Q69: The work of the third day (The work of distinction in itself)

1. The gathering together of the waters
2. The production of plants

Dixit vero Deus: “Congregentur aquae, quae sub caelo sunt, in locum unum, et appareat arida”. Factumque est ita.

Et vocavit Deus aridam Terram congregationesque aquarum appellavit Maria. Et vidit Deus quod esset bonum.

Et ait Deus: “Germinet terra herbam virentem et herbam facientem semen et lignum pomiferum faciens fructum iuxta genus suum, cuius semen in semetipso sit super terram”. Et factum est ita.

Et protulit terra herbam virentem et herbam afferentem semen iuxta genus suum lignumque faciens fructum, qui habet in semetipso sementem secundum speciem suam. Et vidit Deus quod esset bonum.

Et factum est vespere et mane, dies tertius.

(Gen 1:9-13)

Q68 A4: Whether there is only one heaven?

No. There are many heavens because the difference is more nominal than real.

Basilius autem, et Damascenus sequens eum, dicunt plures esse caelos. Sed haec diversitas magis est in voce quam in re.

In order, then, to understand the distinction of heavens, it must be borne in mind that Scripture speaks of heaven in a threefold sense. Sometimes it uses the word in its proper and natural meaning, when it denotes that body on high which is luminous actually or potentially, and incorruptible by nature. In this body there are three heavens; the first is the empyrean, which is wholly luminous; the second is the aqueous or crystalline, wholly transparent; and the third is called the starry heaven, in part transparent, and in part actually luminous, and divided into eight spheres. One of these is the sphere of the fixed stars; the other seven, which may be called the seven heavens, are the spheres of the planets.

Ad distinctionem ergo caelorum sciendam, considerandum est quod caelum tripliciter dicitur in Scripturis. Quandoque enim dicitur proprie et naturaliter. Et sic dicitur caelum corpus aliquod sublime, et luminosum actu vel potentia, et incorruptibile per naturam. Et secundum hoc, ponuntur tres caeli. Primum totaliter lucidum, quod vocant Empyreum. Secundum totaliter diaphanum, quod vocant caelum aqueum vel crystallinum. Tertium partim diaphanum et partim lucidum actu, quod vocant caelum sidereum, et dividitur in octo sphaeras, scilicet in sphaeram stellarum fixarum, et septem sphaeras planetarum; quae possunt dici octo caeli.

In the second place, the name heaven is applied to a body that participates in any property of the heavenly body, as sublimity and luminosity, actual or potential.

Secundo dicitur caelum per participationem alicuius proprietatis caelestis corporis, scilicet sublimitatis et luminositatis actu vel potentia.

Thirdly, there are metaphorical uses of the word heaven.

Tertio dicitur caelum metaphorice.

Q68 A3: Whether the firmament divides waters from waters?

Yes. The firmament does divide the waters from the waters because Moses was speaking to ignorant people, and that out of condescension to their weakness he put before them only such things as are apparent to sense.

Dividit firmamentum aquas ab aquis quod Moyses rudi populo loquebatur, quorum imbecillitati condescendens, illa solum eis proposuit, quae manifeste sensui apparent.

Now even the most uneducated can perceive by their senses that earth and water are corporeal, whereas it is not evident to all that air also is corporeal, for there have even been philosophers who said that air is nothing, and called a space filled with air a vacuum.

Omnes autem, quantumcumque rudes, terram et aquam esse corpora sensu deprehendunt. Aer autem non percipitur ab omnibus esse corpus, intantum quod etiam quidam philosophi aerem dixerunt nihil esse, plenum aere vacuum nominantes.

Moses, then, while he expressly mentions water and earth, makes no express mention of air by name, to avoid setting before ignorant persons something beyond their knowledge. In order, however, to express the truth to those capable of understanding it, he implies in the words: "Darkness was upon the face of the deep," the existence of air as attendant, so to say, upon the water. For it may be understood from these words that over the face of the water a transparent body was extended, the subject of light and darkness, which, in fact, is the air.

Et ideo Moyses de aqua et terra mentionem facit expressam, aerem autem non expresse nominat, ne rudibus quoddam ignotum proponeret. Ut tamen capacibus veritatem exprimeret, dat locum intelligendi aerem, significans ipsum quasi aquae annexum, cum dicit quod tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi; per quod datur intelligi super faciem aquae esse aliquod corpus diaphanum quod est subiectum lucis et tenebrarum.

Whether, then, we understand by the firmament the starry heaven, or the cloudy region of the air, it is true to say that it divides the waters from the waters, according as we take water to denote formless matter, or any kind of transparent body, as fittingly designated under the name of waters. For the starry heaven divides the lower transparent bodies from the higher, and the cloudy region divides that higher part of the air, where the rain and similar things are generated, from the lower part, which is connected with the water and included under that name.

Sic igitur sive per firmamentum intelligamus caelum in quo sunt sidera, sive spatium aeris nubilosum, convenienter dicitur quod firmamentum dividit aquas ab aquis, secundum quod per aquam materia informis significatur; vel secundum quod omnia corpora diaphana sub nomine aquarum intelliguntur. Nam caelum sidereum distinguit corpora inferiora diaphana a superioribus. Aer vero nubilosus distinguit superiorem aeris partem, in qua generantur pluviae et huiusmodi impressiones, ab inferiori parte aeris, quae aquae connectitur, et sub nomine aquarum intelligitur.

Q68 A2: Whether there are waters above the firmament?

Yes. There are waters above the firmament because it is written (Genesis 1:7), "(God) divided the waters that were under the firmament, from those that were above the firmament", and I answer with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that, "These words of Scripture have more authority than the most exalted human intellect. Hence, whatever these waters are, and whatever their mode of existence, we cannot for a moment doubt that they are there."

Aquae sunt supra firmamentum quod dicitur Gen. I, quod "divisit aquas quae erant supra firmamentum, ab his quae erant sub firmamento" et respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, II super Gen. ad Litt., "maior est Scripturae huius auctoritas quam omnis humani ingenii capacitas. Unde quomodo et quales aquae ibi sint, eas tamen ibi esse, minime dubitamus."

1. If by the firmament we understand the starry heaven, and as being of the nature of the four elements, for the same reason it may be believed that the waters above the heaven are of the same nature as the elemental waters.

Si enim per firmamentum intelligitur caelum sidereum quod ponitur esse de natura quatuor elementorum, pari ratione et aquae quae super caelos sunt, eiusdem naturae poterunt credi cum elementaribus aquis.

According to the first opinion, Basil gives two replies (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). He answers first, that a body seen as concave beneath need not necessarily be rounded, or convex, above. Secondly, that the waters above the firmament are not fluid, but exist outside it in a solid state, as a mass of ice, and that this is the crystalline heaven of some writers.

Secundum vero primam, respondet Basilius dupliciter. Uno modo, quia non est necessarium ut omne quod in concavo apparet rotundum, sit etiam supra rotundum secundum convexum. Secundo, quia aquae quae sunt supra caelos, non sunt fluidae; sed quasi glaciali soliditate circa caelum firmatae. Unde et a quibusdam dicuntur caelum crystallinum.

According to the first opinion these waters are set there to temper the heat of the celestial bodies, as Basil supposes (Hom. iii in Hexaem.).

Secundum vero primam opinionem, aquae sunt ibi, ut Basilius dicit, ad contemperandum calorem caelestium corporum.

2. But if by the firmament we understand the starry heaven, not, however, as being of the nature of the four elements then the waters above the firmament will not be of the same nature as the elemental waters, but just as, according to Strabus, one heaven is called empyrean, that is, fiery, solely on account of its splendor: so this other heaven will be called aqueous solely on account of its transparence; and this heaven is above the starry heaven. Again, if the firmament is held to be of other nature than the elements, it may still be said to divide the waters, if we understand by water not the element but formless matter. Augustine, in fact, says (Super Gen. cont. Manich. i, 5,7) that whatever divides bodies from bodies can be said to divide waters from waters.

Si autem per firmamentum intelligatur caelum sidereum quod non sit de natura quatuor elementorum, tunc et aquae illae quae sunt supra firmamentum, non erunt de natura elementarium aquarum, sed sicut, secundum Strabum, dicitur caelum Empyreum, idest igneum, propter solum splendorem; ita dicetur aliud caelum aqueum propter solam diaphaneitatem, quod est supra caelum sidereum. Posito etiam quod firmamentum sit alterius naturae praeter quatuor elementa, adhuc potest dici quod aquas dividit, si per aquam non elementum aquae, sed materiam informem corporum intelligamus, ut Augustinus dicit, super Gen. contra Manich., quia secundum hoc, quidquid est inter corpora, dividit aquas ab aquis.

According to the second opinion, the waters are above the heaven that is wholly transparent and starless. This, according to some, is the primary mobile, the cause of the daily revolution of the entire heaven, whereby the continuance of generation is secured. In the same way the starry heaven, by the zodiacal movement, is the cause whereby different bodies are generated or corrupted, through the rising and setting of the stars, and their various influences.

Secundum vero secundam opinionem, aquae sunt supra firmamentum, idest caelum totum diaphanum absque stellis. Quod quidam ponunt primum mobile, quod revolvit totum caelum motu diurno, ut operetur per motum diurnum continuitatem generationis, sicut caelum in quo sunt sidera, per motum qui est secundum zodiacum, operatur diversitatem generationis et corruptionis, per accessum et recessum, et per diversas virtutes stellarum.

An order of the elements must be supposed different from that given by Aristotle, that is to say, that the waters surrounding the earth are of a dense consistency, and those around the firmament of a rarer consistency, in proportion to the respective density of the earth and of the heaven.

Oportet ponere alium ordinem in elementis quam Aristoteles ponat; ut quaedam aquae spissae sint circa terram, quaedam vero tenues circa caelum; ut sic se habeant illae ad caelum, sicut istae ad terram.

Or by the water, as stated, we may understand the matter of bodies to be signified.

Vel quod per aquam intelligatur materia corporum, ut dictum est.

3. If, however, we understand by the firmament that part of the air in which the clouds are collected, then the waters above the firmament must rather be the vapors resolved from the waters which are raised above a part of the atmosphere, and from which the rain falls.

Si autem per firmamentum intelligatur pars aeris in qua nubes condensantur, sic aquae quae supra firmamentum sunt, sunt aquae quae, vaporabiliter resolutae, supra aliquam partem aeris elevantur ex quibus pluviae generantur.

Q68 A1: Whether the firmament was made on the second day?

Yes. The words which speak of the firmament as made on the second day can be understood in two senses because to produce the substance of the firmament belongs to the work of creation; but its formation, in some degree, belongs to the second day, according to both opinions.

Sciendum est ergo quod hoc quod legitur firmamentum secunda die factum, dupliciter intelligi potest quod productio substantiae firmamenti ad opus creationis pertinet. Sed aliqua formatio eius, secundum has duas opiniones, pertinet ad opus secundae diei.

According to the first opinion, it may, strictly speaking, be granted that the firmament was made, even as to substance, on the second day. For it is part of the work of creation to produce the substance of the elements, while it belongs to the work of distinction and adornment to give forms to the elements that pre-exist.

Secundum igitur primam opinionem, absolute posset concedi quod firmamentum factum fuerit secunda die, etiam secundum suam substantiam. Nam ad opus creationis pertinet producere ipsam elementorum substantiam, ad opus autem distinctionis et ornatus pertinet formare aliqua ex praeexistentibus elementis.

If we take these days to denote merely sequence in the natural order, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,24), and not succession in time, there is then nothing to prevent our saying, whilst holding any one of the opinions of the philosophers, that the substantial formation of the firmament belongs to the second day.

Si autem per istos dies non designetur temporis successio, sed solum ordo naturae, ut Augustinus vult; nihil prohibebit dicere, secundum quamcumque harum opinionum formationem secundum substantiam firmamenti ad secundam diem pertinere.

1. Some of these believed it to be composed of the elements; and this was the opinion of Empedocles, who, however, held further that the body of the firmament was not susceptible of dissolution, because its parts are, so to say, not in disunion, but in harmony.

Quidam enim dixerunt firmamentum illud esse ex elementis compositum. Et haec fuit opinio Empedoclis; qui tamen dixit ideo illud corpus indissolubile esse, quia in eius compositione lis non erat sed amicitia tantum.

2. Others held the firmament to be of the nature of the four elements, not, indeed, compounded of them, but being as it were a simple element. Such was the opinion of Plato, who held that element to be fire. Others, again, have held that the heaven is not of the nature of the four elements, but is itself a fifth body, existing over and above these. This is the opinion of Aristotle (De Coel. i, text. 6,32).

Alii vero dixerunt firmamentum esse de natura quatuor elementorum non quasi ex elementis compositum, sed quasi elementum simplex. Et haec opinio fuit Platonis, qui posuit corpus caeleste esse elementum ignis. Alii vero dixerunt caelum non esse de natura quatuor elementorum, sed esse quintum corpus, praeter quatuor elementa. Et haec est opinio Aristotelis.

3. Another possible explanation is to understand by the firmament that was made on the second day, not that in which the stars are set, but the part of the atmosphere where the clouds are collected, and which has received the name firmament from the firmness and density of the air. "For a body is called firm," that is dense and solid, "thereby differing from a mathematical body" as is remarked by Basil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.).

Potest autem et alio modo intelligi, ut per firmamentum quod legitur secunda die factum, non intelligatur firmamentum illud in quo fixae sunt stellae, sed illa pars aeris in qua condensantur nubes. Et dicitur firmamentum propter spissitudinem aeris in parte illa, nam quod est spissum et solidum, "dicitur esse corpus firmum, ad differentiam corporis mathematici," ut dicit Basilius.

If, then, this explanation is adopted none of these opinions will be found repugnant to reason. Augustine, in fact (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4), recommends it thus: "I consider this view of the question worthy of all commendation, as neither contrary to faith nor difficult to be proved and believed."

Et secundum hanc expositionem, nihil repugnans sequitur cuicumque opinioni. Unde Augustinus, II super Gen. ad Litt., hanc expositionem commendans, dicit, "hanc considerationem laude dignissimam iudico; quod enim dixit, neque est contra fidem, et in promptu, posito documento, credi potest."

Q68: The work of the second day (The work of distinction in itself)

1. Was the firmament made on the second day?
2. Are there waters above the firmament?
3. Does the firmament divide waters from waters?
4. Is there more than one heaven?

Dixit quoque Deus: “Fiat firmamentum in medio aquarum et dividat aquas ab aquis”.

Et fecit Deus firmamentum divisitque aquas, quae erant sub firmamento, ab his, quae erant super firmamentum. Et factum est ita.

Vocavitque Deus firmamentum Caelum. Et factum est vespere et mane, dies secundus.

(Gen 1:6-8)

Q67 A4: Whether the production of light is fittingly assigned to the first day?

Yes. It was fitting, then, as an evidence of the Divine wisdom, that among the works of distinction the production of light should take first place, since light is a form of the primary body, and because it is more common quality.

Oportuit ordinem divinae sapientiae manifestari, ut primo inter opera distinctionis produceretur lux, tanquam primi corporis forma, et tanquam communior.

It seems to be required, for two reasons, that the formlessness of darkness should be removed first of all by the production of light. In the first place because light is a quality of the first body, as was stated (Q67 A3), and thus by means of light it was fitting that the world should first receive its form.

Necessarium autem fuit ut informitas tenebrarum primo removeretur per lucis productionem, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia lux, ut dictum est, est qualitas primi corporis, unde secundum eam primo fuit mundus formandus.

The second reason is because light is a common quality. For light is common to terrestrial and celestial bodies.

Secundo, propter communitatem lucis, communicant enim in ea inferiora corpora cum superioribus.

Basil [Hom. ii in Hexaem.], indeed, adds a third reason: that all other things are made manifest by light.

Basilius autem ponit tertiam rationem, quia per lucem omnia alia manifestantur.

And there is yet a fourth, already touched upon in the objections; that day cannot be unless light exists, which was made therefore on the first day.

Potest et quarta ratio addi, quae in obiiciendo est tacta, quia dies non potest esse sine luce; unde oportuit in prima die fieri lucem.

Q67 A3: Whether light is a quality?

Yes. Light is a species of quality because light produces natural effects, for by the rays of the sun bodies are warmed, and natural changes cannot be brought about by mere intentions.

Lux est quaedam qualitas quod lumen habet effectum in natura, quia per radios solis calefiunt corpora. Intentiones autem non causant transmutationes naturales.

Some writers have said that the light in the air has not a natural being such as the color on a wall has, but only an intentional being, as a similitude of color in the air. But this cannot be the case because light gives a name to the air, since by it the air becomes actually luminous. But color does not do this, for we do not speak of the air as colored.

Quidam dixerunt quod lumen in aere non habet esse naturale, sicut color in pariete; sed esse intentionale, sicut similitudo coloris in aere. Sed hoc non potest esse ... quia lumen denominat aerem, fit enim aer luminosus in actu. Color vero non denominat ipsum, non enim dicitur aer coloratus.

Others have said that light is the sun's substantial form, but this also seems impossible for two reasons. First, because substantial forms are not of themselves objects of the senses; for the object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said De Anima iii, text. 26: whereas light is visible of itself.

Alii vero dixerunt quod lux est forma substantialis solis. Sed hoc etiam apparet impossibile, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia nulla forma substantialis est per se sensibilis, quia quod quid est est obiectum intellectus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Lux autem est secundum se visibilis.

In the second place, because it is impossible that what is the substantial form of one thing should be the accidental form of another; since substantial forms of their very nature constitute species: wherefore the substantial form always and everywhere accompanies the species. But light is not the substantial form of air, for if it were, the air would be destroyed when light is withdrawn. Hence it cannot be the substantial form of the sun.

Secundo, quia impossibile est ut id quod est forma substantialis in uno, sit forma accidentalis in alio, quia formae substantiali per se convenit constituere in specie; unde semper et in omnibus adest ei. Lux autem non est forma substantialis aeris, alioquin, ea recedente, corrumperetur. Unde non potest esse forma substantialis solis.

We must say, then, that as heat is an active quality consequent on the substantial form of fire, so light is an active quality consequent on the substantial form of the sun, or of another body that is of itself luminous, if there is any such body. A proof of this is that the rays of different stars produce different effects according to the diverse natures of bodies.

Dicendum est ergo quod, sicut calor est qualitas activa consequens formam substantialem ignis, ita lux est qualitas activa consequens formam substantialem solis, vel cuiuscumque alterius corporis a se lucentis, si aliquod aliud tale est. Cuius signum est, quod radii diversarum stellarum habent diversos effectus, secundum diversas naturas corporum.

Light is not produced by the transmutation of matter, as though matter were in receipt of a substantial form, and light were a certain inception of substantial form. For this reason light disappears on the disappearance of its active cause.

Illuminatio non fit per aliquam transmutationem materiae ad susceptionem formae substantialis, ut fiat quasi inchoatio aliqua formae. Et ideo lumen non remanet nisi ad praesentiam agentis.

Q67 A2: Whether light is a body?

No. Light cannot be a body because the place of any one body is different from that of any other, nor is it possible, naturally speaking, for any two bodies of whatever nature, to exist simultaneously in the same place; since contiguity requires distinction of place.

Impossibile est lumen esse corpus quod locus cuiuslibet corporis est alius a loco alterius corporis, nec est possibile, secundum naturam, duo corpora esse simul in eodem loco, qualiacumque corpora sint; quia contiguum requirit distinctionem in situ.

Augustine takes light to be a luminous body in act--in other words, to be fire, the noblest of the four elements.

Augustinus accipit lucem pro corpore lucido in actu, scilicet pro igne, quod inter quatuor elementa nobilissimum est.

Aristotle pronounces light to be fire existing in its own proper matter: just as fire in aerial matter is "flame," or in earthly matter is "burning coal." Nor must too much attention be paid to the instances adduced by Aristotle in his works on logic, as he merely mentions them as the more or less probable opinions of various writers.

Aristoteles lumen nominat ignem in propria materia, sicut ignis in materia aerea dicitur flamma, et in materia terrea dicitur carbo. Non tamen est multum curandum de eis exemplis quae Aristoteles inducit in libris logicalibus, quia inducit ea ut probabilia secundum opinionem aliorum.

The powers of movement, intersection, reflection, belong properly to bodies; and all these are attributes of light and its rays. Moreover, different rays of light, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) are united and separated, which seems impossible unless they are bodies.

Ferri, intersecari, et reflecti est proprie corporum, haec autem omnia attribuuntur lumini vel radio. Coniunguntur etiam diversi radii et separantur, ut Dionysius dicit, II cap. de Div. Nom., quod etiam videtur non nisi corporibus convenire posse.

But all these properties are assigned to light metaphorically, and might in the same way be attributed to heat. For because movement from place to place is naturally first in the order of movement as is proved Phys. viii, text. 55, we use terms belonging to local movement in speaking of alteration and movement of all kinds. For even the word distance is derived from the idea of remoteness of place, to that of all contraries, as is said Metaph. x, text. 13.

Sed omnia illa attribuuntur lumini metaphorice, sicut etiam possent attribui calori. Quia enim motus localis est naturaliter primus motuum, ut probatur in VIII Physic., utimur nominibus pertinentibus ad motum localem, in alteratione et in omnibus motibus, sicut etiam nomen distantiae derivatum est a loco ad omnia contraria, ut dicitur in X Metaphys.

Q67 A1: Whether the word "light" is used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things?

No. Light is not used in its proper sense in spiritual matters because in its primary meaning it signifies that which makes manifest to the sense of sight; afterwards it was extended to that which makes manifest to cognition of any kind.

Lux proprie non dicitur in spiritualibus. Nam primo quidem est institutum ad significandum id quod facit manifestationem in sensu visus, postmodum autem extensum est ad significandum omne illud quod facit manifestationem secundum quamcumque cognitionem.

If, then, the word is taken in its strict and primary meaning, it is to be understood metaphorically when applied to spiritual things.

Si ergo accipiatur nomen luminis secundum suam primam impositionem, metaphorice in spiritualibus dicitur.

But if taken in its common and extended use, as applied to manifestation of every kind, it may properly be applied to spiritual things.

Si autem accipiatur secundum quod est in usu loquentium ad omnem manifestationem extensum, sic proprie in spiritualibus dicitur.

Q67: The work of the first day (The work of distinction in itself)

1. Is the word light used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things?
2. Is light, in corporeal things, itself corporeal?
3. Is light a quality?
4. Was light fittingly made on the first day?

In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram.

Terra autem erat inanis et vacua, et tenebrae super faciem abyssi, et spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquas.

Dixitque Deus: “Fiat lux”. Et facta est lux.

Et vidit Deus lucem quod esset bona et divisit Deus lucem ac tenebras.

Appellavitque Deus lucem Diem et tenebras Noctem. Factumque est vespere et mane, dies unus.

(Gen 1:1-5)

Q66 A4: Whether time was created simultaneously with formless matter?

Yes. Time was created simultaneously with formless matter because even if the formlessness of matter preceded by duration its form, this view postulates the existence of time as the measure of duration: for otherwise there would be no such measure.

Tempus est concreatum materiae informi quod si informitas materiae duratione praecessit formationem, ... tunc pro illa duratione necesse est ponere tempus aliquod; aliter enim mensura durationis accipi non posset.

The teaching of Augustine rests on the opinion that the angelic nature and formless matter, precede time and the formation, by origin or nature only, and not by duration; and therefore, as they precede formation, so do they precede movement and time.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus hoc dicit ea ratione qua natura angelica et materia informis praecedunt origine, seu natura, tempus. Haec autem duo, scilicet natura angelica et materia informis, praecedunt formationem non duratione, sed natura. Et sicut natura praecedunt formationem, ita etiam et motum et tempus.

If the movement of the firmament did not begin immediately from the beginning, then the time that preceded was the measure, not of the firmament's movement, but of the first movement of whatsoever kind. For it is accidental to time to be the measure of the firmament's movement, in so far as this is the first movement. But if the first movement was another than this, time would have been its measure, for everything is measured by the first of its kind.

Si motus firmamenti non statim a principio incoepit, tunc tempus quod praecessit, non erat numerus motus firmamenti, sed cuiuscumque primi motus. Accidit enim tempori quod sit numerus motus firmamenti, inquantum hic motus est primus motuum, si autem esset alius motus primus, illius motus esset tempus mensura, quia omnia mensurantur primo sui generis.

And it must be granted that forthwith from the beginning, there was movement of some kind, at least in the succession of concepts and affections in the angelic mind: while movement without time cannot be conceived, since time is nothing else than "the measure of priority and succession in movement."

Oportet autem dicere statim a principio fuisse aliquem motum, ad minus secundum successionem conceptionum et affectionum in mente angelica. Motum autem non est intelligere sine tempore, cum nihil aliud sit tempus quam numerus prioris et posterioris in motu.

Among the first created things are to be reckoned those which have a general relationship to things. And, therefore, among these time must be included, as having the nature of a common measure; but not movement, which is related only to the movable subject.

Inter primo creata computantur ea quae habent generalem habitudinem ad res. Et ideo computari debuit tempus, quod habet rationem communis mensurae, non autem motus, qui comparatur solum ad subiectum mobile.

Place is implied as existing in the empyrean heaven, this being the boundary of the universe. And since place has reference to things permanent, it was created at once in its totality. But time, as not being permanent, was created in its beginning: even as actually we cannot lay hold of any part of time save the "now."

Locus intelligitur in caelo Empyreo omnia continente. Et quia locus est de permanentibus, concreatus est totus simul. Tempus autem, quod non est permanens, concreatum est in suo principio, sicut etiam modo nihil est accipere in actu de tempore nisi nunc.

Q66 A3: Whether the empyrean heaven was created at the same time as formless matter?

Yes. The empyrean heaven was created together with formless matter because when glory is finally consummated, the movement of bodies will cease; and such must have been from the beginning the condition of the empyrean.

Caelum Empyreum est aliquid materiae informi concreatum quod in ultima consummatione gloriae cessabit corporum motus; et talem oportuit esse a principio dispositionem caeli Empyrei.

For in the reward to come a two-fold glory is looked for, spiritual and corporeal, not only in the human body to be glorified, but in the whole world which is to be made new. Now the spiritual glory began with the beginning of the world, in the blessedness of the angels, equality with whom is promised to the saints. It was fitting, then, that even from the beginning, there should be made some beginning of bodily glory in something corporeal, free at the very outset from the servitude of corruption and change, and wholly luminous, even as the whole bodily creation, after the Resurrection, is expected to be. So, then, that heaven is called the empyrean, i.e. fiery, not from its heat, but from its brightness.

Expectatur enim in futura remuneratione duplex gloria, scilicet spiritualis, et corporalis, non solum in corporibus humanis glorificandis, sed etiam in toto mundo innovando. Inchoata est autem spiritualis gloria ab ipso mundi principio in beatitudine Angelorum, quorum aequalitas sanctis promittitur. Unde conveniens fuit ut etiam a principio corporalis gloria inchoaretur in aliquo corpore, quod etiam a principio fuerit absque servitute corruptionis et mutabilitatis, et totaliter lucidum; sicut tota creatura corporalis expectatur post resurrectionem futura. Et ideo illud caelum dicitur Empyreum, idest igneum, non ab ardore, sed a splendore.

It may be said that the influence of the empyrean upon that which is called the first heaven, and is moved, produces therein not something that comes and goes as a result of movement, but something of a fixed and stable nature, as the power of conservation or causation, or something of the kind pertaining to dignity.

Et propter hoc potest dici quod influit in primum caelum quod movetur, non aliquid transiens et adveniens per motum, sed aliquid fixum et stabile; puta virtutem continendi et causandi, vel aliquid huiusmodi ad dignitatem pertinens.

We may also say that the empyrean has light, not condensed so as to emit rays, as the sun does, but of a more subtle nature. Or it may have the brightness of glory which differs from mere natural brightness.

Potest aliter dici quod habet lucem caelum Empyreum non condensatam, ut radios emittat, sicut corpus solis, sed magis subtilem. Vel habet claritatem gloriae, quae non est conformis cum claritate naturali.

Q66 A2: Whether the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same?

No. The formless matter of all corporeal things is not the same because supposing that no form exists in corruptible bodies which remains subsisting beneath generation and corruption, it follows necessarily that the matter of corruptible and incorruptible bodies is not the same. For matter, as it is in itself, is in potentiality to form.

Una non est materia informis omnium corporalium. Supposito autem quod nulla forma quae sit in corpore corruptibili remaneat ut substrata generationi et corruptioni, sequitur de necessitate quod non sit eadem materia corporum corruptibilium et incorruptibilium. Materia enim, secundum id quod est, est in potentia ad formam.

Considered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect to all those forms to which it is common, and in receiving any one form it is in act only as regards that form. Hence it remains in potentiality to all other forms. And this is the case even where some forms are more perfect than others, and contain these others virtually in themselves. For potentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfection and imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in potentiality to a perfect form, and vice versa.

Oportet ergo quod materia, secundum se considerata, sit in potentia ad formam omnium illorum quorum est materia communis. Per unam autem formam non fit in actu nisi quantum ad illam formam. Remanet ergo in potentia quantum ad omnes alias formas. Nec hoc excluditur, si una illarum formarum sit perfectior et continens in se virtute alias. Quia potentia, quantum est de se, indifferenter se habet ad perfectum et imperfectum, unde sicut quando est sub forma imperfecta, est in potentia ad formam perfectam, ita e converso.

Matter, therefore, whilst existing under the form of an incorruptible body, would be in potentiality to the form of a corruptible body; and as it does not actually possess the latter, it has both form and the privation of form; for want of a form in that which is in potentiality thereto is privation. But this condition implies corruptibility. It is therefore impossible that bodies by nature corruptible, and those by nature incorruptible, should possess the same matter.

Sic ergo materia, secundum quod est sub forma incorruptibilis corporis, erit adhuc in potentia ad formam corruptibilis corporis. Et cum non habeat eam in actu, erit simul sub forma et privatione, quia carentia formae in eo quod est in potentia ad formam, est privatio. Haec autem dispositio est corruptibilis corporis. Impossibile ergo est quod corporis corruptibilis et incorruptibilis per naturam, sit una materia.

So, then, the matter of the heavenly bodies and of the elements is not the same, except by analogy, insofar as they agree in the character of potentiality.

Et sic non est eadem materia corporis caelestis et elementorum, nisi secundum analogiam, secundum quod conveniunt in ratione potentiae.

Q66 A1: Did formlessness of created matter precede in time its formation?

No. The formlessness of matter was not prior in time to its formation because an imperfect effect proves imperfection in the agent, but God is an agent absolutely perfect.

Informitas materiae corporalis non praecesserit tempore formationem ipsius. Quod imperfectio effectus attestatur imperfectioni agentis. Sed Deus est agens perfectissimum.

Nature produces effect in act from being in potentiality; and consequently in the operations of nature potentiality must precede act in time, and formlessness precede form. But God produces being in act out of nothing, and can, therefore, produce a perfect thing in an instant, according to the greatness of His power.

Natura producit effectum in actu de ente in potentia, et ideo oportet ut in eius operatione potentia tempore praecedat actum, et informitas formationem. Sed Deus producit ens actu ex nihilo, et ideo statim potest producere rem perfectam, secundum magnitudinem suae virtutis.

If formless matter preceded in duration, it already existed; for this is implied by duration, since the end of creation is being in act: and act itself is a form. To say, then, that matter preceded, but without form, is to say that being existed actually, yet without act, which is a contradiction in terms.

Si enim materia informis praecessit duratione, haec erat iam in actu, hoc enim duratio importat, creationis enim terminus est ens actu. Ipsum autem quod est actus, est forma. Dicere igitur materiam praecedere sine forma, est dicere ens actu sine actu, quod implicat contradictionem.

Nor can it be said that it possessed some common form, on which afterwards supervened the different forms that distinguish it. The supervening form would not simply make an actual being, but 'this' actual being; which is the proper effect of an accidental form. Thus the consequent forms would be merely accidents, implying not generation, but alteration.

Nec etiam potest dici quod habuit aliquam formam communem et postmodum supervenerunt ei formae diversae, quibus sit distincta. ... Superveniens forma non faceret simpliciter ens actu, sed ens actu hoc, quod est proprium formae accidentalis; et sic sequentes formae essent accidentia, secundum quae non attenditur generatio, sed alteratio.

Hence we must assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless, nor under any one common form, but under distinct forms.

Unde oportet dicere quod materia prima neque fuit creata omnino sine forma, neque sub forma una communi, sed sub formis distinctis.

Q66: The order of creation towards distinction

1. Did formlessness of created matter precede in time its formation?
2. Is the matter of all corporeal things the same?
3. Was the empyrean heaven created contemporaneously with formless matter?
4. Was time created simultaneously with it?

Q65 A4: Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels?

No. Corporeal forms are not from the angels but from God because all contrary opinions seem to have a common error (they all, in fact, seek for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself brought into being) whereas, as Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26,27,28), proves, what is, properly speaking, made, is the "composite."

Thus material forms come, not by emanation, but by motion.

We must not look for the cause of corporeal forms in any immaterial form, but in something that is composite, as this fire is generated by that fire. Corporeal forms, therefore, are caused, not as emanations from some immaterial form, but by matter being brought from potentiality into act by some composite agent.

But since the composite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5), it follows further that even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, not emanating from them, but as the term of their movement. And, further still, the species of the angelic intellect, which are, as it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms, must be referred to God as the first cause.

But in the first production of corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies had when first produced came immediately from God, whose bidding alone matter obeys, as its own proper cause.

According to the Platonists, the order of forms corresponds to the order of those separate substances; for example, that there is a single separate substance, which is horse and the cause of all horses, whilst above this is separate life, or "per se" life, as they term it, which is the cause of all life, and that above this again is that which they call being itself, which is the cause of all being.

Avicenna, however, and certain others, have maintained that the forms of corporeal things do not subsist "per se" in matter, but in the intellect only. Thus they say that from forms existing in the intellect of spiritual creatures (called "intelligences" by them, but "angels" by us) proceed all the forms of corporeal matter, as the form of his handiwork proceeds from the forms in the mind of the craftsman. This theory seems to be the same as that of certain heretics of modern times, who say that God indeed created all things, but that the devil formed corporeal matter, and differentiated it into species.

Q65 A3: Whether corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels?

No. Corporeal creatures were produced immediately by God because in the act of coming into being the imperfect must be made before the perfect: and it is impossible that anything should be created, save by God alone.

No secondary cause can produce anything, unless there is presupposed in the thing produced something that is caused by a higher cause. But creation is the production of a thing in its entire substance, nothing being presupposed either uncreated or created. Hence it remains that nothing can create except God alone, Who is the first cause.

Therefore, in order to show that all bodies were created immediately by God, Moses said: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."

Q65 A2: Whether corporeal things were made on account of God's goodness?

Yes. The Divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things because the entire universe, with all its parts, is ordained towards God as its end, inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine goodness, to the glory of God.

Reasonable creatures, however, have in some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can attain to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him.

Origen laid down [Peri Archon ii.] that corporeal creatures were not made according to God's original purpose, but in punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal nature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God, and, according to the measure of their conversion, were given an higher or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others turned from God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies according to the degree of their turning away.

But this position is erroneous. In the first place, because it is contrary to Scripture, which, after narrating the production of each kind of corporeal creatures, subjoins, "God saw that it was good" (Genesis 1), as if to say that everything was brought into being for the reason that it was good for it to be. But according to Origen's opinion, the corporeal creature was made, not because it was good that it should be, but that the evil in another might be punished.

Q65 A1: Whether corporeal creatures are from God?

Yes. There must be one principle of being from which all things in whatever way existing have their being, whether they are invisible and spiritual, or visible and corporeal because being is found to be common to all things, however otherwise different.