In amore amicitiae, affectus alicuius simpliciter exit extra se, quia vult amico bonum, et operatur, quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius, propter ipsum amicum.
In the love of friendship, a man's affection goes out from itself simply, because he wishes and does good to his friend, by caring and providing for him, for his sake.
Extasim pati aliquis dicitur, cum extra se ponitur.
Someone is said to suffer ecstasy when he is placed outside himself.
Secundum appetitivam vero partem dicitur aliquis extasim pati, quando appetitus alicuius in alterum fertur, exiens quodammodo extra seipsum.
As to the appetitive power, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, when that power is borne towards something else, so that it goes forth out from itself, as it were.
"It is because the contemporary alternatives seem so one-sided and are not more evidently solutions to the problems which Thomas faced, and partly solved, that we return to him and to the tradition of theology and philosophy in which his Summa Theologiae appears: theology as the science of the first principle and this as the total knowledge of reality in its unity." -- Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself (Oxford University Press, 1987), p.159.
Sunday, May 02, 2010
Saturday, May 01, 2010
1a 2ae q28 a2: Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love? Yes.
Mutua inhaesio intelligi in amore amicitiae, secundum viam redamationis, inquantum mutuo se amant amici, et sibi invicem bona volunt et operantur, quia eadem ratione, quilibet amor facit amatum esse in amante, et e converso.
Mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can be understood in regard to reciprocal love, inasmuch as friends return love for love, and both desire and do good things for one another, because by the same formal aspect, every love makes the beloved to be in the lover, and vice versa.
Iste effectus mutuae inhaesionis potest intelligi et quantum ad vim apprehensivam, et quantum ad vim appetitivam. Nam quantum ad vim apprehensivam amatum dicitur esse in amante, inquantum amatum immoratur in apprehensione amantis.
This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power. Because, as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the love.
Sed quantum ad vim appetitivam, amatum dicitur esse in amante, prout est per quandam complacentiam in eius affectu, ut vel delectetur in eo, aut in bonis eius, apud praesentiam; vel in absentia, per desiderium tendat in ipsum amatum per amorem concupiscentiae, vel in bona quae vult amato, per amorem amicitiae: non quidem ex aliqua extrinseca causa (sicut cum aliquis desiderat aliquid propter alterum, vel cum aliquis vult bonum alteri propter aliquid aliud) sed propter complacentiam amati interius radicatam. Unde et amor dicitur intimus; et dicuntur viscera caritatis.
As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of fitting pleasure, causing him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to the beloved, with the love of friendship: not indeed from any extrinsic cause (as when we desire one thing on account of another, or wish good to another on account of something else), but because the fitting pleasure in the beloved is rooted in the lover's heart. For this reason we speak of love as being "intimate"; and "of the bowels of charity."
Mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can be understood in regard to reciprocal love, inasmuch as friends return love for love, and both desire and do good things for one another, because by the same formal aspect, every love makes the beloved to be in the lover, and vice versa.
Iste effectus mutuae inhaesionis potest intelligi et quantum ad vim apprehensivam, et quantum ad vim appetitivam. Nam quantum ad vim apprehensivam amatum dicitur esse in amante, inquantum amatum immoratur in apprehensione amantis.
This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power. Because, as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the love.
Sed quantum ad vim appetitivam, amatum dicitur esse in amante, prout est per quandam complacentiam in eius affectu, ut vel delectetur in eo, aut in bonis eius, apud praesentiam; vel in absentia, per desiderium tendat in ipsum amatum per amorem concupiscentiae, vel in bona quae vult amato, per amorem amicitiae: non quidem ex aliqua extrinseca causa (sicut cum aliquis desiderat aliquid propter alterum, vel cum aliquis vult bonum alteri propter aliquid aliud) sed propter complacentiam amati interius radicatam. Unde et amor dicitur intimus; et dicuntur viscera caritatis.
As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of fitting pleasure, causing him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to the beloved, with the love of friendship: not indeed from any extrinsic cause (as when we desire one thing on account of another, or wish good to another on account of something else), but because the fitting pleasure in the beloved is rooted in the lover's heart. For this reason we speak of love as being "intimate"; and "of the bowels of charity."
Friday, April 30, 2010
1a 2ae q28 a1: Whether union is an effect of love? Yes.
Amor quilibet est virtus unitiva quia amor vero et in absentia et in praesentia.
Every love is a unitive love because love remains whether the beloved be absent or present.
Unio tripliciter se habet ad amorem. Quaedam enim unio est causa amoris. Et haec quidem est unio substantialis, quantum ad amorem quo quis amat seipsum, quantum vero ad amorem quo quis amat alia, est unio similitudinis, ut dictum est.
Union has a threefold relation to love. There is union which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the love with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as stated above (q27 a3).
Quaedam vero unio est essentialiter ipse amor. Et haec est unio secundum coaptationem affectus. Quae quidem assimilatur unioni substantiali, inquantum amans se habet ad amatum, in amore quidem amicitiae, ut ad seipsum; in amore autem concupiscentiae, ut ad aliquid sui.
There is also a union which is essentially love itself. This union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened to substantial union, inasmuch as the lover stands to the object of his love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something belonging to himself, if it be love of concupiscence.
Quaedam vero unio est effectus amoris. Et haec est unio realis, quam amans quaerit de re amata. Et haec quidem unio est secundum convenientiam amoris, ut enim philosophus refert, II Politic., "Aristophanes dixit quod amantes desiderarent ex ambobus fieri unum, sed quia ex hoc accideret aut ambos aut alterum corrumpi", quaerunt unionem quae convenit et decet; ut scilicet simul conversentur, et simul colloquantur, et in aliis huiusmodi coniungantur.
Again there is a union, which is the effect of love. This is real union, which the lover seeks with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in keeping with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates (Polit. ii, 1), "Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into one," but since "this would result in either one or both being destroyed," they seek a suitable and becoming union--to live together, speak together, and be united together in other like things.
Duplex est unio amantis ad amatum. Una quidem secundum rem, puta cum amatum praesentialiter adest amanti. Alia vero secundum affectum. Quae quidem unio consideranda est ex apprehensione praecedente, nam motus appetitivus sequitur apprehensionem.
The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover. The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement of the appetite follows apprehension.
Cum autem sit duplex amor, scilicet concupiscentiae et amicitiae, uterque procedit ex quadam apprehensione unitatis amati ad amantem. Cum enim aliquis amat aliquid quasi concupiscens illud, apprehendit illud quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse.
Now love being twofold, viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the lover. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being.
Similiter cum aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum sicut et sibi vult bonum, unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se, inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum sicut et sibi ipsi.
In like manner when a man loves another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends him as his other self, insofar, to wit, as he wills good to him as to himself.
Et inde est quod amicus dicitur esse alter ipse, et Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., "bene quidam dixit de amico suo, dimidium animae suae".
Hence a friend is called a man's "other self" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul."
Primam ergo unionem amor facit effective, quia movet ad desiderandum et quaerendum praesentiam amati, quasi sibi convenientis et ad se pertinentis.
The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love; because love moves man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of something suitable and belonging to him.
Secundam autem unionem facit formaliter, quia ipse amor est talis unio vel nexus. Unde Augustinus dicit, in VIII de Trin., quod "amor est quasi vita quaedam duo aliqua copulans, vel copulare appetens, amantem scilicet et quod amatur". Quod enim dicit copulans, refertur ad unionem affectus, sine qua non est amor, quod vero dicit copulare intendens, pertinet ad unionem realem.
The second union is caused "formally" by love; because love itself is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital principle uniting, or seeking to unite two together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved." For in describing it as "uniting" he refers to the union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying that "it seeks to unite," he refers to real union.
Every love is a unitive love because love remains whether the beloved be absent or present.
Unio tripliciter se habet ad amorem. Quaedam enim unio est causa amoris. Et haec quidem est unio substantialis, quantum ad amorem quo quis amat seipsum, quantum vero ad amorem quo quis amat alia, est unio similitudinis, ut dictum est.
Union has a threefold relation to love. There is union which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the love with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as stated above (q27 a3).
Quaedam vero unio est essentialiter ipse amor. Et haec est unio secundum coaptationem affectus. Quae quidem assimilatur unioni substantiali, inquantum amans se habet ad amatum, in amore quidem amicitiae, ut ad seipsum; in amore autem concupiscentiae, ut ad aliquid sui.
There is also a union which is essentially love itself. This union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened to substantial union, inasmuch as the lover stands to the object of his love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something belonging to himself, if it be love of concupiscence.
Quaedam vero unio est effectus amoris. Et haec est unio realis, quam amans quaerit de re amata. Et haec quidem unio est secundum convenientiam amoris, ut enim philosophus refert, II Politic., "Aristophanes dixit quod amantes desiderarent ex ambobus fieri unum, sed quia ex hoc accideret aut ambos aut alterum corrumpi", quaerunt unionem quae convenit et decet; ut scilicet simul conversentur, et simul colloquantur, et in aliis huiusmodi coniungantur.
Again there is a union, which is the effect of love. This is real union, which the lover seeks with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in keeping with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates (Polit. ii, 1), "Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into one," but since "this would result in either one or both being destroyed," they seek a suitable and becoming union--to live together, speak together, and be united together in other like things.
Duplex est unio amantis ad amatum. Una quidem secundum rem, puta cum amatum praesentialiter adest amanti. Alia vero secundum affectum. Quae quidem unio consideranda est ex apprehensione praecedente, nam motus appetitivus sequitur apprehensionem.
The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover. The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement of the appetite follows apprehension.
Cum autem sit duplex amor, scilicet concupiscentiae et amicitiae, uterque procedit ex quadam apprehensione unitatis amati ad amantem. Cum enim aliquis amat aliquid quasi concupiscens illud, apprehendit illud quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse.
Now love being twofold, viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the lover. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being.
Similiter cum aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum sicut et sibi vult bonum, unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se, inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum sicut et sibi ipsi.
In like manner when a man loves another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends him as his other self, insofar, to wit, as he wills good to him as to himself.
Et inde est quod amicus dicitur esse alter ipse, et Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., "bene quidam dixit de amico suo, dimidium animae suae".
Hence a friend is called a man's "other self" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul."
Primam ergo unionem amor facit effective, quia movet ad desiderandum et quaerendum praesentiam amati, quasi sibi convenientis et ad se pertinentis.
The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love; because love moves man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of something suitable and belonging to him.
Secundam autem unionem facit formaliter, quia ipse amor est talis unio vel nexus. Unde Augustinus dicit, in VIII de Trin., quod "amor est quasi vita quaedam duo aliqua copulans, vel copulare appetens, amantem scilicet et quod amatur". Quod enim dicit copulans, refertur ad unionem affectus, sine qua non est amor, quod vero dicit copulare intendens, pertinet ad unionem realem.
The second union is caused "formally" by love; because love itself is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital principle uniting, or seeking to unite two together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved." For in describing it as "uniting" he refers to the union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying that "it seeks to unite," he refers to real union.
Thursday, April 29, 2010
1a 2ae q27 a4: Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love? No.
Nulla alia passio animae est quae non praesupponat aliquem amorem, quia omnis alia passio animae vel importat motum ad aliquid, vel quietem in aliquo; omnis autem motus in aliquid, vel quies in aliquo, ex aliqua connaturalitate vel coaptatione procedit, quae pertinet ad rationem amoris.
There is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose love of some kind, because every other passion of the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in something; but every movement towards something, or rest in something, arises from some connaturality or fitting aptness, which pertains to love's formal aspect.
Unde impossibile est quod aliqua alia passio animae sit causa universaliter omnis amoris. Contingit tamen aliquam aliam passionem esse causam amoris alicuius, sicut etiam unum bonum est causa alterius.
Therefore it is not possible for any other passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it may happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular love, just as one good is the cause of another.
Cum aliquis amat aliquid propter delectationem, amor quidem ille causatur ex delectatione, sed delectatio illa iterum causatur ex alio amore praecedente; nullus enim delectatur, nisi in re aliquo modo amata.
When someone loves something for the pleasure it affords, love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure is caused, in its turn, by another preceding love; for nobody takes pleasure, save in that which is loved in some way.
There is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose love of some kind, because every other passion of the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in something; but every movement towards something, or rest in something, arises from some connaturality or fitting aptness, which pertains to love's formal aspect.
Unde impossibile est quod aliqua alia passio animae sit causa universaliter omnis amoris. Contingit tamen aliquam aliam passionem esse causam amoris alicuius, sicut etiam unum bonum est causa alterius.
Therefore it is not possible for any other passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it may happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular love, just as one good is the cause of another.
Cum aliquis amat aliquid propter delectationem, amor quidem ille causatur ex delectatione, sed delectatio illa iterum causatur ex alio amore praecedente; nullus enim delectatur, nisi in re aliquo modo amata.
When someone loves something for the pleasure it affords, love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure is caused, in its turn, by another preceding love; for nobody takes pleasure, save in that which is loved in some way.
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
1a 2ae q27 a3: Whether likeness is a cause of love? Yes.
Similitudo, proprie loquendo, est causa amoris quia in amore concupiscentiae amans proprie amat seipsum, cum vult illud bonum quod concupiscit.
Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love, because in the love of concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in willing the good that he desires.
Magis autem unusquisque seipsum amat quam alium, quia sibi unus est in substantia, alteri vero in similitudine alicuius formae. Et ideo si ex eo quod est sibi similis in participatione formae, impediatur ipsemet a consecutione boni quod amat, efficitur ei odiosus, non inquantum est similis, sed inquantum est proprii boni impeditivus.
But a man loves himself more than another, because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only in the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other's likeness to him arising from the participation of a form, hinders him from gaining the good that he loves, he becomes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good.
Et propter hoc figuli corrixantur ad invicem, quia se invicem impediunt in proprio lucro, et inter superbos sunt iurgia, quia se invicem impediunt in propria excellentia, quam concupiscunt.
This is why "potters quarrel among themselves," because they hinder one another's gain, and why "there are contentions among the proud," because they hinder one another in attaining the position they covet.
Ille qui amat hoc quo indiget, habet similitudinem ad id quod amat sicut quod est potentia ad actum.
He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to that which he loves, as what is in potency [bears a likeness] to its act.
Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love, because in the love of concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in willing the good that he desires.
Magis autem unusquisque seipsum amat quam alium, quia sibi unus est in substantia, alteri vero in similitudine alicuius formae. Et ideo si ex eo quod est sibi similis in participatione formae, impediatur ipsemet a consecutione boni quod amat, efficitur ei odiosus, non inquantum est similis, sed inquantum est proprii boni impeditivus.
But a man loves himself more than another, because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only in the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other's likeness to him arising from the participation of a form, hinders him from gaining the good that he loves, he becomes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good.
Et propter hoc figuli corrixantur ad invicem, quia se invicem impediunt in proprio lucro, et inter superbos sunt iurgia, quia se invicem impediunt in propria excellentia, quam concupiscunt.
This is why "potters quarrel among themselves," because they hinder one another's gain, and why "there are contentions among the proud," because they hinder one another in attaining the position they covet.
Ille qui amat hoc quo indiget, habet similitudinem ad id quod amat sicut quod est potentia ad actum.
He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to that which he loves, as what is in potency [bears a likeness] to its act.
Tuesday, April 27, 2010
1a 2ae q27 a2: Whether knowledge is a cause of love? Yes.
Amor requirit aliquam apprehensionem boni quod amatur quia bonum est causa amoris per modum obiecti, sed bonum non est obiectum appetitus, nisi prout est apprehensum.
Love demands some apprehension of the good that is loved because good is the cause of love, as being its object, but good is not the object of the appetite, except as apprehended.
Augustinus probat, in X de Trin., quod "nullus potest amare aliquid incognitum."
Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2) that "none can love what he does not know."
Aliquid requiritur ad perfectionem cognitionis, quod non requiritur ad perfectionem amoris. Cognitio enim ad rationem pertinet, cuius est distinguere inter ea quae secundum rem sunt coniuncta, et componere (quodammodo) ea quae sunt diversa, unum alteri comparando. Et ideo ad perfectionem cognitionis requiritur quod homo cognoscat singillatim quidquid est in re (sicut partes et virtutes et proprietates).
Something is required for the perfection of cognition, that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For cognition is oriented towards formal aspect, whose [function] it is to distinguish between aspects which in the thing are united, and to unite together (in some sort of way) aspects that are distinct, by comparing one [aspect] with another. Consequently the perfection of cognition requires that a man should cognize one by one whatever is in a thing (such as its parts, powers, and properties).
Sed amor est in vi appetitiva, quae respicit rem secundum quod in se est. Unde ad perfectionem amoris sufficit quod res prout in se apprehenditur, ametur. Ob hoc ergo contingit quod aliquid plus amatur quam cognoscatur, quia potest perfecte amari, etiam si non perfecte cognoscatur.
On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which regards a thing according to what it is in itself. Wherefore it suffices, for the perfection of love, that a thing be loved as far as it is known in itself. Hence it is, therefore, that something is loved more than it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known.
Love demands some apprehension of the good that is loved because good is the cause of love, as being its object, but good is not the object of the appetite, except as apprehended.
Augustinus probat, in X de Trin., quod "nullus potest amare aliquid incognitum."
Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2) that "none can love what he does not know."
Aliquid requiritur ad perfectionem cognitionis, quod non requiritur ad perfectionem amoris. Cognitio enim ad rationem pertinet, cuius est distinguere inter ea quae secundum rem sunt coniuncta, et componere (quodammodo) ea quae sunt diversa, unum alteri comparando. Et ideo ad perfectionem cognitionis requiritur quod homo cognoscat singillatim quidquid est in re (sicut partes et virtutes et proprietates).
Something is required for the perfection of cognition, that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For cognition is oriented towards formal aspect, whose [function] it is to distinguish between aspects which in the thing are united, and to unite together (in some sort of way) aspects that are distinct, by comparing one [aspect] with another. Consequently the perfection of cognition requires that a man should cognize one by one whatever is in a thing (such as its parts, powers, and properties).
Sed amor est in vi appetitiva, quae respicit rem secundum quod in se est. Unde ad perfectionem amoris sufficit quod res prout in se apprehenditur, ametur. Ob hoc ergo contingit quod aliquid plus amatur quam cognoscatur, quia potest perfecte amari, etiam si non perfecte cognoscatur.
On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which regards a thing according to what it is in itself. Wherefore it suffices, for the perfection of love, that a thing be loved as far as it is known in itself. Hence it is, therefore, that something is loved more than it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known.
Monday, April 26, 2010
1a 2ae q27 a1: Whether good is the only cause of love? Yes.
Bonum est propria causa amoris quia amoris proprium obiectum est bonum; quia, ut dictum est, amor importat quandam connaturalitatem vel complacentiam amantis ad amatum; unicuique autem est bonum id quod est sibi connaturale et proportionatum.
Good is the proper cause of love because the proper object of love is the good; since, as stated above (q26, a1,a2), love implies a certain connaturalness, or fitting pleasure, of the lover for the thing beloved; and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and [fittingly] proportionate to it.
Amor ad appetitivam potentiam pertinet, quae est vis passiva. Unde obiectum eius comparatur ad ipsam sicut causa motus vel actus ipsius. Oportet igitur ut illud sit proprie causa amoris quod est amoris obiectum.
Love belongs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause of its movement or act. Therefore the cause of love must needs be love's object.
Malum nunquam amatur nisi sub ratione boni, scilicet inquantum est secundum quid bonum, et apprehenditur ut simpliciter bonum. Et sic aliquis amor est malus, inquantum tendit in id quod non est simpliciter verum bonum.
Evil is never loved except under the formal aspect of good, that is to say, insofar as it is good in some respect, but is [instead] considered as being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil, insofar as it tends to that which is not simply a true good.
Pulchrum est idem bono, sola ratione differens. Cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus; sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus.
The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in formal aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the formal aspect of good is that which calms the appetite; while the formal aspect of the beautiful is that which calms the appetite by its [merely] being seen or known.
Unde et illi sensus praecipue respiciunt pulchrum, qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt: scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes.
Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most cognitive: viz. sight and hearing, as [the senses that are foremost in] attaining the formal aspect.
Dicimus enim pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. In sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum, non utimur nomine pulchritudinis, non enim dicimus pulchros sapores aut odores.
For we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to the other formal objects of (i.e., the other specific things sensed by) the other senses, we do not [customarily] use the expression "beautiful," for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful odors.
Et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra bonum, quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam: ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet.
Thus it is evident that beauty adds, on top of goodness, a certain ordination towards cognitive power: thus results the [customary] fact that "good" is spoken of that which simply pleases the appetite; while "beautiful" is spoken of that about which [merely] the apprehension itself is pleasing.
Good is the proper cause of love because the proper object of love is the good; since, as stated above (q26, a1,a2), love implies a certain connaturalness, or fitting pleasure, of the lover for the thing beloved; and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and [fittingly] proportionate to it.
Amor ad appetitivam potentiam pertinet, quae est vis passiva. Unde obiectum eius comparatur ad ipsam sicut causa motus vel actus ipsius. Oportet igitur ut illud sit proprie causa amoris quod est amoris obiectum.
Love belongs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause of its movement or act. Therefore the cause of love must needs be love's object.
Malum nunquam amatur nisi sub ratione boni, scilicet inquantum est secundum quid bonum, et apprehenditur ut simpliciter bonum. Et sic aliquis amor est malus, inquantum tendit in id quod non est simpliciter verum bonum.
Evil is never loved except under the formal aspect of good, that is to say, insofar as it is good in some respect, but is [instead] considered as being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil, insofar as it tends to that which is not simply a true good.
Pulchrum est idem bono, sola ratione differens. Cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus; sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus.
The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in formal aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the formal aspect of good is that which calms the appetite; while the formal aspect of the beautiful is that which calms the appetite by its [merely] being seen or known.
Unde et illi sensus praecipue respiciunt pulchrum, qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt: scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes.
Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most cognitive: viz. sight and hearing, as [the senses that are foremost in] attaining the formal aspect.
Dicimus enim pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. In sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum, non utimur nomine pulchritudinis, non enim dicimus pulchros sapores aut odores.
For we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to the other formal objects of (i.e., the other specific things sensed by) the other senses, we do not [customarily] use the expression "beautiful," for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful odors.
Et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra bonum, quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam: ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet.
Thus it is evident that beauty adds, on top of goodness, a certain ordination towards cognitive power: thus results the [customary] fact that "good" is spoken of that which simply pleases the appetite; while "beautiful" is spoken of that about which [merely] the apprehension itself is pleasing.
Thursday, April 22, 2010
1a 2ae q26 a4: Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence? Yes.
Alius est amor concupiscentiae, et alius est amor amicitiae, quia ad illud bonum quod quis vult alteri, habetur amor concupiscentiae, ad illud autem cui aliquis vult bonum, habetur amor amicitiae.
Love of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship because man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes good.
Amor non dividitur per amicitiam et concupiscentiam, sed per amorem amicitiae et concupiscentiae. Nam ille proprie dicitur amicus, cui aliquod bonum volumus, illud autem dicimur concupiscere, quod volumus nobis.
Love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence. For a friend is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good, while we are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves.
Haec autem divisio est secundum prius et posterius. Nam id quod amatur amore amicitiae, simpliciter et per se amatur, quod autem amatur amore concupiscentiae, non simpliciter et secundum se amatur, sed amatur alteri. Sicut enim ens simpliciter est quod habet esse, ens autem secundum quid quod est in alio; ita bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, simpliciter quidem est quod ipsum habet bonitatem; quod autem est bonum alterius, est bonum secundum quid. Et per consequens amor quo amatur aliquid ut ei sit bonum, est amor simpliciter, amor autem quo amatur aliquid ut sit bonum alterius, est amor secundum quid.
Now the members of this division are related as primary and secondary: since that which is loved with the love of friendship is loved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, but for something else. For just as that which has existence, is a being simply, while that which exists in another is a relative being; so, because good is convertible with being, the good, which itself has goodness, is good simply; but that which is another's good, is a relative good. Consequently the love with which a thing is loved, that it may have some good, is love simply; while the love, with which a thing is loved, that it may be another's good, is relative love.
In amicitia utilis et delectabilis, vult quidem aliquis aliquod bonum amico, et quantum ad hoc salvatur ibi ratio amicitiae. Sed quia illud bonum refert ulterius ad suam delectationem vel utilitatem, inde est quod amicitia utilis et delectabilis, inquantum trahitur ad amorem concupiscentiae, deficit a ratione verae amicitiae.
When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good, and in this respect the formal aspect of friendship is preserved. But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of the useful or pleasant, insofar as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the formal aspect of true friendship.
Love of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship because man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes good.
Amor non dividitur per amicitiam et concupiscentiam, sed per amorem amicitiae et concupiscentiae. Nam ille proprie dicitur amicus, cui aliquod bonum volumus, illud autem dicimur concupiscere, quod volumus nobis.
Love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence. For a friend is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good, while we are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves.
Haec autem divisio est secundum prius et posterius. Nam id quod amatur amore amicitiae, simpliciter et per se amatur, quod autem amatur amore concupiscentiae, non simpliciter et secundum se amatur, sed amatur alteri. Sicut enim ens simpliciter est quod habet esse, ens autem secundum quid quod est in alio; ita bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, simpliciter quidem est quod ipsum habet bonitatem; quod autem est bonum alterius, est bonum secundum quid. Et per consequens amor quo amatur aliquid ut ei sit bonum, est amor simpliciter, amor autem quo amatur aliquid ut sit bonum alterius, est amor secundum quid.
Now the members of this division are related as primary and secondary: since that which is loved with the love of friendship is loved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, but for something else. For just as that which has existence, is a being simply, while that which exists in another is a relative being; so, because good is convertible with being, the good, which itself has goodness, is good simply; but that which is another's good, is a relative good. Consequently the love with which a thing is loved, that it may have some good, is love simply; while the love, with which a thing is loved, that it may be another's good, is relative love.
In amicitia utilis et delectabilis, vult quidem aliquis aliquod bonum amico, et quantum ad hoc salvatur ibi ratio amicitiae. Sed quia illud bonum refert ulterius ad suam delectationem vel utilitatem, inde est quod amicitia utilis et delectabilis, inquantum trahitur ad amorem concupiscentiae, deficit a ratione verae amicitiae.
When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good, and in this respect the formal aspect of friendship is preserved. But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of the useful or pleasant, insofar as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the formal aspect of true friendship.
Wednesday, April 21, 2010
1a 2ae q26 a3: Whether love is the same as dilection? No.
Obiectum amoris est communius quam obiectum dilectionis, quia ad plura se extendit amor quam dilectio.
The object of love is more general than the object of dilection because love extends to more than dilection does.
Nam amor communius est inter ea, omnis enim dilectio vel caritas est amor, sed non e converso. Addit enim dilectio, supra amorem, electionem praecedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Unde dilectio non est in concupiscibili, sed in voluntate tantum, et est in sola rationali natura. Caritas autem addit, supra amorem, perfectionem quandam amoris, inquantum id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur, ut ipsum nomen designat.
For love has a wider signification among these words, since every dilection or charity is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition to love, a choice [electionem] made beforehand, as the very word denotes. And therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in the will, and only in the formally aspectual nature. Charity denotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love, insofar as that which is loved is held to be of great price, as the word itself implies [Referring to the Latin "carus" (dear)].
Ideo aliqui posuerunt, etiam in ipsa voluntate, nomen amoris esse divinius nomine dilectionis, quia amor importat quandam passionem, praecipue secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo; dilectio autem praesupponit iudicium rationis. Magis autem homo in Deum tendere potest per amorem, passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo attractus, quam ad hoc eum propria ratio ducere possit, quod pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, ut dictum est. Et propter hoc, divinius est amor quam dilectio.
Thus some held that, even when applied to the will itself, the word "love" signifies something more Godlike than "dilection," because love denotes a kind of passion, especially insofar as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection presupposes the judgment of formal aspect. But it is more possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his aspectual apprehension, which pertains to the formal aspect of dilection, as stated above. And consequently love is more Godlike than dilection.
The object of love is more general than the object of dilection because love extends to more than dilection does.
Nam amor communius est inter ea, omnis enim dilectio vel caritas est amor, sed non e converso. Addit enim dilectio, supra amorem, electionem praecedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Unde dilectio non est in concupiscibili, sed in voluntate tantum, et est in sola rationali natura. Caritas autem addit, supra amorem, perfectionem quandam amoris, inquantum id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur, ut ipsum nomen designat.
For love has a wider signification among these words, since every dilection or charity is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition to love, a choice [electionem] made beforehand, as the very word denotes. And therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in the will, and only in the formally aspectual nature. Charity denotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love, insofar as that which is loved is held to be of great price, as the word itself implies [Referring to the Latin "carus" (dear)].
Ideo aliqui posuerunt, etiam in ipsa voluntate, nomen amoris esse divinius nomine dilectionis, quia amor importat quandam passionem, praecipue secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo; dilectio autem praesupponit iudicium rationis. Magis autem homo in Deum tendere potest per amorem, passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo attractus, quam ad hoc eum propria ratio ducere possit, quod pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, ut dictum est. Et propter hoc, divinius est amor quam dilectio.
Thus some held that, even when applied to the will itself, the word "love" signifies something more Godlike than "dilection," because love denotes a kind of passion, especially insofar as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection presupposes the judgment of formal aspect. But it is more possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his aspectual apprehension, which pertains to the formal aspect of dilection, as stated above. And consequently love is more Godlike than dilection.
Tuesday, April 20, 2010
1a 2ae q26 a2: Whether love is a passion? Yes.
Amor et passio (proprie quidem, secundum quod est in concupiscibili; communiter autem, et extenso nomine, secundum quod est in voluntate) quia amor consistat in quadam immutatione appetitus ab appetibili.
Love is a passion (properly so called, according as it is in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will) because love consists in a change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object.
Passio est effectus agentis in patiente. Agens autem naturale duplicem effectum inducit in patiens, nam primo quidem dat formam, secundo autem dat motum consequentem formam.
Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient, for in the first place it gives it the form, and secondly it gives it the movement that results from the form.
Sic etiam ipsum appetibile dat appetitui, primo quidem, quandam coaptationem ad ipsum, quae est complacentia appetibilis; ex qua sequitur motus ad appetibile.
In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object.
Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium; et ultimo quies, quae est gaudium.
The first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called "love," and is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and this movement is "desire"; and lastly, there is rest which is "joy."
Philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod amor est passio.
The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love is a passion."
Unio pertinet ad amorem, inquantum per complacentiam appetitus, amans se habet ad id quod amat, sicut ad seipsum, vel ad aliquid sui. Et sic patet quod amor non est ipsa relatio unionis, sed unio est consequens amorem. Unde et Dionysius dicit quod "amor est virtus unitiva", et philosophus dicit, in II Polit., quod unio est opus amoris.
Union belongs to love insofar as by the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that which he loves, as though it were himself, or part of himself. Hence it is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but that union is a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that "love is a unitive force" (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 1) that union is the work of love.
Love is a passion (properly so called, according as it is in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will) because love consists in a change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object.
Passio est effectus agentis in patiente. Agens autem naturale duplicem effectum inducit in patiens, nam primo quidem dat formam, secundo autem dat motum consequentem formam.
Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient, for in the first place it gives it the form, and secondly it gives it the movement that results from the form.
Sic etiam ipsum appetibile dat appetitui, primo quidem, quandam coaptationem ad ipsum, quae est complacentia appetibilis; ex qua sequitur motus ad appetibile.
In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object.
Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium; et ultimo quies, quae est gaudium.
The first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called "love," and is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and this movement is "desire"; and lastly, there is rest which is "joy."
Philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod amor est passio.
The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love is a passion."
Unio pertinet ad amorem, inquantum per complacentiam appetitus, amans se habet ad id quod amat, sicut ad seipsum, vel ad aliquid sui. Et sic patet quod amor non est ipsa relatio unionis, sed unio est consequens amorem. Unde et Dionysius dicit quod "amor est virtus unitiva", et philosophus dicit, in II Polit., quod unio est opus amoris.
Union belongs to love insofar as by the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that which he loves, as though it were himself, or part of himself. Hence it is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but that union is a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that "love is a unitive force" (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 1) that union is the work of love.
Monday, April 19, 2010
1a 2ae q26 a1: Whether love is in the concupiscible power? Yes.
Amor pertinet ad concupiscibilem, quia dicitur per respectum ad bonum absolute, non per respectum ad arduum, quod est obiectum irascibilis.
Love belongs to the concupiscible power, because it regards good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible faculty.
Amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum. In appetitu autem naturali, principium huiusmodi motus est connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quae dici potest amor naturalis.
The name "love" is given to the principle of movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite, the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may be called "natural love".
Et similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitivi, vel voluntatis, ad aliquod bonum, idest ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus, vel intellectivus seu rationalis. Amor igitur sensitivus est in appetitu sensitivo, sicut amor intellectivus in appetitu intellectivo.
In like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite, or of the will, to some good, that is to say, its very complacency in good is called "sensitive love," or "intellectual" or "rational love." So that sensitive love is in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual appetite.
Philosophus dicit, in II Topic., quod "amor est in concupiscibili".
The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that "love is in the concupiscible power".
Love belongs to the concupiscible power, because it regards good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible faculty.
Amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum. In appetitu autem naturali, principium huiusmodi motus est connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quae dici potest amor naturalis.
The name "love" is given to the principle of movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite, the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may be called "natural love".
Et similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitivi, vel voluntatis, ad aliquod bonum, idest ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus, vel intellectivus seu rationalis. Amor igitur sensitivus est in appetitu sensitivo, sicut amor intellectivus in appetitu intellectivo.
In like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite, or of the will, to some good, that is to say, its very complacency in good is called "sensitive love," or "intellectual" or "rational love." So that sensitive love is in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual appetite.
Philosophus dicit, in II Topic., quod "amor est in concupiscibili".
The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that "love is in the concupiscible power".
Sunday, April 18, 2010
1a 2ae q25 a4: Whether these are the four principal passions: joy, sadness, hope and fear? Yes.
Hae quatuor passiones communiter principales esse dicuntur quia
de bono praesenti est gaudium;
de malo praesenti est tristitia;
de bono vero futuro est spes;
de malo futuro est timor.
These four are commonly called the principal passions because
joy relates to present good,
sadness relates to present evil;
hope regards future good, and
fear, future evil.
Quarum duae, scilicet gaudium et tristitia, principales dicuntur, quia sunt completivae et finales simpliciter respectu omnium passionum, unde ad omnes passiones consequuntur.
Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because in them all the other passions have their completion and end.
Desperatio importat recessum a bono, quod est quasi per accidens; et audacia importat accessum ad malum, quod etiam est per accidens. Et ideo hae passiones non possunt esse principales, quia quod est per accidens, non potest dici principale. Et sic etiam nec ira potest dici passio principalis, quae consequitur audaciam.
Despair implies movement away from good, and this is, as it were, accidental; and daring implies movement towards evil, and this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal passions, because that which is accidental cannot be said to be principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion, because it arises from daring.
Augustinus ponit desiderium vel cupiditatem loco spei, inquantum ad idem pertinere videntur, scilicet ad bonum futurum.
Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, insofar as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future good.
de bono praesenti est gaudium;
de malo praesenti est tristitia;
de bono vero futuro est spes;
de malo futuro est timor.
These four are commonly called the principal passions because
joy relates to present good,
sadness relates to present evil;
hope regards future good, and
fear, future evil.
Quarum duae, scilicet gaudium et tristitia, principales dicuntur, quia sunt completivae et finales simpliciter respectu omnium passionum, unde ad omnes passiones consequuntur.
Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because in them all the other passions have their completion and end.
Desperatio importat recessum a bono, quod est quasi per accidens; et audacia importat accessum ad malum, quod etiam est per accidens. Et ideo hae passiones non possunt esse principales, quia quod est per accidens, non potest dici principale. Et sic etiam nec ira potest dici passio principalis, quae consequitur audaciam.
Despair implies movement away from good, and this is, as it were, accidental; and daring implies movement towards evil, and this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal passions, because that which is accidental cannot be said to be principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion, because it arises from daring.
Augustinus ponit desiderium vel cupiditatem loco spei, inquantum ad idem pertinere videntur, scilicet ad bonum futurum.
Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, insofar as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future good.
Saturday, April 17, 2010
1a 2ae q25 a3: Whether hope is the first of the irascible passions? Yes.
Spes est prior inter omnes passiones irascibilis quia spes est motus in bonum secundum rationem boni quod de sua ratione est attractivum, et ideo est motus in bonum per se; desperatio autem est recessus a bono, qui non competit bono secundum quod est bonum, sed secundum aliquid aliud, unde est quasi per accidens.
Hope is the first of the passions in the irascible faculty because hope is a movement towards a good according to the formal aspect of the good, which is attractive [simply] by its own formal aspect, so that hope tends to the good in itself; whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent with good, not as such, but in respect of something else, wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were.
Et eadem ratione, timor, cum sit recessus a malo, est prior quam audacia. Quod autem spes et desperatio sint naturaliter priores quam timor et audacia, ex hoc manifestum est, quod, sicut appetitus boni est ratio quare vitetur malum, ita etiam spes et desperatio sunt ratio timoris et audaciae, nam audacia consequitur spem victoriae, et timor consequitur desperationem vincendi. Ira autem consequitur audaciam, nullus enim irascitur vindictam appetens, nisi audeat vindicare (secundum quod Avicenna dicit, in sexto de naturalibus).
And by the same formal aspect, fear, since it is a movement from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this--that as the appetite for the good is the aspectual apprehension by which evil is avoided, so hope and despair are aspectually apprehended by fear and daring, because daring arises from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring, for no one is angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself (as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his Physics).
Quia ira causatur ex aliis passionibus sicut effectus a causis praecedentibus, ideo ab ea, tanquam a manifestiori, denominatur potentia.
Because anger arises from the other passions, as an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being more manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name.
Et quidem ex praesentia boni non causatur aliqua passio in irascibili, ut dictum est, sed ex praesentia mali causatur passio irae.
The presence of good produces no passion in the irascible, as stated above (q23, a3,a4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger.
Quia igitur in via generationis seu consecutionis, proportio vel aptitudo ad finem praecedit consecutionem finis; inde est quod ira, inter omnes passiones irascibilis, est ultima, ordine generationis. Inter alias autem passiones irascibilis, quae important motum consequentem amorem vel odium boni vel mali, oportet quod passiones quarum obiectum est bonum, scilicet spes et desperatio, sint naturaliter priores passionibus quarum obiectum est malum, scilicet audacia et timore. Ita tamen quod spes est prior desperatione.
Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows that, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation. And among the other passions of the irascible faculty, which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope precedes despair.
Et si ordinem omnium passionum secundum viam generationis, scire velimus,
primo occurrunt amor et odium;
secundo, desiderium et fuga;
tertio, spes et desperatio;
quarto, timor et audacia;
quinto, ira;
sexto et ultimo, gaudium et tristitia,
quae consequuntur ad omnes passiones, ut dicitur in II Ethic.
And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of generation,
love and hatred are first;
desire and aversion, second;
hope and despair, third;
fear and daring, fourth;
anger, fifth;
sixth and last, joy and sadness,
which follow from all the passions, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5.
Ita tamen quod
amor est prior odio,
et desiderium fuga,
et spes desperatione,
et timor audacia,
et gaudium quam tristitia,
ut ex praedictis colligi potest.
Yet so that
love precedes hatred;
desire precedes aversion;
hope precedes despair;
fear precedes daring; and
joy precedes sadness,
as may be gathered from what has been stated above.
Hope is the first of the passions in the irascible faculty because hope is a movement towards a good according to the formal aspect of the good, which is attractive [simply] by its own formal aspect, so that hope tends to the good in itself; whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent with good, not as such, but in respect of something else, wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were.
Et eadem ratione, timor, cum sit recessus a malo, est prior quam audacia. Quod autem spes et desperatio sint naturaliter priores quam timor et audacia, ex hoc manifestum est, quod, sicut appetitus boni est ratio quare vitetur malum, ita etiam spes et desperatio sunt ratio timoris et audaciae, nam audacia consequitur spem victoriae, et timor consequitur desperationem vincendi. Ira autem consequitur audaciam, nullus enim irascitur vindictam appetens, nisi audeat vindicare (secundum quod Avicenna dicit, in sexto de naturalibus).
And by the same formal aspect, fear, since it is a movement from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this--that as the appetite for the good is the aspectual apprehension by which evil is avoided, so hope and despair are aspectually apprehended by fear and daring, because daring arises from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring, for no one is angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself (as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his Physics).
Quia ira causatur ex aliis passionibus sicut effectus a causis praecedentibus, ideo ab ea, tanquam a manifestiori, denominatur potentia.
Because anger arises from the other passions, as an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being more manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name.
Et quidem ex praesentia boni non causatur aliqua passio in irascibili, ut dictum est, sed ex praesentia mali causatur passio irae.
The presence of good produces no passion in the irascible, as stated above (q23, a3,a4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger.
Quia igitur in via generationis seu consecutionis, proportio vel aptitudo ad finem praecedit consecutionem finis; inde est quod ira, inter omnes passiones irascibilis, est ultima, ordine generationis. Inter alias autem passiones irascibilis, quae important motum consequentem amorem vel odium boni vel mali, oportet quod passiones quarum obiectum est bonum, scilicet spes et desperatio, sint naturaliter priores passionibus quarum obiectum est malum, scilicet audacia et timore. Ita tamen quod spes est prior desperatione.
Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows that, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation. And among the other passions of the irascible faculty, which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope precedes despair.
Et si ordinem omnium passionum secundum viam generationis, scire velimus,
primo occurrunt amor et odium;
secundo, desiderium et fuga;
tertio, spes et desperatio;
quarto, timor et audacia;
quinto, ira;
sexto et ultimo, gaudium et tristitia,
quae consequuntur ad omnes passiones, ut dicitur in II Ethic.
And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of generation,
love and hatred are first;
desire and aversion, second;
hope and despair, third;
fear and daring, fourth;
anger, fifth;
sixth and last, joy and sadness,
which follow from all the passions, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5.
Ita tamen quod
amor est prior odio,
et desiderium fuga,
et spes desperatione,
et timor audacia,
et gaudium quam tristitia,
ut ex praedictis colligi potest.
Yet so that
love precedes hatred;
desire precedes aversion;
hope precedes despair;
fear precedes daring; and
joy precedes sadness,
as may be gathered from what has been stated above.
Friday, April 16, 2010
1a 2ae q25 a2: Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions? Yes.
Amor est prima passionum concupiscibilis quia omne quod tendit ad finem aliquem, primo quidem habet aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem, nihil enim tendit in finem non proportionatum; secundo, movetur ad finem; tertio, quiescit in fine post eius consecutionem. Ipsa autem aptitudo sive proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor, qui nihil aliud est quam complacentia boni; motus autem ad bonum est desiderium vel concupiscentia; quies autem in bono est gaudium vel delectatio.
Love is the first of the concupiscible passions because whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure.
Et ideo secundum hunc ordinem, amor praecedit desiderium, et desiderium praecedit delectationem. Sed secundum ordinem intentionis, est e converso, nam delectatio intenta causat desiderium et amorem. Delectatio enim est fruitio boni, quae quodammodo est finis sicut et ipsum bonum, ut supra dictum est.
Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse, because the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as stated above (q11, a3, ad 3).
Hoc modo nominatur aliquid, secundum quod nobis innotescit, voces enim sunt signa intellectuum, secundum philosophum. Nos autem, ut plurimum, per effectum cognoscimus causam. Effectus autem amoris, quando quidem habetur ipsum amatum, est delectatio; quando vero non habetur, est desiderium vel concupiscentia. Ut autem Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., amor magis sentitur, cum eum prodit indigentia. Unde inter omnes passiones concupiscibilis, magis sensibilis est concupiscentia. Et propter hoc, ab ea denominatur potentia.
We name a thing as we understand it, for "words are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now, in most cases, we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure; when it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence. And, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which we love." Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is felt most. And for this reason the power is named after it.
Obiectum concupiscibilis sunt bonum et malum. Naturaliter autem est prius bonum malo, eo quod malum est privatio boni. Unde et omnes passiones, quarum obiectum est bonum, naturaliter sunt priores passionibus quarum obiectum est malum, unaquaeque scilicet sua opposita: quia enim bonum quaeritur, ideo refutatur oppositum malum.
Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil, since evil is privation of good. Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the object of which is evil--that is to say, each precedes its contrary passion: for because a good is sought, therefore an opposite evil is shunned.
Bonum autem habet rationem finis, qui quidem est prior in intentione, sed est posterior in consecutione. Potest ergo ordo passionum concupiscibilis attendi vel secundum intentionem, vel secundum consecutionem. Secundum quidem consecutionem, illud est prius quod primo fit in eo quod tendit ad finem.
Now good has the formal aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the end.
Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod omnes passiones ex amore causantur, "amor enim inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est; id autem habens, eoque fruens, laetitia est".
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy."
Love is the first of the concupiscible passions because whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure.
Et ideo secundum hunc ordinem, amor praecedit desiderium, et desiderium praecedit delectationem. Sed secundum ordinem intentionis, est e converso, nam delectatio intenta causat desiderium et amorem. Delectatio enim est fruitio boni, quae quodammodo est finis sicut et ipsum bonum, ut supra dictum est.
Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse, because the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as stated above (q11, a3, ad 3).
Hoc modo nominatur aliquid, secundum quod nobis innotescit, voces enim sunt signa intellectuum, secundum philosophum. Nos autem, ut plurimum, per effectum cognoscimus causam. Effectus autem amoris, quando quidem habetur ipsum amatum, est delectatio; quando vero non habetur, est desiderium vel concupiscentia. Ut autem Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., amor magis sentitur, cum eum prodit indigentia. Unde inter omnes passiones concupiscibilis, magis sensibilis est concupiscentia. Et propter hoc, ab ea denominatur potentia.
We name a thing as we understand it, for "words are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now, in most cases, we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure; when it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence. And, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which we love." Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is felt most. And for this reason the power is named after it.
Obiectum concupiscibilis sunt bonum et malum. Naturaliter autem est prius bonum malo, eo quod malum est privatio boni. Unde et omnes passiones, quarum obiectum est bonum, naturaliter sunt priores passionibus quarum obiectum est malum, unaquaeque scilicet sua opposita: quia enim bonum quaeritur, ideo refutatur oppositum malum.
Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil, since evil is privation of good. Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the object of which is evil--that is to say, each precedes its contrary passion: for because a good is sought, therefore an opposite evil is shunned.
Bonum autem habet rationem finis, qui quidem est prior in intentione, sed est posterior in consecutione. Potest ergo ordo passionum concupiscibilis attendi vel secundum intentionem, vel secundum consecutionem. Secundum quidem consecutionem, illud est prius quod primo fit in eo quod tendit ad finem.
Now good has the formal aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the end.
Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod omnes passiones ex amore causantur, "amor enim inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est; id autem habens, eoque fruens, laetitia est".
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy."
Thursday, April 15, 2010
1a 2ae q25 a1: Whether the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions? No.
Passiones concupiscibilis sunt priores passionibus irascibilis quia bonum simpliciter est prius quam bonum contractum.
The concupiscible passions precede the irascible because the absolute good precedes the restricted good.
Passiones concupiscibilis respiciunt bonum absolutum, passiones autem irascibilis respiciunt bonum contractum, scilicet arduum.
The concupiscible passions regard the absolute good, while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult, good.
Passiones irascibilis mediae sunt inter passiones concupiscibilis quae important motum in bonum vel in malum, et inter passiones concupiscibilis quae important quietem in bono vel in malo.
The passions of the irascible faculty stand between those concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil, and between those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil.
Id in quo iam quiescitur, non habet rationem difficilis seu ardui, quod est obiectum irascibilis.
When we find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as having the formal aspect of the difficult or arduous, whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty.
De ratione obiecti irascibilis est quod sit arduum. Sed quia obiectum concupiscibilis est bonum absolute, prius naturaliter est quam obiectum irascibilis, sicut commune proprio.
The formal aspect of the object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the common precedes the proper.
The concupiscible passions precede the irascible because the absolute good precedes the restricted good.
Passiones concupiscibilis respiciunt bonum absolutum, passiones autem irascibilis respiciunt bonum contractum, scilicet arduum.
The concupiscible passions regard the absolute good, while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult, good.
Passiones irascibilis mediae sunt inter passiones concupiscibilis quae important motum in bonum vel in malum, et inter passiones concupiscibilis quae important quietem in bono vel in malo.
The passions of the irascible faculty stand between those concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil, and between those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil.
Id in quo iam quiescitur, non habet rationem difficilis seu ardui, quod est obiectum irascibilis.
When we find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as having the formal aspect of the difficult or arduous, whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty.
De ratione obiecti irascibilis est quod sit arduum. Sed quia obiectum concupiscibilis est bonum absolute, prius naturaliter est quam obiectum irascibilis, sicut commune proprio.
The formal aspect of the object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the common precedes the proper.
Wednesday, April 14, 2010
1a 2ae q24 a4: Whether any passion is good or evil in its species? Yes.
Aliquae passiones sunt bonae vel malae secundum suam speciem quia secundum quod appetitus sensitivus obedit rationi, iam bonum et malum rationis non est in passionibus eius per accidens, sed per se.
Some passions are good or evil according to their species because insofar as the sensitive appetite obeys formal aspect, good and evil in their formal aspects are no longer accidentally in the passions of the appetite, but essentially.
In brutis animalibus, appetitus sensitivus non obedit rationi. Et tamen inquantum ducitur quadam aestimativa naturali, quae subiicitur rationi superiori (scilicet divinae), est in eis quaedam similitudo moralis boni, quantum ad animae passiones.
In irrational animals, the sensitive appetite does not obey formal aspect. Nevertheless, insofar as they are led by a kind of estimative apprehension (+, 0, -) of the natures of things, which [estimative power] is governed by a higher aspectual apprehension (i.e., that of the Divine mind [ratio]), there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the soul's passions.
Species actus vel passionis dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est in genere naturae; et sic bonum vel malum morale non pertinet ad speciem actus vel passionis.
The species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view. First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion.
Alio modo, secundum quod pertinent ad genus moris, prout scilicet participant aliquid de voluntario et de iudicio rationis. Et hoc modo bonum et malum morale possunt pertinere ad speciem passionis, secundum quod accipitur ut obiectum passionis aliquid de se conveniens rationi, vel dissonum a ratione: sicut patet de verecundia, quae est timor turpis; et de invidia, quae est tristitia de bono alterius. Sic enim pertinent ad speciem exterioris actus.
Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary and proceeds from a judgment about formal aspect. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion, insofar as the object to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with [that object's] formal aspect: as is clear in the case of "shame", which is base fear; and of "envy", which is sorrow for another's good. For thus passions belong to the same species as the external act.
Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei, quod "misericordia pertinet ad virtutem". Philosophus etiam dicit, in II Ethic., quod verecundia est passio laudabilis.
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a kind of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty is a praiseworthy passion.
Some passions are good or evil according to their species because insofar as the sensitive appetite obeys formal aspect, good and evil in their formal aspects are no longer accidentally in the passions of the appetite, but essentially.
In brutis animalibus, appetitus sensitivus non obedit rationi. Et tamen inquantum ducitur quadam aestimativa naturali, quae subiicitur rationi superiori (scilicet divinae), est in eis quaedam similitudo moralis boni, quantum ad animae passiones.
In irrational animals, the sensitive appetite does not obey formal aspect. Nevertheless, insofar as they are led by a kind of estimative apprehension (+, 0, -) of the natures of things, which [estimative power] is governed by a higher aspectual apprehension (i.e., that of the Divine mind [ratio]), there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the soul's passions.
Species actus vel passionis dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est in genere naturae; et sic bonum vel malum morale non pertinet ad speciem actus vel passionis.
The species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view. First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion.
Alio modo, secundum quod pertinent ad genus moris, prout scilicet participant aliquid de voluntario et de iudicio rationis. Et hoc modo bonum et malum morale possunt pertinere ad speciem passionis, secundum quod accipitur ut obiectum passionis aliquid de se conveniens rationi, vel dissonum a ratione: sicut patet de verecundia, quae est timor turpis; et de invidia, quae est tristitia de bono alterius. Sic enim pertinent ad speciem exterioris actus.
Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary and proceeds from a judgment about formal aspect. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion, insofar as the object to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with [that object's] formal aspect: as is clear in the case of "shame", which is base fear; and of "envy", which is sorrow for another's good. For thus passions belong to the same species as the external act.
Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei, quod "misericordia pertinet ad virtutem". Philosophus etiam dicit, in II Ethic., quod verecundia est passio laudabilis.
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a kind of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty is a praiseworthy passion.
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