Actiones humanae (et alia quorum bonitas dependet ab alio) habent rationem bonitatis ex fine a quo dependent, praeter bonitatem absolutam quae in eis existit, quia oportet quod [actio] consideretur per considerationem ad causam a qua dependet.
Human actions (and other things, the goodness of which depends on something else) have a formal aspect of goodness from the end on which they depend, besides that goodness which is in them absolutely, because in their regard we must consider their being in its relation to the cause on which it depends.
Sic igitur in actione humana bonitas quadruplex considerari potest.
Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action.
Una quidem secundum genus, prout scilicet est actio, quia quantum habet de actione et entitate, tantum habet de bonitate.
(1) First, that which, as an action, it derives from its genus; because as much as it has of action and being so much has it of goodness.
Alia vero secundum speciem, quae accipitur secundum obiectum conveniens.
(2) Secondly, it has goodness according to its species; which is derived with respect to its fitting object.
Tertia secundum circumstantias, quasi secundum accidentia quaedam.
(3) Thirdly, it has goodness from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its accidents.
Quarta autem secundum finem, quasi secundum habitudinem ad causam bonitatis.
(4) Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, with respect to its proportion to the cause of its goodness.
Nihil prohibet actioni habenti unam praedictarum bonitatum, deesse aliam. Et secundum hoc, contingit actionem quae est bona secundum speciem suam vel secundum circumstantias, ordinari ad finem malum, et e converso.
Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the way mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way. And thus it may happen that an action which is good in its species or in its circumstances is ordained to an evil end, or vice versa.
Non tamen est actio bona simpliciter, nisi omnes bonitates concurrant, quia "quilibet singularis defectus causat malum, bonum autem causatur ex integra causa", ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom.
However, an action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways, since "any single defect causes evil, but good is caused from an integral cause," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Bonum ad quod aliquis respiciens operatur, non semper est verum bonum: sed quandoque verum bonum, et quandoque apparens. Et secundum hoc, ex fine sequitur actio mala.
The good in view of which one acts is not always a true good: sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent good. And in the latter event, an evil action results from the end in view.