No. Souls were not created before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are infused into them, because if it were accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would follow that man who results from this union is a being by accident; or that the soul is a man, which is false, as proved above (Q75 A4).
Animae non sunt creatae ante corpora, sed simul creantur cum corporibus infunduntur, quia si accidentaliter conveniret animae corpori uniri, sequeretur quod homo, qui ex ista unione constituitur, esset ens per accidens; vel quod anima esset homo, quod falsum est, ut supra ostensum est.
Moreover, that the human soul is not of the same nature as the angels, is proved from the different mode of understanding, as shown above (Q55 A2; Q85 A1), for man understands through receiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above (Q84 A6; Q84 A7; Q85 A1). For this reason the soul needs to be united to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of the sensitive part, whereas this cannot be said of an angel.
Quod etiam anima humana non sit eiusdem naturae cum Angelis, ipse diversus modus intelligendi ostendit, ut supra ostensum est, homo enim intelligit a sensibus accipiendo, et convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut supra ostensum est.
"It is because the contemporary alternatives seem so one-sided and are not more evidently solutions to the problems which Thomas faced, and partly solved, that we return to him and to the tradition of theology and philosophy in which his Summa Theologiae appears: theology as the science of the first principle and this as the total knowledge of reality in its unity." -- Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself (Oxford University Press, 1987), p.159.
Thursday, September 03, 2009
Wednesday, September 02, 2009
Q118 A2: Whether the intellectual soul is produced from the semen?
No. The rational soul is created by God because since it is an immaterial substance it cannot be caused through generation, but only through creation by God.
Animae rationales creantur a Deo quia cum sit immaterialis substantia, non potest causari per generationem, sed solum per creationem a Deo.
Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with the body. It is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen.
Ponere ergo animam intellectivam a generante causari, nihil est aliud quam ponere eam non subsistentem, et per consequens corrumpi eam cum corpore. Et ideo haereticum est dicere quod anima intellectiva traducatur cum semine.
Since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the body, it is subsistent, as proved above (Q75 A2); therefore to be and to be made are proper to it.
Anima intellectiva, cum habeat operationem sine corpore, est subsistens, ut supra habitum est; et ita sibi debetur esse et fieri.
It is impossible for an active power existing in matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect. Now it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends matter, for it has an operation in which the body takes no part whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellectual principle.
Impossibile est virtutem activam quae est in materia, extendere suam actionem ad producendum immaterialem effectum. Manifestum est autem quod principium intellectivum in homine est principium transcendens materiam, habet enim operationem in qua non communicat corpus. Et ideo impossibile est quod virtus quae est in semine, sit productiva intellectivi principii.
The body has nothing whatever to do in the operation of the intellect. Therefore the power of the intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen. Hence the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3): "It follows that the intellect alone comes from without."
In operatione autem intellectus non communicat corpus. Unde virtus intellectivi principii, prout intellectivum est, non potest ad semen pervenire. Et ideo philosophus, in libro de Generat. Animal., dicit, "relinquitur intellectus solus de foris advenire."
Animae rationales creantur a Deo quia cum sit immaterialis substantia, non potest causari per generationem, sed solum per creationem a Deo.
Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with the body. It is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen.
Ponere ergo animam intellectivam a generante causari, nihil est aliud quam ponere eam non subsistentem, et per consequens corrumpi eam cum corpore. Et ideo haereticum est dicere quod anima intellectiva traducatur cum semine.
Since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the body, it is subsistent, as proved above (Q75 A2); therefore to be and to be made are proper to it.
Anima intellectiva, cum habeat operationem sine corpore, est subsistens, ut supra habitum est; et ita sibi debetur esse et fieri.
It is impossible for an active power existing in matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect. Now it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends matter, for it has an operation in which the body takes no part whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellectual principle.
Impossibile est virtutem activam quae est in materia, extendere suam actionem ad producendum immaterialem effectum. Manifestum est autem quod principium intellectivum in homine est principium transcendens materiam, habet enim operationem in qua non communicat corpus. Et ideo impossibile est quod virtus quae est in semine, sit productiva intellectivi principii.
The body has nothing whatever to do in the operation of the intellect. Therefore the power of the intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen. Hence the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3): "It follows that the intellect alone comes from without."
In operatione autem intellectus non communicat corpus. Unde virtus intellectivi principii, prout intellectivum est, non potest ad semen pervenire. Et ideo philosophus, in libro de Generat. Animal., dicit, "relinquitur intellectus solus de foris advenire."
Tuesday, September 01, 2009
Q118 A1: Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?
Yes. The souls of animals seminally generated are produced by the seminal power because otherwise they would not cease to exist when the body perishes.
Animalium quae generantur ex semine, animae producuntur ex virtute quae est in semine quia alioquin non enim corrumperetur, corrupto corpore.
Since the generator is like the generated, it follows of necessity that both the sensitive soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by certain corporeal agents that reduce the matter from potentiality to act, through some corporeal power of which they are possessed.
Et quia generans est simile generato, necesse est quod naturaliter tam anima sensitiva, quam aliae huiusmodi formae, producantur in esse ab aliquibus corporalibus agentibus transmutantibus materiam de potentia in actum, per aliquam virtutem corpoream quae est in eis.
The sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent substance. We have said enough (Q25 A3) on this point, nor need we repeat it here.
Anima sensitiva non est substantia perfecta per se subsistens. Et de hoc supra dictum est, nec oportet hic iterare.
Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are created by God (Q65 A4). This opinion would hold if the sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself. For thus, as having being and operation of itself, to be made would needs be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot be made except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul would arrive at existence by creation.
Quidam posuerunt animas sensitivas animalium a Deo creari. Quae quidem positio conveniens esset, si anima sensitiva esset res subsistens, habens per se esse et operationem. Sic enim, sicut per se haberet esse et operationem, ita per se deberetur ei fieri. Et cum res simplex et subsistens non possit fieri nisi per creationem, sequeretur quod anima sensitiva procederet in esse per creationem.
But this principle is false--namely, that being and operation are proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above (Q75 A3): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since, therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to existence is that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as proper to them, but which are said to exist forasmuch as the subsistent composites exist through them.
Sed ista radix est falsa, scilicet quod anima sensitiva per se habeat esse et operationem, ut ex superioribus patet, non enim corrumperetur, corrupto corpore. Et ideo, cum non sit forma subsistens, habet se in essendo ad modum aliarum formarum corporalium, quibus per se non debetur esse, sed esse dicuntur inquantum composita subsistentia per eas sunt.
The generating power begets not only by its own virtue but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore the generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal begets an animal.
Virtus generativa non generat solum in virtute propria, sed in virtute totius animae, cuius est potentia. Et ideo virtus generativa plantae generat plantam, virtus vero generativa animalis generat animal.
The semen of the animal or plant derives a certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the instrument derives a certain motive power from the principal agent.
Ex anima generantis derivatur quaedam virtus activa ad ipsum semen animalis vel plantae, sicut et a principali agente derivatur quaedam vis motiva ad instrumentum.
This active force which is in the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain movement of this soul itself; nor is it the soul or a part of the soul, save virtually: thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the axe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there is no need for this active force to have an actual organ.
Illa vis activa quae est in semine, ex anima generantis derivata, est quasi quaedam motio ipsius animae generantis; nec est anima, aut pars animae, nisi in virtute: sicut in serra vel securi non est forma lecti, sed motio quaedam ad talem formam. Et ideo non oportet quod ista vis activa habeat aliquod organum in actu.
Animalium quae generantur ex semine, animae producuntur ex virtute quae est in semine quia alioquin non enim corrumperetur, corrupto corpore.
Since the generator is like the generated, it follows of necessity that both the sensitive soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by certain corporeal agents that reduce the matter from potentiality to act, through some corporeal power of which they are possessed.
Et quia generans est simile generato, necesse est quod naturaliter tam anima sensitiva, quam aliae huiusmodi formae, producantur in esse ab aliquibus corporalibus agentibus transmutantibus materiam de potentia in actum, per aliquam virtutem corpoream quae est in eis.
The sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent substance. We have said enough (Q25 A3) on this point, nor need we repeat it here.
Anima sensitiva non est substantia perfecta per se subsistens. Et de hoc supra dictum est, nec oportet hic iterare.
Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are created by God (Q65 A4). This opinion would hold if the sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself. For thus, as having being and operation of itself, to be made would needs be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot be made except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul would arrive at existence by creation.
Quidam posuerunt animas sensitivas animalium a Deo creari. Quae quidem positio conveniens esset, si anima sensitiva esset res subsistens, habens per se esse et operationem. Sic enim, sicut per se haberet esse et operationem, ita per se deberetur ei fieri. Et cum res simplex et subsistens non possit fieri nisi per creationem, sequeretur quod anima sensitiva procederet in esse per creationem.
But this principle is false--namely, that being and operation are proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above (Q75 A3): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since, therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to existence is that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as proper to them, but which are said to exist forasmuch as the subsistent composites exist through them.
Sed ista radix est falsa, scilicet quod anima sensitiva per se habeat esse et operationem, ut ex superioribus patet, non enim corrumperetur, corrupto corpore. Et ideo, cum non sit forma subsistens, habet se in essendo ad modum aliarum formarum corporalium, quibus per se non debetur esse, sed esse dicuntur inquantum composita subsistentia per eas sunt.
The generating power begets not only by its own virtue but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore the generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal begets an animal.
Virtus generativa non generat solum in virtute propria, sed in virtute totius animae, cuius est potentia. Et ideo virtus generativa plantae generat plantam, virtus vero generativa animalis generat animal.
The semen of the animal or plant derives a certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the instrument derives a certain motive power from the principal agent.
Ex anima generantis derivatur quaedam virtus activa ad ipsum semen animalis vel plantae, sicut et a principali agente derivatur quaedam vis motiva ad instrumentum.
This active force which is in the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain movement of this soul itself; nor is it the soul or a part of the soul, save virtually: thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the axe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there is no need for this active force to have an actual organ.
Illa vis activa quae est in semine, ex anima generantis derivata, est quasi quaedam motio ipsius animae generantis; nec est anima, aut pars animae, nisi in virtute: sicut in serra vel securi non est forma lecti, sed motio quaedam ad talem formam. Et ideo non oportet quod ista vis activa habeat aliquod organum in actu.
Monday, August 31, 2009
Q117 A4: Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally?
No. The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a body because no body is quickened by the separate soul.
Anima separata sua naturali virtute non potest movere aliquod corpus quia ab anima separata nullum corpus vivificatur.
There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are not determinate to certain bodies: such are the angels who are naturally unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey them as to movement (Q110 A5).
Substantiae quaedam spirituales sunt, quarum virtutes non determinantur ad aliqua corpora: sicut sunt Angeli, qui sunt naturaliter a corporibus absoluti; et ideo diversa corpora eis possunt obedire ad motum.
But if the motive power of a separate substance is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only one of lower degree; thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower heaven cannot move the higher heaven.
Si tamen alicuius substantiae separatae virtus motiva determinetur naturaliter ad movendum aliquod corpus, non poterit illa substantia movere aliquod corpus maius, sed minus; sicut, secundum philosophos, motor inferioris caeli non posset movere caelum superius.
Wherefore, since the soul is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it is the form, it cannot by its natural power move any other body.
Unde cum anima secundum suam naturam determinetur ad movendum corpus cuius est forma, nullum aliud corpus sua naturali virtute movere potest.
As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition.
Dicit Augustinus X de Civ. Dei, et Chrysostomus super Matth., frequenter Daemones simulant se esse animas mortuorum, ad confirmandum gentilium errorem, qui hoc credebant.
Anima separata sua naturali virtute non potest movere aliquod corpus quia ab anima separata nullum corpus vivificatur.
There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are not determinate to certain bodies: such are the angels who are naturally unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey them as to movement (Q110 A5).
Substantiae quaedam spirituales sunt, quarum virtutes non determinantur ad aliqua corpora: sicut sunt Angeli, qui sunt naturaliter a corporibus absoluti; et ideo diversa corpora eis possunt obedire ad motum.
But if the motive power of a separate substance is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only one of lower degree; thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower heaven cannot move the higher heaven.
Si tamen alicuius substantiae separatae virtus motiva determinetur naturaliter ad movendum aliquod corpus, non poterit illa substantia movere aliquod corpus maius, sed minus; sicut, secundum philosophos, motor inferioris caeli non posset movere caelum superius.
Wherefore, since the soul is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it is the form, it cannot by its natural power move any other body.
Unde cum anima secundum suam naturam determinetur ad movendum corpus cuius est forma, nullum aliud corpus sua naturali virtute movere potest.
As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition.
Dicit Augustinus X de Civ. Dei, et Chrysostomus super Matth., frequenter Daemones simulant se esse animas mortuorum, ad confirmandum gentilium errorem, qui hoc credebant.
Sunday, August 30, 2009
Q117 A3: Whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter?
No. Man cannot change corporeal matter by the power of his soul because the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change in exterior bodies, except by means of in impression from the body united to it.
Homo per virtutem suae animae non potest materiam corporalem immutare quia ad exteriora corpora immutanda apprehensio animae humanae non sufficit, nisi mediante immutatione proprii corporis.
As stated above (Q110 A2), corporeal matter is not changed to (the reception of) a form, save either by some agent composed of matter and form, or by God Himself, in whom both matter and form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both.
Sicut supra dictum est materia corporalis non immutatur ad formam, nisi vel ab agente aliquo composito ex materia et forma, vel ab ipso Deo, in quo virtualiter et materia et forma praeexistit, sicut in primordiali causa utriusque.
Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Corporeal matter obeys God alone at will."
Dicit Augustinus, in III de Trin., quod "materia corporalis soli Deo obedit ad nutum."
Wherefore of the angels also we have stated (Q110 A2) that they cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by employing corporeal agents for the production of certain effects. Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter, except by means of other bodies.
Unde et de Angelis supra dictum est quod materiam corporalem immutare non possunt naturali virtute, nisi applicando corporalia agentia ad effectus aliquos producendos. Multo igitur minus anima sua virtute naturali potest immutare materiam corporalem, nisi mediantibus aliquibus corporibus.
The saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace, not of nature.
Sancti dicuntur miracula facere ex potestate gratiae, non naturae.
Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation ("the evil eye" [oculus fascinans]: Q117 A3 ad 2), the countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who have a tender and most impressionable body. It is also possible that by God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons co-operate in this, as the witches may have some compact with them.
Sic igitur cum aliqua anima fuerit vehementer commota ad malitiam, sicut maxime in vetulabus contingit, efficitur secundum modum praedictum ["oculi fascinantis"] aspectus eius venenosus et noxius, et maxime pueris, qui habent corpus tenerum, et de facili receptivum impressionis. Possibile est etiam quod ex Dei permissione, vel etiam ex aliquo facto occulto, cooperetur ad hoc malignitas Daemonum, cum quibus vetulae sortilegae aliquod foedus habent.
Homo per virtutem suae animae non potest materiam corporalem immutare quia ad exteriora corpora immutanda apprehensio animae humanae non sufficit, nisi mediante immutatione proprii corporis.
As stated above (Q110 A2), corporeal matter is not changed to (the reception of) a form, save either by some agent composed of matter and form, or by God Himself, in whom both matter and form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both.
Sicut supra dictum est materia corporalis non immutatur ad formam, nisi vel ab agente aliquo composito ex materia et forma, vel ab ipso Deo, in quo virtualiter et materia et forma praeexistit, sicut in primordiali causa utriusque.
Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Corporeal matter obeys God alone at will."
Dicit Augustinus, in III de Trin., quod "materia corporalis soli Deo obedit ad nutum."
Wherefore of the angels also we have stated (Q110 A2) that they cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by employing corporeal agents for the production of certain effects. Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter, except by means of other bodies.
Unde et de Angelis supra dictum est quod materiam corporalem immutare non possunt naturali virtute, nisi applicando corporalia agentia ad effectus aliquos producendos. Multo igitur minus anima sua virtute naturali potest immutare materiam corporalem, nisi mediantibus aliquibus corporibus.
The saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace, not of nature.
Sancti dicuntur miracula facere ex potestate gratiae, non naturae.
Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation ("the evil eye" [oculus fascinans]: Q117 A3 ad 2), the countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who have a tender and most impressionable body. It is also possible that by God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons co-operate in this, as the witches may have some compact with them.
Sic igitur cum aliqua anima fuerit vehementer commota ad malitiam, sicut maxime in vetulabus contingit, efficitur secundum modum praedictum ["oculi fascinantis"] aspectus eius venenosus et noxius, et maxime pueris, qui habent corpus tenerum, et de facili receptivum impressionis. Possibile est etiam quod ex Dei permissione, vel etiam ex aliquo facto occulto, cooperetur ad hoc malignitas Daemonum, cum quibus vetulae sortilegae aliquod foedus habent.
Saturday, August 29, 2009
Q117 A2: Whether man can teach the angels?
No. Angels are never enlightened by men concerning Divine things because in the same way as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men are subject even to the lowest angels.
Non Angeli instruuntur per homines de divinis quia eo modo quo inferiores Angeli superioribus subduntur, supremi homines subduntur etiam infimis Angelorum.
But men can by means of speech make known to angels the thoughts of their hearts, because it belongs to God alone to know the heart's secrets.
Cogitationes tamen suorum cordium homines Angelis per modum locutionis manifestare possunt, quia secreta cordium scire solius Dei est.
When the mysteries of Christ and the Church were fulfilled by the apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the angels, which were hidden from them before.
Dum per apostolos impleta sunt Christi et Ecclesiae mysteria, Angelis aliqua apparuerunt de huiusmodi mysteriis, quae ante erant eis occulta.
The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in His human nature.
Apostoli instruebantur immediate a verbo Dei, non secundum eius divinitatem, sed inquantum eius humanitas loquebatur.
Certain men in this state of life are greater than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have such great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree, though actually it is much smaller.
Aliqui homines, etiam in statu viae, sunt maiores aliquibus Angelis, non quidem actu, sed virtute; inquantum scilicet habent caritatem tantae virtutis, ut possint mereri maiorem beatitudinis gradum quam quidam Angeli habeant. Sicut si dicamus semen alicuius magnae arboris esse maius virtute quam aliquam parvam arborem, cum tamen multo minus sit in actu.
Non Angeli instruuntur per homines de divinis quia eo modo quo inferiores Angeli superioribus subduntur, supremi homines subduntur etiam infimis Angelorum.
But men can by means of speech make known to angels the thoughts of their hearts, because it belongs to God alone to know the heart's secrets.
Cogitationes tamen suorum cordium homines Angelis per modum locutionis manifestare possunt, quia secreta cordium scire solius Dei est.
When the mysteries of Christ and the Church were fulfilled by the apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the angels, which were hidden from them before.
Dum per apostolos impleta sunt Christi et Ecclesiae mysteria, Angelis aliqua apparuerunt de huiusmodi mysteriis, quae ante erant eis occulta.
The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in His human nature.
Apostoli instruebantur immediate a verbo Dei, non secundum eius divinitatem, sed inquantum eius humanitas loquebatur.
Certain men in this state of life are greater than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have such great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree, though actually it is much smaller.
Aliqui homines, etiam in statu viae, sunt maiores aliquibus Angelis, non quidem actu, sed virtute; inquantum scilicet habent caritatem tantae virtutis, ut possint mereri maiorem beatitudinis gradum quam quidam Angeli habeant. Sicut si dicamus semen alicuius magnae arboris esse maius virtute quam aliquam parvam arborem, cum tamen multo minus sit in actu.
Friday, August 28, 2009
Q117 A1: Whether one man can teach another?
Yes. The teacher only brings exterior help, just like the physician who heals (but just like the interior nature is the principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect is the principal cause of knowledge), because the master does not cause the intellectual light in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly, but he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are proposed to him from without.
Homo docens solummodo exterius ministerium adhibet, sicut medicus sanans (sed sicut natura interior est principalis causa sanationis, ita et interius lumen intellectus est principalis causa scientiae), quia magister non causat lumen intelligibile in discipulo, nec directe species intelligibiles, sed movet discipulum per suam doctrinam ad hoc, quod ipse per virtutem sui intellectus formet intelligibiles conceptiones, quarum signa sibi proponit exterius.
The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in detail and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to be his own master, because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is required in a master.
Signa quae magister discipulo proponit, sunt rerum notarum in universali, et sub quadam confusione; sed ignotarum in particulari, et sub quadam distinctione. Et ideo cum quisque per seipsum scientiam acquirit, non potest dici docere seipsum, vel esse sui ipsius magister, quia non praeexistit in eo scientia completa, qualis requiritur in magistro.
Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle (as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research) and from an exterior principle (as is clear in one who learns by instruction). For in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect.
Scientia autem acquiritur in homine et ab interiori principio (ut patet in eo qui per inventionem propriam scientiam acquirit) et a principio exteriori (ut patet in eo qui addiscit). Inest enim unicuique homini quoddam principium scientiae, scilicet lumen intellectus agentis, per quod cognoscuntur statim a principio naturaliter quaedam universalia principia omnium scientiarum.
In order to make this clear, we must observe that of effects proceeding from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone. Whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes from an interior principle; thus health is caused in a sick man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical art, sometimes by an interior principle, as when a man is healed by the force of nature. In these latter effects two things must be noticed.
Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod effectuum qui sunt ab exteriori principio, aliquis est ab exteriori principio tantum; sicut forma domus causatur in materia solum ab arte. Aliquis autem effectus est quandoque quidem ab exteriori principio, quandoque autem ab interiori; sicut sanitas causatur in infirmo quandoque ab exteriori principio, scilicet ab arte medicinae, quandoque autem ab interiori principio ut cum aliquis sanatur per virtutem naturae. Et in talibus effectibus sunt duo attendenda.
First, that art in its work imitates nature, for just as nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection of the matter that caused the sickness, so does art.
Primo quidem, quod ars imitatur naturam in sua operatione, sicut enim natura sanat infirmum alterando, digerendo, et expellendo materiam quae causat morbum, ita et ars.
Secondly, we must remark that the exterior principle, art, acts, not as principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the interior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended end.
Secundo attendendum est, quod principium exterius, scilicet ars, non operatur sicut principale agens, sed sicut coadiuvans agens principale, quod est principium interius, confortando ipsum, et ministrando ei instrumenta et auxilia, quibus utatur ad effectum producendum, sicut medicus confortat naturam, et adhibet ei cibos et medicinas, quibus natura utatur ad finem intentum.
Therefore as of God is it written: "Who healeth all thy diseases" (Psalm 102:3); so of Him is it written: "He that teacheth man knowledge" (Psalm 93:10), inasmuch as "the light of His countenance is signed upon us" (Psalm 4:7), through which light all things are shown to us.
Et ideo sicut de Deo dicitur, "qui sanat omnes infirmitates tuas"; ita de eo dicitur, "qui docet hominem scientiam", inquantum "lumen vultus eius super nos signatur", per quod nobis omnia ostenduntur.
Now when anyone applies these universal principles to certain particular things (the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses), then, by his own research, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before, advancing from the known to the unknown. Wherefore anyone who teaches, leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the cognition of things previously unknown to him; according to what the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): "All teaching and all learning proceed from previous cognition."
Cum autem aliquis huiusmodi universalia principia applicat ad aliqua particularia (quorum memoriam et experimentum per sensum accipit), per inventionem propriam acquirit scientiam eorum quae nesciebat, ex notis ad ignota procedens. Unde et quilibet docens, ex his quae discipulus novit, ducit eum in cognitionem eorum quae ignorabat; secundum quod dicitur in I Poster., quod "omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina ex praeexistenti fit cognitione".
Now the master leads the disciple from already cognized things to cognition of the unknown, in a twofold manner.
Ducit autem magister discipulum ex praecognitis in cognitionem ignotorum, dupliciter.
Firstly, by proposing to him certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition of science: for instance, he may put before him certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from previously cognized things; or he may propose to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led to the cognition of truth previously unknown.
Primo quidem, proponendo ei aliqua auxilia vel instrumenta, quibus intellectus eius utatur ad scientiam acquirendam: puta cum proponit ei aliquas propositiones minus universales, quas tamen ex praecognitis discipulus diiudicare potest; vel cum proponit ei aliqua sensibilia exempla, vel similia, vel opposita, vel aliqua huiusmodi ex quibus intellectus addiscentis manuducitur in cognitionem veritatis ignotae.
Secondly, by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above (Q106 A1; Q111 A1) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch as he proposes to the disciple the order of principles to conclusions, who on his own happens to not have sufficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles. Hence the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowledge." In this way a demonstrator causes his hearer to know.
Alio modo, cum confortat intellectum addiscentis; non quidem aliqua virtute activa quasi superioris naturae, sicut supra dictum est de Angelis illuminantibus, quia omnes humani intellectus sunt unius gradus in ordine naturae; sed inquantum proponit discipulo ordinem principiorum ad conclusiones, qui forte per seipsum non haberet tantam virtutem collativam, ut ex principiis posset conclusiones deducere. Et ideo dicitur in I Poster., quod "demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire". Et per hunc modum ille qui demonstrat, auditorem scientem facit.
As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural agent. Wherefore knowledge need not be an active quality, but is the principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle by which one is directed in working.
Doctor non causat scientiam in discipulo per modum agentis naturalis, ut Averroes obiicit. Unde non oportet quod scientia sit qualitas activa, sed est principium quo aliquis dirigitur in docendo, sicut ars est principium quo aliquis dirigitur in operando.
On this question there have been various opinions. For Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii, maintains that all men have one passive intellect in common, as stated above (Q76 A2). From this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men. Consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he communicates the identical knowledge which he has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension.
Circa hoc diversae fuerunt opiniones. Averroes enim, in Comment. III de anima, posuit unum intellectum possibilem esse omnium hominum, ut supra dictum est. Et ex hoc sequebatur quod eaedem species intelligibiles sint omnium hominum. Et secundum hoc, ponit quod unus homo per doctrinam non causat aliam scientiam in altero ab ea quam ipse habet; sed communicat ei eandem scientiam quam ipse habet, per hoc quod movet eum ad ordinandum phantasmata in anima sua, ad hoc quod sint disposita convenienter ad intelligibilem apprehensionem.
This opinion is true so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider identity according to the unity of the thing known, for the same truth of the thing is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one passive intellect, and the same intelligible species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above (Q76 A2).
Quae quidem opinio quantum ad hoc vera est, quod est eadem scientia in discipulo et magistro, si consideretur identitas secundum unitatem rei scitae, eadem enim rei veritas est quam cognoscit et discipulus et magister. Sed quantum ad hoc quod ponit esse unum intellectum possibilem omnium hominum, et easdem species intelligibiles, differentes solum secundum diversa phantasmata, falsa est eius opinio, ut supra habitum est.
Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through the participation of separate forms, as stated above (Q84 A3, Q84 A4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from the free consideration of those things which it knows. According to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master, but is roused by him to consider what he knows; so that to learn would be nothing else than to remember.
Alia est opinio Platonicorum, qui posuerunt quod scientia inest a principio animabus nostris per participationem formarum separatarum, sicut supra habitum est; sed anima ex unione corporis impeditur ne possit considerare libere ea quorum scientiam habet. Et secundum hoc, discipulus a magistro non acquirit scientiam de novo, sed ab eo excitatur ad considerandum ea quorum scientiam habet; ut sic addiscere nihil aliud sit quam reminisci.
In the same way they held that natural agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms, which matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. But against this we have proved above (Q79 A2; Q84 A3) that the passive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4).
Sicut etiam ponebant quod agentia naturalia solummodo disponunt ad susceptionem formarum, quas acquirit materia corporalis per participationem specierum separatarum. Sed contra hoc supra ostensum est quod intellectus possibilis animae humanae est in potentia pura ad intelligibilia, secundum quod Aristoteles dicit in III de anima.
We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4).
Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod docens causat scientiam in addiscente, reducendo ipsum de potentia in actum, sicut dicitur in VIII Physic.
Homo docens solummodo exterius ministerium adhibet, sicut medicus sanans (sed sicut natura interior est principalis causa sanationis, ita et interius lumen intellectus est principalis causa scientiae), quia magister non causat lumen intelligibile in discipulo, nec directe species intelligibiles, sed movet discipulum per suam doctrinam ad hoc, quod ipse per virtutem sui intellectus formet intelligibiles conceptiones, quarum signa sibi proponit exterius.
The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in detail and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to be his own master, because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is required in a master.
Signa quae magister discipulo proponit, sunt rerum notarum in universali, et sub quadam confusione; sed ignotarum in particulari, et sub quadam distinctione. Et ideo cum quisque per seipsum scientiam acquirit, non potest dici docere seipsum, vel esse sui ipsius magister, quia non praeexistit in eo scientia completa, qualis requiritur in magistro.
Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle (as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research) and from an exterior principle (as is clear in one who learns by instruction). For in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect.
Scientia autem acquiritur in homine et ab interiori principio (ut patet in eo qui per inventionem propriam scientiam acquirit) et a principio exteriori (ut patet in eo qui addiscit). Inest enim unicuique homini quoddam principium scientiae, scilicet lumen intellectus agentis, per quod cognoscuntur statim a principio naturaliter quaedam universalia principia omnium scientiarum.
In order to make this clear, we must observe that of effects proceeding from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone. Whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes from an interior principle; thus health is caused in a sick man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical art, sometimes by an interior principle, as when a man is healed by the force of nature. In these latter effects two things must be noticed.
Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod effectuum qui sunt ab exteriori principio, aliquis est ab exteriori principio tantum; sicut forma domus causatur in materia solum ab arte. Aliquis autem effectus est quandoque quidem ab exteriori principio, quandoque autem ab interiori; sicut sanitas causatur in infirmo quandoque ab exteriori principio, scilicet ab arte medicinae, quandoque autem ab interiori principio ut cum aliquis sanatur per virtutem naturae. Et in talibus effectibus sunt duo attendenda.
First, that art in its work imitates nature, for just as nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection of the matter that caused the sickness, so does art.
Primo quidem, quod ars imitatur naturam in sua operatione, sicut enim natura sanat infirmum alterando, digerendo, et expellendo materiam quae causat morbum, ita et ars.
Secondly, we must remark that the exterior principle, art, acts, not as principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the interior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended end.
Secundo attendendum est, quod principium exterius, scilicet ars, non operatur sicut principale agens, sed sicut coadiuvans agens principale, quod est principium interius, confortando ipsum, et ministrando ei instrumenta et auxilia, quibus utatur ad effectum producendum, sicut medicus confortat naturam, et adhibet ei cibos et medicinas, quibus natura utatur ad finem intentum.
Therefore as of God is it written: "Who healeth all thy diseases" (Psalm 102:3); so of Him is it written: "He that teacheth man knowledge" (Psalm 93:10), inasmuch as "the light of His countenance is signed upon us" (Psalm 4:7), through which light all things are shown to us.
Et ideo sicut de Deo dicitur, "qui sanat omnes infirmitates tuas"; ita de eo dicitur, "qui docet hominem scientiam", inquantum "lumen vultus eius super nos signatur", per quod nobis omnia ostenduntur.
Now when anyone applies these universal principles to certain particular things (the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses), then, by his own research, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before, advancing from the known to the unknown. Wherefore anyone who teaches, leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the cognition of things previously unknown to him; according to what the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): "All teaching and all learning proceed from previous cognition."
Cum autem aliquis huiusmodi universalia principia applicat ad aliqua particularia (quorum memoriam et experimentum per sensum accipit), per inventionem propriam acquirit scientiam eorum quae nesciebat, ex notis ad ignota procedens. Unde et quilibet docens, ex his quae discipulus novit, ducit eum in cognitionem eorum quae ignorabat; secundum quod dicitur in I Poster., quod "omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina ex praeexistenti fit cognitione".
Now the master leads the disciple from already cognized things to cognition of the unknown, in a twofold manner.
Ducit autem magister discipulum ex praecognitis in cognitionem ignotorum, dupliciter.
Firstly, by proposing to him certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition of science: for instance, he may put before him certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from previously cognized things; or he may propose to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led to the cognition of truth previously unknown.
Primo quidem, proponendo ei aliqua auxilia vel instrumenta, quibus intellectus eius utatur ad scientiam acquirendam: puta cum proponit ei aliquas propositiones minus universales, quas tamen ex praecognitis discipulus diiudicare potest; vel cum proponit ei aliqua sensibilia exempla, vel similia, vel opposita, vel aliqua huiusmodi ex quibus intellectus addiscentis manuducitur in cognitionem veritatis ignotae.
Secondly, by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above (Q106 A1; Q111 A1) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch as he proposes to the disciple the order of principles to conclusions, who on his own happens to not have sufficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles. Hence the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowledge." In this way a demonstrator causes his hearer to know.
Alio modo, cum confortat intellectum addiscentis; non quidem aliqua virtute activa quasi superioris naturae, sicut supra dictum est de Angelis illuminantibus, quia omnes humani intellectus sunt unius gradus in ordine naturae; sed inquantum proponit discipulo ordinem principiorum ad conclusiones, qui forte per seipsum non haberet tantam virtutem collativam, ut ex principiis posset conclusiones deducere. Et ideo dicitur in I Poster., quod "demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire". Et per hunc modum ille qui demonstrat, auditorem scientem facit.
As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural agent. Wherefore knowledge need not be an active quality, but is the principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle by which one is directed in working.
Doctor non causat scientiam in discipulo per modum agentis naturalis, ut Averroes obiicit. Unde non oportet quod scientia sit qualitas activa, sed est principium quo aliquis dirigitur in docendo, sicut ars est principium quo aliquis dirigitur in operando.
On this question there have been various opinions. For Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii, maintains that all men have one passive intellect in common, as stated above (Q76 A2). From this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men. Consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he communicates the identical knowledge which he has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension.
Circa hoc diversae fuerunt opiniones. Averroes enim, in Comment. III de anima, posuit unum intellectum possibilem esse omnium hominum, ut supra dictum est. Et ex hoc sequebatur quod eaedem species intelligibiles sint omnium hominum. Et secundum hoc, ponit quod unus homo per doctrinam non causat aliam scientiam in altero ab ea quam ipse habet; sed communicat ei eandem scientiam quam ipse habet, per hoc quod movet eum ad ordinandum phantasmata in anima sua, ad hoc quod sint disposita convenienter ad intelligibilem apprehensionem.
This opinion is true so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider identity according to the unity of the thing known, for the same truth of the thing is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one passive intellect, and the same intelligible species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above (Q76 A2).
Quae quidem opinio quantum ad hoc vera est, quod est eadem scientia in discipulo et magistro, si consideretur identitas secundum unitatem rei scitae, eadem enim rei veritas est quam cognoscit et discipulus et magister. Sed quantum ad hoc quod ponit esse unum intellectum possibilem omnium hominum, et easdem species intelligibiles, differentes solum secundum diversa phantasmata, falsa est eius opinio, ut supra habitum est.
Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through the participation of separate forms, as stated above (Q84 A3, Q84 A4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from the free consideration of those things which it knows. According to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master, but is roused by him to consider what he knows; so that to learn would be nothing else than to remember.
Alia est opinio Platonicorum, qui posuerunt quod scientia inest a principio animabus nostris per participationem formarum separatarum, sicut supra habitum est; sed anima ex unione corporis impeditur ne possit considerare libere ea quorum scientiam habet. Et secundum hoc, discipulus a magistro non acquirit scientiam de novo, sed ab eo excitatur ad considerandum ea quorum scientiam habet; ut sic addiscere nihil aliud sit quam reminisci.
In the same way they held that natural agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms, which matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. But against this we have proved above (Q79 A2; Q84 A3) that the passive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4).
Sicut etiam ponebant quod agentia naturalia solummodo disponunt ad susceptionem formarum, quas acquirit materia corporalis per participationem specierum separatarum. Sed contra hoc supra ostensum est quod intellectus possibilis animae humanae est in potentia pura ad intelligibilia, secundum quod Aristoteles dicit in III de anima.
We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4).
Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod docens causat scientiam in addiscente, reducendo ipsum de potentia in actum, sicut dicitur in VIII Physic.
Thursday, August 27, 2009
Q116 A4: Whether all things are subject to fate?
No. All things are not subject to fate because whatever is done immediately by God, since it is not subject to secondary causes, neither is it subject to fate.
Omnia non subduntur fato quia sunt quae immediate a Deo fiunt, cum non subdantur secundis causis, non subduntur fato.
As stated above (Q116 A2), fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to secondary causes, is subject also to fate.
Sicut supra dictum est, fatum est ordinatio secundarum causarum ad effectus divinitus provisos. Quaecumque igitur causis secundis subduntur, ea subduntur et fato.
Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate." Such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like.
Boetius dicit, in IV de Consol., quod "quaedam quae sub providentia locata sunt, fati seriem superant": sicut creatio rerum, glorificatio spiritualium substantiarum, et alia huiusmodi.
Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "those things which are nigh to God have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence it is clear that "the further a thing is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate", since so much the more it is bound up with secondary causes.
Boetius dicit, quod "ea quae sunt primae divinitati propinqua, stabiliter fixa, fatalis ordinem mobilitatis excedunt. Ex quo etiam patet quod quanto aliquid longius a prima mente discedit, nexibus fati maioribus implicatur", quia magis subiicitur necessitati secundarum causarum.
Omnia non subduntur fato quia sunt quae immediate a Deo fiunt, cum non subdantur secundis causis, non subduntur fato.
As stated above (Q116 A2), fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to secondary causes, is subject also to fate.
Sicut supra dictum est, fatum est ordinatio secundarum causarum ad effectus divinitus provisos. Quaecumque igitur causis secundis subduntur, ea subduntur et fato.
Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate." Such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like.
Boetius dicit, in IV de Consol., quod "quaedam quae sub providentia locata sunt, fati seriem superant": sicut creatio rerum, glorificatio spiritualium substantiarum, et alia huiusmodi.
Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "those things which are nigh to God have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence it is clear that "the further a thing is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate", since so much the more it is bound up with secondary causes.
Boetius dicit, quod "ea quae sunt primae divinitati propinqua, stabiliter fixa, fatalis ordinem mobilitatis excedunt. Ex quo etiam patet quod quanto aliquid longius a prima mente discedit, nexibus fati maioribus implicatur", quia magis subiicitur necessitati secundarum causarum.
Wednesday, August 26, 2009
Q116 A3: Whether fate is unchangeable?
Yes. Fate, considered in regard to second causes, is changeable, but as subject to Divine Providence, it derives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of conditional necessity, because the disposition of second causes which we call fate, can be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second causes, which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to the first principle, namely, God, by Whom they are ordered.
Fatum, secundum considerationem secundarum causarum, mobile est, sed secundum quod subest divinae providentiae, immobilitatem sortitur, non quidem absolutae necessitatis, sed conditionatae, quia dispositio secundarum causarum, quam fatum dicimus, potest dupliciter considerari, uno modo, secundum ipsas causas secundas, quae sic disponuntur seu ordinantur; alio modo, per relationem ad primum principium a quo ordinantur, scilicet Deum.
In this sense we say that this conditional is true and necessary: "If God foreknew that this would happen, it will happen."
Secundum quod dicimus hanc conditionalem esse veram vel necessariam, "si Deus praescivit hoc futurum, erit".
Wherefore Boethius, having said that the chain of fate is fickle, shortly afterwards adds--"which, since it is derived from an unchangeable Providence must also itself be unchangeable."
Unde cum Boetius dixisset fati seriem esse mobilem, post pauca subdit, "quae cum ab immobilis providentiae proficiscatur exordiis, ipsam quoque immutabilem esse necesse est".
Fatum, secundum considerationem secundarum causarum, mobile est, sed secundum quod subest divinae providentiae, immobilitatem sortitur, non quidem absolutae necessitatis, sed conditionatae, quia dispositio secundarum causarum, quam fatum dicimus, potest dupliciter considerari, uno modo, secundum ipsas causas secundas, quae sic disponuntur seu ordinantur; alio modo, per relationem ad primum principium a quo ordinantur, scilicet Deum.
In this sense we say that this conditional is true and necessary: "If God foreknew that this would happen, it will happen."
Secundum quod dicimus hanc conditionalem esse veram vel necessariam, "si Deus praescivit hoc futurum, erit".
Wherefore Boethius, having said that the chain of fate is fickle, shortly afterwards adds--"which, since it is derived from an unchangeable Providence must also itself be unchangeable."
Unde cum Boetius dixisset fati seriem esse mobilem, post pauca subdit, "quae cum ab immobilis providentiae proficiscatur exordiis, ipsam quoque immutabilem esse necesse est".
Tuesday, August 25, 2009
Q116 A2: Whether fate is in created things?
Yes. Fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production of their effects, because Divine Providence produces effects through mediate causes.
Fatum est in ipsis causis creatis, inquantum sunt ordinatae a Deo ad effectus producendos, quia divina providentia per causas medias suos effectus exequitur.
Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things."
Boetius dicit, in IV de Consol. quod "fatum est dispositio rebus mobilibus inhaerens."
Fate has the formal aspect of a cause, just as much as the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.
Intantum fatum habet rationem causae, inquantum et ipsae causae secundae, quarum ordinatio fatum vocatur.
The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the formal aspect of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially fate is the very disposition or "series," i.e. order, of second causes.
Ipsa ordinatio causarum secundarum, quam Augustinus seriem causarum nominat, non habet rationem fati, nisi secundum quod dependet a Deo. Et ideo causaliter Dei potestas vel voluntas dici potest fatum. Essentialiter vero fatum est ipsa dispositio seu series, idest ordo, causarum secundarum.
Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet wrote: "Thy fates draw thee."
Fatum dicitur dispositio, non quae est in genere qualitatis; sed secundum quod dispositio designat ordinem, qui non est substantia, sed relatio. Qui quidem ordo, si consideretur per comparationem ad suum principium, est unus, et sic dicitur unum fatum. Si autem consideretur per comparationem ad effectus, vel ad ipsas causas medias, sic multiplicatur, per quem modum poeta dixit, te tua "fata trahunt". [Vergil, Aeneid 5.709]
Fatum est in ipsis causis creatis, inquantum sunt ordinatae a Deo ad effectus producendos, quia divina providentia per causas medias suos effectus exequitur.
Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things."
Boetius dicit, in IV de Consol. quod "fatum est dispositio rebus mobilibus inhaerens."
Fate has the formal aspect of a cause, just as much as the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.
Intantum fatum habet rationem causae, inquantum et ipsae causae secundae, quarum ordinatio fatum vocatur.
The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the formal aspect of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially fate is the very disposition or "series," i.e. order, of second causes.
Ipsa ordinatio causarum secundarum, quam Augustinus seriem causarum nominat, non habet rationem fati, nisi secundum quod dependet a Deo. Et ideo causaliter Dei potestas vel voluntas dici potest fatum. Essentialiter vero fatum est ipsa dispositio seu series, idest ordo, causarum secundarum.
Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet wrote: "Thy fates draw thee."
Fatum dicitur dispositio, non quae est in genere qualitatis; sed secundum quod dispositio designat ordinem, qui non est substantia, sed relatio. Qui quidem ordo, si consideretur per comparationem ad suum principium, est unus, et sic dicitur unum fatum. Si autem consideretur per comparationem ad effectus, vel ad ipsas causas medias, sic multiplicatur, per quem modum poeta dixit, te tua "fata trahunt". [Vergil, Aeneid 5.709]
Monday, August 24, 2009
Q116 A1: Whether there be such a thing as fate?
Yes. Inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were "fore-spoken," we can admit the existence of fate, because nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes, but not if compared to Divine Providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in the world," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
Inquantum omnia quae hic aguntur, divinae providentiae subduntur, tanquam per eam praeordinata et quasi praelocuta, fatum ponere possumus, nihil prohibet aliqua esse fortuita vel casualia per comparationem ad causas proximas, non tamen per comparationem ad divinam providentiam, sic enim "nihil temere fit in mundo", ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest.
What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius (De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its proper order."
Quod non est, non definitur. Sed Boetius, in IV de Consol., definit fatum, dicens quod "fatum est inhaerens rebus mobilibus dispositio, per quam providentia suis quaeque nectit ordinibus".
The holy doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those who twisted its application to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): "If anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion, but hold his tongue."
Hoc nomine sancti doctores uti recusaverint, propter eos qui ad vim positionis siderum hoc nomen retorquebant. Unde Augustinus dicit, in V de Civ. Dei, "si propterea quisquam res humanas fato tribuit, quia ipsam Dei voluntatem vel potestatem fati nomine appellat, sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat."
It has been said (Q115 A6) that what is accidental, is properly speaking neither a being, nor a unity. But every action of nature terminates in some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the proper effect of an active natural principle.
Dictum est enim supra quod id quod est per accidens, non est proprie ens neque unum. Omnis autem naturae actio terminatur ad aliquid unum. Unde impossibile est quod id quod est per accidens, sit effectus per se alicuius naturalis principii agentis.
We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise the intellect could not form this proposition: "The digger of a grave found a treasure." And just as an intellect can apprehend this so can it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there.
Et ideo dicendum est quod ea quae hic per accidens aguntur, sive in rebus naturalibus sive in rebus humanis, reducuntur in aliquam causam praeordinantem, quae est providentia divina. Quia nihil prohibet id quod est per accidens, accipi ut unum ab aliquo intellectu, alioquin intellectus formare non posset hanc propositionem, "fodiens sepulcrum invenit thesaurum". Et sicut hoc potest intellectus apprehendere, ita potest efficere, sicut si aliquis sciens in quo loco sit thesaurus absconditus, instiget aliquem rusticum hoc ignorantem, ut ibi fodiat sepulcrum.
Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by the intellect, especially the Divine intellect. For God alone can change the will, as shown above (Q105, A4). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone.
Et sic nihil prohibet ea quae hic per accidens aguntur, ut fortuita vel casualia, reduci in aliquam causam ordinantem, quae per intellectum agat, et praecipue intellectum divinum. Nam solus Deus potest voluntatem immutare, ut supra habitum est. Et per consequens ordinatio humanorum actuum, quorum principium est voluntas, soli Deo attribui debet.
Inquantum omnia quae hic aguntur, divinae providentiae subduntur, tanquam per eam praeordinata et quasi praelocuta, fatum ponere possumus, nihil prohibet aliqua esse fortuita vel casualia per comparationem ad causas proximas, non tamen per comparationem ad divinam providentiam, sic enim "nihil temere fit in mundo", ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest.
What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius (De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its proper order."
Quod non est, non definitur. Sed Boetius, in IV de Consol., definit fatum, dicens quod "fatum est inhaerens rebus mobilibus dispositio, per quam providentia suis quaeque nectit ordinibus".
The holy doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those who twisted its application to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): "If anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion, but hold his tongue."
Hoc nomine sancti doctores uti recusaverint, propter eos qui ad vim positionis siderum hoc nomen retorquebant. Unde Augustinus dicit, in V de Civ. Dei, "si propterea quisquam res humanas fato tribuit, quia ipsam Dei voluntatem vel potestatem fati nomine appellat, sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat."
It has been said (Q115 A6) that what is accidental, is properly speaking neither a being, nor a unity. But every action of nature terminates in some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the proper effect of an active natural principle.
Dictum est enim supra quod id quod est per accidens, non est proprie ens neque unum. Omnis autem naturae actio terminatur ad aliquid unum. Unde impossibile est quod id quod est per accidens, sit effectus per se alicuius naturalis principii agentis.
We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise the intellect could not form this proposition: "The digger of a grave found a treasure." And just as an intellect can apprehend this so can it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there.
Et ideo dicendum est quod ea quae hic per accidens aguntur, sive in rebus naturalibus sive in rebus humanis, reducuntur in aliquam causam praeordinantem, quae est providentia divina. Quia nihil prohibet id quod est per accidens, accipi ut unum ab aliquo intellectu, alioquin intellectus formare non posset hanc propositionem, "fodiens sepulcrum invenit thesaurum". Et sicut hoc potest intellectus apprehendere, ita potest efficere, sicut si aliquis sciens in quo loco sit thesaurus absconditus, instiget aliquem rusticum hoc ignorantem, ut ibi fodiat sepulcrum.
Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by the intellect, especially the Divine intellect. For God alone can change the will, as shown above (Q105, A4). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone.
Et sic nihil prohibet ea quae hic per accidens aguntur, ut fortuita vel casualia, reduci in aliquam causam ordinantem, quae per intellectum agat, et praecipue intellectum divinum. Nam solus Deus potest voluntatem immutare, ut supra habitum est. Et per consequens ordinatio humanorum actuum, quorum principium est voluntas, soli Deo attribui debet.
Sunday, August 23, 2009
Q115 A6: Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action?
No. Not all the effects of heavenly bodies take place of necessity because there is nothing to prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of the will, not only in man himself, but also in other things to which human action extends.
Non omnes effectus caelestium corporum ex necessitate eveniunt quia nihil prohibet per voluntariam actionem impediri effectum caelestium corporum, non solum in ipso homine, sed etiam in aliis rebus ad quas hominum operatio se extendit.
Now it is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of necessity.
Manifestum est autem quod causa impediens actionem alicuius causae ordinatae ad suum effectum ut in pluribus, concurrit ei interdum per accidens, unde talis concursus non habet causam, inquantum est per accidens. Et propter hoc, id quod ex tali concursu sequitur, non reducitur in aliquam causam praeexistentem, ex qua ex necessitate sequatur.
Although the cause that hinders the effect of another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause, nevertheless the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of a heavenly body.
Licet causa impediens effectum alterius causae, reducatur in aliquod caeleste corpus sicut in causam, tamen concursus duarum causarum, cum sit per accidens, non reducitur in causam caelestem.
The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes, which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases.
Corpora caelestia sunt causa inferiorum effectuum mediantibus causis particularibus inferioribus, quae deficere possunt in minori parte.
Non omnes effectus caelestium corporum ex necessitate eveniunt quia nihil prohibet per voluntariam actionem impediri effectum caelestium corporum, non solum in ipso homine, sed etiam in aliis rebus ad quas hominum operatio se extendit.
Now it is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of necessity.
Manifestum est autem quod causa impediens actionem alicuius causae ordinatae ad suum effectum ut in pluribus, concurrit ei interdum per accidens, unde talis concursus non habet causam, inquantum est per accidens. Et propter hoc, id quod ex tali concursu sequitur, non reducitur in aliquam causam praeexistentem, ex qua ex necessitate sequatur.
Although the cause that hinders the effect of another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause, nevertheless the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of a heavenly body.
Licet causa impediens effectum alterius causae, reducatur in aliquod caeleste corpus sicut in causam, tamen concursus duarum causarum, cum sit per accidens, non reducitur in causam caelestem.
The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes, which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases.
Corpora caelestia sunt causa inferiorum effectuum mediantibus causis particularibus inferioribus, quae deficere possunt in minori parte.
Saturday, August 22, 2009
Q115 A5: Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons?
No. The demons are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies because we hold that demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies (Q51 A1).
Daemones non subiiciuntur actioni corporum caelestium quia dicimus Daemones esse substantias intellectuales corporibus non unitas.
Daemones non subiiciuntur actioni corporum caelestium quia dicimus Daemones esse substantias intellectuales corporibus non unitas.
Friday, August 21, 2009
Q115 A4: Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions?
No. It is impossible that heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions because intellect and will are not acts of corporeal organs.
Impossibile est quod corpora caelestia sint causa humanorum actuum quia constat intellectum et voluntatem non esse actus organorum corporeorum.
To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ from sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on" (Odyssey xviii 135).
Ponere igitur caelestia corpora esse causam humanorum actuum, est proprium illorum qui dicunt intellectum non differre a sensu. Unde quidam eorum dicebant quod "talis est voluntas in hominibus, qualem in diem inducit pater virorum deorumque."
It must be observed, however, that indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the intellect and will, inasmuch, namely, as both intellect and will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to corporeal organs. But in this the intellect and will are differently situated.
Sciendum est tamen quod indirecte et per accidens impressiones corporum caelestium ad intellectum et voluntatem pertingere possunt; inquantum scilicet tam intellectus quam voluntas aliquo modo ab inferioribus viribus accipiunt, quae organis corporeis alligantur. Sed circa hoc diversimode se habent intellectus et voluntas.
For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior apprehensive powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of necessity, disturbed also.
Nam intellectus ex necessitate accipit ab inferioribus viribus apprehensivis, unde turbata vi imaginativa vel cogitativa vel memorativa, ex necessitate turbatur actio intellectus.
The will, on the contrary, does not, of necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for although the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains the power of following the passions or repressing them.
Sed voluntas non ex necessitate sequitur inclinationem appetitus inferioris, licet enim passiones quae sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili, habeant quandam vim ad inclinandam voluntatem; tamen in potestate voluntatis remanet sequi passiones, vel eas refutare.
Therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior powers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the proximate cause of human actions, than on the intellect.
Et ideo impressio caelestium corporum, secundum quam immutari possunt inferiores vires, minus pertingit ad voluntatem, quae est proxima causa humanorum actuum, quam ad intellectum.
The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly bodies; but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated above (Q111, A2).
Spirituales substantiae quae caelestia corpora movent, in corporalia quidem agunt mediantibus caelestibus corporibus, sed in intellectum humanum agunt immediate illuminando. Voluntatem autem immutare non possunt, ut supra habitum est.
Impossibile est quod corpora caelestia sint causa humanorum actuum quia constat intellectum et voluntatem non esse actus organorum corporeorum.
To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ from sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on" (Odyssey xviii 135).
Ponere igitur caelestia corpora esse causam humanorum actuum, est proprium illorum qui dicunt intellectum non differre a sensu. Unde quidam eorum dicebant quod "talis est voluntas in hominibus, qualem in diem inducit pater virorum deorumque."
It must be observed, however, that indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the intellect and will, inasmuch, namely, as both intellect and will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to corporeal organs. But in this the intellect and will are differently situated.
Sciendum est tamen quod indirecte et per accidens impressiones corporum caelestium ad intellectum et voluntatem pertingere possunt; inquantum scilicet tam intellectus quam voluntas aliquo modo ab inferioribus viribus accipiunt, quae organis corporeis alligantur. Sed circa hoc diversimode se habent intellectus et voluntas.
For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior apprehensive powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of necessity, disturbed also.
Nam intellectus ex necessitate accipit ab inferioribus viribus apprehensivis, unde turbata vi imaginativa vel cogitativa vel memorativa, ex necessitate turbatur actio intellectus.
The will, on the contrary, does not, of necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for although the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains the power of following the passions or repressing them.
Sed voluntas non ex necessitate sequitur inclinationem appetitus inferioris, licet enim passiones quae sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili, habeant quandam vim ad inclinandam voluntatem; tamen in potestate voluntatis remanet sequi passiones, vel eas refutare.
Therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior powers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the proximate cause of human actions, than on the intellect.
Et ideo impressio caelestium corporum, secundum quam immutari possunt inferiores vires, minus pertingit ad voluntatem, quae est proxima causa humanorum actuum, quam ad intellectum.
The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly bodies; but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated above (Q111, A2).
Spirituales substantiae quae caelestia corpora movent, in corporalia quidem agunt mediantibus caelestibus corporibus, sed in intellectum humanum agunt immediate illuminando. Voluntatem autem immutare non possunt, ut supra habitum est.
Thursday, August 20, 2009
Q115 A3: Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies here below?
Yes. The movements of bodies here below, which are various and multiform, must be referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies, as to their cause, because the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of those things which are more movable.
Motus horum inferiorum corporum qui sunt varii et multiformes, reducuntur in motum corporis caelestis, sicut in causam, quia quanto aliqua sunt immobiliora, tanto sunt magis causa eorum quae sunt magis mobilia.
Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10), to suppose a certain movable active principle, which by reason of its presence or absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. Consequently whatever generates here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument of a heavenly body: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that "man and the sun generate man."
Unde secundum philosophum, in II de Gen., necesse est ponere aliquod principium activum mobile, quod per sui praesentiam et absentiam causet varietatem circa generationem et corruptionem inferiorum corporum. Et huiusmodi sunt corpora caelestia. Et ideo quidquid in istis inferioribus generat, movet ad speciem sicut instrumentum caelestis corporis; secundum quod dicitur in II Physic., quod "homo generat hominem, et sol".
The actions of heavenly bodies are variously received in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter. Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an argument against divination by stars, because the effects of the stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the various dispositions of matter.
Actiones corporum caelestium diversimode recipiuntur in inferioribus corporibus secundum diversam materiae dispositionem. Contingit autem quandoque quod materia conceptus humani non est disposita totaliter ad masculinum sexum; unde partim formatur in masculum, partim in feminam. Unde ad hoc introducitur ab Augustino, ad repellendum scilicet divinationem quae fit per astra, quia effectus astrorum variantur etiam in rebus corporeis, secundum diversam materiae dispositionem.
Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "Bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more subtle and powerful nature."
Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod "corpora crassiora et inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine reguntur".
And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that "the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible bodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection."
Et Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod "lumen solis ad generationem sensibilium corporum confert, et ad vitam ipsa movet, et nutrit et auget et perficit".
Motus horum inferiorum corporum qui sunt varii et multiformes, reducuntur in motum corporis caelestis, sicut in causam, quia quanto aliqua sunt immobiliora, tanto sunt magis causa eorum quae sunt magis mobilia.
Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10), to suppose a certain movable active principle, which by reason of its presence or absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. Consequently whatever generates here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument of a heavenly body: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that "man and the sun generate man."
Unde secundum philosophum, in II de Gen., necesse est ponere aliquod principium activum mobile, quod per sui praesentiam et absentiam causet varietatem circa generationem et corruptionem inferiorum corporum. Et huiusmodi sunt corpora caelestia. Et ideo quidquid in istis inferioribus generat, movet ad speciem sicut instrumentum caelestis corporis; secundum quod dicitur in II Physic., quod "homo generat hominem, et sol".
The actions of heavenly bodies are variously received in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter. Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an argument against divination by stars, because the effects of the stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the various dispositions of matter.
Actiones corporum caelestium diversimode recipiuntur in inferioribus corporibus secundum diversam materiae dispositionem. Contingit autem quandoque quod materia conceptus humani non est disposita totaliter ad masculinum sexum; unde partim formatur in masculum, partim in feminam. Unde ad hoc introducitur ab Augustino, ad repellendum scilicet divinationem quae fit per astra, quia effectus astrorum variantur etiam in rebus corporeis, secundum diversam materiae dispositionem.
Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "Bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more subtle and powerful nature."
Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod "corpora crassiora et inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine reguntur".
And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that "the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible bodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection."
Et Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod "lumen solis ad generationem sensibilium corporum confert, et ad vitam ipsa movet, et nutrit et auget et perficit".
Wednesday, August 19, 2009
Q115 A2: Whether there are any seminal aspects in corporeal matter?
Yes. Augustine fittingly gave the name of "seminal aspects" [seminales rationes] to all those active and passive powers which are the principles of natural generation and movement because the active and passive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which living things are generated.
Convenienter Augustinus omnes virtutes activas et passivas quae sunt principia generationum et motuum naturalium, seminales rationes vocat, quia principium activum et passivum generationis rerum viventium sunt semina ex quibus viventia generantur.
It is customary to name things after what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole corporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural things. For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation of living things, which is called "nativity": and because living things are generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, consequently the word "nature" has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved.
Denominationes consueverunt fieri a perfectiori, ut dicitur in II de anima. In tota autem natura corporea perfectiora sunt corpora viva, unde et ipsum nomen naturae translatum est a rebus viventibus ad omnes res naturales. Nam ipsum nomen naturae, ut philosophus dicit in V Metaphys., primo impositum fuit ad significandum generationem viventium, quae nativitas dicitur, et quia viventia generantur ex principio coniuncto, sicut fructus ex arbore, et foetus ex matre, cui colligatur, consequenter tractum est nomen naturae ad omne principium motus quod est in eo quod movetur.
These active and passive powers may be considered in several orders. For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 10), they are principally and originally in the Word of God, as "ideal aspects."
Huiusmodi autem virtutes activae et passivae in multiplici ordine considerari possunt. Nam primo quidem, ut Augustinus dicit VI super Gen. ad Litt., sunt principaliter et originaliter in ipso verbo Dei, secundum rationes ideales.
Secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in "universal causes."
Secundo vero, sunt in elementis mundi, ubi simul a principio productae sunt, sicut in universalibus causis.
Thirdly, they are in those things which, in the succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that animal, as in "particular causes."
Tertio vero modo, sunt in iis quae ex universalibus causis secundum successiones temporum producuntur, sicut in hac planta et in hoc animali, tanquam in particularibus causis.
Fourthly, they are in the "seeds" produced from animals and plants. And these again are compared to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced.
Quarto modo, sunt in seminibus quae ex animalibus et plantis producuntur. Quae iterum comparantur ad alios effectus particulares, sicut primordiales causae universales ad primos effectus productos.
These active and passive powers of natural things, though not called "aspects" [rationes] by reason of their being in corporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, inasmuch as they are the effect of the ideal aspects [rationes ideales].
Huiusmodi virtutes activae et passivae rerum naturalium, etsi non possint dici rationes secundum quod sunt in materia corporali, possunt tamen dici rationes per comparationem ad suam originem, secundum quod deducuntur a rationibus idealibus.
From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal aspects, it is easy to gather that they are also causal aspects, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9) that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things."
Ex verbis Augustini de huiusmodi rationibus seminalibus loquentis, satis accipi potest quod ipsae rationes seminales sunt etiam rationes causales, sicut et semen est quaedam causa, dicit enim in III de Trin., quod "sicut matres gravidae sunt foetibus, sic ipse mundus est gravidus causis nascentium."
Nevertheless, the "ideal aspects" can be called "causal aspects," but not, strictly speaking, "seminal aspects," because seed is not a separate principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of these causal aspects. Likewise neither are miracles wrought outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities which are ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of seminal aspects.
Sed tamen rationes ideales possunt dici causales, non autem proprie loquendo seminales, quia semen non est principium separatum, et praeter huiusmodi rationes non fiunt miracula. Similiter etiam neque praeter virtutes passivas creaturae inditas, ut ex ea fieri possit quidquid Deus mandaverit. Sed praeter virtutes activas naturales, et potentias passivas quae ordinantur ad huiusmodi virtutes activas, dicuntur fieri miracula, dum dicitur quod fiunt praeter rationes seminales.
Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world."
Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., "omnium rerum quae corporaliter visibiliterque nascuntur, occulta quaedam semina in istis corporeis mundi huius elementis latent."
Convenienter Augustinus omnes virtutes activas et passivas quae sunt principia generationum et motuum naturalium, seminales rationes vocat, quia principium activum et passivum generationis rerum viventium sunt semina ex quibus viventia generantur.
It is customary to name things after what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole corporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural things. For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation of living things, which is called "nativity": and because living things are generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, consequently the word "nature" has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved.
Denominationes consueverunt fieri a perfectiori, ut dicitur in II de anima. In tota autem natura corporea perfectiora sunt corpora viva, unde et ipsum nomen naturae translatum est a rebus viventibus ad omnes res naturales. Nam ipsum nomen naturae, ut philosophus dicit in V Metaphys., primo impositum fuit ad significandum generationem viventium, quae nativitas dicitur, et quia viventia generantur ex principio coniuncto, sicut fructus ex arbore, et foetus ex matre, cui colligatur, consequenter tractum est nomen naturae ad omne principium motus quod est in eo quod movetur.
These active and passive powers may be considered in several orders. For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 10), they are principally and originally in the Word of God, as "ideal aspects."
Huiusmodi autem virtutes activae et passivae in multiplici ordine considerari possunt. Nam primo quidem, ut Augustinus dicit VI super Gen. ad Litt., sunt principaliter et originaliter in ipso verbo Dei, secundum rationes ideales.
Secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in "universal causes."
Secundo vero, sunt in elementis mundi, ubi simul a principio productae sunt, sicut in universalibus causis.
Thirdly, they are in those things which, in the succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that animal, as in "particular causes."
Tertio vero modo, sunt in iis quae ex universalibus causis secundum successiones temporum producuntur, sicut in hac planta et in hoc animali, tanquam in particularibus causis.
Fourthly, they are in the "seeds" produced from animals and plants. And these again are compared to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced.
Quarto modo, sunt in seminibus quae ex animalibus et plantis producuntur. Quae iterum comparantur ad alios effectus particulares, sicut primordiales causae universales ad primos effectus productos.
These active and passive powers of natural things, though not called "aspects" [rationes] by reason of their being in corporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, inasmuch as they are the effect of the ideal aspects [rationes ideales].
Huiusmodi virtutes activae et passivae rerum naturalium, etsi non possint dici rationes secundum quod sunt in materia corporali, possunt tamen dici rationes per comparationem ad suam originem, secundum quod deducuntur a rationibus idealibus.
From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal aspects, it is easy to gather that they are also causal aspects, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9) that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things."
Ex verbis Augustini de huiusmodi rationibus seminalibus loquentis, satis accipi potest quod ipsae rationes seminales sunt etiam rationes causales, sicut et semen est quaedam causa, dicit enim in III de Trin., quod "sicut matres gravidae sunt foetibus, sic ipse mundus est gravidus causis nascentium."
Nevertheless, the "ideal aspects" can be called "causal aspects," but not, strictly speaking, "seminal aspects," because seed is not a separate principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of these causal aspects. Likewise neither are miracles wrought outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities which are ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of seminal aspects.
Sed tamen rationes ideales possunt dici causales, non autem proprie loquendo seminales, quia semen non est principium separatum, et praeter huiusmodi rationes non fiunt miracula. Similiter etiam neque praeter virtutes passivas creaturae inditas, ut ex ea fieri possit quidquid Deus mandaverit. Sed praeter virtutes activas naturales, et potentias passivas quae ordinantur ad huiusmodi virtutes activas, dicuntur fieri miracula, dum dicitur quod fiunt praeter rationes seminales.
Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world."
Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., "omnium rerum quae corporaliter visibiliterque nascuntur, occulta quaedam semina in istis corporeis mundi huius elementis latent."
Tuesday, August 18, 2009
Q115 A1: Whether a body can be active?
Yes. Some bodies are active because it is apparent to the senses.
Corpora sunt activa quia sensibiliter apparet.
A body is composed of potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive.
Corpus autem componitur ex potentia et actu, et ideo est agens et patiens.
We must therefore say that a body acts inasmuch as it is in act, on a body inasmuch as it is in potentiality.
Dicendum est ergo quod corpus agit secundum quod est actu, in aliud corpus secundum quod est in potentia.
Action is not effected by local movement, as Democritus held, but by something being reduced from potentiality to act.
Actio non fit per motum localem, ut Democritus posuit, sed per hoc quod aliquid reducitur de potentia in actum.
To act, which is nothing else than to make something to be in act, is essentially proper to an act as such; wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact of its being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and universal: but to the fact that it is determined to this matter, it owes its being an agent limited and particular.
Agere autem, quod nihil est aliud quam facere aliquid actu, est per se proprium actus, inquantum est actus, unde et omne agens agit sibi simile. Sic ergo ex hoc quod aliquid est forma non determinata per materiam quantitati subiectam, habet quod sit agens indeterminatum et universale, ex hoc vero quod est determinata ad hanc materiam, habet quod sit agens contractum et particulare.
Wherefore if the form of fire were separate, as the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of every ignition. But this form of fire which is in this corporeal matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes from this body into that. Hence such an action is effected by the contact of two bodies.
Unde si esset forma ignis separata, ut Platonici posuerunt, esset aliquo modo causa omnis ignitionis. Sed haec forma ignis quae est in hac materia corporali, est causa huius ignitionis quae est ab hoc corpore in hoc corpus. Unde et fit talis actio per contactum duorum corporum.
The term of a body's action is both an accidental form and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat, although itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can terminate in a substantial form.
Corpus agit et ad formam accidentalem, et ad formam substantialem. Qualitas enim activa, ut calor, etsi sit accidens, agit tamen in virtute formae substantialis, sicut eius instrumentum; et ideo potest agere ad formam substantialem.
A body is not that which is most distant from God; for it participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being, inasmuch as it has a form. That which is most distant from God is primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality.
Corpus non est id quod maxime distat a Deo, participat enim aliquid de similitudine divini esse, secundum formam quam habet. Sed id quod maxime distat a Deo, est materia prima; quae nullo modo est agens, cum sit in potentia tantum.
Corpora sunt activa quia sensibiliter apparet.
A body is composed of potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive.
Corpus autem componitur ex potentia et actu, et ideo est agens et patiens.
We must therefore say that a body acts inasmuch as it is in act, on a body inasmuch as it is in potentiality.
Dicendum est ergo quod corpus agit secundum quod est actu, in aliud corpus secundum quod est in potentia.
Action is not effected by local movement, as Democritus held, but by something being reduced from potentiality to act.
Actio non fit per motum localem, ut Democritus posuit, sed per hoc quod aliquid reducitur de potentia in actum.
To act, which is nothing else than to make something to be in act, is essentially proper to an act as such; wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact of its being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and universal: but to the fact that it is determined to this matter, it owes its being an agent limited and particular.
Agere autem, quod nihil est aliud quam facere aliquid actu, est per se proprium actus, inquantum est actus, unde et omne agens agit sibi simile. Sic ergo ex hoc quod aliquid est forma non determinata per materiam quantitati subiectam, habet quod sit agens indeterminatum et universale, ex hoc vero quod est determinata ad hanc materiam, habet quod sit agens contractum et particulare.
Wherefore if the form of fire were separate, as the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of every ignition. But this form of fire which is in this corporeal matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes from this body into that. Hence such an action is effected by the contact of two bodies.
Unde si esset forma ignis separata, ut Platonici posuerunt, esset aliquo modo causa omnis ignitionis. Sed haec forma ignis quae est in hac materia corporali, est causa huius ignitionis quae est ab hoc corpore in hoc corpus. Unde et fit talis actio per contactum duorum corporum.
The term of a body's action is both an accidental form and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat, although itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can terminate in a substantial form.
Corpus agit et ad formam accidentalem, et ad formam substantialem. Qualitas enim activa, ut calor, etsi sit accidens, agit tamen in virtute formae substantialis, sicut eius instrumentum; et ideo potest agere ad formam substantialem.
A body is not that which is most distant from God; for it participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being, inasmuch as it has a form. That which is most distant from God is primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality.
Corpus non est id quod maxime distat a Deo, participat enim aliquid de similitudine divini esse, secundum formam quam habet. Sed id quod maxime distat a Deo, est materia prima; quae nullo modo est agens, cum sit in potentia tantum.
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