; and that man evil, whose will rests in evil.
Delectationes autem appetitus sensitivi non sunt regula bonitatis vel malitiae moralis, nam cibus communiter delectabilis est secundum appetitum sensitivum, bonis et malis. Sed voluntas bonorum delectatur in eis secundum convenientiam rationis, quam non curat voluntas malorum.
On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the rule of moral goodness and malice, since food is universally pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in conformity with reason, to which the will of the evil man gives no heed.
Cum delectatio perficiat operationem per modum finis, ut supra dictum est, non potest esse operatio perfecte bona, nisi etiam adsit delectatio in bono, nam bonitas rei dependet ex fine. Et sic quodammodo bonitas delectationis est causa bonitas in operatione.
Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as stated above (q33 a4), an operation cannot be perfectly good, unless there be also pleasure in good, because the goodness of a thing depends on its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation.