Actiones humanae secundum circumstantias sunt bonae vel malae quia si aliquid desit quod requiratur ad debitas circumstantias, erit actio mala.
Human actions are good or evil according to circumstances because if something be wanting that is requisite as a due circumstance, the action will be evil.
Circumstantiae sunt extra actionem, inquantum non sunt de essentia actionis; sunt tamen in ipsa actione velut quaedam accidentia eius. Sicut et accidentia quae sunt in substantiis naturalibus, sunt extra essentias earum.
Circumstances are outside an action, inasmuch as they are not part of its essence; but they are in an action as certain accidents thereof. Thus, too, accidents in natural substances are outside their essences.
Non omnia accidentia per accidens se habent ad sua subiecta; sed quaedam sunt per se accidentia; quae in unaquaque arte considerantur. Et per hunc modum considerantur circumstantiae actuum in doctrina morali.
Every accident is not accidentally in its subject; for some are proper accidents; and of these every art takes notice. And thus it is that the circumstances of actions are considered in the doctrine of morals.
In rebus naturalibus non invenitur tota plenitudo perfectionis quae debetur rei, ex forma substantiali, quae dat speciem; sed multum superadditur ex supervenientibus accidentibus, sicut in homine ex figura, ex colore, et huiusmodi; quorum si aliquod desit ad decentem habitudinem, consequitur malum.
In natural things, it is to be noted that the whole fullness of perfection due to a thing, is not from the mere substantial form, that gives it its species; since a thing derives much from supervening accidents, as man does from shape, color, and the like; and if any one of these accidents be out of due proportion, evil is the result.
Ita etiam est in actione. Nam plenitudo bonitatis eius non tota consistit in sua specie, sed aliquid additur ex his quae adveniunt tanquam accidentia quaedam. Et huiusmodi sunt circumstantiae debitae.
So it is with action. For the plenitude of its goodness does not consist wholly in its species, but also in certain additions which accrue to it by reason of certain accidents: and such are its due circumstances.
"It is because the contemporary alternatives seem so one-sided and are not more evidently solutions to the problems which Thomas faced, and partly solved, that we return to him and to the tradition of theology and philosophy in which his Summa Theologiae appears: theology as the science of the first principle and this as the total knowledge of reality in its unity." -- Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself (Oxford University Press, 1987), p.159.
Sunday, February 28, 2010
Saturday, February 27, 2010
1a 2ae q18 a2: Whether the good or evil of a man's action is derived from its object? Yes.
Sicut prima bonitas rei naturalis attenditur ex sua forma, quae dat speciem ei, ita et prima bonitas actus moralis attenditur ex obiecto convenienti, quia sicut res naturalis habet speciem ex sua forma, ita actio habet speciem ex obiecto, sicut et motus ex termino.
Just as the primary goodness of a natural thing is derived from its form, which gives it its species, so the primary goodness of a moral action is derived from the befitting object, because just as a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has its species from its object, as movement from its term.
Bonum et malum actionis, sicut et ceterarum rerum, attenditur ex plenitudine essendi vel defectu ipsius. Primum autem quod ad plenitudinem essendi pertinere videtur, est id quod dat rei speciem.
The good or evil of an action, as of other things, depends on its fullness of subsisting or its lack of that fullness. Now the first thing that belongs to the fullness of subsisting seems to be that which gives a thing its species.
Ex hoc autem quod obiectum est aliquo modo effectus potentiae activae, sequitur quod sit terminus actionis eius, et per consequens quod det ei formam et speciem, motus enim habet speciem a terminis.
Now since the object is in some way the effect of the active power, it follows that it is the term of its action, and consequently that it gives it its form and species, since movement derives its species from its term.
Et quamvis etiam bonitas actionis non causetur ex bonitate effectus, tamen ex hoc dicitur actio bona, quod bonum effectum inducere potest. Et ita ipsa proportio actionis ad effectum, est ratio bonitatis ipsius.
Moreover, although the goodness of an action is not caused by the goodness of its effect, yet an action is said to be good from the fact that it can produce a good effect. Consequently the very proportion of an action to its effect is the formal aspect of its goodness.
Just as the primary goodness of a natural thing is derived from its form, which gives it its species, so the primary goodness of a moral action is derived from the befitting object, because just as a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has its species from its object, as movement from its term.
Bonum et malum actionis, sicut et ceterarum rerum, attenditur ex plenitudine essendi vel defectu ipsius. Primum autem quod ad plenitudinem essendi pertinere videtur, est id quod dat rei speciem.
The good or evil of an action, as of other things, depends on its fullness of subsisting or its lack of that fullness. Now the first thing that belongs to the fullness of subsisting seems to be that which gives a thing its species.
Ex hoc autem quod obiectum est aliquo modo effectus potentiae activae, sequitur quod sit terminus actionis eius, et per consequens quod det ei formam et speciem, motus enim habet speciem a terminis.
Now since the object is in some way the effect of the active power, it follows that it is the term of its action, and consequently that it gives it its form and species, since movement derives its species from its term.
Et quamvis etiam bonitas actionis non causetur ex bonitate effectus, tamen ex hoc dicitur actio bona, quod bonum effectum inducere potest. Et ita ipsa proportio actionis ad effectum, est ratio bonitatis ipsius.
Moreover, although the goodness of an action is not caused by the goodness of its effect, yet an action is said to be good from the fact that it can produce a good effect. Consequently the very proportion of an action to its effect is the formal aspect of its goodness.
Friday, February 26, 2010
1a 2ae q18 a1: Whether every human action is good? No.
Est aliqua actio hominis mala quia omnis actio, inquantum habet aliquid de esse, intantum habet de bonitate; inquantum vero deficit ei aliquid de plenitudine essendi quae debetur actioni humanae, intantum deficit a bonitate; et sic dicitur mala.
Some actions of man are evil because every action has goodness, insofar as it has be-ing; whereas it is lacking in goodness, insofar as it is lacking in something that is required by the fullness of subsisting that would befit human action; and thus it is said to be evil.
Malum agit in virtute boni deficientis. Si enim nihil esset ibi de bono, neque esset ens, neque agere posset. Si autem non esset deficiens, non esset malum. Unde et actio causata est quoddam bonum deficiens, quod secundum quid est bonum, simpliciter autem malum.
Evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness. For it there were nothing of good there, there would be neither being nor possibility of action. On the other hand if good were not deficient, there would be no evil. Consequently the action done is a deficient good, which is good in a certain respect, but simply evil.
Nihil prohibet aliquid esse secundum quid in actu, unde agere possit; et secundum aliud privari actu, unde causet deficientem actionem. Sicut homo caecus actu habet virtutem gressivam, per quam ambulare potest, sed inquantum caret visu, qui dirigit in ambulando, patitur defectum in ambulando, dum ambulat cespitando.
Nothing hinders a thing from being in act in a certain respect, so that it can act; and in a certain respect deficient in act, so as to cause a deficient act. Thus a blind man has in act the power of walking, whereby he is able to walk; but inasmuch as he is deprived of sight he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when he walks.
Actio mala potest habere aliquem effectum per se, secundum id quod habet de bonitate et entitate. Sicut adulterium est causa generationis humanae, inquantum habet commixtionem maris et feminae, non autem inquantum caret ordine rationis.
An evil action can have a proper effect, according to the goodness and beingness that it has. Thus adultery is the cause of human generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and female, but not inasmuch as it lacks the order of the formal aspect [of the fullness of being and goodness].
De bono et malo in actionibus oportet loqui sicut de bono et malo in rebus: eo quod unaquaeque res talem actionem producit, qualis est ipsa. In rebus autem unumquodque tantum habet de bono, quantum habet de esse, bonum enim et ens convertuntur, ut in primo dictum est. Solus autem Deus habet totam plenitudinem sui esse secundum aliquid unum et simplex, unaquaeque vero res alia habet plenitudinem essendi sibi convenientem secundum diversa.
We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good and evil in things: because such as everything is, such is the act that it produces. Now in things, each one has so much good as it has be-ing: since good and being are convertible, as was stated in the I, q5, aa1,3. But God alone has the whole plenitude of His Be-ing in a certain unity, and simply, whereas every other thing has the fullness of subsisting that would befit its essence in a certain multiplicity.
Unde in aliquibus contingit quod quantum ad aliquid habent esse, et tamen eis aliquid deficit ad plenitudinem essendi eis debitam. Sicut ad plenitudinem esse humani requiritur quod sit quoddam compositum ex anima et corpore, habens omnes potentias et instrumenta cognitionis et motus; unde si aliquid horum deficiat alicui homini deficit ei aliquid de plenitudine sui esse. Quantum igitur habet de esse, tantum habet de bonitate.
Wherefore it happens with some things, that they have be-ing in some respect, and yet they are lacking in the fullness of subsisting due to them. Thus the fullness of human be-ing requires a compound of soul and body, having all the powers and instruments of knowledge and movement; wherefore if any man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in something due to the fullness of his be-ing. So that as much as he has of be-ing, so much has he of goodness.
Some actions of man are evil because every action has goodness, insofar as it has be-ing; whereas it is lacking in goodness, insofar as it is lacking in something that is required by the fullness of subsisting that would befit human action; and thus it is said to be evil.
Malum agit in virtute boni deficientis. Si enim nihil esset ibi de bono, neque esset ens, neque agere posset. Si autem non esset deficiens, non esset malum. Unde et actio causata est quoddam bonum deficiens, quod secundum quid est bonum, simpliciter autem malum.
Evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness. For it there were nothing of good there, there would be neither being nor possibility of action. On the other hand if good were not deficient, there would be no evil. Consequently the action done is a deficient good, which is good in a certain respect, but simply evil.
Nihil prohibet aliquid esse secundum quid in actu, unde agere possit; et secundum aliud privari actu, unde causet deficientem actionem. Sicut homo caecus actu habet virtutem gressivam, per quam ambulare potest, sed inquantum caret visu, qui dirigit in ambulando, patitur defectum in ambulando, dum ambulat cespitando.
Nothing hinders a thing from being in act in a certain respect, so that it can act; and in a certain respect deficient in act, so as to cause a deficient act. Thus a blind man has in act the power of walking, whereby he is able to walk; but inasmuch as he is deprived of sight he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when he walks.
Actio mala potest habere aliquem effectum per se, secundum id quod habet de bonitate et entitate. Sicut adulterium est causa generationis humanae, inquantum habet commixtionem maris et feminae, non autem inquantum caret ordine rationis.
An evil action can have a proper effect, according to the goodness and beingness that it has. Thus adultery is the cause of human generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and female, but not inasmuch as it lacks the order of the formal aspect [of the fullness of being and goodness].
De bono et malo in actionibus oportet loqui sicut de bono et malo in rebus: eo quod unaquaeque res talem actionem producit, qualis est ipsa. In rebus autem unumquodque tantum habet de bono, quantum habet de esse, bonum enim et ens convertuntur, ut in primo dictum est. Solus autem Deus habet totam plenitudinem sui esse secundum aliquid unum et simplex, unaquaeque vero res alia habet plenitudinem essendi sibi convenientem secundum diversa.
We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good and evil in things: because such as everything is, such is the act that it produces. Now in things, each one has so much good as it has be-ing: since good and being are convertible, as was stated in the I, q5, aa1,3. But God alone has the whole plenitude of His Be-ing in a certain unity, and simply, whereas every other thing has the fullness of subsisting that would befit its essence in a certain multiplicity.
Unde in aliquibus contingit quod quantum ad aliquid habent esse, et tamen eis aliquid deficit ad plenitudinem essendi eis debitam. Sicut ad plenitudinem esse humani requiritur quod sit quoddam compositum ex anima et corpore, habens omnes potentias et instrumenta cognitionis et motus; unde si aliquid horum deficiat alicui homini deficit ei aliquid de plenitudine sui esse. Quantum igitur habet de esse, tantum habet de bonitate.
Wherefore it happens with some things, that they have be-ing in some respect, and yet they are lacking in the fullness of subsisting due to them. Thus the fullness of human be-ing requires a compound of soul and body, having all the powers and instruments of knowledge and movement; wherefore if any man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in something due to the fullness of his be-ing. So that as much as he has of be-ing, so much has he of goodness.
1a 2ae q18: The good and evil of human acts, in general
- Is every human action good, or are there evil actions?
- Is the good or evil of a human action derived from its object?
- Is it derived from a circumstance?
- Is it derived from the end?
- Is a human action good or evil in its species?
- Does an action have the species of good or evil from its end?
- Is the species derived from the end, contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely?
- Is any action indifferent in its species?
- Can an individual action be indifferent?
- Does a circumstance place a moral action in the species of good or evil?
- Does every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, place the moral action in the species of good or evil?
Thursday, February 25, 2010
1a 2ae q17 a9: Whether the acts of the external members are commanded? Yes.
Eo modo quo potentiae animae se habent ad hoc quod obediant rationi, hoc modo se habent etiam corporis membra, quia membra corporis sunt organa quaedam potentiarum animae.
In the same way that the powers of the soul stand in respect of obedience to formal aspect, so do the members of the body stand in respect thereof, because the members of the body are organs of the soul's powers.
Quia igitur vires sensitivae subduntur imperio rationis, non autem vires naturales; ideo omnes motus membrorum quae moventur a potentiis sensitivis, subduntur imperio rationis; motus autem membrorum qui consequuntur vires naturales, non subduntur imperio rationis.
Since then the sensitive powers are subject to the command of formal aspect, whereas the natural powers are not; therefore all movements of members, that are moved by the sensitive powers, are subject to the command of formal aspect; whereas those movements of members, that arise from the natural powers, are not subject to the command of formal aspect.
Augustinus dicit, VIII Confess., "imperat animus ut moveatur manus, et tanta est facilitas, ut vix a servitio discernatur imperium".
Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands a movement of the hand, and so ready is the hand to obey, that scarcely can one discern obedience from command."
Membra non movent seipsa, sed moventur per potentias animae; quarum quaedam sunt rationi viciniores quam vires animae vegetabilis.
The members do not move themselves, but are moved through the powers of the soul; of which powers, some are in closer contact with the formal aspect than are the powers of the vegetal soul.
Sicut Augustinus dicit in XIV de Civ. Dei, hoc quod motus genitalium membrorum rationi non obedit, est ex poena peccati, ut scilicet anima suae inobedientiae ad Deum in illo praecipue membro poenam inobedientiae patiatur, per quod peccatum originale ad posteros traducitur.
As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 17,20) it is in punishment of sin that the movement of these members does not obey formal aspect in this sense, that the soul is punished for its rebellion against God, by the insubmission of that member whereby original sin is transmitted to posterity.
Sed quia per peccatum primi parentis, ut infra dicetur, natura est sibi relicta, subtracto supernaturali dono quod homini divinitus erat collatum; ideo consideranda est ratio naturalis quare motus huiusmodi membrorum specialiter rationi non obedit.
But because, as we shall state later on, the effect of the sin of our first parent was that his nature was left to itself, through the withdrawal of the supernatural gift which God had bestowed on man, we must consider the natural aspect of this particular member's insubmission to formal aspect.
Cuius causam assignat Aristoteles in libro de causis motus animalium, dicens involuntarios esse motus cordis et membri pudendi, quia scilicet ex aliqua apprehensione huiusmodi membra commoventur: inquantum scilicet intellectus et phantasia repraesentant aliqua ex quibus consequuntur passiones animae, ad quas consequitur motus horum membrorum. Non tamen moventur secundum iussum rationis aut intellectus, quia scilicet ad motum horum membrorum requiritur aliqua alteratio naturalis (scilicet caliditatis et frigiditatis), quae quidem alteratio non subiacet imperio rationis.
This is stated by Aristotle (De Causis Mot. Animal.) who says that "the movements of the heart and of the organs of generation are involuntary," because these members are stirred at the occasion of some apprehension: insofar as the intellect and imagination represent such things as arouse the passions of the soul, of which passions the movements of these members are a consequence. But they are not moved at the command of formal aspect or intellect, because these movements are conditioned by a certain natural change (e.g., of heat and cold), which change is not subject to the command of formal aspect.
Specialiter autem hoc accidit in his duobus membris, quia utrumque istorum membrorum est quasi quoddam animal separatum, inquantum est principium vitae; principium autem est virtute totum. Cor enim principium est sensuum, et ex membro genitali virtus exit seminalis, quae est virtute totum animal. Et ideo habent proprios motus naturaliter: quia principia oportet esse naturalia.
This is the case with these two organs in particular, because each is as it were a separate animal being, insofar as it is a principle of life; and the principle is virtually the whole. For the heart is the principle of the senses; and from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal virtue, which is virtually the entire animal. Consequently they have their proper movements naturally: because principles must needs be natural.
In his quae ad intellectum et voluntatem pertinent, primum invenitur id quod est secundum naturam, ex quo alia derivantur: ut a cognitione principiorum naturaliter notorum, cognitio conclusionum; et a voluntate finis naturaliter desiderati, derivatur electio eorum quae sunt ad finem. Ita etiam in corporalibus motibus principium est secundum naturam.
In things pertaining to intellect and will, that which is according to nature stands first, whence all other things are derived: thus from the knowledge of principles that are naturally known, is derived knowledge of the conclusions; and from volition of the end naturally desired, is derived the choice of the means. So also in bodily movements the principle is according to nature.
In the same way that the powers of the soul stand in respect of obedience to formal aspect, so do the members of the body stand in respect thereof, because the members of the body are organs of the soul's powers.
Quia igitur vires sensitivae subduntur imperio rationis, non autem vires naturales; ideo omnes motus membrorum quae moventur a potentiis sensitivis, subduntur imperio rationis; motus autem membrorum qui consequuntur vires naturales, non subduntur imperio rationis.
Since then the sensitive powers are subject to the command of formal aspect, whereas the natural powers are not; therefore all movements of members, that are moved by the sensitive powers, are subject to the command of formal aspect; whereas those movements of members, that arise from the natural powers, are not subject to the command of formal aspect.
Augustinus dicit, VIII Confess., "imperat animus ut moveatur manus, et tanta est facilitas, ut vix a servitio discernatur imperium".
Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands a movement of the hand, and so ready is the hand to obey, that scarcely can one discern obedience from command."
Membra non movent seipsa, sed moventur per potentias animae; quarum quaedam sunt rationi viciniores quam vires animae vegetabilis.
The members do not move themselves, but are moved through the powers of the soul; of which powers, some are in closer contact with the formal aspect than are the powers of the vegetal soul.
Sicut Augustinus dicit in XIV de Civ. Dei, hoc quod motus genitalium membrorum rationi non obedit, est ex poena peccati, ut scilicet anima suae inobedientiae ad Deum in illo praecipue membro poenam inobedientiae patiatur, per quod peccatum originale ad posteros traducitur.
As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 17,20) it is in punishment of sin that the movement of these members does not obey formal aspect in this sense, that the soul is punished for its rebellion against God, by the insubmission of that member whereby original sin is transmitted to posterity.
Sed quia per peccatum primi parentis, ut infra dicetur, natura est sibi relicta, subtracto supernaturali dono quod homini divinitus erat collatum; ideo consideranda est ratio naturalis quare motus huiusmodi membrorum specialiter rationi non obedit.
But because, as we shall state later on, the effect of the sin of our first parent was that his nature was left to itself, through the withdrawal of the supernatural gift which God had bestowed on man, we must consider the natural aspect of this particular member's insubmission to formal aspect.
Cuius causam assignat Aristoteles in libro de causis motus animalium, dicens involuntarios esse motus cordis et membri pudendi, quia scilicet ex aliqua apprehensione huiusmodi membra commoventur: inquantum scilicet intellectus et phantasia repraesentant aliqua ex quibus consequuntur passiones animae, ad quas consequitur motus horum membrorum. Non tamen moventur secundum iussum rationis aut intellectus, quia scilicet ad motum horum membrorum requiritur aliqua alteratio naturalis (scilicet caliditatis et frigiditatis), quae quidem alteratio non subiacet imperio rationis.
This is stated by Aristotle (De Causis Mot. Animal.) who says that "the movements of the heart and of the organs of generation are involuntary," because these members are stirred at the occasion of some apprehension: insofar as the intellect and imagination represent such things as arouse the passions of the soul, of which passions the movements of these members are a consequence. But they are not moved at the command of formal aspect or intellect, because these movements are conditioned by a certain natural change (e.g., of heat and cold), which change is not subject to the command of formal aspect.
Specialiter autem hoc accidit in his duobus membris, quia utrumque istorum membrorum est quasi quoddam animal separatum, inquantum est principium vitae; principium autem est virtute totum. Cor enim principium est sensuum, et ex membro genitali virtus exit seminalis, quae est virtute totum animal. Et ideo habent proprios motus naturaliter: quia principia oportet esse naturalia.
This is the case with these two organs in particular, because each is as it were a separate animal being, insofar as it is a principle of life; and the principle is virtually the whole. For the heart is the principle of the senses; and from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal virtue, which is virtually the entire animal. Consequently they have their proper movements naturally: because principles must needs be natural.
In his quae ad intellectum et voluntatem pertinent, primum invenitur id quod est secundum naturam, ex quo alia derivantur: ut a cognitione principiorum naturaliter notorum, cognitio conclusionum; et a voluntate finis naturaliter desiderati, derivatur electio eorum quae sunt ad finem. Ita etiam in corporalibus motibus principium est secundum naturam.
In things pertaining to intellect and will, that which is according to nature stands first, whence all other things are derived: thus from the knowledge of principles that are naturally known, is derived knowledge of the conclusions; and from volition of the end naturally desired, is derived the choice of the means. So also in bodily movements the principle is according to nature.
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
1a 2ae q17 a8: Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded? No.
Actus vegetabilis animae non subduntur imperio rationis quia ratio imperat per modum apprehensivae virtutis.
The acts of the vegetal soul are not subject to the command of formal aspect because formal aspect commands by way of apprehensive power.
Et ideo actus illi qui procedunt ab appetitu intellectivo vel animali, possunt a ratione imperari, non autem actus illi qui procedunt ex appetitu naturali.
Wherefore those acts that proceed from the intellective or the animal appetite, can be commanded by formal aspect, but not those acts that proceed from the natural appetite.
Huiusmodi autem sunt actus vegetabilis animae; unde Gregorius Nyssenus dicit quod vocatur naturale quod generativum et nutritivum.
And such are the acts of the vegetal soul; wherefore Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) says "that generation and nutrition belong to what are called natural powers."
Quanto aliquis actus est immaterialior, tanto est nobilior, et magis subditus imperio rationis. Unde ex hoc ipso quod vires animae vegetabilis non obediunt rationi, apparet has vires infimas esse.
The more immaterial an act is, the more noble it is, and the more is it subject to the command of formal aspect. Hence the very fact that the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey formal aspect, shows that these powers rank lowest.
Sicut Deus movet mundum, ita anima movet corpus. Non enim anima creavit corpus ex nihilo, sicut Deus mundum; propter quod totaliter subditur eius imperio.
As God moves the world, so the soul moves the body. But the soul did not create the body out of nothing, as God created the world; accordingly, the world is wholly subject to His command.
The acts of the vegetal soul are not subject to the command of formal aspect because formal aspect commands by way of apprehensive power.
Et ideo actus illi qui procedunt ab appetitu intellectivo vel animali, possunt a ratione imperari, non autem actus illi qui procedunt ex appetitu naturali.
Wherefore those acts that proceed from the intellective or the animal appetite, can be commanded by formal aspect, but not those acts that proceed from the natural appetite.
Huiusmodi autem sunt actus vegetabilis animae; unde Gregorius Nyssenus dicit quod vocatur naturale quod generativum et nutritivum.
And such are the acts of the vegetal soul; wherefore Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) says "that generation and nutrition belong to what are called natural powers."
Quanto aliquis actus est immaterialior, tanto est nobilior, et magis subditus imperio rationis. Unde ex hoc ipso quod vires animae vegetabilis non obediunt rationi, apparet has vires infimas esse.
The more immaterial an act is, the more noble it is, and the more is it subject to the command of formal aspect. Hence the very fact that the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey formal aspect, shows that these powers rank lowest.
Sicut Deus movet mundum, ita anima movet corpus. Non enim anima creavit corpus ex nihilo, sicut Deus mundum; propter quod totaliter subditur eius imperio.
As God moves the world, so the soul moves the body. But the soul did not create the body out of nothing, as God created the world; accordingly, the world is wholly subject to His command.
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
1a 2ae q17 a7: Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded? Yes.
Actus appetitus sensitivi subiacet imperio rationis quia apprehensio imaginationis, cum sit particularis, regulatur ab apprehensione rationis, quae est universalis, sicut virtus activa particularis a virtute activa universali.
The act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of formal aspect because the apprehension of the imagination, being a particular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of formal aspect, which is universal; just as a particular active power is regulated by a universal active power.
Qualitas autem et dispositio corporis non subiacet imperio rationis. Et ideo ex hac parte, impeditur quin motus sensitivi appetitus totaliter subdatur imperio rationis.
On the other hand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the command of formal aspect; and consequently in this respect, the movement of the sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to the command of formal aspect.
Contingit etiam quandoque quod motus appetitus sensitivi subito concitatur ad apprehensionem imaginationis vel sensus. Et tunc ille motus est praeter imperium rationis, quamvis potuisset impediri a ratione, si praevidisset. Unde philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod ratio praeest irascibili et concupiscibili non principatu despotico, qui est domini ad servum; sed principatu politico aut regali, qui est ad liberos, qui non totaliter subduntur imperio.
Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the imagination or of sense. And then such movement occurs without the command of formal aspect—although formal aspect could have prevented it, had it foreseen. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2) that formal aspect governs the irascible and concupiscible not by a "despotic supremacy," which is that of a master over his slave; but by a "politic and royal supremacy," whereby the free are governed, who are not wholly subject to command.
Hoc quod homo vult non concupiscere, et tamen concupiscit, contingit ex dispositione corporis, per quam impeditur appetitus sensitivus ne totaliter sequatur imperium rationis. Unde et apostolus ibidem subdit, video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae. Hoc etiam contingit propter subitum motum concupiscentiae, ut dictum est.
That man lusts, although he wills not to lust, is due to a disposition of the body, whereby the sensitive appetite is hindered from perfect compliance with the command of formal aspect. Hence the Apostle adds (Romans 7:15): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind." This may also happen through a sudden movement of concupiscence, as stated above.
The act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of formal aspect because the apprehension of the imagination, being a particular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of formal aspect, which is universal; just as a particular active power is regulated by a universal active power.
Qualitas autem et dispositio corporis non subiacet imperio rationis. Et ideo ex hac parte, impeditur quin motus sensitivi appetitus totaliter subdatur imperio rationis.
On the other hand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the command of formal aspect; and consequently in this respect, the movement of the sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to the command of formal aspect.
Contingit etiam quandoque quod motus appetitus sensitivi subito concitatur ad apprehensionem imaginationis vel sensus. Et tunc ille motus est praeter imperium rationis, quamvis potuisset impediri a ratione, si praevidisset. Unde philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod ratio praeest irascibili et concupiscibili non principatu despotico, qui est domini ad servum; sed principatu politico aut regali, qui est ad liberos, qui non totaliter subduntur imperio.
Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the imagination or of sense. And then such movement occurs without the command of formal aspect—although formal aspect could have prevented it, had it foreseen. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2) that formal aspect governs the irascible and concupiscible not by a "despotic supremacy," which is that of a master over his slave; but by a "politic and royal supremacy," whereby the free are governed, who are not wholly subject to command.
Hoc quod homo vult non concupiscere, et tamen concupiscit, contingit ex dispositione corporis, per quam impeditur appetitus sensitivus ne totaliter sequatur imperium rationis. Unde et apostolus ibidem subdit, video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae. Hoc etiam contingit propter subitum motum concupiscentiae, ut dictum est.
That man lusts, although he wills not to lust, is due to a disposition of the body, whereby the sensitive appetite is hindered from perfect compliance with the command of formal aspect. Hence the Apostle adds (Romans 7:15): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind." This may also happen through a sudden movement of concupiscence, as stated above.
Monday, February 22, 2010
1a 2ae q17 a6: Whether the act of the reason is commanded? Yes.
Actus rationis possunt esse imperati quia ratio supra seipsam reflectitur (sicut ordinat de actibus aliarum potentiarum, ita etiam potest ordinare de actu suo).
Formally aspectual acts can be commanded because aspectual apprehension is turned back on itself (just as it directs the acts of other powers, so can it direct its own act).
Ratio hoc modo imperat sibi ipsi, sicut et voluntas movet seipsam, ut supra dictum est, inquantum scilicet utraque potentia reflectitur supra suum actum, et ex uno in aliud tendit.
Aspectual apprehension commands itself, just as the will moves itself, as stated above (q9 a3), that is to say, insofar as each power is turned back on its own acts, and from one thing tends to another.
Sed attendendum est quod actus rationis potest considerari dupliciter.
But we must take note that a formally aspectual act may be considered in two ways.
Uno modo, quantum ad exercitium actus. Et sic actus rationis semper imperari potest (sicut cum indicitur alicui quod attendat, et ratione utatur).
(1) First, as to the exercise of the act. And considered thus, a formally aspectual act can always be commanded (as when one is told to be attentive, and to use one's reason).
Alio modo, quantum ad obiectum, respectu cuius, duo actus rationis attenduntur.
(2) Secondly, as to the object; in respect of which two formally aspectual acts have to be noticed.
Primo quidem, ut veritatem circa aliquid apprehendat. Et hoc non est in potestate nostra; hoc enim contingit per virtutem alicuius luminis, vel naturalis vel supernaturalis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc, actus rationis non est in potestate nostra, nec imperari potest.
(2a) One is the act whereby it apprehends the truth about something. This act is not in our power; because it happens in virtue of a natural or supernatural light. Consequently in this respect, the formally aspectual act is not in our power, and cannot be commanded.
Alius autem actus rationis est, dum his quae apprehendit assentit. Si igitur fuerint talia apprehensa, quibus naturaliter intellectus assentiat, sicut prima principia, assensus talium vel dissensus non est in potestate nostra; sed in ordine naturae, et ideo, proprie loquendo, nec imperio subiacet.
(2b) The other formally aspectual act is that whereby it assents to what it apprehends. If, therefore, that which the intellect apprehends is such that it naturally assents thereto, e.g., the first principles, it is not in our power to assent or dissent to the like; assent follows naturally, and consequently, properly speaking, is not subject to our command.
Sunt autem quaedam apprehensa, quae non adeo convincunt intellectum, quin possit assentire vel dissentire, vel saltem assensum vel dissensum suspendere, propter aliquam causam; et in talibus assensus ipse vel dissensus in potestate nostra est, et sub imperio cadit.
(1) But some things which are apprehended do not convince the intellect to such an extent as not to leave it free to assent or dissent, or at least suspend its assent or dissent, on account of some cause or other; and in such things assent or dissent is in our power, and is subject to our command.
Formally aspectual acts can be commanded because aspectual apprehension is turned back on itself (just as it directs the acts of other powers, so can it direct its own act).
Ratio hoc modo imperat sibi ipsi, sicut et voluntas movet seipsam, ut supra dictum est, inquantum scilicet utraque potentia reflectitur supra suum actum, et ex uno in aliud tendit.
Aspectual apprehension commands itself, just as the will moves itself, as stated above (q9 a3), that is to say, insofar as each power is turned back on its own acts, and from one thing tends to another.
Sed attendendum est quod actus rationis potest considerari dupliciter.
But we must take note that a formally aspectual act may be considered in two ways.
Uno modo, quantum ad exercitium actus. Et sic actus rationis semper imperari potest (sicut cum indicitur alicui quod attendat, et ratione utatur).
(1) First, as to the exercise of the act. And considered thus, a formally aspectual act can always be commanded (as when one is told to be attentive, and to use one's reason).
Alio modo, quantum ad obiectum, respectu cuius, duo actus rationis attenduntur.
(2) Secondly, as to the object; in respect of which two formally aspectual acts have to be noticed.
Primo quidem, ut veritatem circa aliquid apprehendat. Et hoc non est in potestate nostra; hoc enim contingit per virtutem alicuius luminis, vel naturalis vel supernaturalis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc, actus rationis non est in potestate nostra, nec imperari potest.
(2a) One is the act whereby it apprehends the truth about something. This act is not in our power; because it happens in virtue of a natural or supernatural light. Consequently in this respect, the formally aspectual act is not in our power, and cannot be commanded.
Alius autem actus rationis est, dum his quae apprehendit assentit. Si igitur fuerint talia apprehensa, quibus naturaliter intellectus assentiat, sicut prima principia, assensus talium vel dissensus non est in potestate nostra; sed in ordine naturae, et ideo, proprie loquendo, nec imperio subiacet.
(2b) The other formally aspectual act is that whereby it assents to what it apprehends. If, therefore, that which the intellect apprehends is such that it naturally assents thereto, e.g., the first principles, it is not in our power to assent or dissent to the like; assent follows naturally, and consequently, properly speaking, is not subject to our command.
Sunt autem quaedam apprehensa, quae non adeo convincunt intellectum, quin possit assentire vel dissentire, vel saltem assensum vel dissensum suspendere, propter aliquam causam; et in talibus assensus ipse vel dissensus in potestate nostra est, et sub imperio cadit.
(1) But some things which are apprehended do not convince the intellect to such an extent as not to leave it free to assent or dissent, or at least suspend its assent or dissent, on account of some cause or other; and in such things assent or dissent is in our power, and is subject to our command.
Sunday, February 21, 2010
1a 2ae q17 a5: Whether the act of the will is commanded? Yes.
Ratio potest ordinare de actu voluntatis, quia sicut potest iudicare quod bonum sit aliquid velle, ita potest ordinare imperando quod homo velit.
Formal aspect can direct the act of the will, because just as it can judge what good it is to will something, so it can direct, by commanding, what a man wills.
Imperium nihil aliud est quam actus rationis ordinantis, cum quadam motione, aliquid ad agendum.
Command is nothing else than the act of aspectual apprehension that directs, with a certain motion, something to be actualized.
Sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, animus, quando perfecte imperat sibi ut velit, tunc iam vult; sed quod aliquando imperet et non velit, hoc contingit ex hoc quod non perfecte imperat.
As Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9) when the mind commands itself perfectly to will, then already it wills; but that sometimes it commands and wills not, is due to the fact that it commands imperfectly.
Imperfectum autem imperium contingit ex hoc, quod ratio ex diversis partibus movetur ad imperandum vel non imperandum: unde fluctuat inter duo, et non perfecte imperat.
Now imperfect command arises from the fact that aspectual apprehension is moved by opposite motives to command or not to command: wherefore it fluctuates between the two, and fails to command perfectly.
Sicut in membris corporalibus quodlibet membrum operatur non sibi soli, sed toti corpori (ut oculus videt toti corpori), ita etiam est in potentiis animae. Nam intellectus intelligit non solum sibi, sed omnibus potentiis; et voluntas vult non solum sibi, sed omnibus potentiis. Et ideo homo imperat sibi ipsi actum voluntatis, inquantum est intelligens et volens.
Just as each of the members of the body works not for itself alone but for the whole body (thus it is for the whole body that the eye sees), so is it with the powers of the soul. For the intellect understands, not for itself alone, but for all the powers; and the will wills not only for itself, but for all the powers too. Wherefore man, insofar as he is endowed with intellect and will, commands the act of the will for himself.
Cum imperium sit actus rationis, ille actus imperatur, qui rationi subditur. Primus autem voluntatis actus non est ex rationis ordinatione, sed ex instinctu naturae, aut superioris causae, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non oportet quod in infinitum procedatur.
Since command is an act of aspectual apprehension, that act is commanded which is subject to formal aspect. Now the first act of the will is not due to the direction of formal aspect, but due to biological imperatives, or due to a higher cause, as stated above (q9 a4). Therefore there is no need to proceed to infinity.
Formal aspect can direct the act of the will, because just as it can judge what good it is to will something, so it can direct, by commanding, what a man wills.
Imperium nihil aliud est quam actus rationis ordinantis, cum quadam motione, aliquid ad agendum.
Command is nothing else than the act of aspectual apprehension that directs, with a certain motion, something to be actualized.
Sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, animus, quando perfecte imperat sibi ut velit, tunc iam vult; sed quod aliquando imperet et non velit, hoc contingit ex hoc quod non perfecte imperat.
As Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9) when the mind commands itself perfectly to will, then already it wills; but that sometimes it commands and wills not, is due to the fact that it commands imperfectly.
Imperfectum autem imperium contingit ex hoc, quod ratio ex diversis partibus movetur ad imperandum vel non imperandum: unde fluctuat inter duo, et non perfecte imperat.
Now imperfect command arises from the fact that aspectual apprehension is moved by opposite motives to command or not to command: wherefore it fluctuates between the two, and fails to command perfectly.
Sicut in membris corporalibus quodlibet membrum operatur non sibi soli, sed toti corpori (ut oculus videt toti corpori), ita etiam est in potentiis animae. Nam intellectus intelligit non solum sibi, sed omnibus potentiis; et voluntas vult non solum sibi, sed omnibus potentiis. Et ideo homo imperat sibi ipsi actum voluntatis, inquantum est intelligens et volens.
Just as each of the members of the body works not for itself alone but for the whole body (thus it is for the whole body that the eye sees), so is it with the powers of the soul. For the intellect understands, not for itself alone, but for all the powers; and the will wills not only for itself, but for all the powers too. Wherefore man, insofar as he is endowed with intellect and will, commands the act of the will for himself.
Cum imperium sit actus rationis, ille actus imperatur, qui rationi subditur. Primus autem voluntatis actus non est ex rationis ordinatione, sed ex instinctu naturae, aut superioris causae, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non oportet quod in infinitum procedatur.
Since command is an act of aspectual apprehension, that act is commanded which is subject to formal aspect. Now the first act of the will is not due to the direction of formal aspect, but due to biological imperatives, or due to a higher cause, as stated above (q9 a4). Therefore there is no need to proceed to infinity.
Saturday, February 20, 2010
1a 2ae q17 a4: Whether command and the commanded act are one act? Yes.
Imperium et actus imperatus sunt unus actus humanus (sicut quoddam totum est unum, sed est secundum partes multa), quia actus imperatus non est nisi propter imperium.
Command and the commanded act are one human act (just as a whole is one, yet in its parts, many), because there is no commanded act unless according to the command.
Si essent potentiae diversae ad invicem non ordinatae, actus earum essent simpliciter diversi. Sed quando una potentia est movens alteram, tunc actus earum sunt quodammodo unus; nam "idem est actus moventis et moti", ut dicitur in III Physic.
If the distinct powers are not ordained to one another, their acts are diverse simply. But when one power is the mover of the other, then their acts are, in a way, one; since "the act of the mover and the act of the thing moved are one act" (Phys. iii, 3).
In actibus humanis, actus inferioris potentiae materialiter se habet ad actum superioris, inquantum inferior potentia agit in virtute superioris moventis ipsam.
In human acts, the act of a lower power is in the position of matter in regard to the act of a higher power, insofar as the lower power acts in virtue of the higher power moving it.
Ens autem simpliciter est substantia, sed ens secundum quid est accidens (vel etiam ens rationis).
A substance is a being simply, whereas an accident (or even aspectual being) is a being only in a certain respect.
Esse unum genere vel specie, est esse unum secundum rationem.
To be one in genus or species is to be one according to the consideration of the aspect.
Command and the commanded act are one human act (just as a whole is one, yet in its parts, many), because there is no commanded act unless according to the command.
Si essent potentiae diversae ad invicem non ordinatae, actus earum essent simpliciter diversi. Sed quando una potentia est movens alteram, tunc actus earum sunt quodammodo unus; nam "idem est actus moventis et moti", ut dicitur in III Physic.
If the distinct powers are not ordained to one another, their acts are diverse simply. But when one power is the mover of the other, then their acts are, in a way, one; since "the act of the mover and the act of the thing moved are one act" (Phys. iii, 3).
In actibus humanis, actus inferioris potentiae materialiter se habet ad actum superioris, inquantum inferior potentia agit in virtute superioris moventis ipsam.
In human acts, the act of a lower power is in the position of matter in regard to the act of a higher power, insofar as the lower power acts in virtue of the higher power moving it.
Ens autem simpliciter est substantia, sed ens secundum quid est accidens (vel etiam ens rationis).
A substance is a being simply, whereas an accident (or even aspectual being) is a being only in a certain respect.
Esse unum genere vel specie, est esse unum secundum rationem.
To be one in genus or species is to be one according to the consideration of the aspect.
Friday, February 19, 2010
1a 2ae q17 a3: Whether use precedes command? No.
Imperium praecedit usum quia impetus ad operationem praecedit usum, sed impetus ad operationem fit per imperium.
Command precedes use because impulse to action precedes use, but impulse to operation is given by command.
Non omnis actus voluntatis praecedit hunc actum rationis qui est imperium, sed aliquis praecedit, scilicet electio; et aliquis sequitur, scilicet usus.
Not every act of the will precedes this act of formal aspect which is command; but an act of the will precedes, viz. choice; and an act of the will follows, viz. use.
Quia post determinationem consilii, quae est iudicium rationis, voluntas eligit; et post electionem, ratio imperat ei per quod agendum est quod eligitur; et tunc demum voluntas alicuius incipit uti, exequendo imperium rationis (quandoque quidem voluntas alterius, cum aliquis imperat alteri; quandoque autem voluntas ipsius imperantis, cum aliquis imperat sibi ipsi).
Because after counsel's decision, which is a judgment of formal aspect, the will chooses; and after choice, aspectual apprehension commands that power which has to do what was chosen; and then, last of all, someone's will begins to use, by executing the command of formal aspect (sometimes it is another's will, when one commands another; sometimes the will of the one that commands, when he commands himself to do something).
Usus eius quod est ad finem, secundum quod est in ratione referente ipsum in finem, praecedit electionem, ut supra dictum est. Unde multo magis praecedit imperium.
Use of that which is directed to the end, insofar as it is in the formal aspect referring this to the end, precedes choice, as stated above (I-II q16 a4). Wherefore still more does it precede command.
Sed usus eius quod est ad finem, secundum quod subditur potentiae executivae, sequitur imperium, eo quod usus utentis coniunctus est cum actu eius quo quis utitur; non enim utitur aliquis baculo, antequam aliquo modo per baculum operetur.
On the other hand, use of that which is directed to the end, in so far as it is subject to the executive power, follows command; because use in the user is united to the act of the thing used; for one does not use a stick before doing something with the stick.
Imperium autem non est simul cum actu eius cui imperatur, sed naturaliter prius est imperium quam imperio obediatur, et aliquando etiam est prius tempore.
But command is not simultaneous with the act of the thing to which the command is given, for it naturally precedes its fulfilment, sometimes, indeed, by priority of time.
Command precedes use because impulse to action precedes use, but impulse to operation is given by command.
Non omnis actus voluntatis praecedit hunc actum rationis qui est imperium, sed aliquis praecedit, scilicet electio; et aliquis sequitur, scilicet usus.
Not every act of the will precedes this act of formal aspect which is command; but an act of the will precedes, viz. choice; and an act of the will follows, viz. use.
Quia post determinationem consilii, quae est iudicium rationis, voluntas eligit; et post electionem, ratio imperat ei per quod agendum est quod eligitur; et tunc demum voluntas alicuius incipit uti, exequendo imperium rationis (quandoque quidem voluntas alterius, cum aliquis imperat alteri; quandoque autem voluntas ipsius imperantis, cum aliquis imperat sibi ipsi).
Because after counsel's decision, which is a judgment of formal aspect, the will chooses; and after choice, aspectual apprehension commands that power which has to do what was chosen; and then, last of all, someone's will begins to use, by executing the command of formal aspect (sometimes it is another's will, when one commands another; sometimes the will of the one that commands, when he commands himself to do something).
Usus eius quod est ad finem, secundum quod est in ratione referente ipsum in finem, praecedit electionem, ut supra dictum est. Unde multo magis praecedit imperium.
Use of that which is directed to the end, insofar as it is in the formal aspect referring this to the end, precedes choice, as stated above (I-II q16 a4). Wherefore still more does it precede command.
Sed usus eius quod est ad finem, secundum quod subditur potentiae executivae, sequitur imperium, eo quod usus utentis coniunctus est cum actu eius quo quis utitur; non enim utitur aliquis baculo, antequam aliquo modo per baculum operetur.
On the other hand, use of that which is directed to the end, in so far as it is subject to the executive power, follows command; because use in the user is united to the act of the thing used; for one does not use a stick before doing something with the stick.
Imperium autem non est simul cum actu eius cui imperatur, sed naturaliter prius est imperium quam imperio obediatur, et aliquando etiam est prius tempore.
But command is not simultaneous with the act of the thing to which the command is given, for it naturally precedes its fulfilment, sometimes, indeed, by priority of time.
Thursday, February 18, 2010
1a 2ae q17 a2: Whether command belongs to irrational animals? No.
Impossibile est quod in brutis animalibus, sit aliquo modo imperium, quia in quibus non est ratio; sed ordinare est proprius actus rationis.
It is impossible that brute animals should command in any way, because they are devoid of formal aspect; but to direct is the proper act of aspectual apprehension.
Aliter invenitur impetus ad opus in brutis animalibus, et aliter in hominibus. Homines enim faciunt impetum ad opus per ordinationem rationis, unde habet in eis impetus rationem imperii.
Impulse to action is in brute animals otherwise than in man. For the impulse of man to action arises from the direction of formal aspect; wherefore his impulse has the formal aspect of command.
In brutis autem fit impetus ad opus per instinctum naturae, quia scilicet appetitus eorum statim apprehenso convenienti vel inconvenienti, naturaliter movetur ad prosecutionem vel fugam. Unde ordinantur ab alio ad agendum, non autem ipsa seipsa ordinant ad actionem. Et ideo in eis est impetus, sed non imperium.
On the other hand, the impulse of the brute animal arises from anatomical imperatives; because as soon as they apprehend the fitting or the unfitting, their appetite is moved naturally to pursue (+) or to avoid (-). Wherefore they are directed by another to act; and they themselves do not direct themselves to act. Consequently in them is impulse but not command.
In brutis animalibus corpus quidem habet unde obediat, sed anima non habet unde imperet, quia non habet unde ordinet. Et ideo non est ibi ratio imperantis et imperati; sed solum moventis et moti.
The body of the brute animal is competent to obey; but its soul is not competent to command, because it is not competent to direct. Consequently there is no formal aspect there of commander and commanded; but only of mover and moved.
It is impossible that brute animals should command in any way, because they are devoid of formal aspect; but to direct is the proper act of aspectual apprehension.
Aliter invenitur impetus ad opus in brutis animalibus, et aliter in hominibus. Homines enim faciunt impetum ad opus per ordinationem rationis, unde habet in eis impetus rationem imperii.
Impulse to action is in brute animals otherwise than in man. For the impulse of man to action arises from the direction of formal aspect; wherefore his impulse has the formal aspect of command.
In brutis autem fit impetus ad opus per instinctum naturae, quia scilicet appetitus eorum statim apprehenso convenienti vel inconvenienti, naturaliter movetur ad prosecutionem vel fugam. Unde ordinantur ab alio ad agendum, non autem ipsa seipsa ordinant ad actionem. Et ideo in eis est impetus, sed non imperium.
On the other hand, the impulse of the brute animal arises from anatomical imperatives; because as soon as they apprehend the fitting or the unfitting, their appetite is moved naturally to pursue (+) or to avoid (-). Wherefore they are directed by another to act; and they themselves do not direct themselves to act. Consequently in them is impulse but not command.
In brutis animalibus corpus quidem habet unde obediat, sed anima non habet unde imperet, quia non habet unde ordinet. Et ideo non est ibi ratio imperantis et imperati; sed solum moventis et moti.
The body of the brute animal is competent to obey; but its soul is not competent to command, because it is not competent to direct. Consequently there is no formal aspect there of commander and commanded; but only of mover and moved.
Wednesday, February 17, 2010
1a 2ae q17 a1: Whether command is an act of the reason? Yes.
Imperare est actus rationis, praesupposito tamen actu voluntatis, quia radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subiectum; sed sicut causa, est ratio.
Command is an act of aspectual apprehension, presupposing, however, an act of the will because the root of liberty is the will, as the subject thereof; but formal aspect is as its cause.
Ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad diversa ferri, quia ratio potest habere diversas conceptiones boni. Et ideo philosophi definiunt liberum arbitrium quod est liberum de ratione iudicium, quasi ratio sit causa libertatis.
For the will can tend freely towards various objects, precisely because aspectual apprehension can have various conceptions of the good. Hence philosophers define free choice as that which is "a free judgment, arising from formal aspect" implying that aspectual apprehension is the cause of liberty.
Hoc ipsum quod ratio movet imperando, sit ei ex virtute voluntatis.
The very fact that formal aspect moves by commanding, is due to the power of the will.
Unde relinquitur quod imperare sit actus rationis, praesupposito actu voluntatis, in cuius virtute ratio movet per imperium ad exercitium actus.
Consequently it follows that command is an act of aspectual apprehension, presupposing an act of the will, in the power of which formal aspect, by its command, moves to the execution of the act.
Command is an act of aspectual apprehension, presupposing, however, an act of the will because the root of liberty is the will, as the subject thereof; but formal aspect is as its cause.
Ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad diversa ferri, quia ratio potest habere diversas conceptiones boni. Et ideo philosophi definiunt liberum arbitrium quod est liberum de ratione iudicium, quasi ratio sit causa libertatis.
For the will can tend freely towards various objects, precisely because aspectual apprehension can have various conceptions of the good. Hence philosophers define free choice as that which is "a free judgment, arising from formal aspect" implying that aspectual apprehension is the cause of liberty.
Hoc ipsum quod ratio movet imperando, sit ei ex virtute voluntatis.
The very fact that formal aspect moves by commanding, is due to the power of the will.
Unde relinquitur quod imperare sit actus rationis, praesupposito actu voluntatis, in cuius virtute ratio movet per imperium ad exercitium actus.
Consequently it follows that command is an act of aspectual apprehension, presupposing an act of the will, in the power of which formal aspect, by its command, moves to the execution of the act.
1a 2ae q17: The acts commanded by the will
- Is command an act of the will or of the reason?
- Does command belong to irrational animals?
- The order between command and use
- Are command and the commanded act one act or distinct?
- Is the act of the will commanded?
- Is the act of the reason commanded?
- Is the act of the sensitive appetite commanded?
- Is the act of the vegetal soul commanded?
- Are the acts of the external members commanded?
Tuesday, February 16, 2010
1a 2ae q16 a4: Whether use precedes choice? No.
Usus sequitur electionem, si tamen accipiatur usus, secundum quod voluntas utitur executiva potentia movendo ipsam, quia ipsam executionem operis praecedit motio qua voluntas movet ad exequendum, sequitur autem electionem; et sic, cum usus pertineat ad praedictam motionem voluntatis, medium est inter electionem et executionem.
Use follows choice, provided that by use we mean the will's use of the executive power in moving it, because the motion of the will to the execution of the work precedes execution, but follows choice; and so, since use belongs to that very motion of the will, it stands between choice and execution.
Sed quia voluntas etiam quodammodo rationem movet, et utitur ea, potest intelligi usus eius quod est ad finem, secundum quod est in consideratione rationis referentis ipsum in finem. Et hoc modo usus praecedit electionem.
But since the will, in a way, also moves aspectual apprehension, and uses it, we may take the use of the means, as consisting in the consideration of the formal aspect whereby it refers the means to the end. In this sense use precedes choice.
Use follows choice, provided that by use we mean the will's use of the executive power in moving it, because the motion of the will to the execution of the work precedes execution, but follows choice; and so, since use belongs to that very motion of the will, it stands between choice and execution.
Sed quia voluntas etiam quodammodo rationem movet, et utitur ea, potest intelligi usus eius quod est ad finem, secundum quod est in consideratione rationis referentis ipsum in finem. Et hoc modo usus praecedit electionem.
But since the will, in a way, also moves aspectual apprehension, and uses it, we may take the use of the means, as consisting in the consideration of the formal aspect whereby it refers the means to the end. In this sense use precedes choice.
Monday, February 15, 2010
1a 2ae q16 a3: Whether use regards also the last end? No.
Ultimo fine non est utendum quia uti importat applicationem alicuius ad aliquid; quod autem applicatur ad aliud, se habet in ratione eius quod est ad finem, et ideo uti semper est eius quod est ad finem.
We cannot use the last end because use implies the application of one thing to another; and that which is applied to another has its formal aspect as a means to an end, and consequently use always regards the means.
Finis assumitur in facultatem voluntatis, ut voluntas in illo quiescat. Unde ipsa requies in fine, quae fruitio est, dicitur hoc modo usus finis. Sed id quod est ad finem, assumitur in facultatem voluntatis, non solum in ordine ad usum eius quod est ad finem, sed in ordine ad aliam rem, in qua voluntas quiescit.
The end is applied to the purpose of the will, that the will may find rest in it. Consequently this rest in the end, which is the enjoyment thereof, is in this sense called use of the end. But the means are applied to the will's purpose, not only in being related for use as means, but as ordained to something else in which the will finds rest.
Dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., "Deo nullus recte utitur, sed fruitur".
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "No one rightly uses God, but one enjoys Him."
We cannot use the last end because use implies the application of one thing to another; and that which is applied to another has its formal aspect as a means to an end, and consequently use always regards the means.
Finis assumitur in facultatem voluntatis, ut voluntas in illo quiescat. Unde ipsa requies in fine, quae fruitio est, dicitur hoc modo usus finis. Sed id quod est ad finem, assumitur in facultatem voluntatis, non solum in ordine ad usum eius quod est ad finem, sed in ordine ad aliam rem, in qua voluntas quiescit.
The end is applied to the purpose of the will, that the will may find rest in it. Consequently this rest in the end, which is the enjoyment thereof, is in this sense called use of the end. But the means are applied to the will's purpose, not only in being related for use as means, but as ordained to something else in which the will finds rest.
Dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., "Deo nullus recte utitur, sed fruitur".
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "No one rightly uses God, but one enjoys Him."
Sunday, February 14, 2010
1a 2ae q16 a2: Whether use is to be found in irrational animals? No.
Solum animal rationale et consentit et utitur, quia applicare aliquid ad alterum non est nisi eius quod habet arbitrium super illud, quod non est nisi eius qui scit referre aliquid in alterum, quod ad rationem pertinet.
None but a relationally aspectual animal consents and uses, because only he who has choice of a thing can apply something to something else, and this belongs only to him who knows how to refer something to something else, which pertains to aspectual apprehension.
Frui importat absolutum motum appetitus in appetibile, sed uti importat motum appetitus ad aliquid in ordine ad alterum. Si ergo comparentur uti et frui quantum ad obiecta, sic frui est nobilius quam uti, quia id quod est absolute appetibile, est melius quam id quod est appetibile solum in ordine ad aliud.
To enjoy implies the absolute movement of the appetite to the appetible, whereas to use implies a movement of the appetite to something as directed to something else. If therefore we compare use and enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment is better than use, because that which is appetible absolutely is better than that which is appetible only as directed to something else.
Sed si comparentur quantum ad vim apprehensivam praecedentem, maior nobilitas requiritur ex parte usus, quia ordinare aliquid in alterum est rationis, absolute autem aliquid apprehendere potest etiam sensus.
But if we compare them in respect of the apprehensive power that precedes them, greater excellence is required on the part of use, because to direct one thing to another is an apprehension of formal aspect, whereas to apprehend something absolutely is within the competency even of sense.
Animalia per sua membra aliquid agunt instinctu naturae, non per hoc quod cognoscant ordinem membrorum ad illas operationes. Unde non dicuntur proprie applicare membra ad agendum, nec uti membris.
Animals by means of their body parts do something from the anatomical imperatives of their biological heritage, not through knowing the relation of their body parts to these operations. Wherefore, properly speaking, they do not apply their body parts to what must be enacted, nor do they use them.
Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., "uti aliqua re non potest nisi animal quod rationis est particeps".
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "None but the animal who shares in aspectual apprehension can make use of a thing."
None but a relationally aspectual animal consents and uses, because only he who has choice of a thing can apply something to something else, and this belongs only to him who knows how to refer something to something else, which pertains to aspectual apprehension.
Frui importat absolutum motum appetitus in appetibile, sed uti importat motum appetitus ad aliquid in ordine ad alterum. Si ergo comparentur uti et frui quantum ad obiecta, sic frui est nobilius quam uti, quia id quod est absolute appetibile, est melius quam id quod est appetibile solum in ordine ad aliud.
To enjoy implies the absolute movement of the appetite to the appetible, whereas to use implies a movement of the appetite to something as directed to something else. If therefore we compare use and enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment is better than use, because that which is appetible absolutely is better than that which is appetible only as directed to something else.
Sed si comparentur quantum ad vim apprehensivam praecedentem, maior nobilitas requiritur ex parte usus, quia ordinare aliquid in alterum est rationis, absolute autem aliquid apprehendere potest etiam sensus.
But if we compare them in respect of the apprehensive power that precedes them, greater excellence is required on the part of use, because to direct one thing to another is an apprehension of formal aspect, whereas to apprehend something absolutely is within the competency even of sense.
Animalia per sua membra aliquid agunt instinctu naturae, non per hoc quod cognoscant ordinem membrorum ad illas operationes. Unde non dicuntur proprie applicare membra ad agendum, nec uti membris.
Animals by means of their body parts do something from the anatomical imperatives of their biological heritage, not through knowing the relation of their body parts to these operations. Wherefore, properly speaking, they do not apply their body parts to what must be enacted, nor do they use them.
Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., "uti aliqua re non potest nisi animal quod rationis est particeps".
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "None but the animal who shares in aspectual apprehension can make use of a thing."
Saturday, February 13, 2010
1a 2ae q16 a1: Whether use is an act of the will? Yes.
Uti proprie est actus voluntatis, quia voluntas est quae movet potentias animae ad suos actus, et hoc est applicare eas ad operationem.
Use is, properly speaking, an act of the will, because it is the will which moves the soul's powers to their acts, and this is to apply them to operation.
Ratio quidem in aliud refert, sed voluntas tendit in id quod est in aliud relatum per rationem. Et secundum hoc dicitur quod uti est referre aliquid in alterum.
Reason does indeed refer one thing to another, but the will tends to that which is referred by the reason to something else. And in this sense to use is to refer one thing to another.
Uti primo et principaliter est voluntatis, tanquam primi moventis; rationis autem tanquam dirigentis; sed aliarum potentiarum tanquam exequentium, quae comparantur ad voluntatem, a qua applicantur ad agendum, sicut instrumenta ad principale agens.
First and principally, use belongs to the will as first mover; to the reason, as directing; and to the other powers as executing the operation, which powers are compared to the will which applies them to act, as the instruments are compared to the principal agent.
Actio autem proprie non attribuitur instrumento, sed principali agenti, sicut aedificatio aedificatori, non autem instrumentis.
Now action is properly ascribed, not to the instrument, but to the principal agent, as building is ascribed to the builder, not to his tools.
Etiam ipsa ratio speculativa applicatur ad opus intelligendi vel iudicandi, a voluntate. Et ideo intellectus speculativus uti dicitur tanquam a voluntate motus, sicut aliae executivae potentiae.
Even the speculative reason is applied by the will to the act of understanding or judging. Consequently the speculative reason is said to use, insofar as it is moved by the will, in the same way as the other executing powers.
Use is, properly speaking, an act of the will, because it is the will which moves the soul's powers to their acts, and this is to apply them to operation.
Ratio quidem in aliud refert, sed voluntas tendit in id quod est in aliud relatum per rationem. Et secundum hoc dicitur quod uti est referre aliquid in alterum.
Reason does indeed refer one thing to another, but the will tends to that which is referred by the reason to something else. And in this sense to use is to refer one thing to another.
Uti primo et principaliter est voluntatis, tanquam primi moventis; rationis autem tanquam dirigentis; sed aliarum potentiarum tanquam exequentium, quae comparantur ad voluntatem, a qua applicantur ad agendum, sicut instrumenta ad principale agens.
First and principally, use belongs to the will as first mover; to the reason, as directing; and to the other powers as executing the operation, which powers are compared to the will which applies them to act, as the instruments are compared to the principal agent.
Actio autem proprie non attribuitur instrumento, sed principali agenti, sicut aedificatio aedificatori, non autem instrumentis.
Now action is properly ascribed, not to the instrument, but to the principal agent, as building is ascribed to the builder, not to his tools.
Etiam ipsa ratio speculativa applicatur ad opus intelligendi vel iudicandi, a voluntate. Et ideo intellectus speculativus uti dicitur tanquam a voluntate motus, sicut aliae executivae potentiae.
Even the speculative reason is applied by the will to the act of understanding or judging. Consequently the speculative reason is said to use, insofar as it is moved by the will, in the same way as the other executing powers.
Friday, February 12, 2010
1a 2ae q15 a4: Whether consent to the act belongs only to the higher part of the soul? Yes.
Ratio superior dicitur consentire, non solum quia secundum rationes aeternas semper moveat ad agendum, sed etiam quia secundum rationes aeternas non dissentit.
The higher mode of aspectual apprehension is said to consent not only because it always moves to act according to eternal aspectual principles, but also because it fails to dissent according to eternal aspectual principles.
Manifestum est autem quod superior ratio est quae habet de omnibus iudicare, quia de sensibilibus per rationem iudicamus; de his vero quae ad rationes humanas pertinent, iudicamus secundum rationes divinas, quae pertinent ad rationem superiorem.
Now it is evident that it belongs to the higher mode of aspectual apprehension to judge of all, since it is by the aspectual principle that we judge of sensible things; and of things pertaining to human aspectual principles we judge according to Divine aspectual principles, which is the function of the higher aspectual apprehension.
Et ideo quandiu incertum est an secundum rationes divinas resistatur vel non, nullum iudicium rationis habet rationem finalis sententiae.
Wherefore as long as a man is uncertain whether he resists or not, according to Divine aspectual principles, no judgment of aspect can be considered to have the formal aspect of a final decision.
Finalis autem sententia de agendis est consensus in actum. Et ideo consensus in actum pertinet ad rationem superiorem, secundum tamen quod in ratione voluntas includitur.
Now the final decision of what is to be done is consent to the act. Therefore consent to the act belongs to the higher mode of aspectual apprehension, but in that sense in which aspectual apprehension includes the will.
Consensus in delectationem operis pertinet ad superiorem rationem, sicut et consensus in opus, sed consensus in delectationem cogitationis, pertinet ad rationem inferiorem, sicut ad ipsam pertinet cogitare.
Consent to delight in the work done belongs to the higher mode of aspectual apprehension, as also does consent to the work; but consent to delight in thought belongs to the lower mode of aspectual apprehension, just as to the lower aspect it belongs to think.
Et tamen de hoc ipso quod est cogitare vel non cogitare, inquantum consideratur ut actio quaedam, habet iudicium superior ratio, et similiter de delectatione consequente.
Nevertheless the higher mode of aspectual apprehension exercises judgment on the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an action, and in like manner on the delight that results.
Sed inquantum accipitur ut ad actionem aliam ordinatum, sic pertinet ad inferiorem rationem.
But in so far as the act of thinking is considered as ordained to a further act, it belongs to the lower mode of aspectual apprehension.
Quod enim ad aliud ordinatur, ad inferiorem artem vel potentiam pertinet quam finis ad quem ordinatur; unde ars quae est de fine, architectonica (seu principalis) vocatur.
For that which is ordained to something else, belongs to a lower art or power than does the end to which it is ordained; hence the art which is concerned with the end is called the architectonic (or principal) art.
The higher mode of aspectual apprehension is said to consent not only because it always moves to act according to eternal aspectual principles, but also because it fails to dissent according to eternal aspectual principles.
Manifestum est autem quod superior ratio est quae habet de omnibus iudicare, quia de sensibilibus per rationem iudicamus; de his vero quae ad rationes humanas pertinent, iudicamus secundum rationes divinas, quae pertinent ad rationem superiorem.
Now it is evident that it belongs to the higher mode of aspectual apprehension to judge of all, since it is by the aspectual principle that we judge of sensible things; and of things pertaining to human aspectual principles we judge according to Divine aspectual principles, which is the function of the higher aspectual apprehension.
Et ideo quandiu incertum est an secundum rationes divinas resistatur vel non, nullum iudicium rationis habet rationem finalis sententiae.
Wherefore as long as a man is uncertain whether he resists or not, according to Divine aspectual principles, no judgment of aspect can be considered to have the formal aspect of a final decision.
Finalis autem sententia de agendis est consensus in actum. Et ideo consensus in actum pertinet ad rationem superiorem, secundum tamen quod in ratione voluntas includitur.
Now the final decision of what is to be done is consent to the act. Therefore consent to the act belongs to the higher mode of aspectual apprehension, but in that sense in which aspectual apprehension includes the will.
Consensus in delectationem operis pertinet ad superiorem rationem, sicut et consensus in opus, sed consensus in delectationem cogitationis, pertinet ad rationem inferiorem, sicut ad ipsam pertinet cogitare.
Consent to delight in the work done belongs to the higher mode of aspectual apprehension, as also does consent to the work; but consent to delight in thought belongs to the lower mode of aspectual apprehension, just as to the lower aspect it belongs to think.
Et tamen de hoc ipso quod est cogitare vel non cogitare, inquantum consideratur ut actio quaedam, habet iudicium superior ratio, et similiter de delectatione consequente.
Nevertheless the higher mode of aspectual apprehension exercises judgment on the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an action, and in like manner on the delight that results.
Sed inquantum accipitur ut ad actionem aliam ordinatum, sic pertinet ad inferiorem rationem.
But in so far as the act of thinking is considered as ordained to a further act, it belongs to the lower mode of aspectual apprehension.
Quod enim ad aliud ordinatur, ad inferiorem artem vel potentiam pertinet quam finis ad quem ordinatur; unde ars quae est de fine, architectonica (seu principalis) vocatur.
For that which is ordained to something else, belongs to a lower art or power than does the end to which it is ordained; hence the art which is concerned with the end is called the architectonic (or principal) art.
Thursday, February 11, 2010
1a 2ae q15 a3: Whether consent is directed to the end? No.
Applicatio appetitivi motus ad determinationem consilii, proprie est consensus, quia appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem, praesupponit determinationem consilii.
The application of the appetitive movement to counsel's decision is consent properly speaking, because the desire of the means presupposes the decision of counsel.
Sicut conclusiones scimus per principia, horum tamen non est scientia, sed quod maius est, scilicet intellectus; ita consentimus his quae sunt ad finem propter finem, cuius tamen non est consensus, sed quod maius est, scilicet voluntas.
Just as the knowledge of conclusions through the principles is science, whereas the knowledge of the principles is not science, but something higher, namely, understanding; so do we consent to the means on account of the end, in respect of which our act is not consent but something greater, namely, volition.
Consensus nominat applicationem appetitivi motus ad aliquid praeexistens in potestate applicantis in ordine autem agibilium.
Consent is the application of the appetitive movement to something that is already in the power of him who causes the application.
Primo quidem oportet sumere apprehensionem finis; deinde appetitum finis; deinde consilium de his quae sunt ad finem; deinde appetitum eorum quae sunt ad finem.
Now the order of action is this: First there is the apprehension of the end; then the desire of the end; then the counsel about the means; then the desire of the means.
Unde, cum consilium non sit nisi de his quae sunt ad finem, consensus, proprie loquendo, non est nisi de his quae sunt ad finem.
Consequently, since counsel is only about the means, consent, properly speaking, is of nothing else but the means.
Electio addit supra consensum quandam relationem respectu eius cui aliquid praeeligitur, et ideo post consensum, adhuc remanet electio. Potest enim contingere quod per consilium inveniantur plura ducentia ad finem, quorum dum quodlibet placet, in quodlibet eorum consentitur, sed ex multis quae placent, praeaccipimus unum eligendo.
Choice includes something that consent has not, namely, a certain relation to something to which something else is preferred: and therefore after consent there still remains a choice. For it may happen that by aid of counsel several means have been found conducive to the end, and through each of these meeting with approval, consent has been given to each: but after approving of many, we have given our preference to one by choosing it.
Sed si inveniatur unum solum quod placeat, non differunt re consensus et electio, sed ratione tantum, ut consensus dicatur secundum quod placet ad agendum; electio autem, secundum quod praefertur his quae non placent.
But if only one meets with approval, then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only in our way of looking at them; so that we call it consent, according as we approve of doing that thing; but choice according as we prefer it to those that do not meet with our approval.
The application of the appetitive movement to counsel's decision is consent properly speaking, because the desire of the means presupposes the decision of counsel.
Sicut conclusiones scimus per principia, horum tamen non est scientia, sed quod maius est, scilicet intellectus; ita consentimus his quae sunt ad finem propter finem, cuius tamen non est consensus, sed quod maius est, scilicet voluntas.
Just as the knowledge of conclusions through the principles is science, whereas the knowledge of the principles is not science, but something higher, namely, understanding; so do we consent to the means on account of the end, in respect of which our act is not consent but something greater, namely, volition.
Consensus nominat applicationem appetitivi motus ad aliquid praeexistens in potestate applicantis in ordine autem agibilium.
Consent is the application of the appetitive movement to something that is already in the power of him who causes the application.
Primo quidem oportet sumere apprehensionem finis; deinde appetitum finis; deinde consilium de his quae sunt ad finem; deinde appetitum eorum quae sunt ad finem.
Now the order of action is this: First there is the apprehension of the end; then the desire of the end; then the counsel about the means; then the desire of the means.
Unde, cum consilium non sit nisi de his quae sunt ad finem, consensus, proprie loquendo, non est nisi de his quae sunt ad finem.
Consequently, since counsel is only about the means, consent, properly speaking, is of nothing else but the means.
Electio addit supra consensum quandam relationem respectu eius cui aliquid praeeligitur, et ideo post consensum, adhuc remanet electio. Potest enim contingere quod per consilium inveniantur plura ducentia ad finem, quorum dum quodlibet placet, in quodlibet eorum consentitur, sed ex multis quae placent, praeaccipimus unum eligendo.
Choice includes something that consent has not, namely, a certain relation to something to which something else is preferred: and therefore after consent there still remains a choice. For it may happen that by aid of counsel several means have been found conducive to the end, and through each of these meeting with approval, consent has been given to each: but after approving of many, we have given our preference to one by choosing it.
Sed si inveniatur unum solum quod placeat, non differunt re consensus et electio, sed ratione tantum, ut consensus dicatur secundum quod placet ad agendum; electio autem, secundum quod praefertur his quae non placent.
But if only one meets with approval, then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only in our way of looking at them; so that we call it consent, according as we approve of doing that thing; but choice according as we prefer it to those that do not meet with our approval.
Wednesday, February 10, 2010
1a 2ae q15 a2: Whether consent is to be found in irrational animals? No.
Consensus, proprie loquendo, non est in brutis animalibus, quia proprie dicitur consentire solum rationalis natura, quae habet in potestate sua appetitivum motum, et potest ipsum applicare vel non applicare ad hoc vel ad illud.
Consent, properly speaking, is not in irrational animals, because this is proper to the rational nature, which has the command of the appetitive movement, and is able to apply or not to apply it to this or that thing.
In brutis animalibus invenitur determinatio appetitus ad aliquid passive tantum. Consensus vero importat determinationem appetitus non solum passivam, sed magis activam.
In irrational animals the determination of the appetite to a particular thing is merely passive, whereas consent implies a determination of the appetite, which is active rather than merely passive.
Consent, properly speaking, is not in irrational animals, because this is proper to the rational nature, which has the command of the appetitive movement, and is able to apply or not to apply it to this or that thing.
In brutis animalibus invenitur determinatio appetitus ad aliquid passive tantum. Consensus vero importat determinationem appetitus non solum passivam, sed magis activam.
In irrational animals the determination of the appetite to a particular thing is merely passive, whereas consent implies a determination of the appetite, which is active rather than merely passive.
Sunday, February 07, 2010
1a 2ae q15 a1: Whether consent is an act of the appetitive power? Yes.
Consentire est actus appetitivae virtutis quia consentire importat applicationem sensus ad aliquid.
Consent is an act of the appetitive power because consent implies application of sense to something.
Sentire proprie dictum ad apprehensivam potentiam pertinet, sed secundum similitudinem cuiusdam experientiae, pertinet ad appetitivam.
Sense, properly speaking, belongs to the apprehensive faculty; but by way of similitude, insofar as it implies seeking acquaintance, it belongs to the appetitive power.
Quia actus appetitivae virtutis est quaedam inclinatio ad rem ipsam, secundum quandam similitudinem ipsa applicatio appetitivae virtutis ad rem, secundum quod ei inhaeret, accipit nomen sensus, quasi experientiam quandam sumens de re cui inhaeret, inquantum complacet sibi in ea.
Since the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing itself, the application of the appetitive power to the thing, insofar as it cleaves to it, gets by a kind of similitude, the name of sense, since, as it were, it acquires direct knowledge of the thing to which it cleaves, insofar as it takes complacency in it.
Consent is an act of the appetitive power because consent implies application of sense to something.
Sentire proprie dictum ad apprehensivam potentiam pertinet, sed secundum similitudinem cuiusdam experientiae, pertinet ad appetitivam.
Sense, properly speaking, belongs to the apprehensive faculty; but by way of similitude, insofar as it implies seeking acquaintance, it belongs to the appetitive power.
Quia actus appetitivae virtutis est quaedam inclinatio ad rem ipsam, secundum quandam similitudinem ipsa applicatio appetitivae virtutis ad rem, secundum quod ei inhaeret, accipit nomen sensus, quasi experientiam quandam sumens de re cui inhaeret, inquantum complacet sibi in ea.
Since the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing itself, the application of the appetitive power to the thing, insofar as it cleaves to it, gets by a kind of similitude, the name of sense, since, as it were, it acquires direct knowledge of the thing to which it cleaves, insofar as it takes complacency in it.
Saturday, February 06, 2010
1a 2ae q14 a6: Whether the process of counsel is indefinite? No.
Inquisitio consilii est finita in actu ex duplici parte, scilicet ex parte principii, et ex parte termini, quia accipitur in inquisitione consilii duplex principium: sicut enim finis habet rationem principii, ita id quod agitur propter finem, habet rationem conclusionis.
Counsel's investigation is actually finite on both sides, on that of its principle, and on that of its term, because a twofold principle is available in counsel's investigation: just as the end holds the formal aspect of a principle, so the means hold the formal aspect of a conclusion.
Unde id quod primo agendum occurrit, habet rationem ultimae conclusionis, ad quam inquisitio terminatur.
Wherefore that which presents itself as to be done first, holds the formal aspect of an ultimate conclusion whereat the investigation comes to an end.
Nihil autem prohibet consilium potentia infinitum esse, secundum quod in infinitum possunt aliqua occurrere consilio inquirenda.
Nothing however prevents counsel from being infinite potentially, for as much as an infinite number of things may present themselves to be inquired into by means of counsel.
Singularia non sunt infinita actu, sed in potentia tantum.
Singulars are infinite; not actually, but only potentially.
Counsel's investigation is actually finite on both sides, on that of its principle, and on that of its term, because a twofold principle is available in counsel's investigation: just as the end holds the formal aspect of a principle, so the means hold the formal aspect of a conclusion.
Unde id quod primo agendum occurrit, habet rationem ultimae conclusionis, ad quam inquisitio terminatur.
Wherefore that which presents itself as to be done first, holds the formal aspect of an ultimate conclusion whereat the investigation comes to an end.
Nihil autem prohibet consilium potentia infinitum esse, secundum quod in infinitum possunt aliqua occurrere consilio inquirenda.
Nothing however prevents counsel from being infinite potentially, for as much as an infinite number of things may present themselves to be inquired into by means of counsel.
Singularia non sunt infinita actu, sed in potentia tantum.
Singulars are infinite; not actually, but only potentially.
Friday, February 05, 2010
1a 2ae q14 a5: Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis? Yes.
Inquisitio consilii sit resolutiva, incipiendo scilicet, ab eo quod in futuro intenditur, quousque perveniatur ad id quod statim agendum est, quia autem in inquisitione consilii est finis, qui quidem est prior in intentione, posterior tamen in esse.
Counsel's investigation must needs be one of analysis, beginning that is to say, from that which is intended in the future, and continuing until it arrives at that which is to be done at once, because the principle in counsel's investigation is the end, which precedes indeed in intention, but comes afterwards into execution.
Consilium est quidem de operationibus. Sed ratio operationum accipitur ex fine, et ideo ordo ratiocinandi de operationibus, est contrarius ordini operandi.
Counsel is indeed about action. But actions take their formal aspect from the end, and consequently the order of reasoning about actions is contrary to the order of actions.
Philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod "ille qui consiliatur, videtur quaerere et resolvere."
The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "he who takes counsel seems to inquire and analyze."
Counsel's investigation must needs be one of analysis, beginning that is to say, from that which is intended in the future, and continuing until it arrives at that which is to be done at once, because the principle in counsel's investigation is the end, which precedes indeed in intention, but comes afterwards into execution.
Consilium est quidem de operationibus. Sed ratio operationum accipitur ex fine, et ideo ordo ratiocinandi de operationibus, est contrarius ordini operandi.
Counsel is indeed about action. But actions take their formal aspect from the end, and consequently the order of reasoning about actions is contrary to the order of actions.
Philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod "ille qui consiliatur, videtur quaerere et resolvere."
The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "he who takes counsel seems to inquire and analyze."
Thursday, February 04, 2010
1a 2ae q14 a4: Whether counsel is about all things that we do? No.
Non oportet in omnibus quae ratione aguntur, esse inquisitionem consilii, quia ratio in rebus manifestis non inquirit, sed statim iudicat.
There is no need of counsel's investigation in all that is done by formal aspect, because in matters that are evident, aspectual apprehension makes no investigation, but judges at once.
Electio praesupponit consilium ratione iudicii vel sententiae. Unde quando iudicium vel sententia manifesta est absque inquisitione, non requiritur consilii inquisitio.
Choice presupposes counsel by aspectual apprehension of its judgment or decision. Consequently when the judgment or decision is evident without investigation, there is no need for counsel's investigation.
De duobus non consiliamur, quamvis ordinentur ad finem; scilicet, de rebus parvis, et de his quae sunt determinata qualiter fieri debent (sicut est in operibus artium, praeter quasdam coniecturales, ut puta medicinalis, negotiativa, et huiusmodi):
There are two things of which we do not take counsel, although they conduce to the end; namely, minute things, and those which have a fixed way of being done (as in works produced by art, with the exception of those arts that admit of conjecture, such as medicine, commerce, and the like):
1. Per determinatas vias proceditur ad determinatos fines, sicut contingit in artibus quae habent certas vias operandi (sicut scriptor non consiliatur quomodo debeat trahere litteras, hoc enim determinatum est per artem).
1. Certain determinate ends are gained by certain determinate means, as happens in the arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of action (thus a writer does not take counsel how to form his letters, for this is determined by art)
2. Non multum refert utrum sic vel sic fiat: et ista sunt minima, quae parum adiuvant vel impediunt respectu finis consequendi; quod autem parum est, quasi nihil accipit ratio.
2. It little matters whether it is done this or that way: this occurs in minute matters, which help or hinder but little with regard to the end aimed at; and aspectual apprehension looks upon small things as mere nothings.
There is no need of counsel's investigation in all that is done by formal aspect, because in matters that are evident, aspectual apprehension makes no investigation, but judges at once.
Electio praesupponit consilium ratione iudicii vel sententiae. Unde quando iudicium vel sententia manifesta est absque inquisitione, non requiritur consilii inquisitio.
Choice presupposes counsel by aspectual apprehension of its judgment or decision. Consequently when the judgment or decision is evident without investigation, there is no need for counsel's investigation.
De duobus non consiliamur, quamvis ordinentur ad finem; scilicet, de rebus parvis, et de his quae sunt determinata qualiter fieri debent (sicut est in operibus artium, praeter quasdam coniecturales, ut puta medicinalis, negotiativa, et huiusmodi):
There are two things of which we do not take counsel, although they conduce to the end; namely, minute things, and those which have a fixed way of being done (as in works produced by art, with the exception of those arts that admit of conjecture, such as medicine, commerce, and the like):
1. Per determinatas vias proceditur ad determinatos fines, sicut contingit in artibus quae habent certas vias operandi (sicut scriptor non consiliatur quomodo debeat trahere litteras, hoc enim determinatum est per artem).
1. Certain determinate ends are gained by certain determinate means, as happens in the arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of action (thus a writer does not take counsel how to form his letters, for this is determined by art)
2. Non multum refert utrum sic vel sic fiat: et ista sunt minima, quae parum adiuvant vel impediunt respectu finis consequendi; quod autem parum est, quasi nihil accipit ratio.
2. It little matters whether it is done this or that way: this occurs in minute matters, which help or hinder but little with regard to the end aimed at; and aspectual apprehension looks upon small things as mere nothings.
Wednesday, February 03, 2010
1a 2ae q14 a3: Whether counsel is only of things that we do? Yes.
Consilium est circa ea quae aguntur a nobis quia inquisitio consilii proprie pertinet ad contingentia singularia.
Counsel is about things done by us because counsel's investigation is concerned, properly speaking, with contingent singulars.
Consilium non solum est de his quae aguntur, sed de his quae ordinantur ad operationes. Et propter hoc consultatio dicitur fieri de futuris eventibus, inquantum homo per futuros eventus cognitos dirigitur ad aliquid faciendum vel vitandum.
Counsel is not only about what is done, but also about whatever has relation to what is done. And for this reason we speak of consulting about future events, insofar as man is induced to do or omit something, through the knowledge of future events.
Est autem considerandum quod in particularibus contingentibus, ad hoc quod aliquid certum cognoscatur, plures conditiones seu circumstantias considerare oportet, quas ab uno non facile est considerari, sed a pluribus certius percipiuntur, dum quod unus considerat, alii non occurrit; in necessariis autem et universalibus est absolutior et simplicior consideratio, ita quod magis ad huiusmodi considerationem unus per se sufficere potest.
Now we must take note that in contingent particular cases, in order that anything be known for certain, it is necessary to take several conditions or circumstances into consideration, which it is not easy for one to consider, but are considered by several with greater certainty, since what one takes note of, escapes the notice of another; whereas in necessary and universal things, our view is brought to bear on matters much more absolutely and simply, so that one man by himself may be sufficient to consider these things.
Cognitio autem veritatis in talibus non habet aliquid magnum, ut per se sit appetibilis, sicut cognitio universalium et necessariorum, sed appetitur secundum quod est utilis ad operationem, quia actiones sunt circa contingentia singularia.
Now the knowledge of the truth in such matters [i.e., contingent singulars] does not rank so high as to be desirable of itself, as is the knowledge of things universal and necessary, but it is desired as being useful towards action, because actions bear on things singular and contingent.
Counsel is about things done by us because counsel's investigation is concerned, properly speaking, with contingent singulars.
Consilium non solum est de his quae aguntur, sed de his quae ordinantur ad operationes. Et propter hoc consultatio dicitur fieri de futuris eventibus, inquantum homo per futuros eventus cognitos dirigitur ad aliquid faciendum vel vitandum.
Counsel is not only about what is done, but also about whatever has relation to what is done. And for this reason we speak of consulting about future events, insofar as man is induced to do or omit something, through the knowledge of future events.
Est autem considerandum quod in particularibus contingentibus, ad hoc quod aliquid certum cognoscatur, plures conditiones seu circumstantias considerare oportet, quas ab uno non facile est considerari, sed a pluribus certius percipiuntur, dum quod unus considerat, alii non occurrit; in necessariis autem et universalibus est absolutior et simplicior consideratio, ita quod magis ad huiusmodi considerationem unus per se sufficere potest.
Now we must take note that in contingent particular cases, in order that anything be known for certain, it is necessary to take several conditions or circumstances into consideration, which it is not easy for one to consider, but are considered by several with greater certainty, since what one takes note of, escapes the notice of another; whereas in necessary and universal things, our view is brought to bear on matters much more absolutely and simply, so that one man by himself may be sufficient to consider these things.
Cognitio autem veritatis in talibus non habet aliquid magnum, ut per se sit appetibilis, sicut cognitio universalium et necessariorum, sed appetitur secundum quod est utilis ad operationem, quia actiones sunt circa contingentia singularia.
Now the knowledge of the truth in such matters [i.e., contingent singulars] does not rank so high as to be desirable of itself, as is the knowledge of things universal and necessary, but it is desired as being useful towards action, because actions bear on things singular and contingent.
Tuesday, February 02, 2010
1a 2ae q14 a2: Whether counsel is not only of the means but also of the end? No.
De fine non est consilium, sed solum de his quae sunt ad finem, quia consilium est quaestio.
Counsel is not of the end, but of the means, because counsel is an investigation.
Finis in operabilibus habet rationem principii, eo quod rationes eorum quae sunt ad finem ex fine sumuntur. Principium autem non cadit sub quaestione, sed principia oportet supponere in omni inquisitione.
The end has the formal aspect of the principle in practical matters, because the formal aspects of the means are found in the end. Now the principle cannot be made subject to the investigation, but must be presupposed in every investigation.
De operationibus est consilium, inquantum ordinantur ad aliquem finem. Unde si aliqua operatio humana sit finis, de ea, inquantum huiusmodi, non est consilium.
Counsel is about [practical] operations, insofar as they are ordained to some end. Consequently if any human act be an end, it will not, as such, be the matter of counsel.
Tamen contingit id quod est finis respectu quorundam, ordinari ad alium finem (sicut etiam id quod est principium unius demonstrationis, est conclusio alterius). Et ideo id quod accipitur ut finis in una inquisitione, potest accipi ut ad finem in alia inquisitione: et sic de eo erit consilium.
Nevertheless it may happen that what is the end in regard to some things, is ordained to something else (just as also what is the principle of one demonstration, is the conclusion of another). And consequently that which is looked upon as the end in one investigation, may be looked upon as the means in another: and thus it will become an object of counsel.
Counsel is not of the end, but of the means, because counsel is an investigation.
Finis in operabilibus habet rationem principii, eo quod rationes eorum quae sunt ad finem ex fine sumuntur. Principium autem non cadit sub quaestione, sed principia oportet supponere in omni inquisitione.
The end has the formal aspect of the principle in practical matters, because the formal aspects of the means are found in the end. Now the principle cannot be made subject to the investigation, but must be presupposed in every investigation.
De operationibus est consilium, inquantum ordinantur ad aliquem finem. Unde si aliqua operatio humana sit finis, de ea, inquantum huiusmodi, non est consilium.
Counsel is about [practical] operations, insofar as they are ordained to some end. Consequently if any human act be an end, it will not, as such, be the matter of counsel.
Tamen contingit id quod est finis respectu quorundam, ordinari ad alium finem (sicut etiam id quod est principium unius demonstrationis, est conclusio alterius). Et ideo id quod accipitur ut finis in una inquisitione, potest accipi ut ad finem in alia inquisitione: et sic de eo erit consilium.
Nevertheless it may happen that what is the end in regard to some things, is ordained to something else (just as also what is the principle of one demonstration, is the conclusion of another). And consequently that which is looked upon as the end in one investigation, may be looked upon as the means in another: and thus it will become an object of counsel.
Monday, February 01, 2010
1a 2ae q14 a1: Whether counsel is an inquiry? Yes.
Necessaria est inquisitio rationis ante iudicium de eligendis (et haec inquisitio consilium vocatur), quia actiones sunt circa singularia contingentia, quae propter sui variabilitatem incerta sunt; et in rebus dubiis et incertis ratio non profert iudicium absque inquisitione praecedente.
The inquiry of formal aspect is necessary before judgment on the objects of choice (and this inquiry is called counsel), because actions are concerned with contingent singulars, which by reason of their vicissitude, are uncertain; and in things doubtful and uncertain aspectual apprehension does not pronounce judgment without previous inquiry.
Propter quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod "electio est appetitus praeconsiliati".
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is the "desire of what has been already counselled."
Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, "omne quidem consilium quaestio est; non autem omnis quaestio consilium."
Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says: "Every counsel is an investigation; but not every investigation is a counsel."
Consilium attribuitur Deo quantum ad certitudinem sententiae vel iudicii, quae in nobis provenit ex inquisitione consilii. Sed huiusmodi inquisitio in Deo locum non habet, et ideo consilium secundum hoc Deo non attribuitur. Et secundum hoc Damascenus dicit quod "Deus non consiliatur, ignorantis enim est consiliari".
We ascribe counsel to God, as to the certainty of His knowledge or judgment, which certainty in us arises from the inquiry of counsel. But such inquiry has no place in God; wherefore in this respect it is not ascribed to God: in which sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22): "God takes not counsel: those only take counsel who lack knowledge."
The inquiry of formal aspect is necessary before judgment on the objects of choice (and this inquiry is called counsel), because actions are concerned with contingent singulars, which by reason of their vicissitude, are uncertain; and in things doubtful and uncertain aspectual apprehension does not pronounce judgment without previous inquiry.
Propter quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod "electio est appetitus praeconsiliati".
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is the "desire of what has been already counselled."
Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, "omne quidem consilium quaestio est; non autem omnis quaestio consilium."
Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says: "Every counsel is an investigation; but not every investigation is a counsel."
Consilium attribuitur Deo quantum ad certitudinem sententiae vel iudicii, quae in nobis provenit ex inquisitione consilii. Sed huiusmodi inquisitio in Deo locum non habet, et ideo consilium secundum hoc Deo non attribuitur. Et secundum hoc Damascenus dicit quod "Deus non consiliatur, ignorantis enim est consiliari".
We ascribe counsel to God, as to the certainty of His knowledge or judgment, which certainty in us arises from the inquiry of counsel. But such inquiry has no place in God; wherefore in this respect it is not ascribed to God: in which sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22): "God takes not counsel: those only take counsel who lack knowledge."