"It is because the contemporary alternatives seem so one-sided and are not more evidently solutions to the problems which Thomas faced, and partly solved, that we return to him and to the tradition of theology and philosophy in which his Summa Theologiae appears: theology as the science of the first principle and this as the total knowledge of reality in its unity." -- Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself (Oxford University Press, 1987), p.159.
Wednesday, August 25, 2010
Tuesday, August 24, 2010
1a 2ae q49 a4: Whether habits are necessary? Yes.
Necessarium fuit habitus esse, quia habitus sunt perfectiones quaedam, ut dicitur in VII Physic, sed perfectio est maxime necessaria rei, cum habeat rationem finis.
It is necessary that there should be habits, because habits are perfections (Phys. vii, text. 17), and perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing, since it has the formal aspect of purpose.
Sicut supra dictum est, habitus importat dispositionem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, et ad operationem vel finem eius, secundum quam bene vel male aliquid ad hoc disponitur.
As we have said above (q49 a2, a3), habit implies a disposition in ordination to a thing's nature, and [a disposition] to its operation or purpose, [and], according to [this disposition], something is well- or ill-disposed to that [operative purpose].
Non idem habitus se habet ad bonum et malum, sicut infra patebit. Eadem autem potentia se habet ad bonum et malum. Et ideo necessarii sunt habitus ut potentiae determinentur ad bonum.
The same habit has not a relation to good and evil, as will be made clear further on (q54 a3): whereas the same power has a relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary that potentials be determined to the good.
It is necessary that there should be habits, because habits are perfections (Phys. vii, text. 17), and perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing, since it has the formal aspect of purpose.
Sicut supra dictum est, habitus importat dispositionem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, et ad operationem vel finem eius, secundum quam bene vel male aliquid ad hoc disponitur.
As we have said above (q49 a2, a3), habit implies a disposition in ordination to a thing's nature, and [a disposition] to its operation or purpose, [and], according to [this disposition], something is well- or ill-disposed to that [operative purpose].
Non idem habitus se habet ad bonum et malum, sicut infra patebit. Eadem autem potentia se habet ad bonum et malum. Et ideo necessarii sunt habitus ut potentiae determinentur ad bonum.
The same habit has not a relation to good and evil, as will be made clear further on (q54 a3): whereas the same power has a relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary that potentials be determined to the good.
Monday, August 23, 2010
1a 2ae q49 a3: Whether habit implies order to an act? Yes.
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono coniugali, quod "habitus est quo aliquid agitur cum opus est", et Commentator dicit, in III de anima, quod "habitus est quo quis agit cum voluerit", quia inquantum tamen natura est principium actus, ex consequenti importat ordinem ad actum.
Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "habit is that whereby something is done when necessary", and the Commentator says (De Anima iii) that "habit is that whereby we act when we will", because insofar as nature is a principle of act, it consequently implies ordination to act.
Secundum quidem rationem habitus, convenit omni habitui aliquo modo habere ordinem ad actum. Est enim de ratione habitus ut importet habitudinem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, secundum quod convenit vel non convenit.
In regard to the formal aspect of habit, it befits every habit to have ordination to an act. For it is formally aspectual to habit to imply some some state of affairs in ordination to a thing's nature, insofar as it is befitting or ill-befitting thereto.
Sed natura rei, quae est finis generationis, ulterius etiam ordinatur ad alium finem, qui vel est operatio, vel aliquod operatum, ad quod quis pervenit per operationem.
But a thing's nature, which is the end of generation, is further ordained to another end, which is either an operation, or the product of an operation, to which one attains by means of operation.
Unde habitus non solum importat ordinem ad ipsam naturam rei, sed etiam consequenter ad operationem, inquantum est finis naturae, vel perducens ad finem.
Wherefore habit implies ordination not only to the very nature of a thing, but also, consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or conducive to the end.
Unde et in V Metaphys. dicitur in definitione habitus, quod est dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum aut secundum se, idest secundum suam naturam, aut ad aliud, idest in ordine ad finem.
Whence also it is stated (Metaph. v, text. 25) in the definition of habit, that it is a disposition whereby that which is disposed, is well- or ill-disposed either in regard to itself, that is to its nature, or in regard to something else, that is in ordination to the end.
Sed sunt quidam habitus qui etiam ex parte subiecti in quo sunt, primo et principaliter important ordinem ad actum. Quia ut dictum est, habitus primo et per se importat habitudinem ad naturam rei.
But there are some habits, which even on the part of the subject in which they are, imply primarily and principally ordination to an act. For, as we have said, habit primarily and of itself implies a state of affairs with respect to the thing's nature.
Si igitur natura rei, in qua est habitus, consistat in ipso ordine ad actum, sequitur quod habitus principaliter importet ordinem ad actum. Manifestum est autem quod natura et ratio potentiae est ut sit principium actus. Unde omnis habitus, qui est alicuius potentiae ut subiecti, principaliter importat ordinem ad actum.
If therefore the nature of a thing, in which the habit is, consists in this very ordination to an act, it follows that the habit principally implies ordination to an act. Now it is clear that the nature and the formal aspect of power is that it should be a principle of act. Wherefore every habit, which is subjected in a power, implies principally ordination to an act.
Habitus est actus quidam, inquantum est qualitas, et secundum hoc potest esse principium operationis. Sed est in potentia per respectum ad operationem. Unde habitus dicitur actus primus, et operatio actus secundus; ut patet in II de anima.
Habit is an act, insofar as it is a quality, and in this respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in a state of potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore habit is called first act, and operation, second act; as it is explained in De Anima ii, text. 5.
Non est de ratione habitus quod respiciat potentiam, sed quod respiciat naturam. Et quia natura praecedit actionem, quam respicit potentia, ideo prior species qualitatis ponitur habitus quam potentia.
It is not the formal aspect of habit to be related to power, but to be related to nature. And as nature precedes action, to which power is related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality.
Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "habit is that whereby something is done when necessary", and the Commentator says (De Anima iii) that "habit is that whereby we act when we will", because insofar as nature is a principle of act, it consequently implies ordination to act.
Secundum quidem rationem habitus, convenit omni habitui aliquo modo habere ordinem ad actum. Est enim de ratione habitus ut importet habitudinem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, secundum quod convenit vel non convenit.
In regard to the formal aspect of habit, it befits every habit to have ordination to an act. For it is formally aspectual to habit to imply some some state of affairs in ordination to a thing's nature, insofar as it is befitting or ill-befitting thereto.
Sed natura rei, quae est finis generationis, ulterius etiam ordinatur ad alium finem, qui vel est operatio, vel aliquod operatum, ad quod quis pervenit per operationem.
But a thing's nature, which is the end of generation, is further ordained to another end, which is either an operation, or the product of an operation, to which one attains by means of operation.
Unde habitus non solum importat ordinem ad ipsam naturam rei, sed etiam consequenter ad operationem, inquantum est finis naturae, vel perducens ad finem.
Wherefore habit implies ordination not only to the very nature of a thing, but also, consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or conducive to the end.
Unde et in V Metaphys. dicitur in definitione habitus, quod est dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum aut secundum se, idest secundum suam naturam, aut ad aliud, idest in ordine ad finem.
Whence also it is stated (Metaph. v, text. 25) in the definition of habit, that it is a disposition whereby that which is disposed, is well- or ill-disposed either in regard to itself, that is to its nature, or in regard to something else, that is in ordination to the end.
Sed sunt quidam habitus qui etiam ex parte subiecti in quo sunt, primo et principaliter important ordinem ad actum. Quia ut dictum est, habitus primo et per se importat habitudinem ad naturam rei.
But there are some habits, which even on the part of the subject in which they are, imply primarily and principally ordination to an act. For, as we have said, habit primarily and of itself implies a state of affairs with respect to the thing's nature.
Si igitur natura rei, in qua est habitus, consistat in ipso ordine ad actum, sequitur quod habitus principaliter importet ordinem ad actum. Manifestum est autem quod natura et ratio potentiae est ut sit principium actus. Unde omnis habitus, qui est alicuius potentiae ut subiecti, principaliter importat ordinem ad actum.
If therefore the nature of a thing, in which the habit is, consists in this very ordination to an act, it follows that the habit principally implies ordination to an act. Now it is clear that the nature and the formal aspect of power is that it should be a principle of act. Wherefore every habit, which is subjected in a power, implies principally ordination to an act.
Habitus est actus quidam, inquantum est qualitas, et secundum hoc potest esse principium operationis. Sed est in potentia per respectum ad operationem. Unde habitus dicitur actus primus, et operatio actus secundus; ut patet in II de anima.
Habit is an act, insofar as it is a quality, and in this respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in a state of potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore habit is called first act, and operation, second act; as it is explained in De Anima ii, text. 5.
Non est de ratione habitus quod respiciat potentiam, sed quod respiciat naturam. Et quia natura praecedit actionem, quam respicit potentia, ideo prior species qualitatis ponitur habitus quam potentia.
It is not the formal aspect of habit to be related to power, but to be related to nature. And as nature precedes action, to which power is related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality.
Sunday, August 22, 2010
1a 2ae q49 a2: Whether habit is a distinct species of quality? Yes.
Philosophus, in praedicamentis, ponit inter quatuor species qualitatis primam, dispositionem et habitum, quia natura est id quod primum consideratur in re.
The Philosopher in the Book of Categories (Categor. vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of quality, because nature is the first object of consideration in anything.
In prima specie consideratur et bonum et malum; et etiam facile et difficile mobile, secundum quod aliqua natura est finis generationis et motus.
In the first species we consider both evil and good; and also changeableness, whether easy or difficult, inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and movement.
Unde in V Metaphys. philosophus definit habitum, quod est "dispositio secundum quam aliquis disponitur bene vel male".
And so the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition whereby someone is disposed, well or ill"
Et in II Ethic. dicit quod habitus sunt secundum quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel male.
And in Ethic. ii, 4, he says that by "habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions".
Quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei, tunc habet rationem boni; quando autem non convenit, tunc habet rationem mali.
For when the mode is befitting to the thing's nature, it has the formal aspect of good; and when it is ill-befitting, it has the formal aspect of evil.
Philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod "una species qualitatis est habitus et dispositio".
The Philosopher says in the Book of the Categories (Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit and disposition".
The Philosopher in the Book of Categories (Categor. vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of quality, because nature is the first object of consideration in anything.
In prima specie consideratur et bonum et malum; et etiam facile et difficile mobile, secundum quod aliqua natura est finis generationis et motus.
In the first species we consider both evil and good; and also changeableness, whether easy or difficult, inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and movement.
Unde in V Metaphys. philosophus definit habitum, quod est "dispositio secundum quam aliquis disponitur bene vel male".
And so the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition whereby someone is disposed, well or ill"
Et in II Ethic. dicit quod habitus sunt secundum quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel male.
And in Ethic. ii, 4, he says that by "habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions".
Quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei, tunc habet rationem boni; quando autem non convenit, tunc habet rationem mali.
For when the mode is befitting to the thing's nature, it has the formal aspect of good; and when it is ill-befitting, it has the formal aspect of evil.
Philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod "una species qualitatis est habitus et dispositio".
The Philosopher says in the Book of the Categories (Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit and disposition".
Saturday, August 21, 2010
1a 2ae q49 a1: Whether habit is a quality? Yes.
Habitus est qualitas quia si sumatur habere prout res aliqua dicitur quodam modo se habere in seipsa vel ad aliud; cum iste modus se habendi sit secundum aliquam qualitatem, hoc modo habitus quaedam qualitas est, de quo philosophus, in V Metaphys., dicit quod habitus dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum se aut ad aliud, ut sanitas habitus quidam est.
We must say that habit is a quality because if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another: thus health is a habit."
Philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod "habitus est qualitas de difficili mobilis".
The Philosopher says in the Book of Categories (Categor. vi) that "a habit is a quality which is difficult to change".
Sed habere communiter sumpto est commune ad multa genera.
But "to have" in the general sense is common to many categories.
De habitu, secundum quod intelligitur aliquid medium inter habens et id quod habetur, est quoddam praedicamentum.
A habit, in the sense in which we understand it to be a medium between the haver and that which is had, is a category.
Hoc nomen habitus ab habendo est sumptum. A quo quidem nomen habitus dupliciter derivatur, uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo, vel quaecumque alia res, dicitur aliquid habere; alio modo, secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud.
This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from "habere" [to have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation [se habet] either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else.
Circa primum autem, considerandum est quod habere, secundum quod dicitur respectu cuiuscumque quod habetur, commune est ad diversa genera. Unde philosophus inter post praedicamenta habere ponit, quae scilicet diversa rerum genera consequuntur; sicut sunt opposita, et prius et posterius, et alia huiusmodi.
Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard to anything that is "had," is common to the various categories. And so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the "post-categories," so called because they result from the various categories; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like.
Sed inter ea quae habentur, talis videtur esse distinctio, quod quaedam sunt in quibus nihil est medium inter habens et id quod habetur, sicut inter subiectum et qualitatem vel quantitatem nihil est medium. Quaedam vero sunt in quibus est aliquid medium inter utrumque, sed sola relatio, sicut dicitur aliquis habere socium vel amicum.
Now among things which are had, there seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the "haver" and that which is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend.
Quaedam vero sunt inter quae est aliquid medium, non quidem actio vel passio, sed aliquid per modum actionis vel passionis, prout scilicet unum est ornans vel tegens, et aliud ornatum aut tectum, unde philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod "habitus dicitur tanquam actio quaedam habentis et habiti", sicut est in illis quae circa nos habemus.
And, further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner of action or passion: thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had"; as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves.
Et ideo in his constituitur unum speciale genus rerum, quod dicitur praedicamentum habitus, de quo dicit philosophus, in V Metaphys., quod "inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est habitus medius".
And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which are comprised under the category of "habit": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "there is a habit between clothing and the man who is clothed."
Dispositio quidem semper importat ordinem alicuius habentis partes, sed hoc contingit tripliciter, ut statim ibidem philosophus subdit, scilicet aut secundum locum, aut secundum potentiam, aut secundum speciem.
Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher goes on at once to say (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, "either as to place, or as to power, or as to species."
In quo, ut Simplicius dicit in commento praedicamentorum, comprehendit omnes dispositiones. Corporales quidem, in eo quod dicit secundum locum, et hoc pertinet ad praedicamentum situs, qui est ordo partium in loco. Quod autem dicit secundum potentiam, includit illas dispositiones quae sunt in praeparatione et idoneitate nondum perfecte, sicut scientia et virtus inchoata. Quod autem dicit secundum speciem, includit perfectas dispositiones, quae dicuntur habitus, sicut scientia et virtus complete.
"In saying this," as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Categories, "he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when he says 'as to place,'" and this belongs to the category "Position," which is the order of parts in a place: "when he says 'as to power,' he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue: "and when he says, 'as to species,' he includes perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue.
We must say that habit is a quality because if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another: thus health is a habit."
Philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod "habitus est qualitas de difficili mobilis".
The Philosopher says in the Book of Categories (Categor. vi) that "a habit is a quality which is difficult to change".
Sed habere communiter sumpto est commune ad multa genera.
But "to have" in the general sense is common to many categories.
De habitu, secundum quod intelligitur aliquid medium inter habens et id quod habetur, est quoddam praedicamentum.
A habit, in the sense in which we understand it to be a medium between the haver and that which is had, is a category.
Hoc nomen habitus ab habendo est sumptum. A quo quidem nomen habitus dupliciter derivatur, uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo, vel quaecumque alia res, dicitur aliquid habere; alio modo, secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud.
This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from "habere" [to have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation [se habet] either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else.
Circa primum autem, considerandum est quod habere, secundum quod dicitur respectu cuiuscumque quod habetur, commune est ad diversa genera. Unde philosophus inter post praedicamenta habere ponit, quae scilicet diversa rerum genera consequuntur; sicut sunt opposita, et prius et posterius, et alia huiusmodi.
Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard to anything that is "had," is common to the various categories. And so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the "post-categories," so called because they result from the various categories; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like.
Sed inter ea quae habentur, talis videtur esse distinctio, quod quaedam sunt in quibus nihil est medium inter habens et id quod habetur, sicut inter subiectum et qualitatem vel quantitatem nihil est medium. Quaedam vero sunt in quibus est aliquid medium inter utrumque, sed sola relatio, sicut dicitur aliquis habere socium vel amicum.
Now among things which are had, there seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the "haver" and that which is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend.
Quaedam vero sunt inter quae est aliquid medium, non quidem actio vel passio, sed aliquid per modum actionis vel passionis, prout scilicet unum est ornans vel tegens, et aliud ornatum aut tectum, unde philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod "habitus dicitur tanquam actio quaedam habentis et habiti", sicut est in illis quae circa nos habemus.
And, further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner of action or passion: thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had"; as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves.
Et ideo in his constituitur unum speciale genus rerum, quod dicitur praedicamentum habitus, de quo dicit philosophus, in V Metaphys., quod "inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est habitus medius".
And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which are comprised under the category of "habit": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "there is a habit between clothing and the man who is clothed."
Dispositio quidem semper importat ordinem alicuius habentis partes, sed hoc contingit tripliciter, ut statim ibidem philosophus subdit, scilicet aut secundum locum, aut secundum potentiam, aut secundum speciem.
Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher goes on at once to say (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, "either as to place, or as to power, or as to species."
In quo, ut Simplicius dicit in commento praedicamentorum, comprehendit omnes dispositiones. Corporales quidem, in eo quod dicit secundum locum, et hoc pertinet ad praedicamentum situs, qui est ordo partium in loco. Quod autem dicit secundum potentiam, includit illas dispositiones quae sunt in praeparatione et idoneitate nondum perfecte, sicut scientia et virtus inchoata. Quod autem dicit secundum speciem, includit perfectas dispositiones, quae dicuntur habitus, sicut scientia et virtus complete.
"In saying this," as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Categories, "he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when he says 'as to place,'" and this belongs to the category "Position," which is the order of parts in a place: "when he says 'as to power,' he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue: "and when he says, 'as to species,' he includes perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue.
Thursday, August 19, 2010
1a 2ae q48 a4: Whether anger above all causes taciturnity? Yes.
Irae quandoque est usque ad impediendum rationem a cohibitione linguae; quandoque autem ultra procedit, usque ad impediendum motum linguae, et aliorum membrorum exteriorum, quia perturbatio cordis quandoque potest superabundare usque ad hoc, quod per inordinatum motum cordis impediatur motus exteriorum membrorum; et tunc causatur taciturnitas, et immobilitas exteriorum membrorum.
Anger sometimes goes so far as to hinder the reason from curbing the tongue, but sometimes it goes yet farther, so as to paralyze the tongue and other outward members, because the disturbance of the heart may sometimes superabound to the extend that the movements of the outward members are hindered by the inordinate movement of the heart; thence ensue taciturnity and immobility of the outward members.
Gregorius dicit, in V Moral., quod "ira per silentium clausa, intra mentem vehementius aestuat".
Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that "when anger does not vent itself outwardly by the lips, inwardly it burns the more fiercely".
Anger sometimes goes so far as to hinder the reason from curbing the tongue, but sometimes it goes yet farther, so as to paralyze the tongue and other outward members, because the disturbance of the heart may sometimes superabound to the extend that the movements of the outward members are hindered by the inordinate movement of the heart; thence ensue taciturnity and immobility of the outward members.
Gregorius dicit, in V Moral., quod "ira per silentium clausa, intra mentem vehementius aestuat".
Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that "when anger does not vent itself outwardly by the lips, inwardly it burns the more fiercely".
Wednesday, August 18, 2010
1a 2ae q48 a3: Whether anger above all hinders the use of reason? Yes.
Ira impedit iudicium rationis quia a ratione est principium irae, quantum ad motum appetitivum, qui est formalis in ira, sed perfectum iudicium rationis passio irae praeoccupat quasi non perfecte rationem audiens, propter commotionem caloris velociter impellentis, quae est materialis in ira.
Anger hinders the judgment of reason because the beginning of anger is in the reason, as regards the appetitive movement, which is the formal element of anger, but the passion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason, as though it listened but imperfectly to reason, on account of the commotion of the heat urging to instant action, which commotion is the material element of anger.
Mens vel ratio quamvis non utatur organo corporali in suo proprio actu, tamen, quia indiget ad sui actum quibusdam viribus sensitivis, quorum actus impediuntur corpore perturbato, necesse est quod perturbationes corporales etiam iudicium rationis impediant, sicut patet in ebrietate et somno.
Although the mind or reason makes no use of a bodily organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain sensitive powers for the execution of its act, the acts of which powers are hindered when the body is disturbed, it follows of necessity that any disturbance in the body hinders even the judgment of reason, as is clear in the case of drunkenness or sleep.
Iracundus dicitur esse manifestus, non quia manifestum sit sibi quid facere debeat, sed quia manifeste operatur, non quaerens aliquam occultationem. Quod partim contingit propter impedimentum rationis, quae non potest discernere quid sit occultandum et quid manifestandum, nec etiam excogitare occultandi vias. Partim vero est ex ampliatione cordis, quae pertinet ad magnanimitatem, quam facit ira: unde et de magnanimo philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod "est manifestus oditor et amator et manifeste dicit et operatur".
An angry man is said to be open, not because it is open to him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly, without thought of hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason being hindered, so as not to discern what should be hidden and what done openly, nor to devise the means of hiding; and partly to the dilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanimity which is an effect of anger: wherefore the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he is open in his hatreds and his friendships . . . and speaks and acts openly."
Concupiscentia autem dicitur esse latens et insidiosa, quia, ut plurimum, delectabilia quae concupiscuntur, habent turpitudinem quandam et mollitiem, in quibus homo vult latere. In his autem quae sunt virilitatis et excellentiae, cuiusmodi sunt vindictae, quaerit homo manifestus esse.
Desire, on the other hand, is said to lie low and to be cunning, because, in many cases, the pleasurable things that are desired, savor of shame and voluptuousness, wherein man wishes not to be seen. But in those things that savor of manliness and excellence, such as matters of vengeance, man seeks to be in the open.
Anger hinders the judgment of reason because the beginning of anger is in the reason, as regards the appetitive movement, which is the formal element of anger, but the passion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason, as though it listened but imperfectly to reason, on account of the commotion of the heat urging to instant action, which commotion is the material element of anger.
Mens vel ratio quamvis non utatur organo corporali in suo proprio actu, tamen, quia indiget ad sui actum quibusdam viribus sensitivis, quorum actus impediuntur corpore perturbato, necesse est quod perturbationes corporales etiam iudicium rationis impediant, sicut patet in ebrietate et somno.
Although the mind or reason makes no use of a bodily organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain sensitive powers for the execution of its act, the acts of which powers are hindered when the body is disturbed, it follows of necessity that any disturbance in the body hinders even the judgment of reason, as is clear in the case of drunkenness or sleep.
Iracundus dicitur esse manifestus, non quia manifestum sit sibi quid facere debeat, sed quia manifeste operatur, non quaerens aliquam occultationem. Quod partim contingit propter impedimentum rationis, quae non potest discernere quid sit occultandum et quid manifestandum, nec etiam excogitare occultandi vias. Partim vero est ex ampliatione cordis, quae pertinet ad magnanimitatem, quam facit ira: unde et de magnanimo philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod "est manifestus oditor et amator et manifeste dicit et operatur".
An angry man is said to be open, not because it is open to him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly, without thought of hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason being hindered, so as not to discern what should be hidden and what done openly, nor to devise the means of hiding; and partly to the dilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanimity which is an effect of anger: wherefore the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he is open in his hatreds and his friendships . . . and speaks and acts openly."
Concupiscentia autem dicitur esse latens et insidiosa, quia, ut plurimum, delectabilia quae concupiscuntur, habent turpitudinem quandam et mollitiem, in quibus homo vult latere. In his autem quae sunt virilitatis et excellentiae, cuiusmodi sunt vindictae, quaerit homo manifestus esse.
Desire, on the other hand, is said to lie low and to be cunning, because, in many cases, the pleasurable things that are desired, savor of shame and voluptuousness, wherein man wishes not to be seen. But in those things that savor of manliness and excellence, such as matters of vengeance, man seeks to be in the open.
Tuesday, August 17, 2010
1a 2ae q48 a2: Whether anger above all causes fervor in the heart? Yes.
Fervor irae est cum amaritudine, ad consumendum, quia tendit ad punitionem contrarii: unde assimilatur calori ignis et cholerae, et propter hoc Damascenus dicit quod "procedit ex evaporatione fellis, et fellea nominatur".
The fervor of anger has a certain bitterness with a tendency to destroy, because it seeks to be avenged on the contrary evil: whence it is likened to the heat of fire and of the bile, and for this reason Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that it "results from an exhalation of the bile whence it takes its name chole."
The fervor of anger has a certain bitterness with a tendency to destroy, because it seeks to be avenged on the contrary evil: whence it is likened to the heat of fire and of the bile, and for this reason Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that it "results from an exhalation of the bile whence it takes its name chole."
Monday, August 16, 2010
1a 2ae q48 a1: Whether anger causes pleasure? Yes.
Tristitia se habet ad iram sicut principium, sed delectatio sicut effectus vel terminus, quia non de eodem iratus tristatur et gaudet; sed tristatur de illata iniuria, delectatur autem de vindicta cogitata et sperata.
Sorrow is to anger as its beginning, while pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger, because the angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the same thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in the thought and hope of vengeance.
Delectatio de vindicta consequitur ipsam.
Pleasure felt in taking vengeance follows from anger.
Sicut philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., delectationes, maxime sensibiles et corporales, sunt medicinae quaedam contra tristitiam; et ideo quanto per delectationem contra maiorem tristitiam vel anxietatem remedium praestatur, tanto delectatio magis percipitur: sicut patet quod quando aliquis sitit, delectabilior fit ei potus.
As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures, chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow; and therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible are we to the pleasure which heals it: as is evident in the case of thirst which increases the pleasure of drink.
Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod motus irae insurgit ex aliqua illata iniuria contristante, cui quidem tristitiae remedium adhibetur per vindictam.
Now it is clear from what has been said (q47 a1, a3), that the movement of anger arises from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for which sorrow vengeance is sought as a remedy.
Philosophus, in eodem libro, inducit proverbium, quod "ira multo dulcior melle distillante in pectoribus virorum crescit".
The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying that anger is "Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste" (Iliad, xviii, 109 [trans. Alexander Pope]).
Sorrow is to anger as its beginning, while pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger, because the angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the same thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in the thought and hope of vengeance.
Delectatio de vindicta consequitur ipsam.
Pleasure felt in taking vengeance follows from anger.
Sicut philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., delectationes, maxime sensibiles et corporales, sunt medicinae quaedam contra tristitiam; et ideo quanto per delectationem contra maiorem tristitiam vel anxietatem remedium praestatur, tanto delectatio magis percipitur: sicut patet quod quando aliquis sitit, delectabilior fit ei potus.
As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures, chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow; and therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible are we to the pleasure which heals it: as is evident in the case of thirst which increases the pleasure of drink.
Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod motus irae insurgit ex aliqua illata iniuria contristante, cui quidem tristitiae remedium adhibetur per vindictam.
Now it is clear from what has been said (q47 a1, a3), that the movement of anger arises from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for which sorrow vengeance is sought as a remedy.
Philosophus, in eodem libro, inducit proverbium, quod "ira multo dulcior melle distillante in pectoribus virorum crescit".
The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying that anger is "Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste" (Iliad, xviii, 109 [trans. Alexander Pope]).
Sunday, August 15, 2010
1a 2ae q47 a4: Whether a person's defect is a reason for being more easily angry with him? Yes.
Defectus vel parvitas eius contra quem irascimur, facit ad augmentum irae, inquantum auget indignam despectionem, quia indigna despectio est maxime provocativa irae.
Deficiency or littleness in the person with whom we are angry, tends to increase our anger, insofar as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised, because unmerited contempt more than anything else is provocative of anger.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "dives irascitur contra pauperem, si eum despiciat; et principans contra subiectum".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "the rich man is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in like manner the prince is angry with his subject."
Si vero parvitas vel defectus diminuat despectionem indignam, talis parvitas non auget, sed diminuit iram. Et hoc modo illi qui poenitent de iniuriis factis, et confitentur se male fecisse, et humiliantur et veniam petunt, mitigant iram, secundum illud Prov. XV, "responsio mollis frangit iram", inquantum scilicet tales videntur non despicere, sed magis magnipendere eos quibus se humiliant.
If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited contempt, then such littleness does not increase but lessens anger. In this way those who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done wrong, who humble themselves and ask pardon, mitigate anger, according to Proverbs 15:1: "A mild answer breaketh wrath": because, to wit, they seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom they humble themselves.
Etiam despectio quae est ab amicis, videtur esse magis indigna. Et ideo ex simili causa magis irascimur contra eos, si despiciant, vel nocendo vel non iuvando, sicut et contra minores.
But to be despised by one's friends seems also a greater indignity. Consequently if they despise us by hurting or by failing to help, we are angry with them for the same reason for which we are angry with those who are beneath us.
Deficiency or littleness in the person with whom we are angry, tends to increase our anger, insofar as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised, because unmerited contempt more than anything else is provocative of anger.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "dives irascitur contra pauperem, si eum despiciat; et principans contra subiectum".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "the rich man is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in like manner the prince is angry with his subject."
Si vero parvitas vel defectus diminuat despectionem indignam, talis parvitas non auget, sed diminuit iram. Et hoc modo illi qui poenitent de iniuriis factis, et confitentur se male fecisse, et humiliantur et veniam petunt, mitigant iram, secundum illud Prov. XV, "responsio mollis frangit iram", inquantum scilicet tales videntur non despicere, sed magis magnipendere eos quibus se humiliant.
If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited contempt, then such littleness does not increase but lessens anger. In this way those who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done wrong, who humble themselves and ask pardon, mitigate anger, according to Proverbs 15:1: "A mild answer breaketh wrath": because, to wit, they seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom they humble themselves.
Etiam despectio quae est ab amicis, videtur esse magis indigna. Et ideo ex simili causa magis irascimur contra eos, si despiciant, vel nocendo vel non iuvando, sicut et contra minores.
But to be despised by one's friends seems also a greater indignity. Consequently if they despise us by hurting or by failing to help, we are angry with them for the same reason for which we are angry with those who are beneath us.
Saturday, August 14, 2010
1a 2ae q47 a3: Whether a man's excellence is the cause of his being angry? Yes.
Illi qui sunt in aliqua excellentia, maxime irascuntur, si parvipendantur (puta si dives parvipenditur in pecunia, et rhetor in loquendo, et sic de aliis), quia constat quod quanto aliquis est excellentior, iniustius parvipenditur in hoc in quo excellit.
Those who excel in any matter, are most of all angry, if they be slighted in that matter (for instance, a wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in his eloquence, and so forth), because the more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a slight offered him in the matter in which he excels.
Causa irae in eo qui irascitur, ex parte dispositionis quae in eo relinquitur ex tali motivo. Manifestum est autem quod nihil movet ad iram, nisi nocumentum quod contristat. Ea autem quae ad defectum pertinent, maxime sunt contristantia, quia homines defectibus subiacentes facilius laeduntur. Et ista est causa quare homines qui sunt infirmi, vel in aliis defectibus, facilius irascuntur, quia facilius contristantur.
The cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be considered on the part of the disposition produced in him by the motive aforesaid. Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a hurt that grieves him: while whatever savors of defect is above all a cause of grief, since men who suffer from some defect are more easily hurt. And this is why men who are weak, or subject to some other defect, are more easily angered, since they are more easily grieved.
Ille qui despicitur in eo in quo manifeste multum excellit, non reputat se aliquam iacturam pati, et ideo non contristatur, et ex hac parte minus irascitur. Sed ex alia parte, inquantum indignius despicitur, habet maiorem rationem irascendi. Nisi forte reputet se non invideri vel subsannari propter despectum, sed propter ignorantiam, vel propter aliud huiusmodi.
If a man be despised in a matter in which he evidently excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser thereby, and therefore is not grieved, and in this respect he is less angered. But in another respect, insofar as he is more undeservedly despised, he has more reason for being angry; unless perhaps he thinks that he is envied or insulted not through contempt but through ignorance, or some other like cause.
Philosophus, in eodem libro, dicit quod homines propter excellentiam indignantur.
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) that excellence makes men prone to anger.
Those who excel in any matter, are most of all angry, if they be slighted in that matter (for instance, a wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in his eloquence, and so forth), because the more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a slight offered him in the matter in which he excels.
Causa irae in eo qui irascitur, ex parte dispositionis quae in eo relinquitur ex tali motivo. Manifestum est autem quod nihil movet ad iram, nisi nocumentum quod contristat. Ea autem quae ad defectum pertinent, maxime sunt contristantia, quia homines defectibus subiacentes facilius laeduntur. Et ista est causa quare homines qui sunt infirmi, vel in aliis defectibus, facilius irascuntur, quia facilius contristantur.
The cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be considered on the part of the disposition produced in him by the motive aforesaid. Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a hurt that grieves him: while whatever savors of defect is above all a cause of grief, since men who suffer from some defect are more easily hurt. And this is why men who are weak, or subject to some other defect, are more easily angered, since they are more easily grieved.
Ille qui despicitur in eo in quo manifeste multum excellit, non reputat se aliquam iacturam pati, et ideo non contristatur, et ex hac parte minus irascitur. Sed ex alia parte, inquantum indignius despicitur, habet maiorem rationem irascendi. Nisi forte reputet se non invideri vel subsannari propter despectum, sed propter ignorantiam, vel propter aliud huiusmodi.
If a man be despised in a matter in which he evidently excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser thereby, and therefore is not grieved, and in this respect he is less angered. But in another respect, insofar as he is more undeservedly despised, he has more reason for being angry; unless perhaps he thinks that he is envied or insulted not through contempt but through ignorance, or some other like cause.
Philosophus, in eodem libro, dicit quod homines propter excellentiam indignantur.
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) that excellence makes men prone to anger.
Friday, August 13, 2010
1a 2ae q47 a2: Whether the sole formal aspect of anger is slight or contempt? Yes.
Omnes causae irae reducuntur ad parvipensionem quia ex quacumque alia causa aliquis iniuriam patiatur quam ex contemptu, illa causa minuit rationem iniuriae; sed solus contemptus, vel parvipensio, rationem irae auget: et ideo est per se causa irascendi.
All the causes of anger are reduced to slight because any other cause, besides contempt, through which a man suffers an injury, takes away from the formal aspect of injury; contempt or slight alone adds to the formal aspect of anger: and consequently is of itself the cause of anger.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod ira est appetitus cum tristitia punitionis, propter apparentem parvipensionem non convenienter factam.
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is "a desire, with sadness, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done unbecomingly".
Licet animal brutum non appetat honorem sub ratione honoris, appetit tamen naturaliter quandam excellentiam, et irascitur contra ea quae illi excellentiae derogant.
Although a dumb animal does not seek honor in its formal aspect, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with anything derogatory thereto.
All the causes of anger are reduced to slight because any other cause, besides contempt, through which a man suffers an injury, takes away from the formal aspect of injury; contempt or slight alone adds to the formal aspect of anger: and consequently is of itself the cause of anger.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod ira est appetitus cum tristitia punitionis, propter apparentem parvipensionem non convenienter factam.
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is "a desire, with sadness, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done unbecomingly".
Licet animal brutum non appetat honorem sub ratione honoris, appetit tamen naturaliter quandam excellentiam, et irascitur contra ea quae illi excellentiae derogant.
Although a dumb animal does not seek honor in its formal aspect, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with anything derogatory thereto.
Thursday, August 12, 2010
1a 2ae q47 a1: Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry? Yes.
Motivum irae alicuius semper sit aliquid contra ipsum factum quia, sicut supra dictum est, ira est appetitus nocendi alteri sub ratione iusti vindicativi.
The motive of a man's anger is always something done against him because, as stated above (q46 a6), anger is the desire to hurt another under the formal aspect of just vengeance.
Vindicta autem locum non habet nisi ubi praecessit iniuria. Nec iniuria omnis ad vindictam provocat, sed illa sola quae ad eum pertinet qui appetit vindictam, sicut enim unumquodque naturaliter appetit proprium bonum, ita etiam naturaliter repellit proprium malum. Iniuria autem ab aliquo facta non pertinet ad aliquem, nisi aliquid fecerit quod aliquo modo sit contra ipsum.
Now unless some injury has been done, there is no question of vengeance; nor does any injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the person who seeks vengeance: for just as everything naturally seeks its own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by anyone does not affect a man unless in some way it be something done against him.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "ira fit semper ex his quae ad seipsum. Inimicitia autem et sine his quae ad ipsum, si enim putemus talem esse odimus".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise without anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we think him to be such and such".
Irascimur contra illos qui aliis nocent et vindictam appetimus, inquantum illi quibus nocetur, aliquo modo ad nos pertinent, vel per aliquam affinitatem, vel per amicitiam, vel saltem per communionem naturae.
If we are angry with those who harm others, and seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in some way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least because of the nature we have in common.
Id in quo maxime studemus, reputamus esse bonum nostrum. Et ideo, cum illud despicitur, reputamus nos quoque despici, et arbitramur nos laesos.
When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as though we ourselves were despised and injured.
Ira non dicitur in Deo secundum passionem animi, sed secundum iudicium iustitiae, prout vult vindictam facere de peccato. Peccator enim, peccando, Deo nihil nocere effective potest, tamen ex parte sua dupliciter contra Deum agit. Primo quidem, inquantum eum in suis mandatis contemnit. Secundo, inquantum nocumentum aliquod infert alicui, vel sibi vel alteri: quod ad Deum pertinet, prout ille cui nocumentum infertur, sub Dei providentia et tutela continetur.
We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of the soul, but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take vengeance on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any actual harm: but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against God in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments. Secondly, insofar as he harms himself or another: which injury redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an object of God's providence and protection.
The motive of a man's anger is always something done against him because, as stated above (q46 a6), anger is the desire to hurt another under the formal aspect of just vengeance.
Vindicta autem locum non habet nisi ubi praecessit iniuria. Nec iniuria omnis ad vindictam provocat, sed illa sola quae ad eum pertinet qui appetit vindictam, sicut enim unumquodque naturaliter appetit proprium bonum, ita etiam naturaliter repellit proprium malum. Iniuria autem ab aliquo facta non pertinet ad aliquem, nisi aliquid fecerit quod aliquo modo sit contra ipsum.
Now unless some injury has been done, there is no question of vengeance; nor does any injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the person who seeks vengeance: for just as everything naturally seeks its own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by anyone does not affect a man unless in some way it be something done against him.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "ira fit semper ex his quae ad seipsum. Inimicitia autem et sine his quae ad ipsum, si enim putemus talem esse odimus".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise without anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we think him to be such and such".
Irascimur contra illos qui aliis nocent et vindictam appetimus, inquantum illi quibus nocetur, aliquo modo ad nos pertinent, vel per aliquam affinitatem, vel per amicitiam, vel saltem per communionem naturae.
If we are angry with those who harm others, and seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in some way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least because of the nature we have in common.
Id in quo maxime studemus, reputamus esse bonum nostrum. Et ideo, cum illud despicitur, reputamus nos quoque despici, et arbitramur nos laesos.
When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as though we ourselves were despised and injured.
Ira non dicitur in Deo secundum passionem animi, sed secundum iudicium iustitiae, prout vult vindictam facere de peccato. Peccator enim, peccando, Deo nihil nocere effective potest, tamen ex parte sua dupliciter contra Deum agit. Primo quidem, inquantum eum in suis mandatis contemnit. Secundo, inquantum nocumentum aliquod infert alicui, vel sibi vel alteri: quod ad Deum pertinet, prout ille cui nocumentum infertur, sub Dei providentia et tutela continetur.
We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of the soul, but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take vengeance on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any actual harm: but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against God in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments. Secondly, insofar as he harms himself or another: which injury redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an object of God's providence and protection.
Wednesday, August 11, 2010
1a 2ae q46 a8: Whether the species of anger are suitably assigned? Yes.
Damascenus convenienter assignet tres species irae, scilicet fel, maniam et furorem quia gradus illi irae distinguuntur secundum effectum irae.
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) suitably assigns three species of anger--"wrath," "ill-will" and "rancor", because these degrees are distinguished according to various effects of anger.
Tres species irae quas Damascenus ponit, et etiam Gregorius Nyssenus, sumuntur secundum ea quae dant irae aliquod augmentum. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Uno modo, ex facilitate ipsius motus, et talem iram vocat fel, quia cito accenditur.
The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger. This happens in three ways. First, from facility of the movement itself, and he calls this kind of anger cholos [bile], because it is quickly aroused.
Alio modo, ex parte tristitiae causantis iram, quae diu in memoria manet, et haec pertinet ad maniam, quae a manendo dicitur.
Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and which dwells some time in the memory; this belongs to menis [ill-will] which is derived from menein [to dwell].
Tertio, ex parte eius quod iratus appetit, scilicet vindictae, et haec pertinet ad furorem, qui nunquam quiescit donec puniat.
Thirdly, on the part of that which the angry man seeks, viz. vengeance; and this pertains to kotos [rancor] which never rests until it is avenged.
Unde philosophus, in IV Ethic., quosdam irascentium vocat acutos, quia cito irascuntur; quosdam amaros, quia diu retinent iram; quosdam difficiles, quia nunquam quiescunt nisi puniant.
Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) calls some angry persons akrocholoi [choleric], because they are easily angered; some he calls pikroi [bitter], because they retain their anger for a long time; and some he calls chalepoi [ill-tempered], because they never rest until they have retaliated [Cf. II-II, 158, 5].
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) suitably assigns three species of anger--"wrath," "ill-will" and "rancor", because these degrees are distinguished according to various effects of anger.
Tres species irae quas Damascenus ponit, et etiam Gregorius Nyssenus, sumuntur secundum ea quae dant irae aliquod augmentum. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Uno modo, ex facilitate ipsius motus, et talem iram vocat fel, quia cito accenditur.
The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger. This happens in three ways. First, from facility of the movement itself, and he calls this kind of anger cholos [bile], because it is quickly aroused.
Alio modo, ex parte tristitiae causantis iram, quae diu in memoria manet, et haec pertinet ad maniam, quae a manendo dicitur.
Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and which dwells some time in the memory; this belongs to menis [ill-will] which is derived from menein [to dwell].
Tertio, ex parte eius quod iratus appetit, scilicet vindictae, et haec pertinet ad furorem, qui nunquam quiescit donec puniat.
Thirdly, on the part of that which the angry man seeks, viz. vengeance; and this pertains to kotos [rancor] which never rests until it is avenged.
Unde philosophus, in IV Ethic., quosdam irascentium vocat acutos, quia cito irascuntur; quosdam amaros, quia diu retinent iram; quosdam difficiles, quia nunquam quiescunt nisi puniant.
Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) calls some angry persons akrocholoi [choleric], because they are easily angered; some he calls pikroi [bitter], because they retain their anger for a long time; and some he calls chalepoi [ill-tempered], because they never rest until they have retaliated [Cf. II-II, 158, 5].
Monday, August 09, 2010
1a 2ae q46 a7: Whether anger is only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice? Yes.
Ad eosdem est ira, ad quos est iustitia et iniustitia, quia inferre vindictam ad iustitiam pertinet, laedere autem aliquem pertinet ad iniustitiam.
Anger is towards those to whom we are just or unjust, because vengeance is an act of justice, and wrong-doing is an act of injustice.
Unde tam ex parte causae, quae est laesio illata ab altero, quam etiam ex parte vindictae, quam appetit iratus, manifestum est quod ad eosdem pertinet ira, ad quos iustitia et iniustitia.
Therefore both on the part of the cause, viz. the harm done by another, and on the part of the vengeance sought by the angry man, it is evident that anger concerns those to whom one is just or unjust.
Anger is towards those to whom we are just or unjust, because vengeance is an act of justice, and wrong-doing is an act of injustice.
Unde tam ex parte causae, quae est laesio illata ab altero, quam etiam ex parte vindictae, quam appetit iratus, manifestum est quod ad eosdem pertinet ira, ad quos iustitia et iniustitia.
Therefore both on the part of the cause, viz. the harm done by another, and on the part of the vengeance sought by the angry man, it is evident that anger concerns those to whom one is just or unjust.
Sunday, August 08, 2010
1a 2ae q46 a6: Whether anger is more grievous than hatred? No.
Odium est multo deterius et gravius quam ira quia odium est per applicationem mali ad malum, ira autem per applicationem boni ad malum.
Hatred is far worse and graver than anger because hatred implies application of evil to evil, whereas anger denotes application of good to evil.
Manifestum est autem quod appetere malum sub ratione iusti, minus habet de ratione mali quam velle malum alicuius simpliciter. Velle enim malum alicuius sub ratione iusti, potest esse etiam secundum virtutem iustitiae, si praecepto rationis obtemperetur; sed ira in hoc solum deficit, quod non obedit rationis praecepto in ulciscendo.
Now it is evident that to seek evil under the aspect of justice, has a lesser aspect of evil than simply to seek evil to someone. Because to wish evil to someone under the aspect of justice, may be according to the virtue of justice, if it be in conformity with the order of reason; and anger fails only in this, that it does not obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance.
Species passionis, et ratio ipsius, ex obiecto pensatur. Est autem obiectum irae et odii idem subiecto; nam sicut odiens appetit malum ei quem odit, ita iratus ei contra quem irascitur.
The species and formal aspect of a passion are taken from its object. Now the object of anger is the same in subject as the object of hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates, so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he is angry.
Sed non eadem ratione: sed odiens appetit malum inimici, inquantum est malum; iratus autem appetit malum eius contra quem irascitur, non inquantum est malum, sed inquantum habet quandam rationem boni, scilicet prout aestimat illud esse iustum, inquantum est vindicativum.
But there is a difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his enemy, inasmuch as it is evil; whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom he is angry, not inasmuch as it is evil but insofar as it has a certain aspect of good, that is, insofar as he reckons it as just, since it is a means of vengeance.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "iratus, si fiant multa, miserebitur, odiens autem pro nullo".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the angry man is appeased if many evils befall, whereas the hater is never appeased."
Odium autem provenit ex permanentiori causa quam ira. Nam ira provenit ex aliqua commotione animi propter laesionem illatam; sed odium procedit ex aliqua dispositione hominis, secundum quam reputat sibi contrarium et nocivum id quod odit.
Hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion of the soul due to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a man, according to which he considers that which he hates to be contrary and hurtful to him.
Et ideo sicut passio citius transit quam dispositio vel habitus, ita ira citius transit quam odium; quamvis etiam odium sit passio ex tali dispositione proveniens. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "odium est magis insanabile quam ira".
Consequently, as passion is more transitory than disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; although hatred itself is a passion ensuing from this disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "hatred is more incurable than anger."
Hatred is far worse and graver than anger because hatred implies application of evil to evil, whereas anger denotes application of good to evil.
Manifestum est autem quod appetere malum sub ratione iusti, minus habet de ratione mali quam velle malum alicuius simpliciter. Velle enim malum alicuius sub ratione iusti, potest esse etiam secundum virtutem iustitiae, si praecepto rationis obtemperetur; sed ira in hoc solum deficit, quod non obedit rationis praecepto in ulciscendo.
Now it is evident that to seek evil under the aspect of justice, has a lesser aspect of evil than simply to seek evil to someone. Because to wish evil to someone under the aspect of justice, may be according to the virtue of justice, if it be in conformity with the order of reason; and anger fails only in this, that it does not obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance.
Species passionis, et ratio ipsius, ex obiecto pensatur. Est autem obiectum irae et odii idem subiecto; nam sicut odiens appetit malum ei quem odit, ita iratus ei contra quem irascitur.
The species and formal aspect of a passion are taken from its object. Now the object of anger is the same in subject as the object of hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates, so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he is angry.
Sed non eadem ratione: sed odiens appetit malum inimici, inquantum est malum; iratus autem appetit malum eius contra quem irascitur, non inquantum est malum, sed inquantum habet quandam rationem boni, scilicet prout aestimat illud esse iustum, inquantum est vindicativum.
But there is a difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his enemy, inasmuch as it is evil; whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom he is angry, not inasmuch as it is evil but insofar as it has a certain aspect of good, that is, insofar as he reckons it as just, since it is a means of vengeance.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "iratus, si fiant multa, miserebitur, odiens autem pro nullo".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the angry man is appeased if many evils befall, whereas the hater is never appeased."
Odium autem provenit ex permanentiori causa quam ira. Nam ira provenit ex aliqua commotione animi propter laesionem illatam; sed odium procedit ex aliqua dispositione hominis, secundum quam reputat sibi contrarium et nocivum id quod odit.
Hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion of the soul due to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a man, according to which he considers that which he hates to be contrary and hurtful to him.
Et ideo sicut passio citius transit quam dispositio vel habitus, ita ira citius transit quam odium; quamvis etiam odium sit passio ex tali dispositione proveniens. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "odium est magis insanabile quam ira".
Consequently, as passion is more transitory than disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; although hatred itself is a passion ensuing from this disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "hatred is more incurable than anger."
Saturday, August 07, 2010
1a 2ae q46 a5: Whether anger is more natural than desire? Yes.
Ira est magis naturalis homini quam concupiscentia, inquantum ira est cum ratione magis quam concupiscentia.
Anger is more natural to man than desire, insofar as anger follows reason more than desire does.
Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod humanius est punire, quod pertinet ad iram, quam mansuetum esse, unumquodque enim naturaliter insurgit contra contraria et nociva.
Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "revenge" which pertains to anger "is more natural to man than meekness", for it is natural to everything to rise up against things contrary and hurtful.
Ipsa ratio pertinet ad naturam hominis. Unde ex hoc ipso quod ira est cum ratione, sequitur quod secundum aliquem modum sit homini naturalis.
Reason itself belongs to the nature of man: wherefore from the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it follows that it is, in a manner, natural to man.
Anger is more natural to man than desire, insofar as anger follows reason more than desire does.
Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod humanius est punire, quod pertinet ad iram, quam mansuetum esse, unumquodque enim naturaliter insurgit contra contraria et nociva.
Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "revenge" which pertains to anger "is more natural to man than meekness", for it is natural to everything to rise up against things contrary and hurtful.
Ipsa ratio pertinet ad naturam hominis. Unde ex hoc ipso quod ira est cum ratione, sequitur quod secundum aliquem modum sit homini naturalis.
Reason itself belongs to the nature of man: wherefore from the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it follows that it is, in a manner, natural to man.
Friday, August 06, 2010
1a 2ae q46 a4: Whether anger requires an act of reason? Yes.
Ira est quodammodo cum ratione quia sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., ira audit aliqualiter rationem, sicut nuntiantem quod iniuriatum est ei, sed non perfecte audit, quia non observat regulam rationis in rependendo vindictam.
Anger, in a fashion, requires an act of reason, because as stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "anger listens somewhat to reason" insofar as reason denounces the injury inflicted, "but listens not perfectly," because it does not observe the rule of reason as to the measure of vengeance.
Ad iram ergo requiritur aliquis actus rationis; et additur impedimentum rationis. Unde philosophus dicit, in libro de Problemat., quod illi qui sunt multum ebrii, tanquam nihil habentes de iudicio rationis, non irascuntur, sed quando sunt parum ebrii, irascuntur, tanquam habentes iudicium rationis, sed impeditum.
Anger, therefore, requires an act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2,27) that those who are very drunk, so as to be incapable of the use of reason, do not get angry, but those who are slightly drunk, do get angry, through being still able, though hampered, to form a judgment of reason.
Anger, in a fashion, requires an act of reason, because as stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "anger listens somewhat to reason" insofar as reason denounces the injury inflicted, "but listens not perfectly," because it does not observe the rule of reason as to the measure of vengeance.
Ad iram ergo requiritur aliquis actus rationis; et additur impedimentum rationis. Unde philosophus dicit, in libro de Problemat., quod illi qui sunt multum ebrii, tanquam nihil habentes de iudicio rationis, non irascuntur, sed quando sunt parum ebrii, irascuntur, tanquam habentes iudicium rationis, sed impeditum.
Anger, therefore, requires an act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2,27) that those who are very drunk, so as to be incapable of the use of reason, do not get angry, but those who are slightly drunk, do get angry, through being still able, though hampered, to form a judgment of reason.
Thursday, August 05, 2010
1a 2ae q46 a3: Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty? No.
Ira non est in concupiscibili, sed in irascibili, quia ira respicit duo obiecta: scilicet vindictam, quam appetit, et eum de quo vindictam quaerit; et circa utrumque quandam arduitatem ira requirit: non enim insurgit motus irae, nisi aliqua magnitudine circa utrumque existente; "quaecumque enim nihil sunt, aut modica valde nullo digna aestimamus", ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric.
Anger is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible faculty, because anger regards two objects: viz. the vengeance that it seeks, and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness: for the movement of anger does not arise, unless there be some magnitude about both these objects; since "we make no ado about things that are naught or very minute," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2).
Ira dicitur componi ex tristitia et desiderio, non sicut ex partibus, sed sicut ex causis. Dictum est autem supra quod passiones concupiscibilis sunt causae passionum irascibilis.
Anger is said to be composed of [the concupiscible passions] pain and desire, not as though they were its parts, but because they are its causes. For it has been said above (q25 a2) that the concupiscible passions are the causes of the irascible passions.
Ira dicitur crescere in odium, non quod eadem numero passio quae prius fuit ira, postmodum fiat odium per quandam inveterationem, sed per quandam causalitatem. Ira enim, per diuturnitatem, causat odium.
Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though the same passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by becoming inveterate, but by a process of causality. For anger when it lasts a long time engenders hatred.
Anger is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible faculty, because anger regards two objects: viz. the vengeance that it seeks, and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness: for the movement of anger does not arise, unless there be some magnitude about both these objects; since "we make no ado about things that are naught or very minute," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2).
Ira dicitur componi ex tristitia et desiderio, non sicut ex partibus, sed sicut ex causis. Dictum est autem supra quod passiones concupiscibilis sunt causae passionum irascibilis.
Anger is said to be composed of [the concupiscible passions] pain and desire, not as though they were its parts, but because they are its causes. For it has been said above (q25 a2) that the concupiscible passions are the causes of the irascible passions.
Ira dicitur crescere in odium, non quod eadem numero passio quae prius fuit ira, postmodum fiat odium per quandam inveterationem, sed per quandam causalitatem. Ira enim, per diuturnitatem, causat odium.
Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though the same passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by becoming inveterate, but by a process of causality. For anger when it lasts a long time engenders hatred.
Wednesday, August 04, 2010
1a 2ae q46 a2: Whether the object of anger is an evil? No.
Obiectum irae est bonum quia appetitus vindictae est appetitus boni, cum vindicta ad iustitiam pertineat.
The object of anger is a good because the desire for revenge is a desire for something good, since revenge belongs to justice.
Augustinus dicit, in II Confess., quod "ira appetit vindictam".
Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "anger craves for revenge".
Praeterea, ira semper est cum spe, unde et delectationem causat, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Sed spei et delectationis obiectum est bonum. Ergo et irae.
Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the object of hope and of pleasure is a good. Therefore a good is also the object of anger.
Et sic motus irae tendit in duo, scilicet in ipsam vindictam, quam appetit et sperat sicut quoddam bonum, unde et de ipsa delectatur; tendit etiam in illum de quo quaerit vindictam, sicut in contrarium et nocivum, quod pertinet ad rationem mali.
The movement of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, which it desires and hopes for as being a definite good, wherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, as to something contrary and hurtful, which bears the formal aspect of evil.
Est tamen duplex differentia attendenda circa hoc, irae ad odium et ad amorem. Quarum prima est, quod ira semper respicit duo obiecta, amor vero et odium quandoque respiciunt unum obiectum tantum, sicut cum dicitur aliquis amare vinum vel aliquid huiusmodi, aut etiam odire.
We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The first difference is that anger always regards two objects, whereas love and hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is said to love wine or something of the kind, or to hate it.
Secunda est, quia utrumque obiectorum quod respicit amor, est bonum: vult enim amans bonum alicui, tanquam sibi convenienti. Utrumque vero eorum quae respicit odium, habet rationem mali: vult enim odiens malum alicui, tamquam cuidam inconvenienti.
The second difference is, that both the objects of love are good: since the lover wishes good to someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the objects of hatred bear the formal aspect of evil: for the man who hates, wishes evil to someone, as to something disagreeable to him.
Sed ira respicit unum obiectum secundum rationem boni, scilicet vindictam, quam appetit, et aliud secundum rationem mali, scilicet hominem nocivum, de quo vult vindicari. Et ideo est passio quodammodo composita ex contrariis passionibus.
Whereas anger regards one object under the formal aspect of good, viz. the revenge which it seeks, and another object under the formal aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged. Consequently it is a passion somewhat made up of contrary passions.
The object of anger is a good because the desire for revenge is a desire for something good, since revenge belongs to justice.
Augustinus dicit, in II Confess., quod "ira appetit vindictam".
Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "anger craves for revenge".
Praeterea, ira semper est cum spe, unde et delectationem causat, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Sed spei et delectationis obiectum est bonum. Ergo et irae.
Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the object of hope and of pleasure is a good. Therefore a good is also the object of anger.
Et sic motus irae tendit in duo, scilicet in ipsam vindictam, quam appetit et sperat sicut quoddam bonum, unde et de ipsa delectatur; tendit etiam in illum de quo quaerit vindictam, sicut in contrarium et nocivum, quod pertinet ad rationem mali.
The movement of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, which it desires and hopes for as being a definite good, wherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, as to something contrary and hurtful, which bears the formal aspect of evil.
Est tamen duplex differentia attendenda circa hoc, irae ad odium et ad amorem. Quarum prima est, quod ira semper respicit duo obiecta, amor vero et odium quandoque respiciunt unum obiectum tantum, sicut cum dicitur aliquis amare vinum vel aliquid huiusmodi, aut etiam odire.
We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The first difference is that anger always regards two objects, whereas love and hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is said to love wine or something of the kind, or to hate it.
Secunda est, quia utrumque obiectorum quod respicit amor, est bonum: vult enim amans bonum alicui, tanquam sibi convenienti. Utrumque vero eorum quae respicit odium, habet rationem mali: vult enim odiens malum alicui, tamquam cuidam inconvenienti.
The second difference is, that both the objects of love are good: since the lover wishes good to someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the objects of hatred bear the formal aspect of evil: for the man who hates, wishes evil to someone, as to something disagreeable to him.
Sed ira respicit unum obiectum secundum rationem boni, scilicet vindictam, quam appetit, et aliud secundum rationem mali, scilicet hominem nocivum, de quo vult vindicari. Et ideo est passio quodammodo composita ex contrariis passionibus.
Whereas anger regards one object under the formal aspect of good, viz. the revenge which it seeks, and another object under the formal aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged. Consequently it is a passion somewhat made up of contrary passions.
Tuesday, August 03, 2010
1a 2ae q46 a1: Whether anger is a special passion? Yes.
Potest ira dici passio generalis, inquantum ex concursu multarum passionum causatur, quia effectus ex congregatione multarum causarum productus, habet quandam generalitatem, inquantum continet multas causas quodammodo in actu.
Anger may be called a general passion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several passions, because an effect which is due to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain generality, inasmuch as several causes are, in a fashion, actually existing therein.
Ira includit multas passiones, non quidem sicut genus species, sed magis secundum continentiam causae et effectus.
Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a genus includes several species, but rather according to the inclusion of cause and effect.
Non enim insurgit motus irae nisi propter aliquam tristitiam illatam et nisi adsit desiderium et spes ulciscendi, quia, ut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., "iratus habet spem puniendi; appetit enim vindictam ut sibi possibilem".
The movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope of revenge: as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), "the angry man hopes to punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible."
Unde si fuerit multum excellens persona quae nocumentum intulit, non sequitur ira, sed solum tristitia, ut Avicenna dicit, in libro de anima.
Consequently, if the person who inflicted the injury excels by very much, anger does not ensue, but only pain, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv, 6).
Anger may be called a general passion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several passions, because an effect which is due to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain generality, inasmuch as several causes are, in a fashion, actually existing therein.
Ira includit multas passiones, non quidem sicut genus species, sed magis secundum continentiam causae et effectus.
Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a genus includes several species, but rather according to the inclusion of cause and effect.
Non enim insurgit motus irae nisi propter aliquam tristitiam illatam et nisi adsit desiderium et spes ulciscendi, quia, ut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., "iratus habet spem puniendi; appetit enim vindictam ut sibi possibilem".
The movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope of revenge: as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), "the angry man hopes to punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible."
Unde si fuerit multum excellens persona quae nocumentum intulit, non sequitur ira, sed solum tristitia, ut Avicenna dicit, in libro de anima.
Consequently, if the person who inflicted the injury excels by very much, anger does not ensue, but only pain, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv, 6).
1a 2ae q46: Anger, in itself
- Is anger a special passion?
- Is the object of anger good or evil?
- Is anger in the concupiscible faculty?
- Is anger accompanied by an act of reason?
- Is anger more natural than desire?
- Is anger more grievous than hatred?
- Is anger only towards those with whom we have a relation of justice?
- The species of anger
Monday, August 02, 2010
1a 2ae q45 a4: Whether the daring are more eager at first than in the midst of danger? Yes.
Dicitur in III Ethic., quod "audaces praevolantes sunt et volentes ante pericula, in ipsis autem discedunt" quia contingit quandoque quod secundum subitam apprehensionem non possunt cognosci omnia quae difficultatem in aliquo negotio afferunt: unde surgit audaciae motus ad aggrediendum periculum; unde quando iam experiuntur ipsum periculum, sentiunt maiorem difficultatem quam aestimaverunt, et ideo deficiunt.
It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that "the daring are precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the midst of dangers they stand aloof" because it happens sometimes that it is impossible for a man to take note in an instant of all the difficulties of a certain situation: hence there arises the movement of daring to face the danger; so that when he comes to experience the danger, he feels the difficulty to be greater than he expected, and so gives way.
Audacia, cum sit quidam motus appetitus sensitivi, sequitur apprehensionem sensitivae virtutis. Virtus autem sensitiva non est collativa nec inquisitiva singulorum quae circumstant rem, sed subitum habet iudicium.
Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite, follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive faculty cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into circumstances; its judgment is instantaneous.
Sed ratio est discussiva omnium quae afferunt difficultatem negotio. Et ideo fortes, qui ex iudicio rationis aggrediuntur pericula, in principio videntur remissi, quia non passi, sed cum deliberatione debita aggrediuntur. Quando autem sunt in ipsis periculis, non experiuntur aliquid improvisum, sed quandoque minora illis quae praecogitaverunt; et ideo magis persistunt.
On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a situation. Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according to the judgment of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the danger not from passion but with due deliberation. Yet when they are in the midst of danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but sometimes the difficulty turns out to be less than they anticipated; wherefore they are more persevering.
Vel etiam quia propter bonum virtutis pericula aggrediuntur, cuius boni voluntas in eis perseverat, quantacumque sint pericula. Audaces autem, propter solam aestimationem facientem spem et excludentem timorem, sicut dictum est.
Moreover, it may be because they face the danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of their will, however great the danger may prove. Whereas men of daring face the danger on account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and banishing fear, as stated above (q45 a3).
Obiectum amoris est simpliciter bonum, unde augmentatum simpliciter augmentat amorem. Sed obiectum audaciae est compositum ex bono et malo; et motus audaciae in malum, praesupponit motum spei in bonum.
The object of love is the good simply, wherefore if it be increased, love is increased simply. But the object of daring is a compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil presupposes the movement of hope towards good.
Et ideo si tantum addatur de arduitate ad periculum quod excedat spem, non sequetur motus audaciae, sed diminuetur. Si tamen sit motus audaciae, quanto maius est periculum, tanto maior audacia reputatur.
If, therefore, so much difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the movement of daring does not ensue, but fails. But if the movement of daring does ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the daring considered to be.
It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that "the daring are precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the midst of dangers they stand aloof" because it happens sometimes that it is impossible for a man to take note in an instant of all the difficulties of a certain situation: hence there arises the movement of daring to face the danger; so that when he comes to experience the danger, he feels the difficulty to be greater than he expected, and so gives way.
Audacia, cum sit quidam motus appetitus sensitivi, sequitur apprehensionem sensitivae virtutis. Virtus autem sensitiva non est collativa nec inquisitiva singulorum quae circumstant rem, sed subitum habet iudicium.
Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite, follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive faculty cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into circumstances; its judgment is instantaneous.
Sed ratio est discussiva omnium quae afferunt difficultatem negotio. Et ideo fortes, qui ex iudicio rationis aggrediuntur pericula, in principio videntur remissi, quia non passi, sed cum deliberatione debita aggrediuntur. Quando autem sunt in ipsis periculis, non experiuntur aliquid improvisum, sed quandoque minora illis quae praecogitaverunt; et ideo magis persistunt.
On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a situation. Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according to the judgment of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the danger not from passion but with due deliberation. Yet when they are in the midst of danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but sometimes the difficulty turns out to be less than they anticipated; wherefore they are more persevering.
Vel etiam quia propter bonum virtutis pericula aggrediuntur, cuius boni voluntas in eis perseverat, quantacumque sint pericula. Audaces autem, propter solam aestimationem facientem spem et excludentem timorem, sicut dictum est.
Moreover, it may be because they face the danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of their will, however great the danger may prove. Whereas men of daring face the danger on account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and banishing fear, as stated above (q45 a3).
Obiectum amoris est simpliciter bonum, unde augmentatum simpliciter augmentat amorem. Sed obiectum audaciae est compositum ex bono et malo; et motus audaciae in malum, praesupponit motum spei in bonum.
The object of love is the good simply, wherefore if it be increased, love is increased simply. But the object of daring is a compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil presupposes the movement of hope towards good.
Et ideo si tantum addatur de arduitate ad periculum quod excedat spem, non sequetur motus audaciae, sed diminuetur. Si tamen sit motus audaciae, quanto maius est periculum, tanto maior audacia reputatur.
If, therefore, so much difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the movement of daring does not ensue, but fails. But if the movement of daring does ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the daring considered to be.
Sunday, August 01, 2010
1a 2ae q45 a3: Whether some defect is a cause of daring? No.
Nihil quod ad defectum pertinet, est causa audaciae quia nullus defectus causat audaciam nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet habet adiunctam aliquam excellentiam, vel veram vel aestimatam, vel ex parte sui vel ex parte alterius.
Nothing pertaining to defect is a cause of daring because no defect causes daring except accidentally, i.e. insofar as some excellence attaches thereto, real or imaginary, either in oneself or in another.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod causa audaciae est, "cum in phantasia spes fuerit salutarium ut prope existentium, timendorum autem aut non entium, aut longe entium".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that the cause of daring "is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means of safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either non-existent or far off."
Illi qui sunt inexperti periculorum, sunt audaciores, non propter defectum, sed per accidens, inquantum scilicet, propter inexperientiam, neque debilitatem suam cognoscunt, neque praesentiam periculorum.
Those who have no experience of dangers are more daring, not on account of a defect, but accidentally, i.e. insofar as through being inexperienced they do not know their own failings, nor the dangers that threaten.
Philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., "iniustum passi redduntur audaciores, quia aestimant quod Deus iniustum passis auxilium ferat".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) "those who have been wronged are courageous, because they think that God comes to the assistance of those who suffer unjustly."
Nothing pertaining to defect is a cause of daring because no defect causes daring except accidentally, i.e. insofar as some excellence attaches thereto, real or imaginary, either in oneself or in another.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod causa audaciae est, "cum in phantasia spes fuerit salutarium ut prope existentium, timendorum autem aut non entium, aut longe entium".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that the cause of daring "is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means of safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either non-existent or far off."
Illi qui sunt inexperti periculorum, sunt audaciores, non propter defectum, sed per accidens, inquantum scilicet, propter inexperientiam, neque debilitatem suam cognoscunt, neque praesentiam periculorum.
Those who have no experience of dangers are more daring, not on account of a defect, but accidentally, i.e. insofar as through being inexperienced they do not know their own failings, nor the dangers that threaten.
Philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., "iniustum passi redduntur audaciores, quia aestimant quod Deus iniustum passis auxilium ferat".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) "those who have been wronged are courageous, because they think that God comes to the assistance of those who suffer unjustly."