Q82 A2: Whether the will desires of necessity, whatever it desires?

No. The will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires because the will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of good, but because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will is not of necessity determined to one.

Voluntas non ex necessitate vult quaecumque vult quia voluntas in nihil potest tendere nisi sub ratione boni. Sed quia bonum est multiplex, propter hoc non ex necessitate determinatur ad unum.

The sensitive power does not compare different things with each other, as reason does, but it simply apprehends some one thing. Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the sensitive appetite in a determinate way. But the reason is a power that compares several things together; therefore from several things the intellectual appetite--that is, the will--may be moved, but not of necessity from one thing.

Vis sensitiva non est vis collativa diversorum, sicut ratio, sed simpliciter aliquid unum apprehendit. Et ideo secundum illud unum determinate movet appetitum sensitivum. Sed ratio est collativa plurium, et ideo ex pluribus moveri potest appetitus intellectivus, scilicet voluntas, et non ex uno ex necessitate.

The mover, then, of necessity causes movement in the thing movable, when the power of the mover exceeds the thing movable, so that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as the capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, its capacity is not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is not of necessity moved by it.

Movens tunc ex necessitate causat motum in mobili, quando potestas moventis excedit mobile, ita quod tota eius possibilitas moventi subdatur. Cum autem possibilitas voluntatis sit respectu boni universalis et perfecti, non subiicitur eius possibilitas tota alicui particulari bono. Et ideo non ex necessitate movetur ab illo.

There are certain individual goods which have not a necessary connection with happiness, because without them a man can be happy: and to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are some things which have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of which things man adheres to God, in Whom alone true happiness consists. Nevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the necessity of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will of the man who sees God in His essence of necessity adheres to God, just as now we desire of necessity to be happy.

Sunt enim quaedam particularia bona, quae non habent necessariam connexionem ad beatitudinem, quia sine his potest aliquis esse beatus, et huiusmodi voluntas non de necessitate inhaeret. Sunt autem quaedam habentia necessariam connexionem ad beatitudinem, quibus scilicet homo Deo inhaeret, in quo solo vera beatitudo consistit. Sed tamen antequam per certitudinem divinae visionis necessitas huiusmodi connexionis demonstretur, voluntas non ex necessitate Deo inhaeret, nec his quae Dei sunt. Sed voluntas videntis Deum per essentiam, de necessitate inhaeret Deo, sicut nunc ex necessitate volumus esse beati.

Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is the will by which we sin and live well," and so the will extends to opposite things. Therefore it does not desire of necessity all things whatsoever it desires.

Augustinus dicit, quod "voluntas est qua peccatur et recte vivitur", et sic se habet ad opposita. Non ergo ex necessitate vult quaecumque vult.

Q82 A1: Whether the will desires something of necessity?

Yes. The will desires something of necessity because the desire of the ultimate end does not regard those actions of which we are masters.

Voluntas ex necessitate aliquid vult quia appetitus ultimi finis non est de his quorum domini sumus.

We are masters of our own actions by reason of our being able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end, but "the means to the end," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9).

Sumus domini nostrorum actuum secundum quod possumus hoc vel illud eligere. Electio autem non est de fine, sed de his quae sunt ad finem, ut dicitur in III Ethic.

For as the intellect of necessity adheres to the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness: since the end is in practical matters what the principle is in speculative matters.

Sicut intellectus ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo: finis enim se habet in operativis sicut principium in speculativis, ut dicitur in II Physic.

Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4) that "all desire happiness with one will."

Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin., quod "beatitudinem omnes una voluntate appetunt."

Q82: The will

1. Does the will desire something of necessity?
2. Does it desire anything of necessity?
3. Is it a higher power than the intellect?
4. Does the will move the intellect?
5. Is the will divided into irascible and concupiscible?

Q81 A3: Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason?

Yes. The irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason because the exterior senses require for action exterior sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which is not ruled by reason, but the interior powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, do not require exterior things; therefore they are subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or modify the affections of the appetitive power, but can also form the phantasms of the imagination.

Irascibilis et concupiscibilis rationi subduntur quia sensus exteriores indigent ad suos actus exterioribus sensibilibus, quibus immutentur, quorum praesentia non est in potestate rationis. Sed vires interiores, tam appetitivae quam apprehensivae, non indigent exterioribus rebus. Et ideo subduntur imperio rationis, quae potest non solum instigare vel mitigare affectus appetitivae virtutis, sed etiam formare imaginativae virtutis phantasmata.

As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2): "We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power." For a power is called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the ability to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since they have nothing of their own.

Sicut philosophus dicit in I politicorum, "est quidem in animali contemplari et despoticum principatum, et politicum, anima quidem enim corpori dominatur despotico principatu; intellectus autem appetitui, politico et regali." Dicitur enim despoticus principatus, quo aliquis principatur servis, qui non habent facultatem in aliquo resistendi imperio praecipientis, quia nihil sui habent.

But that power is called politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands.

Principatus autem politicus et regalis dicitur, quo aliquis principatur liberis, qui, etsi subdantur regimini praesidentis, tamen habent aliquid proprium, ex quo possunt reniti praecipientis imperio.

And so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic power, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul's command both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power, because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason.

Sic igitur anima dicitur dominari corpori despotico principatu, quia corporis membra in nullo resistere possunt imperio animae, sed statim ad appetitum animae movetur manus et pes, et quodlibet membrum quod natum est moveri voluntario motu. Intellectus autem, seu ratio, dicitur principari irascibili et concupiscibili politico principatu, quia appetitus sensibilis habet aliquid proprium, unde potest reniti imperio rationis.

For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative power in other animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not conclude that they do not obey.

Natus est enim moveri appetitus sensitivus, non solum ab aestimativa in aliis animalibus, et cogitativa in homine, quam dirigit universalis ratio, sed etiam ab imaginativa et sensu. Unde experimur irascibilem vel concupiscibilem rationi repugnare, per hoc quod sentimus vel imaginamur aliquod delectabile quod ratio vetat, vel triste quod ratio praecipit. Et sic per hoc quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis in aliquo rationi repugnant, non excluditur quin ei obediant.

In two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers obey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the will; first, as to reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance, a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid.

Rationi quidem obediunt quantum ad ipsos suos actus. Cuius ratio est, quia appetitus sensitivus in aliis quidem animalibus natus est moveri ab aestimativa virtute; sicut ovis aestimans lupum inimicum, timet.

In man the estimative power, as we have said above (Q78, A4), is replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some 'the particular reason,' because it compares individual intentions. Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason. But this same particular reason is naturally guided and moved according to the universal reason; wherefore in syllogistic matters particular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions.

Loco autem aestimativae virtutis est in homine, sicut supra dictum est, vis cogitativa, quae dicitur a quibusdam ratio particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium. Unde ab ea natus est moveri in homine appetitus sensitivus. Ipsa autem ratio particularis nata est moveri et dirigi secundum rationem universalem; unde in syllogisticis ex universalibus propositionibus concluduntur conclusiones singulares.

Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible, and this appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions from universal principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but of the reason, hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible are said to obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect.

Et ideo patet quod ratio universalis imperat appetitui sensitivo, qui distinguitur per concupiscibilem et irascibilem, et hic appetitus ei obedit. Et quia deducere universalia principia in conclusiones singulares, non est opus simplicis intellectus, sed rationis, ideo irascibilis et concupiscibilis magis dicuntur obedire rationi, quam intellectui.

Anyone can experience this in himself, for by applying certain universal considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited.

Hoc etiam quilibet experiri potest in seipso, applicando enim aliquas universales considerationes, mitigatur ira aut timor aut aliquid huiusmodi, vel etiam instigatur.

To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution, which is accomplished by the motive power. For in other animals movement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites; for instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it has no superior counteracting appetite.

Voluntati etiam subiacet appetitus sensitivus, quantum ad executionem, quae fit per vim motivam. In aliis enim animalibus statim ad appetitum concupiscibilis et irascibilis sequitur motus; sicut ovis, timens lupum statim fugit, quia non est in eis aliquis superior appetitus qui repugnet.

On the contrary, man is not moved at once, according to the irascible and concupiscible appetites; but he awaits the command of the will, which is the superior appetite. For wherever there is order among a number of motive powers, the second only moves by virtue of the first; wherefore the lower appetite is not sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher appetite consents.

Sed homo non statim movetur secundum appetitum irascibilis et concupiscibilis; sed expectatur imperium voluntatis, quod est appetitus superior. In omnibus enim potentiis motivis ordinatis, secundum movens non movet nisi virtute primi moventis; unde appetitus inferior non sufficit movere, nisi appetitus superior consentiat.

And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), that "the higher appetite moves the lower appetite, as the higher sphere moves the lower." In this way, therefore, the irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason.

Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod "appetitus superior movet appetitum inferiorem, sicut sphaera superior inferiorem." Hoc ergo modo irascibilis et concupiscibilis rationi subduntur.

Q81 A2: Whether the sensitive appetite is divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers?

Yes. The sensitive appetite is one generic power, and is called sensuality; but it is divided into two powers, which are species of the sensitive appetite -- the irascible and the concupiscible, because the concupiscible power regards both what is suitable and what is unsuitable, but the object of the irascible power is to resist the onslaught of the unsuitable.

Appetitus sensitivus est una vis in genere, quae sensualitas dicitur; sed dividitur in duas potentias, quae sunt species appetitus sensitivi, scilicet in irascibilem et concupiscibilem quia vis concupiscibilis est et convenientis et inconvenientis, sed irascibilis est ad resistendum inconvenienti quod impugnat.

As in the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part there is an estimative power, which perceives those things which do not impress the senses, as we have said above (Q78, A2); so also in the sensitive appetite there is a certain appetitive power which regards something as suitable, not because it pleases the senses, but because it is useful to the animal for self-defense: and this is the irascible power.

Sicut in apprehensivis virtutibus in parte sensitiva est aliqua vis aestimativa, scilicet quae est perceptiva eorum quae sensum non immutant, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam in appetitu sensitivo est aliqua vis appetens aliquid quod non est conveniens secundum delectationem sensus, sed secundum quod est utile animali ad suam defensionem. Et haec est vis irascibilis.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that in natural corruptible things there is needed an inclination not only to the acquisition of what is suitable and to the avoiding of what is harmful, but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary agencies which are a hindrance to the acquisition of what is suitable, and are productive of harm.

Ad cuius evidentiam, considerari oportet quod in rebus naturalibus corruptibilibus, non solum oportet esse inclinationem ad consequendum convenientia et refugiendum nociva; sed etiam ad resistendum corrumpentibus et contrariis, quae convenientibus impedimentum praebent et ingerunt nocumenta.

Therefore, since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive apprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination following the natural form, there must needs be in the sensitive part two appetitive powers--one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is suitable, according to the senses, and to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible: and another, whereby an animal resists these attacks that hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm, and this is called the irascible. Whence we say that its object is something arduous, because its tendency is to overcome and rise above obstacles.

Quia igitur appetitus sensitivus est inclinatio consequens apprehensionem sensitivam, sicut appetitus naturalis est inclinatio consequens formam naturalem; necesse est quod in parte sensitiva sint duae appetitivae potentiae. Una, per quam anima simpliciter inclinatur ad prosequendum ea quae sunt convenientia secundum sensum, et ad refugiendum nociva, et haec dicitur concupiscibilis. Alia vero, per quam animal resistit impugnantibus, quae convenientia impugnant et nocumenta inferunt, et haec vis vocatur irascibilis. Unde dicitur quod eius obiectum est arduum, quia scilicet tendit ad hoc quod superet contraria, et superemineat eis.

Now these two are not to be reduced to one principle: for sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant things, against the inclination of the concupiscible appetite, in order that, following the impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight against obstacles.

Hae autem duae inclinationes non reducuntur in unum principium, quia interdum anima tristibus se ingerit, contra inclinationem concupiscibilis, ut secundum inclinationem irascibilis impugnet contraria.

Wherefore also the passions of the irascible appetite counteract the passions of the concupiscible appetite: since the concupiscence, on being aroused, diminishes anger; and anger being roused, diminishes concupiscence in many cases.

Unde etiam passiones irascibilis repugnare videntur passionibus concupiscibilis, nam concupiscentia accensa minuit iram, et ira accensa minuit concupiscentiam, ut in pluribus.

This is clear also from the fact that the irascible is, as it were, the champion and defender of the concupiscible when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of the suitable things which the concupiscible desires, or against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies.

Patet etiam ex hoc, quod irascibilis est quasi propugnatrix et defensatrix concupiscibilis, dum insurgit contra ea quae impediunt convenientia, quae concupiscibilis appetit, et ingerunt nociva, quae concupiscibilis refugit.

And for this reason all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the passions of the concupiscible appetite and terminate in them; for instance, anger rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy. For this reason also the quarrels of animals are about things concupiscible--namely, food and sex, as the Philosopher says [De Animal. Histor. viii.].

Et propter hoc, omnes passiones irascibilis incipiunt a passionibus concupiscibilis, et in eas terminantur; sicut ira nascitur ex illata tristitia, et vindictam inferens, in laetitiam terminatur. Propter hoc etiam pugnae animalium sunt de concupiscibilibus, scilicet de cibis et venereis, ut dicitur in VIII de animalibus.

Q81 A1: Is sensuality only an appetitive power?

Yes. Sensuality is defined as "the appetite of things belonging to the body" because the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to the bodily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended through the bodily senses, and thus the bodily senses appertain to sensuality as a preamble.

Sensualitas definitur esse "appetitus rerum ad corpus pertinentium" quia motus sensualitatis sit inclinatio quaedam ad sensus corporis, dum scilicet appetimus ea quae per corporis sensus apprehenduntur et sic corporis sensus pertinent ad sensualitatem quasi praeambuli.

Sensuality is divided against higher and lower reason, as having in common with them the act of movement; for the apprehensive power, to which belong the higher and lower reason, is a motive power, as is appetite, to which appertains sensuality.

Sensualitas dividitur contra rationem superiorem et inferiorem, inquantum communicant in actu motionis; vis enim cognitiva, ad quam pertinet ratio superior et inferior, est motiva, sicut et appetitiva, ad quam pertinet sensualitas.

The name sensuality seems to be taken from the sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks (De Trin. xii, 12, 13), just as the name of a power is taken from its act; for instance, sight from seeing.

Nomen sensualitatis sumptum videtur a sensuali motu, de quo Augustinus loquitur XII de Trin., sicut ab actu sumitur nomen potentiae, ut a visione visus.

Now the sensual movement is an appetite following sensitive apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly called a movement, as the act of the appetite is, since the operation of the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact that the thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends; while the operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that he who desires is borne towards the thing desirable.

Motus autem sensualis est appetitus apprehensionem sensitivam consequens. Actus enim apprehensivae virtutis non ita proprie dicitur motus, sicut actio appetitus, nam operatio virtutis apprehensivae perficitur in hoc, quod res apprehensae sunt in apprehendente; operatio autem virtutis appetitivae perficitur in hoc, quod appetens inclinatur in rem appetibilem.

Therefore the operation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest; whereas the operation of the appetitive power is rather likened to movement.

Et ideo operatio apprehensivae virtutis assimilatur quieti; operatio autem virtutis appetitivae magis assimilatur motui.

Wherefore by sensual movement we understand the operation of the appetitive power, so that sensuality is the name of the sensitive appetite.

Unde per sensualem motum intelligitur operatio appetitivae virtutis. Et sic sensualitas est nomen appetitus sensitivi.

Q81: The power of sensuality

1. Is sensuality only an appetitive power?
2. Is it divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers?
3. Do the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?

Q80 A2: Whether the sensitive and intellectual appetites are distinct powers?

Yes. The intellectual appetite is distinct from the sensitive because what is apprehended by the intellect and what is apprehended by sense are generically different.

Quia igitur est alterius generis apprehensum per intellectum et apprehensum per sensum, consequens est quod appetitus intellectivus sit alia potentia a sensitivo.

The intellectual appetite, though it tends to individual things which exist outside the soul, yet tends to them as with respect to a certain universal aspect, as when it desires something because it is good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhetoric. ii, 4) that hatred is able to be about something universal; as when "we hate every kind of thief." In the same way by the intellectual appetite we are able to desire immaterial goods, which are not apprehended by sense, such as knowledge, virtue, and suchlike.

Appetitus intellectivus, etsi feratur in res quae sunt extra animam singulares, fertur tamen in eas secundum aliquam rationem universalem, sicut cum appetit aliquid quia est bonum. Unde philosophus dicit in sua rhetorica, quod odium potest esse de aliquo universali; puta cum odio habemus omne latronum genus. Similiter etiam per appetitum intellectivum appetere possumus immaterialia bona, quae sensus non apprehendit; sicut scientiam, virtutes, et alia huiusmodi.

Now things passive and movable are differentiated according to the distinction of the corresponding active and motive principles, because the motive must be proportionate to the movable, and the active to the passive; indeed, the passive power itself has its proper aspect from its relation to its active principle.

Passiva autem et mobilia distinguuntur secundum distinctionem activorum et motivorum, quia oportet motivum esse proportionatum mobili, et activum passivo; et ipsa potentia passiva propriam rationem habet ex ordine ad suum activum.

The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9) distinguishes a double appetite, and says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower.

Philosophus, in III de anima, distinguit duplicem appetitum, et dicit quod appetitus superior movet inferiorem.

For the appetitive power is a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended, wherefore the apprehended appetible is an activator (a mover which is not moved); while the appetite is a receptor (a mover moved), as the Philosopher says in De Anima iii, 10 and Metaph. xii (Did. xi, 7).

Potentia enim appetitiva est potentia passiva, quae nata est moveri ab apprehenso, unde appetibile apprehensum est movens non motum; appetitus autem movens motum, ut dicitur in III de anima, et XII Metaphys.

It is not accidental to the thing desired to be apprehended by the sense or the intellect, rather this belongs to it intrinsically; for the appetible does not move the appetite except as it is apprehended.

Appetibili non accidit esse apprehensum per sensum vel intellectum, sed per se ei convenit; nam appetibile non movet appetitum nisi inquantum est apprehensum.

Wherefore differences in the thing apprehended are of themselves differences of the appetible. And so the appetitive powers are distinct according to the distinction of the things apprehended, as according to their proper objects.

Unde differentiae apprehensi sunt per se differentiae appetibilis. Unde potentiae appetitivae distinguuntur secundum differentiam apprehensorum, sicut secundum propria obiecta.

Q80 A1: Whether the appetite is a special power of the soul?

Yes. It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul because appetite is found in things which have knowledge, above the common manner in which it is found in all things.

Necesse est ponere quandam potentiam animae appetitivam quia appetere invenitur in habentibus cognitionem, supra modum communem quo invenitur in omnibus.

Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by the natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself.

Unaquaeque potentia animae est quaedam forma seu natura, et habet naturalem inclinationem in aliquid. Unde unaquaeque appetit obiectum sibi conveniens naturali appetitu.

Above which natural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows the apprehension, and by which something is desired, not as suitable to this or that power (such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing), but simply as suitable to the animal.

Supra quem est appetitus animalis consequens apprehensionem, quo appetitur aliquid, non ea ratione qua est conveniens ad actum huius vel illius potentiae (utpote visio ad videndum et auditio ad audiendum), sed quia est conveniens simpliciter animali.

What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in reality, but differ in aspect, for a thing is apprehended as something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable or good. Now, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers.

Id quod apprehenditur et appetitur, est idem subiecto, sed differt ratione, apprehenditur enim ut est ens sensibile vel intelligibile, appetitur vero ut est conveniens aut bonum. Diversitas autem rationum in obiectis requiritur ad diversitatem potentiarum; non autem materialis diversitas.

To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination follows every form.

Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio.

Now, the form is found to have a more perfect existence in those things which participate knowledge than in those which lack knowledge.

Forma autem in his quae cognitionem participant, altiori modo invenitur quam in his quae cognitione carent.

For in those which lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being: that is, to its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite.

In his enim quae cognitione carent, invenitur tantummodo forma ad unum esse proprium determinans unumquodque, quod etiam naturale uniuscuiusque est. Hanc igitur formam naturalem sequitur naturalis inclinatio, quae appetitus naturalis vocatur.

But in those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other things; for example, sense receives the species of all things sensible, and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and intellect, and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness to God, "in Whom all things pre-exist," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).

In habentibus autem cognitionem, sic determinatur unumquodque ad proprium esse naturale per formam naturalem, quod tamen est receptivum specierum aliarum rerum; sicut sensus recipit species omnium sensibilium, et intellectus omnium intelligibilium, ut sic anima hominis sit omnia quodammodo secundum sensum et intellectum, in quo quodammodo cognitionem habentia ad Dei similitudinem appropinquant, "in quo omnia praeexistunt", sicut Dionysius dicit.

Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms, so must there be in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite.

Sicut igitur formae altiori modo existunt in habentibus cognitionem supra modum formarum naturalium, ita oportet quod in eis sit inclinatio supra modum inclinationis naturalis, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis.

And this superior inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul.

Et haec superior inclinatio pertinet ad vim animae appetitivam, per quam animal appetere potest ea quae apprehendit, non solum ea ad quae inclinatur ex forma naturali. Sic igitur necesse est ponere aliquam potentiam animae appetitivam.

Q80: The appetitive powers in general

1. Should the appetite be considered a special power of the soul?
2. Should the appetite be divided into intellectual and sensitive as distinct powers?

Q79 A13: Whether conscience be a power?

No. Properly speaking, conscience is not a power, but an act because the application of knowledge to something is done by some act.

Conscientia, proprie loquendo, non est potentia, sed actus quia applicatio scientiae ad aliquid fit per aliquem actum.

For conscience, according to the very nature of the word, implies the relation of knowledge to something: for conscience may be resolved into "cum alio scientia," i.e. knowledge applied to an individual case.

Conscientia enim, secundum proprietatem vocabuli, importat ordinem scientiae ad aliquid: nam conscientia dicitur "cum alio scientia".

For conscience is said to witness, to bind, or incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. And all these follow the application of knowledge or science to what we do.

Dicitur enim conscientia testificari, ligare vel instigare, et etiam accusare vel remordere sive reprehendere. Et haec omnia consequuntur applicationem alicuius nostrae cognitionis vel scientiae ad ea quae agimus.

Conscience can be laid aside. But a power cannot be laid aside. Therefore conscience is not a power.

Conscientia deponi potest, non autem potentia. Ergo conscientia non est potentia.

Wherefore, properly speaking, conscience denominates an act. But since habit is a principle of act, sometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural habit: namely, "synderesis"; thus Jerome calls "synderesis" conscience (Gloss. Ezekiel 1:6); Basil [Hom. in princ. Proverb.], the "natural power of judgment," and Damascene [De Fide Orth. iv. 22] says that it is the "law of our intellect." For it is customary for causes and effects to be called after one another.

Unde proprie loquendo, conscientia nominat actum. Quia tamen habitus est principium actus, quandoque nomen conscientiae attribuitur primo habitui naturali: scilicet "synderesi", sicut Hieronymus, in Glossa Ezech. I, "synderesim" conscientiam nominat; et Basilius "naturale iudicatorium"; et Damascenus dicit quod est " intellectus nostri". Consuetum enim est quod causae et effectus per invicem nominentur.

Although an act does not always remain in itself, yet it always remains in its cause, which is power and habit. Now all the habits by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless have their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first principles, which is called "synderesis". And for this special reason, this habit is sometimes called "conscience".

Actus, etsi non semper maneat in se, semper tamen manet in sua causa, quae est potentia et habitus. Habitus autem ex quibus conscientia informatur, etsi multi sint, omnes tamen efficaciam habent ab uno primo, scilicet ab habitu primorum principiorum, qui dicitur "synderesis". Unde specialiter hic habitus interdum "conscientia" nominatur.

Q79 A12: Whether synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from the others?

No. "Synderesis" is not a power but a habit because various acts can belong to one power.

Synderesis non est potentia, sed habitus quia diversi actus possunt esse unius potentiae.

Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which is called "the understanding of principles," as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. vi, 6). Wherefore the first practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we call "synderesis".

Prima autem principia speculabilium nobis naturaliter indita, non pertinent ad aliquam specialem potentiam, sed ad quendam specialem habitum, qui dicitur "intellectus principiorum", ut patet in VI Ethic. Unde et principia operabilium nobis naturaliter indita, non pertinent ad specialem potentiam, sed ad specialem habitum naturalem, quem dicimus synderesim.

Whence "synderesis" is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered. It is therefore clear that "synderesis" is not a power, but a natural habit.

Unde et synderesis dicitur instigare ad bonum, et murmurare de malo, inquantum per prima principia procedimus ad inveniendum, et iudicamus inventa. Patet ergo quod synderesis non est potentia, sed habitus naturalis.

As we have said above (Q79, A8), man's act of reasoning, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the understanding of certain things -- namely, those which are naturally known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an immovable principle -- and ends also at the understanding, inasmuch as by means of those principles naturally known, we judge of those things which we have discovered by reasoning.

Sicut supra dictum est, ratiocinatio hominis, cum sit quidam motus, ab intellectu progreditur aliquorum -- scilicet naturaliter notorum absque investigatione rationis, sicut a quodam principio immobili -- et ad intellectum etiam terminatur, inquantum iudicamus per principia per se naturaliter nota, de his quae ratiocinando invenimus.

Now it is clear that, as the speculative reason argues about speculative things, so that practical reason argues about practical things. Therefore we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical principles.

Constat autem quod, sicut ratio speculativa ratiocinatur de speculativis, ita ratio practica ratiocinatur de operabilibus. Oportet igitur naturaliter nobis esse indita, sicut principia speculabilium, ita et principia operabilium.

According to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), "rational powers regard opposite things." But "synderesis" does not regard opposites, but inclines to good only. Therefore "synderesis" is not a power. For if it were a power it would be a rational power, since it is not found in brute animals.

"Potentiae rationales se habent ad opposita", secundum philosophum. Synderesis autem non se habet ad opposita, sed ad bonum tantum inclinat. Ergo synderesis non est potentia. Si enim esset potentia, oporteret quod esset rationalis potentia, non enim invenitur in brutis.

Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 10) that in the natural power of judgment there are certain "rules and seeds of virtue, both true and unchangeable."

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod in naturali iudicatorio adsunt quaedam "regulae et semina virtutum et vera et incommutabilia".

Those unchangeable notions are the first practical principles, concerning which no one errs; and they are attributed to reason as to a power, and to "synderesis" as to a habit. Wherefore we judge naturally both by our reason and by "synderesis".

Huiusmodi incommutabiles rationes sunt prima principia operabilium, circa quae non contingit errare; et attribuuntur rationi sicut potentiae, et synderesi sicut habitui. Unde et utroque, scilicet ratione et synderesi, naturaliter iudicamus.

Q79 A11: Whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers?

No. The speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers because what is accidental to the formal aspect of the object of a power, does not differentiate that power.

Intellectus speculativus et practicus non sunt diversae potentiae quia id quod accidentaliter se habet ad obiecti rationem quam respicit aliqua potentia, non diversificat potentiam.

Now, to a thing apprehended by the intellect, it is accidental whether it be directed to operation or not: and according to this the speculative and practical intellects differ.

Accidit autem alicui apprehenso per intellectum, quod ordinetur ad opus, vel non ordinetur. Secundum hoc autem differunt intellectus speculativus et practicus.

For it is the speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration of truth; while the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to operation.

Nam intellectus speculativus est, qui quod apprehendit, non ordinat ad opus, sed ad solam veritatis considerationem; practicus vero intellectus dicitur, qui hoc quod apprehendit, ordinat ad opus.

The speculative intellect by extension becomes practical (De Anima iii, 10). But one power is not changed into another.

Intellectus speculativus per extensionem fit practicus. Una autem potentia non mutatur in aliam.

The practical intellect is a motive power, not as executing movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to it according to its mode of apprehension.

Intellectus practicus est motivus, non quasi exequens motum, sed quasi dirigens ad motum. Quod convenit ei secundum modum suae apprehensionis.

Truth and good include one another; for truth is something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore as the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the aspect of good, for example, when some one desires to know the truth; so the object of the practical intellect is good directed to the operation, and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect knows truth, just as the speculative, but it directs the known truth to operation.

Verum et bonum se invicem includunt, nam verum est quoddam bonum, alioquin non esset appetibile; et bonum est quoddam verum, alioquin non esset intelligibile. Sicut igitur obiectum appetitus potest esse verum, inquantum habet rationem boni, sicut cum aliquis appetit veritatem cognoscere; ita obiectum intellectus practici est bonum ordinabile ad opus, sub ratione veri. Intellectus enim practicus veritatem cognoscit, sicut et speculativus; sed veritatem cognitam ordinat ad opus.

And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10); that "the speculative differs from the practical in its end." Whence each is named from its end: the one speculative, the other practical--i.e. operative.

Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit in III de anima, quod "speculativus differt a practico, fine". Unde et a fine denominatur uterque, hic quidem speculativus, ille vero practicus, idest operativus.

Q79 A10: Whether intelligence is a power distinct from intellect?

No. Intelligence is not another power than the intellect because intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as power is from power, but as act is from power.

Intelligentia non est alia potentia praeter intellectum quia intelligentia ab intellectu non distinguitur sicut potentia a potentia, sed sicut actus a potentia.

For every difference of acts does not make the powers vary, but only what cannot be reduced to the one same principle, as we have said above (Q78, A4).

Non enim omnis differentia actuum potentias diversificat; sed solum illa quae non potest reduci in idem principium, ut supra dictum est.

And such a division is recognized even by the philosophers. For sometimes they assign four intellects--namely, the "active" and "passive" intellects, the intellect "in habit," and the "actual" intellect. Of which four the active and passive intellects are different powers; just as in all things the active power is distinct from the passive.

Invenitur enim talis divisio etiam a philosophis. Quandoque enim ponunt quatuor intellectus, scilicet intellectum agentem, possibilem, et in habitu, et adeptum. Quorum quatuor intellectus agens et possibilis sunt diversae potentiae; sicut et in omnibus est alia potentia activa, et alia passiva.

But three of these are distinct, as three states of the passive intellect, which is sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it is called passive; sometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge, and thus it is called intellect in habit; and sometimes it is in the second act, which is to consider, and thus it is called intellect in act, or actual intellect.

Alia vero tria distinguuntur secundum tres status intellectus possibilis, qui quandoque est in potentia tantum, et sic dicitur possibilis; quandoque autem in actu primo, qui est scientia, et sic dicitur intellectus in habitu; quandoque autem in actu secundo, qui est considerare, et sic dicitur intellectus in actu, sive intellectus adeptus.

This word "intelligence" properly signifies the intellect's very act, which is to understand. However, in some works translated from the Arabic, the separate substances which we call angels are called "intelligences," and perhaps for this reason, that such substances are always actually understanding. But in works translated from the Greek, they are called "intellects" or "minds."

Hoc nomen "intelligentia" proprie significat ipsum actum intellectus qui est intelligere. In quibusdam tamen libris de Arabico translatis, substantiae separatae quas nos Angelos dicimus, "intelligentiae" vocantur; forte propter hoc, quod huiusmodi substantiae semper actu intelligunt. In libris tamen de Graeco translatis, dicuntur "intellectus" seu "mentes".

All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong to one power--namely, the intellectual power. For this power first of all only apprehends something; and this act is called "intelligence."

Omnes illi actus quos Damascenus enumerat, sunt unius potentiae, scilicet intellectivae. Quae primo quidem simpliciter aliquid apprehendit, et hic actus dicitur intelligentia.

Secondly, it directs what it apprehends to the knowledge of something else, or to some operation; and this is called "intention." And when it goes on in search of what it "intends," it is called "invention." When, by reference to something known for certain, it examines what it has found, it is said to know or to be wise, which belongs to "phronesis" or "wisdom"; for "it belongs to the wise man to judge," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). And when once it has obtained something for certain, as being fully examined, it thinks about the means of making it known to others; and this is the ordering of "interior speech," from which proceeds "external speech."

Secundo vero, id quod apprehendit, ordinat ad aliquid aliud cognoscendum vel operandum, et hic vocatur "intentio". Dum vero persistit in inquisitione illius quod "intendit", vocatur "excogitatio". Dum vero id quod est excogitatum examinat ad aliqua certa, dicitur scire vel sapere; quod est "phronesis", vel "sapientiae", nam "sapientiae est iudicare", ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Ex quo autem habet aliquid pro certo, quasi examinatum, cogitat quomodo possit illud aliis manifestare, et haec est dispositio "interioris sermonis"; ex qua procedit "exterior locutio".

Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he also says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence alone belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand all things without any investigation.

Boethius accipit intelligentiam pro actu intellectus qui transcendit actum rationis. Unde ibidem dicit quod "ratio tantum humani generis est, sicut intelligentia sola divini", proprium enim Dei est quod absque omni investigatione omnia intelligat.

Q79 A9: Whether the higher and lower reason are distinct powers?

No. The higher and lower reasons are one and the same power because they are distinguished by the functions of their actions, and according to their various habits: for wisdom is attributed to the higher reason, science to the lower.

Una et eadem potentia rationis est ratio superior et inferior quia distinguuntur, secundum Augustinum, per officia actuum, et secundum diversos habitus: nam superiori rationi attribuitur sapientia, inferiori vero scientia.

The lower reason is said to flow from the higher, or to be ruled by it, as far as the principles made use of by the lower reason are drawn from and directed by the principles of the higher reason.

Ratio inferior dicitur a superiori deduci, vel ab ea regulari, inquantum principia quibus utitur inferior ratio, deducuntur et diriguntur a principiis superioris rationis.

The power of the reason is such that both medium and term belong to it. For the act of the reason is, as it were, a movement from one thing to another. But the same movable thing passes through the medium and reaches the end.

Sed eadem potentia rationis est, ad quam pertinet et medium et ultimum. Est enim actus rationis quasi quidam motus de uno in aliud perveniens, idem autem est mobile quod pertransiens medium pertingit ad terminum.

It may happen that the medium and what is attained thereby belong to different habits, as the first indemonstrable principles belong to the habit of the intellect, whereas the conclusions which we draw from them belong to the habit of science. And so it happens that from the principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in another science; for example, perspective.

Potest autem contingere quod medium, et id ad quod per medium pervenitur, ad diversos habitus pertineant, sicut principia prima indemonstrabilia pertinent ad habitum intellectus, conclusiones vero ex his deductae ad habitum scientiae. Et ideo ex principiis geometriae contingit aliquid concludere in alia scientia, puta in perspectiva.

We must not say, without any qualification, that a power, by which the intellect knows necessary things, is distinct from a power by which it knows contingent things: because it knows both under the same objective aspect; namely, under the aspect of being and truth.

Nec tamen est simpliciter dicendum quod sit alia potentia qua intellectus cognoscit necessaria, et alia qua cognoscit contingentia: quia utraque cognoscit secundum eandem rationem obiecti, scilicet secundum rationem entis et veri.

Wherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have perfect being in truth; since it penetrates to their very essence, from which it demonstrates their proper accidents.

Unde et necessaria, quae habent perfectum esse in veritate, perfecte cognoscit; utpote ad eorum quidditatem pertingens, per quam propria accidentia de his demonstrat.

On the other hand, it knows contingent things, but imperfectly, inasmuch as they have but imperfect being and truth.

Contingentia vero imperfecte cognoscit, sicut et habent imperfectum esse et veritatem.

Now perfect and imperfect in the action do not vary the power; but they vary the actions as to the mode of acting, and consequently the principles of the actions and the habits themselves.

Perfectum autem et imperfectum in actu non diversificant potentiam; sed diversificant actus quantum ad modum agendi, et per consequens principia actuum et ipsos habitus.

Augustine says that "the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal", inasmuch as in contemplation it sees them in themselves, and in consultation it takes its rules of action from them. But he calls the lower reason that which "is intent on the disposal of temporal things."

Dicit enim quod "ratio superior est quae intendit aeternis conspiciendis aut consulendis, conspiciendis quidem", secundum quod ea in seipsis speculatur, consulendis vero, secundum quod ex eis accipit regulas agendorum. Ratio vero inferior ab ipso dicitur, quae "intendit temporalibus rebus".

Now these two--namely, eternal and temporal --are related to our knowledge in this way, that one of them is the means of knowing the other. For by way of discovery, we come through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal, according to the words of the Apostle (Romans 1:20), "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made"; while by way of judgment, from eternal things already known, we judge of temporal things, and according to laws of things eternal we dispose of temporal things.

Haec autem duo, scilicet temporalia et aeterna, comparantur ad cognitionem nostram hoc modo, quod unum eorum est medium ad cognoscendum alterum. Nam secundum viam inventionis, per res temporales in cognitionem devenimus aeternorum, secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. I, "invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur"; in via vero iudicii, per aeterna iam cognita de temporalibus iudicamus, et secundum rationes aeternorum temporalia disponimus.

Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "the higher and lower reason are only distinct by their functions." Therefore they are not two powers.

Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., quod ratio superior et inferior non nisi per officia distinguuntur. Non ergo sunt duae potentiae.

Q79 A8: Whether the reason is distinct from the intellect?

No. In man reason and intellect are the same power because rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but to one and the same.

In homine eadem potentia est ratio et intellectus quia quiescere et moveri non reducuntur ad diversas potentias, sed ad unam et eandem.

Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding, as movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession, of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the imperfect.

Ratiocinari comparatur ad intelligere sicut moveri ad quiescere, vel acquirere ad habere, quorum unum est perfecti, aliud autem imperfecti.

And since movement always proceeds from something immovable, and ends in something at rest, hence it is that human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, advances from certain things simply understood -- namely, the first principles -- and, again, by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the light of which it examines what it has found.

Et quia motus semper ab immobili procedit, et ad aliquid quietum terminatur, inde est quod ratiocinatio humana, secundum viam inquisitionis vel inventionis, procedit a quibusdam simpliciter intellectis -- quae sunt prima principia -- et rursus, in via iudicii, resolvendo redit ad prima principia, ad quae inventa examinat.

For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth. And to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, so as to know an intelligible truth.

Intelligere enim est simpliciter veritatem intelligibilem apprehendere. Ratiocinari autem est procedere de uno intellecto ad aliud, ad veritatem intelligibilem cognoscendam.

And therefore angels, who according to their nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible truth, have no need to advance from one thing to another; but apprehend the truth simply and without mental discussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii).

Et ideo Angeli, qui perfecte possident, secundum modum suae naturae, cognitionem intelligibilis veritatis, non habent necesse procedere de uno ad aliud; sed simpliciter et absque discursu veritatem rerum apprehendunt, ut Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom.

But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to another (as Dionysius says in the same place) and therefore he is called rational.

Homines autem ad intelligibilem veritatem cognoscendam perveniunt, procedendo de uno ad aliud (ut ibidem dicitur) et ideo rationales dicuntur.

Other animals are so much lower than man that they cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But man attains, although imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible truth, which angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of knowledge is not of a different genus from that which is in the human reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect.

Alia animalia sunt ita infra hominem, quod non possunt attingere ad cognoscendam veritatem, quam ratio inquirit. Homo vero attingit ad cognoscendam intelligibilem veritatem, quam Angeli cognoscunt, sed imperfecte. Et ideo vis cognoscitiva Angelorum non est alterius generis a vi cognoscitiva rationis, sed comparatur ad ipsam ut perfectum ad imperfectum.

Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 20) that "that in which man excels irrational animals is reason, or mind, or intelligence or whatever appropriate name we like to give it." Therefore, reason, intellect and mind are one power.

Augustinus dicit, III super Gen. ad Litt., quod "illud quo homo irrationabilibus animalibus antecellit, est ratio, vel mens, vel intelligentia, vel si quo alio vocabulo commodius appellatur." Ratio ergo et intellectus et mens sunt una potentia.

Q79 A7: Whether the intellectual memory is a power distinct from the intellect?

No. Memory in the intellectual part is not a power distinct from the intellect because intelligence arises from memory, as act from habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to a power.

Memoria partis intellectivae non est alia potentia ab intellectu quia intelligentia oritur ex memoria, sicut actus ex habitu; et hoc modo etiam aequatur ei, non autem sicut potentia potentiae.

As has been said above (Q77, A3), the powers of the soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their objects, since each power is defined in reference to that thing to which it is directed and which is its object:

Sicut supra dictum est, potentiae animae distinguuntur secundum diversas rationes obiectorum, eo quod ratio cuiuslibet potentiae consistit in ordine ad id ad quod dicitur, quod est eius obiectum:

With regard to its formal aspect, the memory is the treasury or storehouse of species.

De ratione memoriae est, quod sit thesaurus vel locus conservativus specierum.

It has also been said above (Q59, A4) that if any power by its formal aspect be directed to an object according to the common formal aspect of the object, that power will not be differentiated according to the individual differences of that object: just as the power of sight, which regards its object under the common formal aspect of color, is not differentiated by differences of black and white.

Dictum est etiam supra quod, si aliqua potentia secundum propriam rationem ordinetur ad aliquod obiectum secundum communem rationem obiecti, non diversificabitur illa potentia secundum diversitates particularium differentiarum: sicut potentia visiva, quae respicit suum obiectum secundum rationem colorati, non diversificatur per diversitatem albi et nigri.

Now, the intellect regards its object under the common formal aspect of being, since the passive intellect is that "in which all are in potentiality". Wherefore the passive intellect is not differentiated by any difference of beings.

Intellectus autem respicit suum obiectum secundum communem rationem entis, eo quod intellectus possibilis est "quo est omnia fieri". Unde secundum nullam differentiam entium, diversificatur differentia intellectus possibilis.

Past and present may differentiate the sensitive powers, but not the intellectual powers.

Praeteritum et praesens possunt esse propriae differentiae potentiarum sensitivarum diversificativae, non autem potentiarum intellectivarum.

Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the active intellect and of the passive intellect, because as regards the same object, the active power which [formally] makes the object to be in act must be distinct from the passive power, which is [formally] moved by the object existing in act.

Diversificatur tamen potentia intellectus agentis, et intellectus possibilis, quia respectu eiusdem obiecti, aliud principium oportet esse potentiam activam, quae facit obiectum esse in actu; et aliud potentiam passivam, quae movetur ab obiecto in actu existente.

Thus the active power is compared to its object as a being in act is to a being in potentiality; whereas the passive power, on the contrary, is compared to its object as being in potentiality is to a being in act.

Et sic potentia activa comparatur ad suum obiectum, ut ens in actu ad ens in potentia; potentia autem passiva comparatur ad suum obiectum e converso, ut ens in potentia ad ens in actu.

Therefore there can be no other difference of powers in the intellect, but that of passive and active. Wherefore it is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the intellect, for it belongs to the formal aspect of its passive power to retain as well as to receive.

Sic igitur nulla alia differentia potentiarum in intellectu esse potest, nisi possibilis et agentis. Unde patet quod memoria non est alia potentia ab intellectu, ad rationem enim potentiae passivae pertinet conservare, sicut et recipere.

Although it is said (3 Sent. D, 1) that memory, intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with the meaning of Augustine, who says expressly (De Trin. xiv) that "if we take memory, intelligence, and will as always present in the soul, whether we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the memory only. And by intelligence I mean that by which we understand when actually thinking; and by will I mean that love or affection which unites the child and its parent."

Quamvis in III dist. I Sent. dicatur quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sint tres vires, tamen hoc non est secundum intentionem Augustini, qui expresse dicit in XIV de Trin., quod "si accipiatur memoria, intelligentia et voluntas, secundum quod semper praesto sunt animae, sive cogitentur sive non cogitentur, ad solam memoriam pertinere videntur. Intelligentiam autem nunc dico qua intelligimus cogitantes; et eam voluntatem, sive amorem vel dilectionem, quae istam prolem parentemque coniungit."

Wherefore it is clear that Augustine does not take the above three for three powers: but by memory he understands the soul's habit of retention; by intelligence, the act of the intellect; and by will, the act of the will.

Ex quo patet quod ista tria non accipit Augustinus pro tribus potentiis: sed memoriam accipit pro habituali animae retentione, intelligentiam autem pro actu intellectus; voluntatem autem pro actu voluntatis.

Q79 A6: Whether memory is in the intellectual part of the soul?

Yes. Memory does belong to the intellectual part of the soul because whoever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to actual consideration.

Memoria pertinet ad partem animae intellectivam quia sciens in habitu est in potentia ad considerandum in actu.

The intelligible species is sometimes in the intellect only in potentiality, and then the intellect is said to be in potentiality. Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect as regards the ultimate completion of the act, and then it understands in act. And sometimes the intelligible species is in a middle state, between potentiality and act: and then we have habitual knowledge. In this way the intellect retains the species, even when it does not understand in act.

Species intelligibilis aliquando est in intellectu in potentia tantum, et tunc dicitur intellectus esse in potentia. Aliquando autem secundum ultimam completionem actus, et tunc intelligit actu. Aliquando medio modo se habet inter potentiam et actum, et tunc dicitur esse intellectus in habitu. Et secundum hunc modum intellectus conservat species, etiam quando actu non intelligit.

Memory, if considered as retentive of species, is not common to us and other animals. For species are not retained in the sensitive part of the soul only, but rather in the body and soul united, since the memorative power is the act of some organ. But the intellect in itself is retentive of species, without the association of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "the soul is the seat of the species, not the whole soul, but the intellect."

Memoria, secundum quod est conservativa specierum, non est nobis pecoribusque communis. Species enim conservantur non in parte animae sensitiva tantum, sed magis in coniuncto, cum vis memorativa sit actus organi cuiusdam. Sed intellectus secundum seipsum est conservativus specierum, praeter concomitantiam organi corporalis. Unde philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod "anima est locus specierum, non tota, sed intellectus".

For what is received into something is received according to the conditions of the recipient. But the intellect is of a more stable nature, and is more immovable than corporeal nature. If, therefore, corporeal matter holds the forms which it receives, not only while it actually does something through them, but also after ceasing to act through them, much more cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive the species unchangeably and lastingly, whether it receive them from things sensible, or derive them from some superior intellect.

Quod enim recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo secundum modum recipientis. Intellectus autem est magis stabilis naturae et immobilis, quam materia corporalis. Si ergo materia corporalis formas quas recipit, non solum tenet dum per eas agit in actu, sed etiam postquam agere per eas cessaverit, multo fortius intellectus immobiliter et inamissibiliter recipit species intelligibiles, sive a sensibilibus acceptas, sive etiam ab aliquo superiori intellectu effluxas.

Thus, therefore, if we take memory only for the power of retaining species, we must say that it is in the intellectual part. But if in the notion of memory we include its object to be something past, as past, then the memory is not in the intellectual, but only in the sensitive part, which apprehends individual things. For the past, as past, is something individual, since it signifies being under a particular condition of fixed time.

Sic igitur, si memoria accipiatur solum pro vi conservativa specierum, oportet dicere memoriam esse in intellectiva parte. Si vero de ratione memoriae sit quod eius obiectum sit praeteritum, ut praeteritum, memoria in parte intellectiva non erit, sed sensitiva tantum, quae est apprehensiva particularium. Praeteritum enim, ut praeteritum, cum significet esse sub determinato tempore, ad conditionem particularis pertinet.

The condition of past may be referred to two things: namely, to the object which is known, and to the act of knowledge. These two are found together in the sensitive part, which apprehends something from the fact of its being immuted by a present sensible, wherefore at the same time an animal remembers to have sensed before in the past, and to have sensed some past sensible thing.

Praeteritio potest ad duo referri, scilicet ad obiectum quod cognoscitur; et ad cognitionis actum. Quae quidem duo simul coniunguntur in parte sensitiva, quae est apprehensiva alicuius per hoc quod immutatur a praesenti sensibili, unde simul animal memoratur se prius sensisse in praeterito, et se sensisse quoddam praeteritum sensibile.

But as concerns the intellectual part, the past is accidental, and is not in itself a part of the object of the intellect. For the intellect understands man, as man; and to man, as man, it is accidental that he exist in the present, past, or future. But on the part of the act, the condition of past, even as such, may be understood to be in the intellect, as well as in the senses. Because our soul's act of understanding is an individual act, existing in this or that time, inasmuch as a man is said to understand now, or yesterday, or tomorrow.

Sed quantum ad partem intellectivam pertinet, praeteritio accidit, et non per se convenit, ex parte obiecti intellectus. Intelligit enim intellectus hominem, inquantum est homo; homini autem, inquantum est homo, accidit vel in praesenti vel in praeterito vel in futuro esse. Ex parte vero actus, praeteritio per se accipi potest etiam in intellectu, sicut in sensu. Quia intelligere animae nostrae est quidam particularis actus, in hoc vel in illo tempore existens, secundum quod dicitur homo intelligere nunc vel heri vel cras.

And this is not incompatible with the intellectual nature: for such an act of understanding, though something individual, is yet an immaterial act, as we have said above of the intellect (Q76, A1); and therefore, as the intellect understands itself, though it be itself an individual intellect, so also it understands its act of understanding, which is an individual act, in the past, present, or future.

Et hoc non repugnat intellectualitati, quia huiusmodi intelligere, quamvis sit quoddam particulare, tamen est immaterialis actus, ut supra de intellectu dictum est; et ideo sicut intelligit seipsum intellectus, quamvis ipse sit quidam singularis intellectus, ita intelligit suum intelligere, quod est singularis actus vel in praeterito vel in praesenti vel in futuro existens.

In this way, then, the notion of memory, in as far as it regards past events, is preserved in the intellect, forasmuch as it understands that it previously understood: but not in the sense that it understands the past as something "here" and "now."

Sic igitur salvatur ratio memoriae, quantum ad hoc quod est praeteritorum, in intellectu, secundum quod intelligit se prius intellexisse, non autem secundum quod intelligit praeteritum, prout est hic et nunc.

Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11) that "memory, understanding, and will are one mind."

Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., quod "memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una mens".

Q79 A5: Whether the active intellect is one in all?

No. The same active intellect is not in various men because it is impossible that one same power belong to various substances.

Non est idem intellectus agens in diversis hominibus quia non potest esse quod una et eadem virtus numero sit diversarum substantiarum.

If the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its powers, we are bound to say that there are as many active intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied according to the number of men, as we have said above (Q76, A2).

Si autem intellectus agens sit aliquid animae, ut quaedam virtus ipsius, necesse est dicere quod sint plures intellectus agentes, secundum pluralitatem animarum, quae multiplicantur secundum multiplicationem hominum, ut supra dictum est.

The truth about this question depends on what we have already said (Q79, A4). For if the active intellect were not something belonging to the soul, but were some separate substance, there would be one active intellect for all men. And this is what they mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all.

Veritas huius quaestionis dependet ex praemissis. Si enim intellectus agens non esset aliquid animae, sed esset quaedam substantia separata, unus esset intellectus agens omnium hominum. Et hoc intelligunt qui ponunt unitatem intellectus agentis.

All things which are of one species enjoy in common the action which accompanies the nature of the species, and consequently the power which is the principle of such action; but not so as that power be identical in all. Now to know the first intelligible principles is the action belonging to the human species. Wherefore all men enjoy in common the power which is the principle of this action: and this power is the active intellect.

Omnia quae sunt unius speciei, communicant in actione consequente naturam speciei, et per consequens in virtute, quae est actionis principium, non quod sit eadem numero in omnibus. Cognoscere autem prima intelligibilia est actio consequens speciem humanam. Unde oportet quod omnes homines communicent in virtute quae est principium huius actionis, et haec est virtus intellectus agentis.

But there is no need for it to be identical in all. Yet it must be derived by all from one principle. And thus the possession by all men in common of the first principles proves the unity of the separate intellect, which Plato compares to the sun; but not the unity of the active intellect, which Aristotle compares to light.

Non tamen oportet quod sit eadem numero in omnibus. Oportet tamen quod ab uno principio in omnibus derivetur. Et sic illa communicatio hominum in primis intelligibilibus, demonstrat unitatem intellectus separati, quem Plato comparat soli; non autem unitatem intellectus agentis, quem Aristoteles comparat lumini.

The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) that the active intellect is as a light. But light is not the same in the various things enlightened.

Philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus agens est sicut lumen. Non autem est idem lumen in diversis illuminatis.

The active intellect is the cause of the universal, by "abstracting" it from matter. But for this purpose it need not be the same intellect in all intelligent beings; but it must be one in its relationship to all those things from which it "abstracts" the universal, with respect to which things the universal is one. And this befits the active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial.

Intellectus agens causat universale "abstrahendo" a materia. Ad hoc autem non requiritur quod sit unus in omnibus habentibus intellectum, sed quod sit unus in omnibus secundum habitudinem ad omnia a quibus "abstrahit" universale, respectu quorum universale est unum. Et hoc competit intellectui agenti inquantum est immaterialis.

The Philosopher proves that the active intellect is separate, by the fact that the passive intellect is separate: because, as he says (De Anima iii, 5), "the agent is more noble than the patient."

Philosophus probat intellectum agentem esse separatum, per hoc quod possibilis est separatus; quia, ut ipse dicit, "agens est honorabilius patiente".

Now the passive intellect is said to be separate, because it is not the act of any corporeal organ. And in the same sense the active intellect is also called "separate"; but not as a separate substance.

Intellectus autem possibilis dicitur separatus, quia non est actus alicuius organi corporalis. Et secundum hunc modum etiam intellectus agens dicitur separatus, non quasi sit aliqua substantia separata.

Q79 A4: Whether the active intellect is something in the soul?

Yes. In the soul is some power derived from a higher intellect, whereby it is able to light up the phantasms, and we know this by experience, since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from their particular conditions, which is to make them actually intelligible; but the power which is the principle of this action must be something in the soul, because no action belongs to anything except through some principle formally inherent therein, as we have said above of the passive intellect (Q76, A1).

In ipsa sit aliqua virtus derivata a superiori intellectu, per quam possit phantasmata illustrare, et hoc experimento cognoscimus, dum percipimus nos abstrahere formas universales a conditionibus particularibus, quod est facere actu intelligibilia; oportet virtutem quae est principium huius actionis, esse aliquid in anima, quia nulla actio convenit alicui rei, nisi per aliquod principium formaliter ei inhaerens, ut supra dictum est, cum de intellectu possibili ageretur.

There must needs be some higher intellect, by which the soul is helped to understand.

Oportet ergo esse aliquem altiorem intellectum, quo anima iuvetur ad intelligendum.

Some held that this intellect, substantially separate, is the active intellect, which by lighting up the phantasms as it were, makes them to be actually intelligible. But, even supposing the existence of such a separate active intellect, it would still be necessary to assign to the human soul some power participating in that superior intellect, by which power the human soul makes things actually intelligible.

Posuerunt ergo quidam hunc intellectum secundum substantiam separatum, esse intellectum agentem, qui quasi illustrando phantasmata, facit ea intelligibilia actu. Sed, dato quod sit aliquis talis intellectus agens separatus, nihilominus tamen oportet ponere in ipsa anima humana aliquam virtutem ab illo intellectu superiori participatam, per quam anima humana facit intelligibilia in actu.

But the separate intellect, according to the teaching of our faith, is God Himself, Who is the soul's Creator, and only beatitude; as will be shown later on (Q90, A3; I-II, Q3, A7). Wherefore the human soul derives its intellectual light from Him, according to Psalm 4:7, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us."

Sed intellectus separatus, secundum nostrae fidei documenta, est ipse Deus, qui est creator animae, et in quo solo beatificatur, ut infra patebit. Unde ab ipso anima humana lumen intellectuale participat, secundum illud Psalmi IV, "signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine."

That true light enlightens as a universal cause, from which the human soul derives a particular power.

Illa lux vera illuminat sicut causa universalis, a qua anima humana participat quandam particularem virtutem, ut dictum est.

Since the essence of the soul is immaterial, created by the supreme intellect, nothing prevents that power which it derives from the supreme intellect, and whereby it abstracts from matter, flowing from the essence of the soul, in the same way as its other powers.

Cum essentia animae sit immaterialis, a supremo intellectu creata, nihil prohibet virtutem quae a supremo intellectu participatur, per quam abstrahit a materia, ab essentia ipsius procedere, sicut et alias eius potentias.

The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate species.

Anima intellectiva est quidem actu immaterialis, sed est in potentia ad determinatas species rerum.

Phantasms are actual images of certain species, but are immaterial in potentiality. Wherefore nothing prevents one and the same soul, inasmuch as it is actually immaterial, having one power by which it makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from the conditions of individual matter, which power is called the "active intellect"; and another power, receptive of such species, which is called the "passive intellect", by reason of its being in potentiality to such species.

Phantasmata autem, e converso, sunt quidem actu similitudines specierum quarundam, sed sunt potentia immaterialia. Unde nihil prohibet unam et eandem animam, inquantum est immaterialis in actu, habere aliquam virtutem per quam faciat immaterialia in actu abstrahendo a conditionibus individualis materiae, quae quidem virtus dicitur intellectus agens; et aliam virtutem receptivam huiusmodi specierum, quae dicitur intellectus possibilis, inquantum est in potentia ad huiusmodi species.

The active intellect is not an object, rather is it that whereby the objects are made to be in act, for which, besides the presence of the active intellect, we require the presence of phantasms, the good disposition of the sensitive powers, and practice in this sort of operation; since through one thing understood, other things come to be understood, as from terms are made propositions, and from first principles, conclusions.

Nunc autem non se habet ut obiectum, sed ut faciens obiecta in actu, ad quod requiritur, praeter praesentiam intellectus agentis, praesentia phantasmatum, et bona dispositio virium sensitivarum, et exercitium in huiusmodi opere; quia per unum intellectum fiunt etiam alia intellecta, sicut per terminos propositiones, et per prima principia conclusiones.

The human soul is called intellectual by reason of a participation in intellectual power, a sign of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but only in part. Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning and movement. Again it has an imperfect understanding; both because it does not understand everything, and because, in those things which it does understand, it passes from potentiality to act.

Anima autem humana intellectiva dicitur per participationem intellectualis virtutis, cuius signum est, quod non tota est intellectiva, sed secundum aliquam sui partem. Pertingit etiam ad intelligentiam veritatis cum quodam discursu et motu, arguendo. Habet etiam imperfectam intelligentiam; tum quia non omnia intelligit, tum quia in his quae intelligit, de potentia procedit ad actum.

The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), that "it is necessary for these differences," namely, the passive and active intellect, "to be in the soul."

Philosophus dicit, III de anima quod "necesse est in anima has esse differentias", scilicet intellectum possibilem, et agentem.

Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says that the active intellect is a "substance in actual being."

Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus agens est "substantia actu ens".

Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) compared the active intellect to light. Plato compared the separate intellect impressing the soul to the sun, as Themistius says in his commentary on De Anima iii.

Aristoteles comparavit intellectum agentem lumini. Plato autem intellectum separatum imprimentem in animas nostras, comparavit soli; ut Themistius dicit in commentario tertii de anima.