Q117 A4: Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally?

No. The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a body because no body is quickened by the separate soul.

Anima separata sua naturali virtute non potest movere aliquod corpus quia ab anima separata nullum corpus vivificatur.

There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are not determinate to certain bodies: such are the angels who are naturally unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey them as to movement (Q110 A5).

Substantiae quaedam spirituales sunt, quarum virtutes non determinantur ad aliqua corpora: sicut sunt Angeli, qui sunt naturaliter a corporibus absoluti; et ideo diversa corpora eis possunt obedire ad motum.

But if the motive power of a separate substance is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only one of lower degree; thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower heaven cannot move the higher heaven.

Si tamen alicuius substantiae separatae virtus motiva determinetur naturaliter ad movendum aliquod corpus, non poterit illa substantia movere aliquod corpus maius, sed minus; sicut, secundum philosophos, motor inferioris caeli non posset movere caelum superius.

Wherefore, since the soul is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it is the form, it cannot by its natural power move any other body.

Unde cum anima secundum suam naturam determinetur ad movendum corpus cuius est forma, nullum aliud corpus sua naturali virtute movere potest.

As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition.

Dicit Augustinus X de Civ. Dei, et Chrysostomus super Matth., frequenter Daemones simulant se esse animas mortuorum, ad confirmandum gentilium errorem, qui hoc credebant.

Q117 A3: Whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter?

No. Man cannot change corporeal matter by the power of his soul because the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change in exterior bodies, except by means of in impression from the body united to it.

Homo per virtutem suae animae non potest materiam corporalem immutare quia ad exteriora corpora immutanda apprehensio animae humanae non sufficit, nisi mediante immutatione proprii corporis.

As stated above (Q110 A2), corporeal matter is not changed to (the reception of) a form, save either by some agent composed of matter and form, or by God Himself, in whom both matter and form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both.

Sicut supra dictum est materia corporalis non immutatur ad formam, nisi vel ab agente aliquo composito ex materia et forma, vel ab ipso Deo, in quo virtualiter et materia et forma praeexistit, sicut in primordiali causa utriusque.

Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Corporeal matter obeys God alone at will."

Dicit Augustinus, in III de Trin., quod "materia corporalis soli Deo obedit ad nutum."

Wherefore of the angels also we have stated (Q110 A2) that they cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by employing corporeal agents for the production of certain effects. Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter, except by means of other bodies.

Unde et de Angelis supra dictum est quod materiam corporalem immutare non possunt naturali virtute, nisi applicando corporalia agentia ad effectus aliquos producendos. Multo igitur minus anima sua virtute naturali potest immutare materiam corporalem, nisi mediantibus aliquibus corporibus.

The saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace, not of nature.

Sancti dicuntur miracula facere ex potestate gratiae, non naturae.

Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation ("the evil eye" [oculus fascinans]: Q117 A3 ad 2), the countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who have a tender and most impressionable body. It is also possible that by God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons co-operate in this, as the witches may have some compact with them.

Sic igitur cum aliqua anima fuerit vehementer commota ad malitiam, sicut maxime in vetulabus contingit, efficitur secundum modum praedictum ["oculi fascinantis"] aspectus eius venenosus et noxius, et maxime pueris, qui habent corpus tenerum, et de facili receptivum impressionis. Possibile est etiam quod ex Dei permissione, vel etiam ex aliquo facto occulto, cooperetur ad hoc malignitas Daemonum, cum quibus vetulae sortilegae aliquod foedus habent.

Q117 A2: Whether man can teach the angels?

No. Angels are never enlightened by men concerning Divine things because in the same way as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men are subject even to the lowest angels.

Non Angeli instruuntur per homines de divinis quia eo modo quo inferiores Angeli superioribus subduntur, supremi homines subduntur etiam infimis Angelorum.

But men can by means of speech make known to angels the thoughts of their hearts, because it belongs to God alone to know the heart's secrets.

Cogitationes tamen suorum cordium homines Angelis per modum locutionis manifestare possunt, quia secreta cordium scire solius Dei est.

When the mysteries of Christ and the Church were fulfilled by the apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the angels, which were hidden from them before.

Dum per apostolos impleta sunt Christi et Ecclesiae mysteria, Angelis aliqua apparuerunt de huiusmodi mysteriis, quae ante erant eis occulta.

The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in His human nature.

Apostoli instruebantur immediate a verbo Dei, non secundum eius divinitatem, sed inquantum eius humanitas loquebatur.

Certain men in this state of life are greater than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have such great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree, though actually it is much smaller.

Aliqui homines, etiam in statu viae, sunt maiores aliquibus Angelis, non quidem actu, sed virtute; inquantum scilicet habent caritatem tantae virtutis, ut possint mereri maiorem beatitudinis gradum quam quidam Angeli habeant. Sicut si dicamus semen alicuius magnae arboris esse maius virtute quam aliquam parvam arborem, cum tamen multo minus sit in actu.

Q117 A1: Whether one man can teach another?

Yes. The teacher only brings exterior help, just like the physician who heals (but just like the interior nature is the principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect is the principal cause of knowledge), because the master does not cause the intellectual light in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly, but he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are proposed to him from without.

Homo docens solummodo exterius ministerium adhibet, sicut medicus sanans (sed sicut natura interior est principalis causa sanationis, ita et interius lumen intellectus est principalis causa scientiae), quia magister non causat lumen intelligibile in discipulo, nec directe species intelligibiles, sed movet discipulum per suam doctrinam ad hoc, quod ipse per virtutem sui intellectus formet intelligibiles conceptiones, quarum signa sibi proponit exterius.

The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in detail and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to be his own master, because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is required in a master.

Signa quae magister discipulo proponit, sunt rerum notarum in universali, et sub quadam confusione; sed ignotarum in particulari, et sub quadam distinctione. Et ideo cum quisque per seipsum scientiam acquirit, non potest dici docere seipsum, vel esse sui ipsius magister, quia non praeexistit in eo scientia completa, qualis requiritur in magistro.

Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle (as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research) and from an exterior principle (as is clear in one who learns by instruction). For in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect.

Scientia autem acquiritur in homine et ab interiori principio (ut patet in eo qui per inventionem propriam scientiam acquirit) et a principio exteriori (ut patet in eo qui addiscit). Inest enim unicuique homini quoddam principium scientiae, scilicet lumen intellectus agentis, per quod cognoscuntur statim a principio naturaliter quaedam universalia principia omnium scientiarum.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that of effects proceeding from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone. Whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes from an interior principle; thus health is caused in a sick man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical art, sometimes by an interior principle, as when a man is healed by the force of nature. In these latter effects two things must be noticed.

Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod effectuum qui sunt ab exteriori principio, aliquis est ab exteriori principio tantum; sicut forma domus causatur in materia solum ab arte. Aliquis autem effectus est quandoque quidem ab exteriori principio, quandoque autem ab interiori; sicut sanitas causatur in infirmo quandoque ab exteriori principio, scilicet ab arte medicinae, quandoque autem ab interiori principio ut cum aliquis sanatur per virtutem naturae. Et in talibus effectibus sunt duo attendenda.

First, that art in its work imitates nature, for just as nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection of the matter that caused the sickness, so does art.

Primo quidem, quod ars imitatur naturam in sua operatione, sicut enim natura sanat infirmum alterando, digerendo, et expellendo materiam quae causat morbum, ita et ars.

Secondly, we must remark that the exterior principle, art, acts, not as principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the interior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended end.

Secundo attendendum est, quod principium exterius, scilicet ars, non operatur sicut principale agens, sed sicut coadiuvans agens principale, quod est principium interius, confortando ipsum, et ministrando ei instrumenta et auxilia, quibus utatur ad effectum producendum, sicut medicus confortat naturam, et adhibet ei cibos et medicinas, quibus natura utatur ad finem intentum.

Therefore as of God is it written: "Who healeth all thy diseases" (Psalm 102:3); so of Him is it written: "He that teacheth man knowledge" (Psalm 93:10), inasmuch as "the light of His countenance is signed upon us" (Psalm 4:7), through which light all things are shown to us.

Et ideo sicut de Deo dicitur, "qui sanat omnes infirmitates tuas"; ita de eo dicitur, "qui docet hominem scientiam", inquantum "lumen vultus eius super nos signatur", per quod nobis omnia ostenduntur.

Now when anyone applies these universal principles to certain particular things (the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses), then, by his own research, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before, advancing from the known to the unknown. Wherefore anyone who teaches, leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the cognition of things previously unknown to him; according to what the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): "All teaching and all learning proceed from previous cognition."

Cum autem aliquis huiusmodi universalia principia applicat ad aliqua particularia (quorum memoriam et experimentum per sensum accipit), per inventionem propriam acquirit scientiam eorum quae nesciebat, ex notis ad ignota procedens. Unde et quilibet docens, ex his quae discipulus novit, ducit eum in cognitionem eorum quae ignorabat; secundum quod dicitur in I Poster., quod "omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina ex praeexistenti fit cognitione".

Now the master leads the disciple from already cognized things to cognition of the unknown, in a twofold manner.

Ducit autem magister discipulum ex praecognitis in cognitionem ignotorum, dupliciter.

Firstly, by proposing to him certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition of science: for instance, he may put before him certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from previously cognized things; or he may propose to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led to the cognition of truth previously unknown.

Primo quidem, proponendo ei aliqua auxilia vel instrumenta, quibus intellectus eius utatur ad scientiam acquirendam: puta cum proponit ei aliquas propositiones minus universales, quas tamen ex praecognitis discipulus diiudicare potest; vel cum proponit ei aliqua sensibilia exempla, vel similia, vel opposita, vel aliqua huiusmodi ex quibus intellectus addiscentis manuducitur in cognitionem veritatis ignotae.

Secondly, by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above (Q106 A1; Q111 A1) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch as he proposes to the disciple the order of principles to conclusions, who on his own happens to not have sufficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles. Hence the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowledge." In this way a demonstrator causes his hearer to know.

Alio modo, cum confortat intellectum addiscentis; non quidem aliqua virtute activa quasi superioris naturae, sicut supra dictum est de Angelis illuminantibus, quia omnes humani intellectus sunt unius gradus in ordine naturae; sed inquantum proponit discipulo ordinem principiorum ad conclusiones, qui forte per seipsum non haberet tantam virtutem collativam, ut ex principiis posset conclusiones deducere. Et ideo dicitur in I Poster., quod "demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire". Et per hunc modum ille qui demonstrat, auditorem scientem facit.

As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural agent. Wherefore knowledge need not be an active quality, but is the principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle by which one is directed in working.

Doctor non causat scientiam in discipulo per modum agentis naturalis, ut Averroes obiicit. Unde non oportet quod scientia sit qualitas activa, sed est principium quo aliquis dirigitur in docendo, sicut ars est principium quo aliquis dirigitur in operando.

On this question there have been various opinions. For Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii, maintains that all men have one passive intellect in common, as stated above (Q76 A2). From this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men. Consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he communicates the identical knowledge which he has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension.

Circa hoc diversae fuerunt opiniones. Averroes enim, in Comment. III de anima, posuit unum intellectum possibilem esse omnium hominum, ut supra dictum est. Et ex hoc sequebatur quod eaedem species intelligibiles sint omnium hominum. Et secundum hoc, ponit quod unus homo per doctrinam non causat aliam scientiam in altero ab ea quam ipse habet; sed communicat ei eandem scientiam quam ipse habet, per hoc quod movet eum ad ordinandum phantasmata in anima sua, ad hoc quod sint disposita convenienter ad intelligibilem apprehensionem.

This opinion is true so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider identity according to the unity of the thing known, for the same truth of the thing is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one passive intellect, and the same intelligible species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above (Q76 A2).

Quae quidem opinio quantum ad hoc vera est, quod est eadem scientia in discipulo et magistro, si consideretur identitas secundum unitatem rei scitae, eadem enim rei veritas est quam cognoscit et discipulus et magister. Sed quantum ad hoc quod ponit esse unum intellectum possibilem omnium hominum, et easdem species intelligibiles, differentes solum secundum diversa phantasmata, falsa est eius opinio, ut supra habitum est.

Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through the participation of separate forms, as stated above (Q84 A3, Q84 A4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from the free consideration of those things which it knows. According to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master, but is roused by him to consider what he knows; so that to learn would be nothing else than to remember.

Alia est opinio Platonicorum, qui posuerunt quod scientia inest a principio animabus nostris per participationem formarum separatarum, sicut supra habitum est; sed anima ex unione corporis impeditur ne possit considerare libere ea quorum scientiam habet. Et secundum hoc, discipulus a magistro non acquirit scientiam de novo, sed ab eo excitatur ad considerandum ea quorum scientiam habet; ut sic addiscere nihil aliud sit quam reminisci.

In the same way they held that natural agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms, which matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. But against this we have proved above (Q79 A2; Q84 A3) that the passive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4).

Sicut etiam ponebant quod agentia naturalia solummodo disponunt ad susceptionem formarum, quas acquirit materia corporalis per participationem specierum separatarum. Sed contra hoc supra ostensum est quod intellectus possibilis animae humanae est in potentia pura ad intelligibilia, secundum quod Aristoteles dicit in III de anima.

We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4).

Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod docens causat scientiam in addiscente, reducendo ipsum de potentia in actum, sicut dicitur in VIII Physic.

Q117: The action of man

1. Can one man teach another, as being the cause of his knowledge?
2. Can man teach an angel?
3. Can man change corporeal matter by the power of his soul?
4. Can the separate soul of man move bodies by local movement?

Q116 A4: Whether all things are subject to fate?

No. All things are not subject to fate because whatever is done immediately by God, since it is not subject to secondary causes, neither is it subject to fate.

Omnia non subduntur fato quia sunt quae immediate a Deo fiunt, cum non subdantur secundis causis, non subduntur fato.

As stated above (Q116 A2), fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to secondary causes, is subject also to fate.

Sicut supra dictum est, fatum est ordinatio secundarum causarum ad effectus divinitus provisos. Quaecumque igitur causis secundis subduntur, ea subduntur et fato.

Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate." Such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like.

Boetius dicit, in IV de Consol., quod "quaedam quae sub providentia locata sunt, fati seriem superant": sicut creatio rerum, glorificatio spiritualium substantiarum, et alia huiusmodi.

Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "those things which are nigh to God have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence it is clear that "the further a thing is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate", since so much the more it is bound up with secondary causes.

Boetius dicit, quod "ea quae sunt primae divinitati propinqua, stabiliter fixa, fatalis ordinem mobilitatis excedunt. Ex quo etiam patet quod quanto aliquid longius a prima mente discedit, nexibus fati maioribus implicatur", quia magis subiicitur necessitati secundarum causarum.

Q116 A3: Whether fate is unchangeable?

Yes. Fate, considered in regard to second causes, is changeable, but as subject to Divine Providence, it derives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of conditional necessity, because the disposition of second causes which we call fate, can be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second causes, which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to the first principle, namely, God, by Whom they are ordered.

Fatum, secundum considerationem secundarum causarum, mobile est, sed secundum quod subest divinae providentiae, immobilitatem sortitur, non quidem absolutae necessitatis, sed conditionatae, quia dispositio secundarum causarum, quam fatum dicimus, potest dupliciter considerari, uno modo, secundum ipsas causas secundas, quae sic disponuntur seu ordinantur; alio modo, per relationem ad primum principium a quo ordinantur, scilicet Deum.

In this sense we say that this conditional is true and necessary: "If God foreknew that this would happen, it will happen."

Secundum quod dicimus hanc conditionalem esse veram vel necessariam, "si Deus praescivit hoc futurum, erit".

Wherefore Boethius, having said that the chain of fate is fickle, shortly afterwards adds--"which, since it is derived from an unchangeable Providence must also itself be unchangeable."

Unde cum Boetius dixisset fati seriem esse mobilem, post pauca subdit, "quae cum ab immobilis providentiae proficiscatur exordiis, ipsam quoque immutabilem esse necesse est".

Q116 A2: Whether fate is in created things?

Yes. Fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production of their effects, because Divine Providence produces effects through mediate causes.

Fatum est in ipsis causis creatis, inquantum sunt ordinatae a Deo ad effectus producendos, quia divina providentia per causas medias suos effectus exequitur.

Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things."

Boetius dicit, in IV de Consol. quod "fatum est dispositio rebus mobilibus inhaerens."

Fate has the formal aspect of a cause, just as much as the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.

Intantum fatum habet rationem causae, inquantum et ipsae causae secundae, quarum ordinatio fatum vocatur.

The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the formal aspect of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially fate is the very disposition or "series," i.e. order, of second causes.

Ipsa ordinatio causarum secundarum, quam Augustinus seriem causarum nominat, non habet rationem fati, nisi secundum quod dependet a Deo. Et ideo causaliter Dei potestas vel voluntas dici potest fatum. Essentialiter vero fatum est ipsa dispositio seu series, idest ordo, causarum secundarum.

Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet wrote: "Thy fates draw thee."

Fatum dicitur dispositio, non quae est in genere qualitatis; sed secundum quod dispositio designat ordinem, qui non est substantia, sed relatio. Qui quidem ordo, si consideretur per comparationem ad suum principium, est unus, et sic dicitur unum fatum. Si autem consideretur per comparationem ad effectus, vel ad ipsas causas medias, sic multiplicatur, per quem modum poeta dixit, te tua "fata trahunt". [Vergil, Aeneid 5.709]

Q116 A1: Whether there be such a thing as fate?

Yes. Inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were "fore-spoken," we can admit the existence of fate, because nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes, but not if compared to Divine Providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in the world," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24).

Inquantum omnia quae hic aguntur, divinae providentiae subduntur, tanquam per eam praeordinata et quasi praelocuta, fatum ponere possumus, nihil prohibet aliqua esse fortuita vel casualia per comparationem ad causas proximas, non tamen per comparationem ad divinam providentiam, sic enim "nihil temere fit in mundo", ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest.

What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius (De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its proper order."

Quod non est, non definitur. Sed Boetius, in IV de Consol., definit fatum, dicens quod "fatum est inhaerens rebus mobilibus dispositio, per quam providentia suis quaeque nectit ordinibus".

The holy doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those who twisted its application to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): "If anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion, but hold his tongue."

Hoc nomine sancti doctores uti recusaverint, propter eos qui ad vim positionis siderum hoc nomen retorquebant. Unde Augustinus dicit, in V de Civ. Dei, "si propterea quisquam res humanas fato tribuit, quia ipsam Dei voluntatem vel potestatem fati nomine appellat, sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat."

It has been said (Q115 A6) that what is accidental, is properly speaking neither a being, nor a unity. But every action of nature terminates in some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the proper effect of an active natural principle.

Dictum est enim supra quod id quod est per accidens, non est proprie ens neque unum. Omnis autem naturae actio terminatur ad aliquid unum. Unde impossibile est quod id quod est per accidens, sit effectus per se alicuius naturalis principii agentis.

We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise the intellect could not form this proposition: "The digger of a grave found a treasure." And just as an intellect can apprehend this so can it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there.

Et ideo dicendum est quod ea quae hic per accidens aguntur, sive in rebus naturalibus sive in rebus humanis, reducuntur in aliquam causam praeordinantem, quae est providentia divina. Quia nihil prohibet id quod est per accidens, accipi ut unum ab aliquo intellectu, alioquin intellectus formare non posset hanc propositionem, "fodiens sepulcrum invenit thesaurum". Et sicut hoc potest intellectus apprehendere, ita potest efficere, sicut si aliquis sciens in quo loco sit thesaurus absconditus, instiget aliquem rusticum hoc ignorantem, ut ibi fodiat sepulcrum.

Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by the intellect, especially the Divine intellect. For God alone can change the will, as shown above (Q105, A4). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone.

Et sic nihil prohibet ea quae hic per accidens aguntur, ut fortuita vel casualia, reduci in aliquam causam ordinantem, quae per intellectum agat, et praecipue intellectum divinum. Nam solus Deus potest voluntatem immutare, ut supra habitum est. Et per consequens ordinatio humanorum actuum, quorum principium est voluntas, soli Deo attribui debet.

Q116: Fate

1. Is there such a thing as fate?
2. Where is it?
3. Is it unchangeable?
4. Are all things subject to fate?

Q115 A6: Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action?

No. Not all the effects of heavenly bodies take place of necessity because there is nothing to prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of the will, not only in man himself, but also in other things to which human action extends.

Non omnes effectus caelestium corporum ex necessitate eveniunt quia nihil prohibet per voluntariam actionem impediri effectum caelestium corporum, non solum in ipso homine, sed etiam in aliis rebus ad quas hominum operatio se extendit.

Now it is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of necessity.

Manifestum est autem quod causa impediens actionem alicuius causae ordinatae ad suum effectum ut in pluribus, concurrit ei interdum per accidens, unde talis concursus non habet causam, inquantum est per accidens. Et propter hoc, id quod ex tali concursu sequitur, non reducitur in aliquam causam praeexistentem, ex qua ex necessitate sequatur.

Although the cause that hinders the effect of another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause, nevertheless the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of a heavenly body.

Licet causa impediens effectum alterius causae, reducatur in aliquod caeleste corpus sicut in causam, tamen concursus duarum causarum, cum sit per accidens, non reducitur in causam caelestem.

The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes, which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases.

Corpora caelestia sunt causa inferiorum effectuum mediantibus causis particularibus inferioribus, quae deficere possunt in minori parte.

Q115 A5: Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons?

No. The demons are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies because we hold that demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies (Q51 A1).

Daemones non subiiciuntur actioni corporum caelestium quia dicimus Daemones esse substantias intellectuales corporibus non unitas.

Q115 A4: Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions?

No. It is impossible that heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions because intellect and will are not acts of corporeal organs.

Impossibile est quod corpora caelestia sint causa humanorum actuum quia constat intellectum et voluntatem non esse actus organorum corporeorum.

To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ from sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on" (Odyssey xviii 135).

Ponere igitur caelestia corpora esse causam humanorum actuum, est proprium illorum qui dicunt intellectum non differre a sensu. Unde quidam eorum dicebant quod "talis est voluntas in hominibus, qualem in diem inducit pater virorum deorumque."

It must be observed, however, that indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the intellect and will, inasmuch, namely, as both intellect and will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to corporeal organs. But in this the intellect and will are differently situated.

Sciendum est tamen quod indirecte et per accidens impressiones corporum caelestium ad intellectum et voluntatem pertingere possunt; inquantum scilicet tam intellectus quam voluntas aliquo modo ab inferioribus viribus accipiunt, quae organis corporeis alligantur. Sed circa hoc diversimode se habent intellectus et voluntas.

For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior apprehensive powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of necessity, disturbed also.

Nam intellectus ex necessitate accipit ab inferioribus viribus apprehensivis, unde turbata vi imaginativa vel cogitativa vel memorativa, ex necessitate turbatur actio intellectus.

The will, on the contrary, does not, of necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for although the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains the power of following the passions or repressing them.

Sed voluntas non ex necessitate sequitur inclinationem appetitus inferioris, licet enim passiones quae sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili, habeant quandam vim ad inclinandam voluntatem; tamen in potestate voluntatis remanet sequi passiones, vel eas refutare.

Therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior powers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the proximate cause of human actions, than on the intellect.

Et ideo impressio caelestium corporum, secundum quam immutari possunt inferiores vires, minus pertingit ad voluntatem, quae est proxima causa humanorum actuum, quam ad intellectum.

The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly bodies; but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated above (Q111, A2).

Spirituales substantiae quae caelestia corpora movent, in corporalia quidem agunt mediantibus caelestibus corporibus, sed in intellectum humanum agunt immediate illuminando. Voluntatem autem immutare non possunt, ut supra habitum est.

Q115 A3: Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies here below?

Yes. The movements of bodies here below, which are various and multiform, must be referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies, as to their cause, because the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of those things which are more movable.

Motus horum inferiorum corporum qui sunt varii et multiformes, reducuntur in motum corporis caelestis, sicut in causam, quia quanto aliqua sunt immobiliora, tanto sunt magis causa eorum quae sunt magis mobilia.

Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10), to suppose a certain movable active principle, which by reason of its presence or absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. Consequently whatever generates here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument of a heavenly body: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that "man and the sun generate man."

Unde secundum philosophum, in II de Gen., necesse est ponere aliquod principium activum mobile, quod per sui praesentiam et absentiam causet varietatem circa generationem et corruptionem inferiorum corporum. Et huiusmodi sunt corpora caelestia. Et ideo quidquid in istis inferioribus generat, movet ad speciem sicut instrumentum caelestis corporis; secundum quod dicitur in II Physic., quod "homo generat hominem, et sol".

The actions of heavenly bodies are variously received in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter. Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an argument against divination by stars, because the effects of the stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the various dispositions of matter.

Actiones corporum caelestium diversimode recipiuntur in inferioribus corporibus secundum diversam materiae dispositionem. Contingit autem quandoque quod materia conceptus humani non est disposita totaliter ad masculinum sexum; unde partim formatur in masculum, partim in feminam. Unde ad hoc introducitur ab Augustino, ad repellendum scilicet divinationem quae fit per astra, quia effectus astrorum variantur etiam in rebus corporeis, secundum diversam materiae dispositionem.

Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "Bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more subtle and powerful nature."

Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod "corpora crassiora et inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine reguntur".

And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that "the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible bodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection."

Et Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod "lumen solis ad generationem sensibilium corporum confert, et ad vitam ipsa movet, et nutrit et auget et perficit".

Q115 A2: Whether there are any seminal aspects in corporeal matter?

Yes. Augustine fittingly gave the name of "seminal aspects" [seminales rationes] to all those active and passive powers which are the principles of natural generation and movement because the active and passive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which living things are generated.

Convenienter Augustinus omnes virtutes activas et passivas quae sunt principia generationum et motuum naturalium, seminales rationes vocat, quia principium activum et passivum generationis rerum viventium sunt semina ex quibus viventia generantur.

It is customary to name things after what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole corporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural things. For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation of living things, which is called "nativity": and because living things are generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, consequently the word "nature" has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved.

Denominationes consueverunt fieri a perfectiori, ut dicitur in II de anima. In tota autem natura corporea perfectiora sunt corpora viva, unde et ipsum nomen naturae translatum est a rebus viventibus ad omnes res naturales. Nam ipsum nomen naturae, ut philosophus dicit in V Metaphys., primo impositum fuit ad significandum generationem viventium, quae nativitas dicitur, et quia viventia generantur ex principio coniuncto, sicut fructus ex arbore, et foetus ex matre, cui colligatur, consequenter tractum est nomen naturae ad omne principium motus quod est in eo quod movetur.

These active and passive powers may be considered in several orders. For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 10), they are principally and originally in the Word of God, as "ideal aspects."

Huiusmodi autem virtutes activae et passivae in multiplici ordine considerari possunt. Nam primo quidem, ut Augustinus dicit VI super Gen. ad Litt., sunt principaliter et originaliter in ipso verbo Dei, secundum rationes ideales.

Secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in "universal causes."

Secundo vero, sunt in elementis mundi, ubi simul a principio productae sunt, sicut in universalibus causis.

Thirdly, they are in those things which, in the succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that animal, as in "particular causes."

Tertio vero modo, sunt in iis quae ex universalibus causis secundum successiones temporum producuntur, sicut in hac planta et in hoc animali, tanquam in particularibus causis.

Fourthly, they are in the "seeds" produced from animals and plants. And these again are compared to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced.

Quarto modo, sunt in seminibus quae ex animalibus et plantis producuntur. Quae iterum comparantur ad alios effectus particulares, sicut primordiales causae universales ad primos effectus productos.

These active and passive powers of natural things, though not called "aspects" [rationes] by reason of their being in corporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, inasmuch as they are the effect of the ideal aspects [rationes ideales].

Huiusmodi virtutes activae et passivae rerum naturalium, etsi non possint dici rationes secundum quod sunt in materia corporali, possunt tamen dici rationes per comparationem ad suam originem, secundum quod deducuntur a rationibus idealibus.

From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal aspects, it is easy to gather that they are also causal aspects, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9) that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things."

Ex verbis Augustini de huiusmodi rationibus seminalibus loquentis, satis accipi potest quod ipsae rationes seminales sunt etiam rationes causales, sicut et semen est quaedam causa, dicit enim in III de Trin., quod "sicut matres gravidae sunt foetibus, sic ipse mundus est gravidus causis nascentium."

Nevertheless, the "ideal aspects" can be called "causal aspects," but not, strictly speaking, "seminal aspects," because seed is not a separate principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of these causal aspects. Likewise neither are miracles wrought outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities which are ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of seminal aspects.

Sed tamen rationes ideales possunt dici causales, non autem proprie loquendo seminales, quia semen non est principium separatum, et praeter huiusmodi rationes non fiunt miracula. Similiter etiam neque praeter virtutes passivas creaturae inditas, ut ex ea fieri possit quidquid Deus mandaverit. Sed praeter virtutes activas naturales, et potentias passivas quae ordinantur ad huiusmodi virtutes activas, dicuntur fieri miracula, dum dicitur quod fiunt praeter rationes seminales.

Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world."

Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., "omnium rerum quae corporaliter visibiliterque nascuntur, occulta quaedam semina in istis corporeis mundi huius elementis latent."

Q115 A1: Whether a body can be active?

Yes. Some bodies are active because it is apparent to the senses.

Corpora sunt activa quia sensibiliter apparet.

A body is composed of potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive.

Corpus autem componitur ex potentia et actu, et ideo est agens et patiens.

We must therefore say that a body acts inasmuch as it is in act, on a body inasmuch as it is in potentiality.

Dicendum est ergo quod corpus agit secundum quod est actu, in aliud corpus secundum quod est in potentia.

Action is not effected by local movement, as Democritus held, but by something being reduced from potentiality to act.

Actio non fit per motum localem, ut Democritus posuit, sed per hoc quod aliquid reducitur de potentia in actum.

To act, which is nothing else than to make something to be in act, is essentially proper to an act as such; wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact of its being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and universal: but to the fact that it is determined to this matter, it owes its being an agent limited and particular.

Agere autem, quod nihil est aliud quam facere aliquid actu, est per se proprium actus, inquantum est actus, unde et omne agens agit sibi simile. Sic ergo ex hoc quod aliquid est forma non determinata per materiam quantitati subiectam, habet quod sit agens indeterminatum et universale, ex hoc vero quod est determinata ad hanc materiam, habet quod sit agens contractum et particulare.

Wherefore if the form of fire were separate, as the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of every ignition. But this form of fire which is in this corporeal matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes from this body into that. Hence such an action is effected by the contact of two bodies.

Unde si esset forma ignis separata, ut Platonici posuerunt, esset aliquo modo causa omnis ignitionis. Sed haec forma ignis quae est in hac materia corporali, est causa huius ignitionis quae est ab hoc corpore in hoc corpus. Unde et fit talis actio per contactum duorum corporum.

The term of a body's action is both an accidental form and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat, although itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can terminate in a substantial form.

Corpus agit et ad formam accidentalem, et ad formam substantialem. Qualitas enim activa, ut calor, etsi sit accidens, agit tamen in virtute formae substantialis, sicut eius instrumentum; et ideo potest agere ad formam substantialem.

A body is not that which is most distant from God; for it participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being, inasmuch as it has a form. That which is most distant from God is primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality.

Corpus non est id quod maxime distat a Deo, participat enim aliquid de similitudine divini esse, secundum formam quam habet. Sed id quod maxime distat a Deo, est materia prima; quae nullo modo est agens, cum sit in potentia tantum.

Q115: The action of the corporeal creature

1. Can a body be active?
2. Do certain seminal virtues exist in bodies?
3. Are the heavenly bodies the causes of what is done here by the inferior bodies?
4. Are they the cause of human acts?
5. Are demons subject to their influence?
6. Do the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which are subject to their influence?

Q114 A5: Whether a demon who is overcome by man, is for this reason hindered from making further assaults?

Yes. Once a demon has been overcome, he can tempt others, but not the same man, because the devil does not tempt man for just as long as he likes, but for as long as God allows; for although He allows him to tempt for a short time, He orders him off on account of our weakness.

Daemon superatus potest alios tentare, sed non eundem, quia non tandiu homines Diabolus tentat, quandiu vult, sed quandiu Deus permittit; quia etsi permittat paulisper tentare, tamen repellit, propter infirmam naturam.

The other reason is taken from the astuteness of the devil. As to this, Ambrose says on Luke 4:13: "The devil is afraid of persisting, because he shrinks from frequent defeat." That the devil does nevertheless sometimes return to the assault, is apparent from Matthew 12:44: "I will return into my house from whence I came out."

Alia ratio sumitur ex astutia Diaboli, unde Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, quod "Diabolus instare formidat, quia frequentius refugit triumphari". Quod tamen aliquando Diabolus redeat ad eum quem dimisit, patet per illud quod dicitur Matth. XII, "revertar in domum meam, unde exivi".

Q114 A4: Whether demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles?

Yes. Sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense (for whatever exceeds the human power and experience) and thus demons can work miracles (that is, things which rouse man's astonishment, by reason of their being beyond his power and outside his sphere of knowledge) because even a man by doing what is beyond the power and knowledge of another, leads him to marvel at what he has done, so that in a way he seems to that man to have worked a miracle.

Dicitur quandoque miraculum large (quod excedit humanam facultatem et considerationem) et sic Daemones possunt facere miracula (quae scilicet homines mirantur, inquantum eorum facultatem et cognitionem excedunt) quia et unus homo, inquantum facit aliquid quod est supra facultatem et cognitionem alterius, ducit alium in admirationem sui operis, ut quodammodo miraculum videatur operari.

It is to be noted, however, that although these works of demons, which appear marvelous to us, do not attain the true formal aspect of miracles, they are sometimes nevertheless something real. Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the demons' power produced real serpents and frogs. And "when fire came down from heaven and at one blow consumed Job's servants and sheep; when the storm struck down his house and with it his children--these were the works of Satan, not the products of the imagination"; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 19).

Sciendum est tamen quod, quamvis huiusmodi opera Daemonum, quae nobis miracula videntur, ad veram rationem miraculi non pertingant, sunt tamen quandoque verae res. Sicut magi Pharaonis per virtutem Daemonum veros serpentes et ranas fecerunt. "Et quando ignis de caelo cecidit et familiam Iob cum gregibus pecorum uno impetu consumpsit, et turbo domum deiiciens filios eius occidit, quae fuerunt opera Satanae, phantasmata non fuerunt", ut Augustinus dicit, XX de Civ. Dei.

As we have said above (Q110, A2), corporeal matter does not obey either good or bad angels at their will, so that demons be able by their power to transmute matter from one form to another; but they can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the world, in order to produce these effects, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9).

Sicut supra dictum est, materia corporalis non obedit Angelis bonis seu malis ad nutum, ut Daemones sua virtute possint transmutare materiam de forma in formam, sed possunt adhibere quaedam semina quae in elementis mundi inveniuntur, ad huiusmodi effectus complendos, ut Augustinus dicit III de Trin.

Therefore it must be admitted that all the transformation of corporeal things which can be produced by certain natural powers, to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can alike be produced by the operation of the demons, by the employment of these seeds.

Et ideo dicendum est quod omnes transmutationes corporalium rerum quae possunt fieri per aliquas virtutes naturales, ad quas pertinent praedicta semina, possunt fieri per operationem Daemonum, huiusmodi seminibus adhibitis.

But those transformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature, cannot in reality be effected by the operation of the demons.

Illae vero transmutationes corporalium rerum quae non possunt virtute naturae fieri, nullo modo operatione Daemonum, secundum rei veritatem, perfici possunt.

As is clear from what has been said above (Q110, A4), if we take a miracle in the strict sense, the demons cannot work miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone, because in the strict sense a miracle is something done outside the order of the entire created nature, under which order every power of a creature is contained.

Sicut ex supra dictis patet, si miraculum proprie accipiatur, Daemones miracula facere non possunt, nec aliqua creatura, sed solus Deus, quia miraculum proprie dicitur quod fit praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae, sub quo ordine continetur omnis virtus creaturae.

Q114 A3: Whether all sins are due to the temptation of the devil?

No. The devil is not the cause of every sin because all sins are not committed at the devil's instigation, but some are due to the free-will and the corruption of the flesh.

Diabolus non est causa omnis peccati quia non omnia peccata committuntur Diabolo instigante, sed quaedam ex libertate arbitrii et carnis corruptione.

When man commits sin without being thereto instigated by the devil, he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil thereby, in so far as he imitates him who was the first to sin.

Si qua peccata absque instinctu Diaboli perpetrantur, per ea tamen fiunt homines filii Diaboli, inquantum ipsum primo peccantem imitantur.

Man can of his own accord fall into sin: but he cannot advance in merit without the Divine assistance, which is borne to man by the ministry of the angels. For this reason the angels take part in all our good works: whereas all our sins are not due to the demons' instigation. Nevertheless there is no kind of sin which is not sometimes due to the demons' suggestion.

Homo potest per seipsum ruere in peccatum, sed ad meritum proficere non potest nisi auxilio divino, quod homini exhibetur mediante ministerio Angelorum. Et ideo ad omnia bona nostra cooperantur Angeli, non tamen omnia nostra peccata procedunt ex Daemonum suggestione. Quamvis nullum genus peccati sit, quod non interdum ex Daemonum suggestione proveniat.

Q114 A2: Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?

Yes. It is said to be his proper office to tempt because the devil always tempts in order to hurt by urging man into sin.

Dicitur proprium officium eius tentare quia Diabolus semper tentat ut noceat, in peccatum praecipitando.

To tempt is, properly speaking, to make trial of something.

Tentare est proprie experimentum sumere de aliquo.

The demons know what happens outwardly among men; but the inward disposition of man God alone knows, Who is the "weigher of spirits" (Proverbs 16:2). It is this disposition that makes man more prone to one vice than to another: hence the devil tempts, in order to explore this inward disposition of man, so that he may tempt him to that vice to which he is most prone.

Daemones sciunt ea quae exterius aguntur circa homines, sed interiorem hominis conditionem solus Deus novit, qui est "spirituum ponderator", ex qua aliqui sunt magis proni ad unum vitium quam ad aliud. Et ideo Diabolus tentat explorando interiorem conditionem hominis, ut de illo vitio tentet, ad quod homo magis pronus est.

Although a demon cannot change the will, yet, as stated above (Q111, A3), he can change the inferior powers of man, in a certain degree: by which powers, though the will cannot be forced, it can nevertheless be inclined.

Daemon, etsi non possit immutare voluntatem, potest tamen, ut supra dictum est, aliqualiter immutare inferiores hominis vires; ex quibus etsi non cogitur voluntas, tamen inclinatur.

Q114 A1: Whether men are assailed by the demons?

Yes. The wicked angels assail men by instigating them to sin (and thus they are not sent by God to assail us, but are sometimes permitted to do so according to God's just judgments), but sometimes their assault is a punishment to man (and thus they are sent by God) because punishment is referred to God as its first author.

Mali Angeli impugnant homines instigando ad peccatum (et sic non mittuntur a Deo ad impugnandum, sed aliquando permittuntur, secundum Dei iusta iudicia), aliquando autem impugnant homines puniendo (et sic mittuntur a Deo) quia poena refertur in Deum, sicut in primum auctorem.

Nevertheless the demons who are sent to punish, do so with an intention other than that for which they are sent, for they punish from hatred or envy, whereas they are sent by God on account of His justice.

Et tamen Daemones ad puniendum missi, alia intentione puniunt, quam mittantur, nam ipsi puniunt ex odio vel invidia, mittuntur autem a Deo propter eius iustitiam.

In order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained principally through the grace of God, secondarily through the guardianship of the angels.

Ad hoc quod non sit inaequalis pugnae conditio, fit ex parte hominis recompensatio, principaliter quidem per auxilium divinae gratiae, secundario autem per custodiam Angelorum.

The assault of the flesh and the world would suffice for the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the demon's malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men. But by the Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of the elect.

Infirmitati humanae sufficeret ad exercitium impugnatio quae est a carne et mundo, sed malitiae Daemonum non sufficit, quae utroque utitur ad hominum impugnationem. Sed tamen ex divina ordinatione hoc provenit in gloriam electorum.

Two things may be considered in the assault of the demons--the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. The assault itself is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavor to hinder man's progress; and through pride usurp a semblance of Divine power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the angels of God in their various offices minister to man's salvation.

Circa impugnationem Daemonum duo est considerare, scilicet ipsam impugnationem, et impugnationis ordinem. Impugnatio quidem ipsa ex Daemonum malitia procedit, qui propter invidiam profectum hominum impedire nituntur; et propter superbiam divinae potestatis similitudinem usurpant, deputando sibi ministros determinatos ad hominum impugnationem, sicut et Angeli Deo ministrant in determinatis officiis ad hominum salutem.

But the ordering of the assault is from God, Who knows how to make orderly use of evil by ordering it to good. On the other hand, in regard to the angels, both their guardianship and the ordering thereof are to be referred to God as their first author.

Sed ordo impugnationis ipsius est a Deo, qui ordinate novit malis uti, ad bona ea ordinando. Sed ex parte Angelorum, tam ipsa custodia quam ordo custodiae reducitur ad Deum, sicut ad primum auctorem.

Q114: The assaults of the demons

1. Are men assailed by the demons?
2. Is proper to the devil to tempt?
3. Are all the sins of men to be set down to the assaults or temptations of the demons?
4. Can they work real miracles for the purpose of leading men astray?
5. Are the demons who are overcome by men, hindered from making further assaults?

Q113 A8: Whether there can be strife or discord among the angels?

Yes. One angel can be said to resist another because the Divine judgments in regard to various kingdoms and various men are executed by the angels.

Unus Angelus alteri resistere dicitur quia divina iudicia circa diversa regna et diversos homines, per Angelos exercentur.

Now in their actions, the angels are ruled by the Divine decree. But it happens at times in various kingdoms or various men there are contrary merits or demerits, so that one of them is subject to or placed over another. As to what is the ordering of Divine wisdom on such matters, the angels cannot know it unless God reveal it to them: and so they need to consult Divine wisdom thereupon.

In suis autem actionibus Angeli secundum divinam sententiam regulantur. Contingit autem quandoque quod in diversis regnis, vel in diversis hominibus, contraria merita vel demerita inveniuntur, ut unus alteri subdatur aut praesit. Quid autem super hoc ordo divinae sapientiae habeat, cognoscere non possunt nisi Deo revelante, unde necesse habent super his sapientiam Dei consulere.

Wherefore inasmuch as they consult the Divine will concerning various contrary and opposing merits, they are said to resist one another: not that their wills are in opposition, since they are all of one mind as to the fulfillment of the Divine decree; but that the things about which they seek knowledge are in opposition.

Sic igitur inquantum de contrariis meritis et sibi repugnantibus, divinam consulunt voluntatem, resistere sibi invicem dicuntur, non quia sint eorum contrariae voluntates, cum in hoc omnes concordent, quod Dei sententia impleatur; sed quia ea de quibus consulunt, sunt repugnantia.

The raising of this question is occasioned by this passage of Daniel:

Ista quaestio movetur occasione horum verborum Danielis:

It is written (Daniel 10:13): "The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days."

Dicitur Dan. X, ex persona Gabrielis, "princeps regni Persarum restitit mihi viginti et uno diebus."

Jerome explains it by saying that the prince of the kingdom of the Persians is the angel who opposed the setting free of the people of Israel, for whom Daniel was praying, his prayers being offered to God by Gabriel. And this resistance of his may have been caused by some prince of the demons having led the Jewish captives in Persia into sin; which sin was an impediment to the efficacy of the prayer which Daniel put up for that same people.

Quae quidem Hieronymus exponit, dicens principem regni Persarum esse Angelum qui se opposuit liberationi populi Israelitici, pro quo Daniel orabat, Gabriele preces eius Deo praesentante. Haec autem resistentia potuit fieri, quia princeps aliquis Daemonum Iudaeos in Persidem ductos ad peccatum induxerat, per quod impedimentum praestabatur orationi Danielis, pro eodem populo deprecantis.

But according to Gregory (Moral. xvii), the prince of the kingdom of Persia was a good angel appointed to the guardianship of that kingdom.

Sed secundum Gregorium, XVII Moral., princeps regni Persarum bonus Angelus fuit, custodiae regni illius deputatus.

Therefore one good angel resists the others; and thus there is strife among them.

Ergo unus bonus Angelus resistit alii, et sic inter eos est pugna.

Q113 A7: Whether angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard?

No. Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the pains inflicted on men, because, simply speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the will of the blessed.

Angeli non dolent neque de peccatis, neque de poenis hominum, quia, simpliciter loquendo, nihil fit in mundo contra voluntatem beatorum.

For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that is called simply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a particular time, having considered all the circumstances; although universally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary: thus the sailor does not will the casting of his cargo into the sea, considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the threatened danger of his life, he wills it. Wherefore this is voluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage.

Ut enim philosophus dicit in III Ethic. illud dicitur simpliciter voluntarium, quod aliquis vult in particulari, secundum quod agitur, consideratis scilicet omnibus quae circumstant, quamvis in universali consideratum non esset voluntarium, sicut nauta non vult proiectionem mercium in mare, absolute et universaliter considerando, sed imminente periculo salutis hoc vult. Unde magis est hoc voluntarium quam involuntarium, ut ibidem dicitur.

Therefore universally and absolutely speaking the angels do not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the fulfilment of the ordering of Divine justice in this matter, in respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall into sin.

Sic igitur Angeli peccata et poenas hominum, universaliter et absolute loquendo, non volunt, volunt tamen quod circa hoc ordo divinae iustitiae servetur, secundum quem quidam poenis subduntur, et peccare permittuntur.

Q113 A6: Whether the angel guardian ever forsakes a man?

No. The angel guardian never forsakes a man entirely, but sometimes he leaves him in some particular, for instance by not preventing him from being subject to some trouble, or even from falling into sin, according to the ordering of Divine judgments, because neither man, nor anything at all, is entirely withdrawn from the providence of God, for inasmuch as a thing participates being, so far is it subject to the providence that extends over all being.

Angelus custos nunquam totaliter dimittit hominem, sed ad aliquid interdum eum dimittit; prout scilicet non impedit quin subdatur alicui tribulationi, vel etiam quin cadat in peccatum, secundum ordinem divinorum iudiciorum, quia nec homo, nec res aliqua, totaliter divinae providentiae subtrahitur, inquantum enim aliquid participat de esse, intantum subditur universali providentiae entium.

God indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering of His providence, but only inasmuch as He allows man to suffer some defect of punishment or of fault.

Sed intantum Deus, secundum ordinem suae providentiae, dicitur hominem derelinquere, inquantum permittit hominem pati aliquem defectum vel poenae vel culpae.

Q113 A5: Whether an angel is appointed to guard a man from his birth?

Yes. From the very moment of his birth man has an angel guardian appointed to him, because those benefits which are conferred by God on man as a Christian, begin with his baptism (such as receiving the Eucharist, and the like), but those which are conferred by God on man as a rational being, are bestowed on him at his birth, for then it is that he receives that nature; among the latter benefits we must count the guardianship of angels.

Statim a nativitate habet homo Angelum ad sui custodiam deputatum quia beneficia quae dantur homini divinitus ex eo quod est Christianus, incipiunt a tempore Baptismi (sicut perceptio Eucharistiae, et alia huiusmodi), sed ea quae providentur homini a Deo, inquantum habet naturam rationalem, ex tunc ei exhibentur, ex quo nascendo talem naturam accipit; et tale beneficium est custodia Angelorum.

As long as the child is in the mother's womb it is not entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still part of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of the tree. And therefore it can be said with some degree of probability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child while in the womb. But at its birth, when it becomes separate from the mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it.

Puer quandiu est in materno utero, non totaliter est a matre separatus, sed per quandam colligationem est quodammodo adhuc aliquid eius, sicut et fructus pendens in arbore, est aliquid arboris. Et ideo probabiliter dici potest quod Angelus qui est in custodia matris, custodiat prolem in matris utero existentem. Sed in nativitate, quando separatur a matre, Angelus ei ad custodiam deputatur, ut Hieronymus dicit.

Q113 A4: Whether angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men?

Yes. Each soul has an angel appointed to guard it because, as guardians are appointed for men who have to pass by an unsafe road, so an angel guardian is assigned to each man as long as he is a wayfarer.

Unaquaeque anima ad sui custodiam habet Angelum deputatum quia sicut hominibus per viam non tutam ambulantibus dantur custodes, ita et cuilibet homini, quandiu viator est, custos Angelus deputatur.

Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even Anti-christ, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason; so neither are they deprived of that exterior help granted by God to the whole human race--namely the guardianship of the angels. And although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in their deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless conduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt both themselves and others. For even the demons are held off by the good angels, lest they hurt as much as they would. In like manner Antichrist will not do as much harm as he would wish.

Sicut praesciti et infideles, et etiam Antichristus, non privantur interiori auxilio naturalis rationis; ita etiam non privantur exteriori auxilio toti naturae humanae divinitus concesso, scilicet custodia Angelorum. Per quam etsi non iuventur quantum ad hoc quod vitam aeternam bonis operibus mereantur, iuvantur tamen quantum ad hoc, quod ab aliquibus malis retrahuntur, quibus et sibi ipsis et aliis nocere possunt. Nam et ipsi Daemones arcentur per bonos Angelos, ne noceant quantum volunt. Et similiter Antichristus non tantum nocebit, quantum vellet.

On the text, "Their angels in heaven," etc. (Matthew 8:10), Jerome says: "Great is the dignity of souls, for each one to have an angel deputed to guard it from its birth."

Hieronymus, exponens illud Matth. XVIII, "Angeli eorum in caelis," dicit, "magna est dignitas animarum, ut unaquaeque habeat, ab ortu nativitatis, in custodiam sui Angelum delegatum."

Q113 A3: Whether to guard men belongs only to the lowest order of angels?

Yes. To each man an angel is appointed to guard him, and such guardianship belongs to the lowest order of the angels (whose place it is, according to Gregory, to announce the "lesser things"), because it seems to be the least of the angelic offices to procure what concerns the salvation of only one man.

Singulis hominibus singuli Angeli ad custodiam deputantur, et talis custodia pertinet ad infimum ordinem Angelorum (quorum, secundum Gregorium, est minima nuntiare), quia hoc videtur esse minimum in officiis Angelorum, procurare ea quae ad unius hominis tantum salutem pertinent.

The other kind of guardianship is universal, multiplied according to the different orders. For the more universal an agent is, the higher it is.

Alia vero est custodia universalis. Et haec multiplicatur secundum diversos ordines, nam quanto agens fuerit universalius, tanto est superius.

Thus the guardianship of the human race belongs to the order of "Principalities," or perhaps to the "Archangels," whom we call the angel princes. Hence, Michael, whom we call an archangel, is also styled "one of the princes" (Daniel 10:13). Moreover all corporeal creatures are guarded by the "Virtues"; and likewise the demons by the "Powers," and the good spirits by the "Principalities," according to Gregory's opinion (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.).

Sic igitur custodia humanae multitudinis pertinet ad ordinem principatuum, vel forte ad Archangelos, qui dicuntur principes Angeli, unde et Michael, quem Archangelum dicimus, unus de principibus dicitur Dan. X. Ulterius autem super omnes naturas corporeas habent custodiam virtutes. Et ulterius etiam super Daemones habent custodiam potestates. Et ulterius etiam super bonos spiritus habent custodiam principatus, secundum Gregorium.

Q113 A2: Whether each man is guarded by an angel?

Yes. Each man has an angel guardian appointed to him because men are not only incorruptible in the common species, but also in the proper forms of each individual, which are the rational souls, which cannot be said of other corruptible things.

Singulis hominibus singuli Angeli ad custodiam deputantur quia homines non solum sunt incorruptibiles quantum ad communem speciem, sed etiam quantum ad proprias formas singulorum, quae sunt animae rationales, quod de aliis rebus corruptibilibus dici non potest.

Although men are equal in nature, still inequality exists among them, according as Divine Providence orders some to the greater, and others to the lesser things, according to Sirach 33:11-12: "With much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diversified their ways: some of them hath He blessed and exalted, and some of them hath He cursed and brought low."

Quamvis homines natura sint pares, tamen inaequalitas in eis invenitur, secundum quod ex divina providentia quidam ordinantur ad maius, et quidam ad minus; secundum illud quod dicitur Eccli. XXXIII, "in multitudine disciplinae domini separavit eos, ex ipsis benedixit et exaltavit, ex ipsis maledixit et humiliavit."

Q113 A1: Whether men are guarded by the angels?

Yes. It was necessary that angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men, in order to regulate them and move them to good, because as regards things to be done human cognition and affection can vary and fail from good in many ways.

Necessarium fuit quod hominibus Angeli ad custodiam deputarentur, per quos regularentur et moverentur ad bonum, quia in rebus agendis cognitio et affectus hominis multipliciter variari et deficere possunt a bono.

Two things are required for a good action; first, that the affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the habit of moral virtue. Secondly, that reason should discover the proper ways to make perfect the good of virtue; this the Philosopher (Ethic. vi) attributes to prudence.

Ad bene operandum duo requiruntur. Primo quidem, quod affectus inclinetur ad bonum, quod quidem fit in nobis per habitum virtutis moralis. Secundo autem, quod ratio inveniat congruas vias ad perficiendum bonum virtutis, quod quidem philosophus attribuit prudentiae.

As regards the first, God guards man immediately by infusing into him grace and virtues; as regards the second, God guards man as his universal instructor, Whose precepts reach man by the medium of the angels, as above stated (Q111, A1).

Quantum ergo ad primum, Deus immediate custodit hominem, infundendo ei gratiam et virtutes. Quantum autem ad secundum, Deus custodit hominem sicut universalis instructor, cuius instructio ad hominem provenit mediantibus Angelis, ut supra habitum est.

As men depart from the natural instinct of good by reason of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the instigation of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he may do what is right. Hence that men perish is not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice of men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside the ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace of God, as likewise that miracles occur outside the order of nature.

Sicut homines a naturali instinctu boni discedunt propter passionem peccati; ita etiam discedunt ab instigatione bonorum Angelorum, quae fit invisibiliter per hoc quod homines illuminant ad bene agendum. Unde quod homines pereunt, non est imputandum negligentiae Angelorum, sed malitiae hominum. Quod autem aliquando, praeter legem communem, hominibus visibiliter apparent, ex speciali Dei gratia est, sicut etiam quod praeter ordinem naturae miracula fiunt.

By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree, but not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in affection towards good on account of the manifold passions of the soul. Likewise universal natural cognition of the law, which by nature belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but not in a sufficient degree; because in the application of the universal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be deficient in many ways. Hence it is written (Wisdom 9:14): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Thus man needs to be guarded by the angels.

Per liberum arbitrium potest homo aliqualiter malum vitare, sed non sufficienter, quia infirmatur circa affectum boni, propter multiplices animae passiones. Similiter etiam universalis cognitio naturalis legis, quae homini naturaliter adest, aliqualiter dirigit hominem ad bonum, sed non sufficienter, quia in applicando universalia principia iuris ad particularia opera, contingit hominem multipliciter deficere. Unde dicitur Sap. IX, "cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae." Et ideo necessaria fuit homini custodia Angelorum.

Q113: The guardianship of the good angels

1. Are men guarded by the angels?
2. Is each man assigned a single guardian angel?
3. Does the guardianship belong only to the lowest order of angels?
4. Is it fitting for each man to have an angel guardian?
5. When does an angel's guardianship of a man begin?
6. Do the angel guardians always watch over men?
7. Does the angel grieve over the loss of the one guarded?
8. Does rivalry exist among the angels as regards their guardianship?

Q112 A4: Whether all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent?

No. The dominations are not sent to minister because to be sent to external ministry properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by Divine command in respect of any corporeal creature, which is part of the execution of the Divine ministry.

Dominationes in ministerium non mittuntur quia mitti ad exterius ministerium proprie convenit Angelo, secundum quod ex divino imperio operatur circa aliquam creaturam corporalem, quod quidem pertinet ad executionem divini ministerii.

Now the angelic properties are manifested by their names, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii); and therefore the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry whose names signify some kind of administration. But the name "dominations" does not signify any such administration, but only disposition and command in administering.

Proprietates autem Angelorum ex eorum nominibus manifestantur, ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Et ideo Angeli illorum ordinum ad exterius ministerium mittuntur, ex quorum nominibus aliqua executio datur intelligi. In nomine autem dominationum non importatur aliqua executio, sed sola dispositio et imperium de exequendis.

On the other hand, the names of the inferior orders imply administration, for the "Angels" and "Archangels" are so called from "announcing"; the "Virtues" and "Powers" are so called in respect of some act; and it is right that the "Prince," according to what Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), "be first among the workers." Hence it belongs to these five orders to be sent to external ministry, not to the four superior orders.

Sed in nominibus inferiorum ordinum intelligitur aliqua executio, nam "Angeli" et "Archangeli" denominantur a denuntiando; "virtutes" et "potestates" dicuntur per respectum ad aliquem actum; "principis" etiam est, ut Gregorius dicit, inter alios operantes priorem existere. Unde ad hos quinque ordines pertinet in exterius ministerium mitti, non autem ad quatuor superiores.

The Dominations are reckoned among the ministering angels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to be done by others; thus an architect does not put his hands to the production of his art, but only disposes and orders what others are to do.

Dominationes computantur quidem inter Angelos ministrantes, non sicut exequentes ministerium, sed sicut disponentes et mandantes quid per alios fieri debeat. Sicut architectores in artificiis nihil manu operantur, sed solum disponunt et praecipiunt quid alii debeant operari.

Two accounts may be given in assigning the number of the assisting and ministering angels. For Gregory says that those who minister are more numerous than those who assist; because he takes the words (Daniel 7:10) "thousands of thousands ministered to Him," not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean "thousands out of thousands"; thus the number of those who minister is indefinite, and signifies excess; while the number of assistants is finite as in the words added, "and ten thousand times a hundred thousand assisted Him."

De numero assistentium et ministrantium duplex ratio haberi potest. Gregorius enim dicit plures esse ministrantes quam assistentes. Intelligit enim quod dicitur, millia millium ministrabant ei, non esse dictum multiplicative, sed partitive; ac si diceretur, millia de numero millium. Et sic ministrantium numerus ponitur indefinitus, ad significandum excessum; assistentium vero finitus, cum subditur, et decies millies centena millia assistebant ei.

This explanation rests on the account of the Platonists, who said that the nearer things are to the one first principle, the smaller they are in number; as the nearer a number is to unity, the lesser it is than multitude. This opinion is verified as regards the number of orders, as six administer and three assist.

Et hoc procedit secundum rationem Platonicorum, qui dicebant quod quanto aliqua sunt uni primo principio propinquiora, tanto sunt minoris multitudinis, sicut quanto numerus est propinquior unitati, tanto est multitudine minor. Et haec opinio salvatur quantum ad numerum ordinum, dum sex ministrant, et tres assistunt.

Dionysius, however, (Coel. Hier. xiv) declares that the multitude of angels surpasses all the multitude of material things; so that, as the superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable degree, so the superior incorporeal natures surpass all corporeal natures in multitude; because whatever is better is more intended and more multiplied by God. Hence, as the assistants are superior to the ministers there will be more assistants than ministers.

Sed Dionysius ponit, XIV cap. Cael. Hier., quod multitudo Angelorum transcendit omnem materialem multitudinem; ut scilicet, sicut corpora superiora transcendunt corpora inferiora magnitudine quasi in immensum, ita superiores naturae incorporeae transcendunt multitudine omnes naturas corporeas; quia quod est melius, est magis a Deo intentum et multiplicatum. Et secundum hoc, cum assistentes sint superiores ministrantibus, plures erunt assistentes quam ministrantes.

In this way, the words "thousands of thousands" are taken by way of multiplication, to signify "a thousand times a thousand." And because ten times a hundred is a thousand, if it were said "ten times a hundred thousand" it would mean that there are as many assistants as ministers: but since it is written "ten thousand times a hundred thousand," we are given to understand that the assistants are much more numerous than the ministers.

Unde secundum hoc, millia millium legitur multiplicativae, ac si diceretur, millies millia. Et quia decies centum sunt mille, si diceretur, decies centena millia, daretur intelligi quod tot essent assistentes, quot ministrantes, sed quia dicitur, decies millies centena millia, multo plures dicuntur esse assistentes quam ministrantes.

Nor is this said to signify that this is the precise number of angels, but rather that it is much greater, in that it exceeds all material multitude. This is signified by the multiplication together of all the greatest numbers, namely ten, a hundred, and a thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same passage.

Nec tamen hoc pro tanto dicitur, quia tantus solum sit Angelorum numerus, sed multo maior, quia omnem materialem multitudinem excedit. Quod significatur per multiplicationem maximorum numerorum supra seipsos, scilicet denarii, centenarii et millenarii; ut Dionysius ibidem dicit.