Q85 A3: Whether the more universal is first in our intellectual cognition?

Yes. Our intellect knows "animal" before it knows "man", and the same reason holds in comparing any more universal idea with the less universal, because our intellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality.

Prius occurrit intellectui nostro cognoscere animal quam cognoscere hominem, et eadem ratio est si comparemus quodcumque magis universale ad minus universale, quia intellectus noster de potentia in actum procedit.

And every power thus proceeding from potentiality to actuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is the medium between potentiality and actuality, before accomplishing the perfect act.

Omne autem quod procedit de potentia in actum, prius pervenit ad actum incompletum, qui est medius inter potentiam et actum, quam ad actum perfectum.

Knowledge of the singular and individual is prior, as regards us, to the knowledge of the universal, as sensible knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge. But in both sense and intellect the knowledge of the more common precedes the knowledge of the less common.

Cognitio singularium est prior quoad nos quam cognitio universalium, sicut cognitio sensitiva quam cognitio intellectiva. Sed tam secundum sensum quam secundum intellectum, cognitio magis communis est prior quam cognitio minus communis.

The reason of this is clear: because he who knows a thing indistinctly is in a state of potentiality as regards its principle of distinction; as he who knows "genus" is in a state of potentiality as regards "difference." Thus it is evident that indistinct knowledge is midway between potentiality and act.

Et huius ratio manifesta est. Quia qui scit aliquid indistincte, adhuc est in potentia ut sciat distinctionis principium; sicut qui scit genus, est in potentia ut sciat differentiam. Et sic patet quod cognitio indistincta media est inter potentiam et actum.

The universal can be considered in two ways.

Universale dupliciter potest considerari.

First, the universal nature may be considered together with the intention of universality. And since the intention of universality--viz., the relation of one and the same to many--is due to intellectual abstraction, the universal thus considered is a secondary consideration. Hence it is said (De Anima i, 1) that the "universal animal is either nothing or something secondary." But according to Plato, who held that universals are subsistent, the universal considered thus would be prior to the particular, for the latter, according to him, are mere participations of the subsistent universals which he called ideas.

Uno modo, secundum quod natura universalis consideratur simul cum intentione universalitatis. Et cum intentio universalitatis, ut scilicet unum et idem habeat habitudinem ad multa, proveniat ex abstractione intellectus, oportet quod secundum hunc modum universale sit posterius. Unde in I de anima dicitur quod "animal universale aut nihil est, aut posterius est." Sed secundum Platonem, qui posuit universalia subsistentia, secundum hanc considerationem universale esset prius quam particularia, quae secundum eum non sunt nisi per participationem universalium subsistentium, quae dicuntur ideae.

Secondly, the universal can be considered in the nature itself--for instance, animality or humanity as existing in the individual. And thus we must distinguish two orders of nature: one, by way of generation and time; and thus the imperfect and the potential come first. In this way the more common comes first in the order of nature; as appears clearly in the generation of man and animal; for "the animal is generated before man," as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal ii, 3). The other order is the order of perfection or of the intention of nature: for instance, act considered absolutely is naturally prior to potentiality, and the perfect to the imperfect: thus the less common comes naturally before the more common; as man comes before animal. For the intention of nature does not stop at the generation of animal but goes on to the generation of man.

Alio modo potest considerari quantum ad ipsam naturam, scilicet animalitatis vel humanitatis, prout invenitur in particularibus. Et sic dicendum est quod duplex est ordo naturae. Unus secundum viam generationis et temporis, secundum quam viam, ea quae sunt imperfecta et in potentia, sunt priora. Et hoc modo magis commune est prius secundum naturam, quod apparet manifeste in generatione hominis et animalis; nam prius generatur animal quam homo, ut dicitur in libro de Generat. Animal. Alius est ordo perfectionis, sive intentionis naturae; sicut actus simpliciter est prius secundum naturam quam potentia, et perfectum prius quam imperfectum. Et per hunc modum, minus commune est prius secundum naturam quam magis commune, ut homo quam animal, naturae enim intentio non sistit in generatione animalis, sed intendit generare hominem.

The universal, as understood with the intention of universality, is, indeed, in a way, a principle of knowledge, in so far as the intention of universality results from the mode of understanding by way of abstraction. But what is a principle of knowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence, as Plato thought: since at times we know a cause through its effect, and substance through accidents. Wherefore the universal thus considered, according to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a principle of existence, nor a substance, as he makes clear (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 13).

Universale, secundum quod accipitur cum intentione universalitatis, est quidem quodammodo principium cognoscendi, prout intentio universalitatis consequitur modum intelligendi qui est per abstractionem. Non autem est necesse quod omne quod est principium cognoscendi, sit principium essendi, ut Plato existimavit, cum quandoque cognoscamus causam per effectum, et substantiam per accidentia. Unde universale sic acceptum, secundum sententiam Aristotelis, non est principium essendi, neque substantia, ut patet in VII Metaphys.

But if we consider the generic or specific nature itself as existing in the singular, thus in a way it is in the formal aspect of a formal principle in regard to the singulars: for the singular is the result of matter, while the formal aspect of species is from the form. But the generic nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the fashion of a material principle, because the generic nature is taken from that which is material in a thing, while the formal aspect of species is taken from that which is formal: thus the formal aspect of animal is taken from the sensitive part, whereas the formal aspect of man is taken from the intellectual part.

Si autem consideremus ipsam naturam generis et speciei prout est in singularibus, sic quodammodo habet rationem principii formalis respectu singularium: nam singulare est propter materiam, ratio autem speciei sumitur ex forma. Sed natura generis comparatur ad naturam speciei magis per modum materialis principii, quia natura generis sumitur ab eo quod est materiale in re, ratio vero speciei ab eo quod est formale: sicut ratio animalis a sensitivo, ratio vero hominis ab intellectivo.

Thus it is that the ultimate intention of nature is to the species and not to the individual, or the genus: because the form is the end of generation, while matter is for the sake of the form. Neither is it necessary that, as regards us, knowledge of any cause or principle should be secondary: since at times through sensible causes we become acquainted with unknown effects, and sometimes conversely.

Et inde est quod ultima naturae intentio est ad speciem, non autem ad individuum, neque ad genus: quia forma est finis generationis, materia vero est propter formam. Non autem oportet quod cuiuslibet causae vel principii cognitio sit posterior quoad nos: cum quandoque cognoscamus per causas sensibiles, effectus ignotos, quandoque autem e converso.

Q85 A2: Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood?

No. The soul knows external things by means of its intelligible species because the intelligible species is not what is actually understood, but that by which the intellect understands.

Anima per species intelligibiles cognoscat res quae sunt extra animam quia species intelligibilis non est quod intelligitur actu, sed id quo intelligit intellectus.

Since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness. This also appears from the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who said that "like is known by like."

Quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundum eandem reflexionem intelligit et suum intelligere, et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellectiva secundario est id quod intelligitur. Sed id quod intelligitur primo, est res cuius species intelligibilis est similitudo. Et hoc etiam patet ex antiquorum opinione, qui ponebant simile simili cognosci.

There are two operations in the sensitive part. One, in regard of impression only, and thus the operation of the senses takes place by the senses being impressed by the sensible. The other is formation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself an image of an absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of these operations are found in the intellect.

In parte sensitiva invenitur duplex operatio. Una secundum solam immutationem, et sic perficitur operatio sensus per hoc quod immutatur a sensibili. Alia operatio est formatio, secundum quod vis imaginativa format sibi aliquod idolum rei absentis, vel etiam nunquam visae. Et utraque haec operatio coniungitur in intellectu.

For in the first place there is the passion of the passive intellect as informed by the intelligible species; and then the passive intellect thus informed forms a definition, or a division, or a composition, expressed by a word. Wherefore the formal aspect conveyed by a word is its definition; and a proposition conveys the intellect's division or composition. Words do not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves; but that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose of judging of external things.

Nam primo quidem consideratur passio intellectus possibilis secundum quod informatur specie intelligibili. Qua quidem formatus, format secundo vel definitionem vel divisionem vel compositionem, quae per vocem significatur. Unde ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio; et enuntiatio significat compositionem et divisionem intellectus. Non ergo voces significant ipsas species intelligibiles; sed ea quae intellectus sibi format ad iudicandum de rebus exterioribus.

Q85 A1: Whether our intellect understands corporeal and material things by abstraction from phantasms?

Yes. Material things must needs be understood according as they are abstracted from matter and from material images, namely, phantasms, because the object of knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge.

Oportet quod materialia intelligantur inquantum a materia abstrahuntur, et a similitudinibus materialibus, quae sunt phantasmata, quia obiectum cognoscibile proportionatur virtuti cognoscitivae.

We must needs say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial.

Necesse est dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia abstrahendo a phantasmatibus; et per materialia sic considerata in immaterialium aliqualem cognitionem devenimus, sicut e contra Angeli per immaterialia materialia cognoscunt.

The things which belong to the formal aspect of species of a material thing, such as a stone, or a man, or a horse, can be thought of apart from the individualizing principles which do not belong to the formal aspect of the species. This is what we mean by abstracting the universal from the particular, or the intelligible species from the phantasm; that is, by considering the nature of the species apart from its individual qualities represented by the phantasms.

Ea quae pertinent ad rationem speciei cuiuslibet rei materialis, puta lapidis aut hominis aut equi, possunt considerari sine principiis individualibus, quae non sunt de ratione speciei. Et hoc est abstrahere universale a particulari, vel speciem intelligibilem a phantasmatibus; considerare scilicet naturam speciei absque consideratione individualium principiorum, quae per phantasmata repraesentantur.

The thing understood is immaterially in the one who understands, according to the mode of the intellect, and not materially, according to the mode of a material thing.

Intellectum est in intelligente immaterialiter, per modum intellectus; non autem materialiter, per modum rei materialis.

The intellect therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from the individual sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter.

Intellectus igitur abstrahit speciem rei naturalis a materia sensibili individuali, non autem a materia sensibili communi.

Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the intellect from sensible matter, not only from individual, but also from common matter; not, however, from common intelligible matter, but only from individual [quantified] matter.

Species autem mathematicae possunt abstrahi per intellectum a materia sensibili non solum individuali, sed etiam communi; non tamen a materia intelligibili communi, sed solum individuali.

The intellect would be false if it abstracted the species of a stone from its matter in such a way as to regard the species as not existing in matter, as Plato held.

Unde falsus esset intellectus, si sic abstraheret speciem lapidis a materia, ut intelligeret eam non esse in materia, ut Plato posuit.

He held that all those things which we have stated to be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in reality.

Et quia Plato non consideravit quod dictum est de duplici modo abstractionis, omnia quae diximus abstrahi per intellectum, posuit abstracta esse secundum rem.

Colors, as being in individual corporeal matter, have the same mode of existence as the power of sight: therefore they can impress their own image on the eye. But phantasms, since they are images of individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, have not the same mode of existence as the human intellect, and therefore have not the power of themselves to make an impression on the passive intellect.

Colores habent eundem modum existendi prout sunt in materia corporali individuali, sicut et potentia visiva: et ideo possunt imprimere suam similitudinem in visum. Sed phantasmata, cum sint similitudines individuorum, et existant in organis corporeis, non habent eundem modum existendi quem habet intellectus humanus, ut ex dictis patet; et ideo non possunt sua virtute imprimere in intellectum possibilem.

This is done by the power of the active intellect which by turning towards the phantasms produces in the passive intellect a certain similitude which is representative — as far as concerns the nature of the species — of those things which are phantasms. It is thus that the intelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasms; not that the identical form which previously was in the phantasms is subsequently in the passive intellect, as a body transferred from one place to another.

Sed virtute intellectus agentis resultat quaedam similitudo in intellectu possibili ex conversione intellectus agentis supra phantasmata, quae quidem est repraesentativa eorum quorum sunt phantasmata, solum quantum ad naturam speciei. Et per hunc modum dicitur abstrahi species intelligibilis a phantasmatibus; non quod aliqua eadem numero forma, quae prius fuit in phantasmatibus, postmodum fiat in intellectu possibili, ad modum quo corpus accipitur ab uno loco et transfertur ad alterum.

Not only does the active intellect (A) throw light on the phantasms, it does more; (B) by its own power it abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms.

Phantasmata et illuminantur ab intellectu agente; et iterum ab eis, per virtutem intellectus agentis, species intelligibiles abstrahuntur.

(A) It throws light on the phantasms, because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by its conjunction with the intellectual part, so by the power of the active intellect the phantasms are made more fit for the abstraction therefrom of intelligible intentions.

Illuminantur quidem, quia, sicut pars sensitiva ex coniunctione ad intellectivam efficitur virtuosior, ita phantasmata ex virtute intellectus agentis redduntur habilia ut ab eis intentiones intelligibiles abstrahantur.

Furthermore, (B) the active intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms, inasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we are able to take into our consideration the natures of the species apart from the individual conditions: the passive intellect is informed according to the similitudes of [the relations between] the individual conditions.

Abstrahit autem intellectus agens species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum per virtutem intellectus agentis accipere possumus in nostra consideratione naturas specierum sine individualibus conditionibus: secundum quarum similitudines intellectus possibilis informatur.

Our intellect both (B) abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things as universal, and nevertheless (A) understands these natures in the phantasms, since it cannot understand even the things of which it abstracts the species, without turning itself to the phantasms.

Intellectus noster et abstrahit species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum considerat naturas rerum in universali, et tamen intelligit eas in phantasmatibus, quia non potest intelligere etiam ea quorum species abstrahit, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata.

Q85: The mode and order of understanding

1. Does our intellect understand by abstracting the species from the phantasms?
2. Are the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms what our intellect understands, or that whereby it understands?
3. Does our intellect naturally first understand the more universal?
4. Can our intellect know many things at the same time?
5. Does our intellect understand by the process of composition and division?
6. Can the intellect err?
7. Can one intellect understand better than another?
8. Does our intellect understand the indivisible before the divisible?

Q84 A8: Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered through suspension of the sensitive powers?

Yes. Suspension of the senses necessarily involves a hindrance to the judgment of the intellect because although the intellect is superior to the senses, nevertheless in a manner it receives from the senses, and its first and principal objects are founded in sensible things.

Necesse est quod impediatur iudicium intellectus ex ligamento sensus quia quamvis intellectus sit superior sensu, accipit tamen aliquo modo a sensu, et eius obiecta prima et principalia in sensibilibus fundantur.

As we have said above (Q84, A7), our intellect's proper and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing. Now a perfect judgment concerning anything cannot be formed, unless all that pertains to that thing's nature be known, especially if that be ignored which is the term and end of judgment.

Sicut dictum est, proprium obiectum intellectui nostro proportionatum est natura rei sensibilis. Iudicium autem perfectum de re aliqua dari non potest, nisi ea omnia quae ad rem pertinent cognoscantur, et praecipue si ignoretur id quod est terminus et finis iudicii.

Now the Philosopher says (De Coel. iii), that "as the end of a practical science is action, so the end of natural science is that which is perceived principally through the senses"; for the smith does not seek knowledge of a knife except for the purpose of action, in order that he may produce a certain individual knife; and in like manner the natural philosopher does not seek to know the nature of a stone and of a horse, save for the purpose of knowing the essential formal structures of those things which he perceives with his senses.

Dicit autem philosophus, in III de caelo, quod "sicut finis factivae scientiae est opus, ita naturalis scientiae finis est quod videtur principaliter secundum sensum"; faber enim non quaerit cognitionem cultelli nisi propter opus, ut operetur hunc particularem cultellum; et similiter naturalis non quaerit cognoscere naturam lapidis et equi, nisi ut sciat rationes eorum quae videntur secundum sensum.

Now it is clear that a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he knows the action of the knife; and in like manner the natural philosopher cannot judge perfectly of natural things, unless he knows sensible things.

Manifestum est autem quod non posset esse perfectum iudicium fabri de cultello, si opus ignoraret; et similiter non potest esse perfectum iudicium scientiae naturalis de rebus naturalibus, si sensibilia ignorentur.

But in the present state of life whatever we understand, we know by comparison to natural sensible things. Consequently it is not possible for our intellect to form a perfect judgment, while the senses are suspended, through which sensible things are known to us.

Omnia autem quae in praesenti statu intelligimus, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad res sensibiles naturales. Unde impossibile est quod sit in nobis iudicium intellectus perfectum, cum ligamento sensus, per quem res sensibiles cognoscimus.

Q84 A7: Whether the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without turning to the phantasms?

No. In the present state of life in which the soul is united to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect to understand anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms, because the proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible things it rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible.

Impossibile est intellectum nostrum, secundum praesentis vitae statum, quo passibili corpori coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, quia intellectus humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens; et per huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum etiam in invisibilium rerum aliqualem cognitionem ascendit.

Now it belongs to such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from corporeal matter: for instance, it belongs to the nature of a stone to be in an individual stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an individual horse, and so forth. Wherefore the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except in as much as it is known as existing in the individual. Now we apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for the intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of necessity turn itself to the phantasms, in order to perceive the universal nature existing in the individual.

De ratione autem huius naturae est, quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non est absque materia corporali: sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide, et de ratione naturae equi quod sit in hoc equo, et sic de aliis. Unde natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem. Et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum obiectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem.

For the intellect to understand actually, not only when it acquires fresh knowledge, but also when it applies knowledge already acquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and of the other powers.

Intellectus actu intelligat, non solum accipiendo scientiam de novo, sed etiam utendo scientia iam acquisita, requiritur actus imaginationis et ceterarum virtutum.

Anyone can experience this of himself, that when he tries to understand something, he forms certain phantasms to serve him by way of examples, in which as it were he examines what he is desirous of understanding. For this reason it is that when we wish to help someone to understand something, we lay examples before him, from which he forms phantasms for the purpose of understanding.

Hoc quilibet in seipso experiri potest, quod quando aliquis conatur aliquid intelligere, format aliqua phantasmata sibi per modum exemplorum, in quibus quasi inspiciat quod intelligere studet. Et inde est etiam quod quando alium volumus facere aliquid intelligere, proponimus ei exempla, ex quibus sibi phantasmata formare possit ad intelligendum.

Now the reason of this is that the power of knowledge is proportioned to the thing known.

Huius autem ratio est, quia potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili.

Incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms, are known to us by comparison with sensible bodies of which there are phantasms. Thus we understand truth by considering a thing of which we possess the truth; and God, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), we know as cause, by way of excess and by way of remotion. Other incorporeal substances we know, in the present state of life, only by way of remotion or by some comparison to corporeal things. And, therefore, when we understand something about these things, we need to turn to phantasms of bodies, although there are no phantasms of the things themselves.

Incorporea, quorum non sunt phantasmata, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad corpora sensibilia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Sicut veritatem intelligimus ex consideratione rei circa quam veritatem speculamur; Deum autem, ut Dionysius dicit, cognoscimus ut causam, et per excessum, et per remotionem; alias etiam incorporeas substantias, in statu praesentis vitae, cognoscere non possumus nisi per remotionem, vel aliquam comparationem ad corporalia. Et ideo cum de huiusmodi aliquid intelligimus, necesse habemus converti ad phantasmata corporum, licet ipsorum non sint phantasmata.

The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that "the soul understands nothing without a phantasm."

Philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod "nihil sine phantasmate intelligit anima."

Q84 A6: Whether intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things?

Yes. The principle of knowledge is in the senses because on the part of the phantasms, intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses.

Principium nostrae cognitionis est a sensu quia ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis operatio a sensu causatur.

But since the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect, and require to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect, it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the material cause.

Sed quia phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportet quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem, non potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est materia causae.

We must not expect the entire truth from the senses. For the light of the active intellect is needed, through which we achieve the unchangeable truth of changeable things, and discern things themselves from their likeness.

Veritas non sit totaliter a sensibus expectanda. Requiritur enim lumen intellectus agentis, per quod immutabiliter veritatem in rebus mutabilibus cognoscamus, et discernamus ipsas res a similitudinibus rerum.

Aristotle, with Plato, he agreed that intellect and sense are different. But he held that the sense has not its proper operation without the cooperation of the body; so that to feel is not an act of the soul alone, but of the "composite." And he held the same in regard to all the operations of the sensitive part.

Aristoteles autem media via processit. Posuit enim cum Platone intellectum differre a sensu. Sed sensum posuit propriam operationem non habere sine communicatione corporis; ita quod sentire non sit actus animae tantum, sed coniuncti. Et similiter posuit de omnibus operationibus sensitivae partis.

Since, therefore, it is not unreasonable that the sensible objects which are outside the soul should produce some effect in the "composite," Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this, that the operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impression of the sensible on the sense: not by a discharge, as Democritus said, but by some kind of operation. For Democritus maintained that every action comes into being by way of a discharge of atoms, as we gather from De Gener. i, 8.

Quia igitur non est inconveniens quod sensibilia quae sunt extra animam, causent aliquid in coniunctum, in hoc Aristoteles cum Democrito concordavit, quod operationes sensitivae partis causentur per impressionem sensibilium in sensum: non per modum defluxionis, ut Democritus posuit, sed per quandam operationem. Nam et Democritus omnem actionem fieri posuit per influxionem atomorum, ut patet in I de Generat.

But Aristotle held that the intellect has an operation which is independent of the body's cooperation. Now nothing corporeal can make an impression on the incorporeal. And therefore in order to cause the intellectual operation according to Aristotle, the impression caused by the sensible does not suffice, but something more noble is required, for "the agent is more noble than the patient," as he says (De Gener. i, 5).

Intellectum vero posuit Aristoteles habere operationem absque communicatione corporis. Nihil autem corporeum imprimere potest in rem incorpoream. Et ideo ad causandam intellectualem operationem, secundum Aristotelem, non sufficit sola impressio sensibilium corporum, sed requiritur aliquid nobilius, quia "agens est honorabilius patiente", ut ipse dicit.

Not, indeed, in the sense that the intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere impression of some superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher and more noble agent which he calls the active intellect, of which we have spoken above (Q79, A3; Q79, A4) causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction.

Non tamen ita quod intellectualis operatio causetur in nobis ex sola impressione aliquarum rerum superiorum, ut Plato posuit; sed illud superius et nobilius agens quod vocat intellectum agentem, de quo iam supra diximus, facit phantasmata a sensibus accepta intelligibilia in actu, per modum abstractionis cuiusdam.

Q84 A5: Whether the intellectual soul knows material things in the eternal types?

Yes. The intellectual soul knows all true things in the eternal types because the unchangeable truth is contained in the eternal types.

Anima intellectiva omnia vera cognoscit in rationibus aeterni quia veritas incommutabilis in aeternis rationibus continetur.

Augustine says (Confess. xii, 25): "If we both see that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is true, where do we see this, I pray? Neither do I see it in you, nor do you see it in me: but we both see it in the unchangeable truth which is above our minds."

Dicit Augustinus, XII Confess., "si ambo videmus verum esse quod dicis, et ambo videmus verum esse quod dico, ubi quaeso id videmus? Nec ego utique in te, nec tu in me sed ambo in ipsa, quae supra mentes nostras est, incommutabili veritate."

The human soul knows all things in the eternal types, since by participation of these types we know all things. For the intellectual light itself which is in us, is nothing else than a participated likeness of the uncreated light, in which are contained the eternal types. Whence it is written (Psalm 4:6-7), "Many say: Who showeth us good things?" which question the Psalmist answers, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us," as though he were to say: "By the seal of the Divine light in us, all things are made known to us."

Anima humana omnia cognoscat in rationibus aeternis, per quarum participationem omnia cognoscimus. Ipsum enim lumen intellectuale quod est in nobis, nihil est aliud quam quaedam participata similitudo luminis increati, in quo continentur rationes aeternae. Unde in Psalmo IV, dicitur, "multi dicunt, quis ostendit nobis bona?" Cui quaestioni Psalmista respondet, dicens, "signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine." Quasi dicat, "per ipsam sigillationem divini luminis in nobis, omnia nobis demonstrantur."

But since besides the intellectual light which is in us, intelligible species, which are derived from things, are required in order for us to have knowledge of material things; therefore this same knowledge is not due merely to a participation of the eternal types, as the Platonists held, maintaining that the mere participation of ideas sufficed for knowledge.

Quia tamen praeter lumen intellectuale in nobis, exiguntur species intelligibiles, a rebus acceptae, ad scientiam de rebus materialibus habendam; ideo non per solam participationem rationum aeternarum de rebus materialibus notitiam habemus, sicut Platonici posuerunt quod sola idearum participatio sufficit ad scientiam habendam.

As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 11): "If those who are called philosophers said by chance anything that was true and consistent with our faith, we must claim it from them as from unjust possessors. For some of the doctrines of the heathens are spurious imitations or superstitious inventions, which we must be careful to avoid when we renounce the society of the heathens." Consequently whenever Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists, found in their teaching anything consistent with faith, he adopted it; and those things which he found contrary to faith he amended.

Augustinus dicit in II de Doctr. Christ., "philosophi qui vocantur, si qua forte vera et fidei nostrae accommoda dixerunt, ab eis tanquam ab iniustis possessoribus in usum nostrum vindicanda sunt. Habent enim doctrinae gentilium quaedam simulata et superstitiosa figmenta, quae unusquisque nostrum de societate gentilium exiens, debet evitare." Et ideo Augustinus, qui doctrinis Platonicorum imbutus fuerat, si qua invenit fidei accommoda in eorum dictis, assumpsit; quae vero invenit fidei nostrae adversa, in melius commutavit.

Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 16): "Although the philosophers prove by convincing arguments that all things occur in time according to the eternal types, were they able to see in the eternal types, or to find out from them how many kinds of animals there are and the origin of each? Did they not seek for this information from the story of times and places?"

Unde Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., "numquid quia philosophi documentis certissimis persuadent aeternis rationibus omnia temporalia fieri, propterea potuerunt in ipsis rationibus perspicere, vel ex ipsis colligere quot sint animalium genera, quae semina singulorum? Nonne ista omnia per locorum ac temporum historiam quaesierunt?"

That Augustine did not understand all things to be known in their "eternal types" or in the "unchangeable truth," as though the eternal types themselves were seen, is clear from what he says (QQ. 83, qu. 46): viz., that "not each and every rational soul can be said to be worthy of that vision," namely, of the eternal types, "but only those that are holy and pure": such as the souls of the blessed.

Quod autem Augustinus non sic intellexerit omnia cognosci in rationibus aeternis, vel in incommutabili veritate, quasi ipsae rationes aeternae videantur, patet per hoc quod ipse dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod "rationalis anima non omnis et quaelibet, sed quae sancta et pura fuerit, asseritur illi visioni," scilicet rationum aeternarum, esse idonea: sicut sunt animae beatorum.

In this way the soul, in the present state of life, cannot see all things in the eternal types; but the blessed who see God, and all things in Him, thus know all things in the eternal types.

Et hoc modo anima, in statu praesentis vitae, non potest videre omnia in rationibus aeternis; sed sic in rationibus aeternis cognoscunt omnia beati, qui Deum vident et omnia in ipso.

Q84 A4: Whether the intelligible species are derived by the soul from certain separate forms?

No. The intelligible species, by which our soul understands, are not derived from separate forms because if this were true we should not need the senses in order to understand.

Species intelligibiles quibus anima nostra intelligit, non effluunt a formis separatis quia secundum hoc sensibus non indigeremus ad intelligendum.

And this is proved to be false especially from the fact that if a man be wanting in a sense, he cannot have any knowledge of the sensibles corresponding to that sense.

Quod patet esse falsum ex hoc praecipue quod qui caret uno sensu, nullo modo potest habere scientiam de sensibilibus illius sensus.

Material things, as to the being which they have outside the soul, may be actually sensible, but not actually intelligible.

Res materiales, secundum esse quod habent extra animam, possunt esse sensibiles actu, non autem actu intelligibiles.

Our passive intellect is reduced from potentiality to act by some being in act, that is, by the active intellect, which is a power of the soul, as we have said (Q79, A4), and not by a separate intelligence, as proximate cause; although perchance as remote cause.

Intellectus noster possibilis reducitur de potentia ad actum per aliquod ens actu, idest per intellectum agentem, qui est virtus quaedam animae nostrae, ut dictum est, non autem per aliquem intellectum separatum, sicut per causam proximam; sed forte sicut per causam remotam.

The intelligible species which are participated by our intellect are reduced, as to their first cause, to a first principle which is by its essence intelligible: namely, God. But they proceed from that principle by means of the sensible forms and material things, from which we gather knowledge, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii).

Species intelligibiles quas participat noster intellectus, reducuntur sicut in primam causam in aliquod principium per suam essentiam intelligibile: scilicet in Deum. Sed ab illo principio procedunt mediantibus formis rerum sensibilium et materialium, a quibus scientiam colligimus, ut Dionysius dicit.

Q84 A3: Whether the soul understands all things through innate species?

No. The soul does not know corporeal things through innate species because the angelic intellect is perfected by intelligible species, in accordance with its nature; whereas the human intellect is in potentiality to such species.

Anima non cognoscit corporalia per species naturaliter inditas quia intellectus Angeli est perfectus per species intelligibiles secundum suam naturam, intellectus autem humanus est in potentia ad huiusmodi species.

If questions be put in an orderly fashion they proceed from universal self-evident principles to what is particular. Now by such a process knowledge is produced in the mind of the learner. Wherefore when he answers the truth to a subsequent question, this is not because he had knowledge previously, but because he thus learns for the first time. For it matters not whether the teacher proceed from universal principles to conclusions by questioning or by asserting; for in either case the mind of the listener is assured of what follows by that which preceded.

Ordinata interrogatio procedit ex principiis communibus per se notis, ad propria. Per talem autem processum scientia causatur in anima addiscentis. Unde cum verum respondet de his de quibus secundo interrogatur, hoc non est quia prius ea noverit; sed quia tunc ea de novo addiscit. Nihil enim refert utrum ille qui docet, proponendo vel interrogando procedat de principiis communibus ad conclusiones, utrobique enim animus audientis certificatur de posterioribus per priora.

Now we observe that man sometimes is only a potential knower, both as to sense and as to intellect. And he is reduced from such potentiality to act: through the action of sensible objects on his senses, to the act of sensation; by instruction or discovery, to the act of understanding. Wherefore we must say that the cognitive soul is in potentiality both to the [physical] icons which are the principles of sensing, and to those [mental] icons which are the principles of understanding. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 4) held that the intellect by which the soul understands has no innate species, but is at first in potentiality to all such species.

Videmus autem quod homo est quandoque cognoscens in potentia tantum, tam secundum sensum quam secundum intellectum. Et de tali potentia in actum reducitur: ut sentiat quidem, per actiones sensibilium in sensum; ut intelligat autem, per disciplinam aut inventionem. Unde oportet dicere quod anima cognoscitiva sit in potentia tam ad similitudines quae sunt principia sentiendi, quam ad similitudines quae sunt principia intelligendi. Et propter hoc Aristoteles posuit quod intellectus, quo anima intelligit, non habet aliquas species naturaliter inditas, sed est in principio in potentia ad huiusmodi species omnes.

Since form is the principle of action, a thing must be related to the form which is the principle of an action, as it is to that action: for instance, if upward motion is from lightness, then that which only potentially moves upwards must needs be only potentially light, but that which actually moves upwards must needs be actually light.

Cum forma sit principium actionis, oportet ut eo modo se habeat aliquid ad formam quae est actionis principium, quo se habet ad actionem illam: sicut si moveri sursum est ex levitate, oportet quod in potentia tantum sursum fertur, esse leve solum in potentia, quod autem actu sursum fertur, esse leve in actu.

But since that which has a form actually, is sometimes unable to act according to that form on account of some hindrance, as a light thing may be hindered from moving upwards; for this reason did Plato hold that naturally man's intellect is filled with all intelligible species, but that, by being united to the body, it is hindered from the realization of its act. But this seems to be unreasonable.

Sed quia id quod habet actu formam, interdum non potest agere secundum formam propter aliquod impedimentum, sicut leve si impediatur sursum ferri; propter hoc Plato posuit quod intellectus hominis naturaliter est plenus omnibus speciebus intelligibilibus, sed per unionem corporis impeditur ne possit in actum exire. Sed hoc non videtur convenienter dictum.

First, because, if the soul has a natural knowledge of all things, it seems impossible for the soul so far to forget the existence of such knowledge as not to know itself to be possessed thereof: for no man forgets what he knows naturally; that, for instance, the whole is larger than the part, and such like. And especially unreasonable does this seem if we suppose that it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, as we have established above (Q76, A1): for it is unreasonable that the natural operation of a thing be totally hindered by that which belongs to it naturally.

Primo quidem quia, si habet anima naturalem notitiam omnium, non videtur esse possibile quod huius naturalis notitiae tantam oblivionem capiat, quod nesciat se huiusmodi scientiam habere, nullus enim homo obliviscitur ea quae naturaliter cognoscit, sicut quod omne totum sit maius sua parte, et alia huiusmodi. Praecipue autem hoc videtur inconveniens, si ponatur esse animae naturale corpori uniri, ut supra habitum est, inconveniens enim est quod naturalis operatio alicuius rei totaliter impediatur per id quod est sibi secundum naturam.

Secondly, the falseness of this opinion is clearly proved from the fact that if a sense be wanting, the knowledge of what is apprehended through that sense is wanting also: for instance, a man who is born blind can have no knowledge of colors. This would not be the case if the soul had innate images of all intelligible things.

Secundo, manifeste apparet huius positionis falsitas ex hoc quod, deficiente aliquo sensu, deficit scientia eorum, quae apprehenduntur secundum illum sensum; sicut caecus natus nullam potest habere notitiam de coloribus. Quod non esset, si animae essent naturaliter inditae omnium intelligibilium rationes.

The Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (De Anima iii, 4) that it is like "a tablet on which nothing is written."

Philosophus dicit, in III de anima, de intellectu loquens, quod est sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum.

Q84 A2: Whether the soul understands corporeal things through its essence?

No. The soul does not know corporeal things through itself because the soul itself cannot be known through the bodily senses.

Anima non cognoscit corporea per suam substantiam quia ipsa anima non est cognoscibilis per corporis sensus.

If there be an intellect which knows all things by its essence, then its essence must needs have all things in itself immaterially; thus the early philosophers held that the essence of the soul, that it may know all things, must be actually composed of the principles of all material things. Now this is proper to God, that His Essence comprise all things immaterially as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause. God alone, therefore, understands all things through His Essence; but neither the human soul nor the angels can do so.

Si aliquis intellectus est qui per essentiam suam cognoscit omnia, oportet quod essentia eius habeat in se immaterialiter omnia; sicut antiqui posuerunt essentiam animae actu componi ex principiis omnium materialium, ut cognosceret omnia. Hoc autem est proprium Dei, ut sua essentia sit immaterialiter comprehensiva omnium, prout effectus virtute praeexistunt in causa. Solus igitur Deus per essentiam suam omnia intelligit; non autem anima humana, neque etiam Angelus.

Material things known must needs exist in the knower, not materially, but immaterially. The reason of this is, because the act of knowledge extends to things outside the knower: for we know things even that are external to us. Now by matter the form of a thing is determined to some one thing. Wherefore it is clear that knowledge is in inverse ratio of materiality. And consequently things that are not receptive of forms save materially, have no power of knowledge whatever: such as plants, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 12).

Oportet materialia cognita in cognoscente existere non materialiter, sed magis immaterialiter. Et huius ratio est, quia actus cognitionis se extendit ad ea quae sunt extra cognoscentem: cognoscimus enim etiam ea quae extra nos sunt. Per materiam autem determinatur forma rei ad aliquid unum. Unde manifestum est quod ratio cognitionis ex opposito se habet ad rationem materialitatis. Et ideo quae non recipiunt formas nisi materialiter, nullo modo sunt cognoscitiva: sicut plantae, ut dicitur in II libro de anima.

But the more immaterially a thing receives the form of the thing known, the more perfect is its knowledge. Therefore the intellect which abstracts the species not only from matter, but also from the individuating conditions of matter, has more perfect knowledge than the senses, which receive the form of the thing known, without matter indeed, but subject to material conditions.

Quanto autem aliquid immaterialius habet formam rei cognitae, tanto perfectius cognoscit. Unde et intellectus, qui abstrahit speciem non solum a materia, sed etiam a materialibus conditionibus individuantibus, perfectius cognoscit quam sensus, qui accipit formam rei cognitae sine materia quidem, sed cum materialibus conditionibus.

Aristotle did not hold that the soul is actually composed of all things, as did the earlier philosophers; he said that the soul is all things, "after a fashion," inasmuch as it is in potentiality to all: through the senses, to all things sensible; through the intellect, to all things intelligible.

Aristoteles non posuit animam esse actu compositam ex omnibus, sicut antiqui naturales; sed dixit "quodammodo" animam esse omnia, inquantum est in potentia ad omnia: per sensum quidem ad sensibilia; per intellectum vero ad intelligibilia.

Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3) that "the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses."

Augustinus dicit, IX de Trin., quod "mens corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit".

Q84 A1: Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?

Yes. Science is in the intellect because through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a knowledge which is immaterial, universal, and necessary.

Scientia est in intellectu quia anima per intellectum cognoscit corpora cognitione immateriali, universali et necessaria.

If, therefore, the intellect does not know bodies, it follows that there is no science of bodies; and thus perishes natural science, which treats of mobile bodies.

Si ergo intellectus non cognoscit corpora, sequitur quod nulla scientia sit de corporibus. Et sic peribit scientia naturalis, quae est de corpore mobili.

Every movement presupposes something immovable: for when a change of quality occurs, the substance remains unmoved; and when there is a change of substantial form, matter remains unmoved. Moreover the various conditions of mutable things are themselves immovable; for instance, though Socrates be not always sitting, yet it is an immovable truth that whenever he does sit he remains in one place. For this reason there is nothing to hinder our having an immovable science of movable things.

Omnis motus supponit aliquid immobile, cum enim transmutatio fit secundum qualitatem, remanet substantia immobilis; et cum transmutatur forma substantialis, remanet materia immobilis. Rerum etiam mutabilium sunt immobiles habitudines, sicut Socrates etsi non semper sedeat, tamen immobiliter est verum quod, quandocumque sedet, in uno loco manet. Et propter hoc nihil prohibet de rebus mobilibus immobilem scientiam habere.

Even in sensible things it is to be observed that the form is otherwise in one sensible than in another: for instance, whiteness may be of great intensity in one, and of a less intensity in another: in one we find whiteness with sweetness, in another without sweetness.

Quia etiam in ipsis sensibilibus videmus quod forma alio modo est in uno sensibilium quam in altero, puta cum in uno est albedo intensior, in alio remissior, et in uno est albedo cum dulcedine, in alio sine dulcedine.

In the same way the sensible form is conditioned differently in the thing which is external to the soul, and in the senses which receive the forms of sensible things without receiving matter, such as the color of gold without receiving gold.

Et per hunc etiam modum forma sensibilis alio modo est in re quae est extra animam, et alio modo in sensu, qui suscipit formas sensibilium absque materia, sicut colorem auri sine auro.

So also the intellect, according to its own mode, receives under conditions of immateriality and immobility, the species of material and mobile bodies: for the received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver.

Et similiter intellectus species, corporum, quae sunt materiales et mobiles, recipit immaterialiter et immobiliter, secundum modum suum, nam receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis.

Q84: How the soul while united to the body understands corporeal things beneath it

1. Does the soul know bodies through the intellect?
2. Does it understand them through its essence, or through any species?
3. If through some species, are the species of all things intelligible naturally innate in the soul?
4. Are these species derived by the soul from certain separate immaterial forms?
5. Does our soul see in the eternal ideas all that it understands?
6. Does it acquire intellectual knowledge from the senses?
7. Can the intellect, through the species of which it is possessed, actually understand, without turning to the phantasms?
8. Is the judgment of the intellect hindered by an obstacle in the sensitive powers?

Q83 A4: Whether free choice is a power distinct from the will?

No. Choice and will -- that is, the act of willing -- are different acts, yet they belong to the same power, because in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end.

Electio et voluntas, idest ipsum velle, sunt diversi actus, sed tamen pertinent ad unam potentiam, sicut etiam intelligere et ratiocinari, quia in appetitivis se habet finis ad ea quae sunt ad finem, quae propter finem appetuntur.

To "will" implies the simple appetite for something, wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself.

Velle importat simplicem appetitum alicuius rei, unde voluntas dicitur esse de fine, qui propter se appetitur.

But to "choose" is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else, wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means to the end.

Eligere autem est appetere aliquid propter alterum consequendum, unde proprie est eorum quae sunt ad finem.

Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free choice. But it has been shown above (Q79, A8) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and free choice are not two powers, but one.

Unde manifestum est quod sicut se habet intellectus ad rationem, ita se habet voluntas ad vim electivam, idest ad liberum arbitrium. Ostensum est autem supra quod eiusdem potentiae est intelligere et ratiocinari, sicut eiusdem virtutis est quiescere et moveri. Unde etiam eiusdem potentiae est velle et eligere. Et propter hoc voluntas et liberum arbitrium non sunt duae potentiae, sed una.

The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active and a passive will.

Intellectus comparatur ad voluntatem ut movens. Et ideo non oportet in voluntate distinguere agens et possibile.

Q83 A3: Whether free choice is an appetitive power?

Yes. Free choice is an appetitive power because free choice is that by which we choose.

Liberum arbitrium est virtus appetitiva quia liberum arbitrium est secundum quod eligimus.

Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptation of the appetite: whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3) says that, "having formed a judgment by counsel, we desire in accordance with that counsel." And in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free choice takes its name.

Iudicium est quasi conclusio et determinatio consilii. Determinatur autem consilium, primo quidem per sententiam rationis, et secundo per acceptationem appetitus, unde philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod "ex consiliari iudicantes desideramus secundum consilium". Et hoc modo ipsa electio dicitur quoddam iudicium, a quo nominatur liberum arbitrium.

This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the appetite does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to another.

Ista collatio quae importatur in nomine electionis, pertinet ad consilium praecedens, quod est rationis. Appetitus enim, quamvis non sit collativus, tamen inquantum a vi cognitiva conferente movetur, habet quandam collationis similitudinem, dum unum alteri praeoptat.

The proper act of free choice is choice: for we say that we have a free choice because we can take one thing while refusing another; and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature of free choice, by considering the nature of choice.

Proprium liberi arbitrii est electio, ex hoc enim liberi arbitrii esse dicimur, quod possumus unum recipere, alio recusato, quod est eligere. Et ideo naturam liberi arbitrii ex electione considerare oportet.

Now two things concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel.

Ad electionem autem concurrit aliquid ex parte cognitivae virtutis, et aliquid ex parte appetitivae, ex parte quidem cognitivae, requiritur consilium, per quod diiudicatur quid sit alteri praeferendum; ex parte autem appetitivae, requiritur quod appetendo acceptetur id quod per consilium diiudicatur.

Therefore Aristotle (Ethic. vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive power: since he says that choice is either "an appetitive intellect or an intellectual appetite." But (Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines to its being an intellectual appetite when he describes choice as "a desire proceeding from counsel." And the reason of this is because the proper object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such, is in the nature of that good which is called useful: wherefore since good, as such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice is principally an act of the appetitive power. And thus free choice is an appetitive power.

Et ideo Aristoteles in VI Ethic. sub dubio derelinquit utrum principalius pertineat electio ad vim appetitivam, vel ad vim cognitivam, dicit enim quod electio vel est intellectus appetitivus, vel appetitus intellectivus. Sed in III Ethic. in hoc magis declinat quod sit appetitus intellectivus, nominans electionem desiderium consiliabile. Et huius ratio est, quia proprium obiectum electionis est illud quod est ad finem, hoc autem, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem boni quod dicitur utile, unde cum bonum, inquantum huiusmodi, sit obiectum appetitus, sequitur quod electio sit principaliter actus appetitivae virtutis. Et sic liberum arbitrium est appetitiva potentia.

Q83 A2: Whether free choice is a power?

Yes. Free choice is a power because free choice is indifferent to good and evil choice, wherefore it is impossible for free choice to be a habit.

Liberum arbitrium est potentia quia liberum arbitrium indifferenter se habet ad bene eligendum vel male, unde impossibile est quod liberum arbitrium sit habitus.

It is not unusual for a power to be named from its act. And so from this act, which is a free judgment, is named the power which is the principle of this act. Otherwise, if free choice denominated an act, it would not always remain in man.

Consuetum est potentiam significari nomine actus. Et sic per hunc actum qui est liberum iudicium, nominatur potentia quae est huius actus principium. Alioquin, si liberum arbitrium nominaret actum, non semper maneret in homine.

Although free choice in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of speaking we call free choice, that which is the principle of the act by which man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is both power and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge and by the intellectual power. Therefore free choice must be either a power or a habit, or a power with a habit. That it is neither a habit nor a power together with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways.

Quamvis liberum arbitrium nominet quendam actum secundum propriam significationem vocabuli, secundum tamen communem usum loquendi, liberum arbitrium dicimus id quod est huius actus principium, scilicet quo homo libere iudicat. Principium autem actus in nobis est et potentia et habitus; dicimur enim aliquid cognoscere et per scientiam et per intellectivam potentiam. Oportet ergo quod liberum arbitrium vel sit potentia vel sit habitus, vel sit potentia cum aliquo habitu. Quod autem non sit habitus, neque potentia cum habitu, manifeste apparet ex duobus.

First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural habit; for it is natural to man to have a free choice. But there is not natural habit in us with respect to those things which come under free choice, for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we have natural habits--for instance, to assent to first principles; while those things to which we are naturally inclined are not subject to free choice, as we have said of the desire of happiness (Q82, A1; Q82, A2). Wherefore it is against the very notion of free choice that it should be a natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural habit is against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit.

Primo quidem, quia si est habitus, oportet quod sit habitus naturalis; hoc enim est naturale homini, quod sit liberi arbitrii. Nullus autem habitus naturalis adest nobis ad ea quae subsunt libero arbitrio, quia ad ea respectu quorum habemus habitus naturales, naturaliter inclinamur, sicut ad assentiendum primis principiis; ea autem ad quae naturaliter inclinamur, non subsunt libero arbitrio, sicut dictum est de appetitu beatitudinis. Unde contra propriam rationem liberi arbitrii est, quod sit habitus naturalis. Contra naturalitatem autem eius est, quod sit habitus non naturalis. Et sic relinquitur quod nullo modo sit habitus.

Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that "by reason of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to actions and passions" (Ethic. ii, 5), for by temperance we are well-disposed as regards concupiscences, and by intemperance ill-disposed; and by knowledge we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we know the truth, and by the contrary ill-disposed. But the free choice is indifferent to good and evil choice; wherefore it is impossible for free choice to be a habit. Therefore it is a power.

Secundo hoc apparet, quia habitus dicuntur secundum quos "nos habemus ad passiones vel ad actus bene vel male", ut dicitur in II Ethic., nam per temperantiam bene nos habemus ad concupiscentias, per intemperantiam autem male; per scientiam etiam bene nos habemus ad actum intellectus, dum verum cognoscimus per habitum autem contrarium male. Liberum autem arbitrium indifferenter se habet ad bene eligendum vel male. Unde impossibile est quod liberum arbitrium sit habitus. Relinquitur ergo quod sit potentia.

Bernard says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. 1,2) that free choice is "the soul's habit of disposing of itself." But Bernard takes habit, not as divided against power, but as signifying a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of relation to an act. And this may be both by a power and by a habit, for by a power man is, as it were, empowered to do the action, and by the habit he is apt to act well or ill.

Bernardus etiam dicit quod liberum arbitrium est "habitus animae liber sui". Bernardus autem accipit habitum non secundum quod dividitur contra potentiam, sed secundum quod significat habitudinem quandam, qua aliquo modo se aliquis habet ad actum. Quod quidem est tam per potentiam quam per habitum, nam per potentiam homo se habet ut potens operari, per habitum autem ut aptus ad operandum bene vel male.

Free choice is defined as "the faculty of the will and reason." Sometimes faculty denominates a facility of power, which is due to a habit. But faculty sometimes also denominates a power ready for operation: and in this sense faculty is used in the definition of free choice.

Liberum arbitrium dicitur esse facultas voluntatis et rationis. Facultas quandoque nominat facilitatem potestatis, quae quidem est per habitum. Facultas nominat quandoque potestatem expeditam ad operandum. Et sic facultas ponitur in definitione liberi arbitrii.

Q83 A1: Whether man has free choice?

Yes. Man has free choice because otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain; but man is rational.

Homo est liberi arbitrii, alioquin frustra essent consilia, exhortationes, praecepta, prohibitiones, praemia et poenae; sed rationalis est homo.

Free choice is the cause of its own movement, because by his free choice man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.

Liberum arbitrium est causa sui motus, quia homo per liberum arbitrium seipsum movet ad agendum. Non tamen hoc est de necessitate libertatis, quod sit prima causa sui id quod liberum est, sicut nec ad hoc quod aliquid sit causa alterius, requiritur quod sit prima causa eius. Deus igitur est prima causa movens et naturales causas et voluntarias. Et sicut naturalibus causis, movendo eas, non aufert quin actus earum sint naturales; ita movendo causas voluntarias, non aufert quin actiones earum sint voluntariae, sed potius hoc in eis facit, operatur enim in unoquoque secundum eius proprietatem.

In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge.

Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quaedam agunt absque iudicio, sicut lapis movetur deorsum; et similiter omnia cognitione carentia.

And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals.

Quaedam autem agunt iudicio, sed non libero; sicut animalia bruta.

But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things.

Iudicat enim ovis videns lupum, eum esse fugiendum, naturali iudicio, et non libero, quia non ex collatione, sed ex naturali instinctu hoc iudicat. Et simile est de quolibet iudicio brutorum animalium. Sed homo agit iudicio, quia per vim cognoscitivam iudicat aliquid esse fugiendum vel prosequendum. Sed quia iudicium istud non est ex naturali instinctu in particulari operabili, sed ex collatione quadam rationis; ideo agit libero iudicio, potens in diversa ferri.

For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free choice.

Ratio enim circa contingentia habet viam ad opposita; ut patet in dialecticis syllogismis, et rhetoricis persuasionibus. Particularia autem operabilia sunt quaedam contingentia, et ideo circa ea iudicium rationis ad diversa se habet, et non est determinatum ad unum. Et pro tanto necesse est quod homo sit liberi arbitrii, ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est.

It is written (Sirach 15:14): "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel"; and the gloss adds: "i.e., of his free choice."

Dicitur Eccli. XV, "Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui." Glossa, idest in libertate arbitrii.

Q83: Free choice

1. Does man have free choice?
2. What is free choice--a power, an act, or a habit?
3. If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive?
4. If it is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or distinct?

Q82 A5: Whether we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite?

No. The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will, because, as was said above (Q59, A4; Q79, A7), a power which is directed to an object according to some common formal aspect is not differentiated by special differences which are contained under that common formal aspect.

Irascibilis et concupiscibilis non sunt partes intellectivi appetitus, qui dicitur voluntas quia, sicut supra dictum est, potentia quae ordinatur ad aliquod obiectum secundum communem rationem, non diversificatur per differentias speciales sub illa ratione communi contentas.

For instance, because sight regards the visible thing under the common aspect of something colored, the visual power is not multiplied according to the different kinds of color: but if there were a power regarding white as white, and not as something colored, it would be distinct from a power regarding black as black.

Sicut quia visus respicit visibile secundum rationem colorati, non multiplicantur visivae potentiae secundum diversas species colorum, si autem esset aliqua potentia quae esset albi inquantum est album, et non inquantum est coloratum, diversificaretur a potentia quae esset nigri inquantum est nigrum.

Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common aspect of good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the different aspects of particular good, for the concupiscible regards as proper to it the aspect of good, as something pleasant to the senses and suitable to nature; whereas the irascible regards the aspect of good as something that wards off and repels what is hurtful.

Appetitus autem sensitivus non respicit communem rationem boni, quia nec sensus apprehendit universale. Et ideo secundum diversas rationes particularium bonorum, diversificantur partes appetitus sensitivi, nam concupiscibilis respicit propriam rationem boni, inquantum est delectabile secundum sensum, et conveniens naturae; irascibilis autem respicit rationem boni, secundum quod est repulsivum et impugnativum eius quod infert nocumentum.

But the will regards good according to the common aspect of good, and therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appetite, there is no differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in the intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from a concupiscible power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehensive powers multiplied, although they are on the part of the senses.

Sed voluntas respicit bonum sub communi ratione boni. Et ideo non diversificantur in ipsa, quae est appetitus intellectivus, aliquae potentiae appetitivae, ut sit in appetitu intellectivo alia potentia irascibilis, et alia concupiscibilis, sicut etiam ex parte intellectus non multiplicantur vires apprehensivae, licet multiplicentur ex parte sensus.

Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions--arising, that is, with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive appetite.

Aamor, concupiscentia, et huiusmodi, dupliciter accipiuntur. Quandoque quidem secundum quod sunt quaedam passiones, cum quadam scilicet concitatione animi provenientes. Et sic communiter accipiuntur, et hoc modo sunt solum in appetitu sensitivo.

They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they are simple affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are attributed to the angels and to God.

Alio modo significant simplicem affectum, absque passione vel animi concitatione. Et sic sunt actus voluntatis. Et hoc etiam modo attribuuntur Angelis et Deo.

The will itself may be said to be "irascible", as far as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion, but from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may be said to be "concupiscible" on account of its desire for good. And thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope--that is, in the will as ordered to such acts.

Ipsa voluntas potest dici irascibilis, prout vult impugnare malum, non ex impetu passionis, sed ex iudicio rationis. Et eodem modo potest dici concupiscibilis, propter desiderium boni. Et sic in irascibili et concupiscibili sunt caritas et spes; idest in voluntate secundum quod habet ordinem ad huiusmodi actus.

Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) says "that the irrational" part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and irascible, and Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9) "that the will is in reason, while in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger," or "desire and animus."

Gregorius Nyssenus, dicit, quod irrationalis pars animae dividitur in desiderativum et irascitivum; et idem dicit Damascenus, in libro II. Et philosophus dicit, in III de anima quod "voluntas in ratione est, in irrationali autem parte animae concupiscentia et ira, vel desiderium et animus."

Q82 A4: Whether the will moves the intellect?

Yes. These powers include one another in their acts, because the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to understand, because good is contained in truth, inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as it is a desired good.

Hae potentiae suis actibus invicem se includunt, quia intellectus intelligit voluntatem velle, et voluntas vult intellectum intelligere, quia bonum continetur sub vero, inquantum est quoddam verum intellectum, et verum continetur sub bono, inquantum est quoddam bonum desideratum.

The intellect may be considered in two ways: as apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a thing and a particular power having a determinate act.

Intellectus dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum quod intellectus est apprehensivus entis et veri universalis; alio modo, secundum quod est quaedam res, et particularis potentia habens determinatum actum.

In like manner also the will may be considered in two ways: according to the common nature of its object--that is to say, as appetitive of universal good--and as a determinate power of the soul having a determinate act.

Et similiter voluntas dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum communitatem sui obiecti, prout scilicet est appetitiva boni communis; alio modo, secundum quod est quaedam determinata animae potentia habens determinatum actum.

If, therefore, the intellect and the will be compared with one another according to the universality of their respective objects, then, as we have said above (Q82 A3), the intellect is simply higher and nobler than the will.

Si ergo comparentur intellectus et voluntas secundum rationem communitatis obiectorum utriusque, sic dictum est supra quod intellectus est simpliciter altior et nobilior voluntate.

If, however, we take the intellect as regards the common nature of its object and the will as a determinate power, then again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under the notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and its act, and its object.

Si autem consideretur intellectus secundum communitatem sui obiecti, et voluntas secundum quod est quaedam determinata potentia, sic iterum intellectus est altior et prior voluntate, quia sub ratione entis et veri, quam apprehendit intellectus, continetur voluntas ipsa, et actus eius, et obiectum ipsius.

Wherefore the intellect understands the will, and its act, and its object, just as it understands other species of things, as stone or wood, which are contained in the common notion of being and truth.

Unde intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et actum eius, et obiectum ipsius, sicut et alia specialia intellecta, ut lapidem aut lignum, quae continentur sub communi ratione entis et veri.

But if we consider the will as regards the common nature of its object, which is good, and the intellect as a thing and a special power; then the intellect itself, and its act, and its object, which is truth, each of which is some species of good, are contained under the common notion of good. And in this way the will is higher than the intellect, and can move it.

Si vero consideretur voluntas secundum communem rationem sui obiecti, quod est bonum, intellectus autem secundum quod est quaedam res et potentia specialis; sic sub communi ratione boni continetur, velut quoddam speciale, et intellectus ipse, et ipsum intelligere, et obiectum eius, quod est verum, quorum quodlibet est quoddam speciale bonum. Et secundum hoc voluntas est altior intellectu, et potest ipsum movere.

There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher than our intellect --namely, God--as also Aristotle says (Eth. Eudemic. vii, 14), and in this way he explains that there is no need to proceed indefinitely.

Non oportet procedere in infinitum, sed statur in intellectu sicut in primo. Omnem enim voluntatis motum necesse est quod praecedat apprehensio, sed non omnem apprehensionem praecedit motus voluntatis; sed principium consiliandi et intelligendi est aliquod intellectivum principium altius intellectu nostro, quod est Deus, ut etiam Aristoteles dicit in VII Ethicae Eudemicae, et per hunc modum ostendit quod non est procedere in infinitum.

The intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will moves the intellect in another. A thing is said to move in two ways:

Intellectus alio modo movet voluntatem, quam voluntas intellectum. Aliquid dicitur movere dupliciter:

First, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end.

Uno modo, per modum finis; sicut dicitur quod finis movet efficientem. Et hoc modo intellectus movet voluntatem, quia bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis, et movet ipsam ut finis.

Secondly, a thing is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De Similitudinibus).

Alio modo dicitur aliquid movere per modum agentis; sicut alterans movet alteratum, et impellens movet impulsum. Et hoc modo voluntas movet intellectum, et omnes animae vires; ut Anselmus dicit in libro de similitudinibus.

The reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. And we may observe this both in nature and in things politic. For the heaven, which aims at the universal preservation of things subject to generation and corruption, moves all inferior bodies, each of which aims at the preservation of its own species or of the individual. The king also, who aims at the common good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves all the governors of cities, each of whom rules over his own particular city.

Cuius ratio est, quia in omnibus potentiis activis ordinatis, illa potentia quae respicit finem universalem, movet potentias quae respiciunt fines particulares. Et hoc apparet tam in naturalibus quam in politicis. Caelum enim, quod agit ad universalem conservationem generabilium et corruptibilium, movet omnia inferiora corpora, quorum unumquodque agit ad conservationem propriae speciei, vel etiam individui. Rex etiam, qui intendit bonum commune totius regni, movet per suum imperium singulos praepositos civitatum, qui singulis civitatibus curam regiminis impendunt.

Now the object of the will is good and the end in general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as agent moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our will.

Obiectum autem voluntatis est bonum et finis in communi. Quaelibet autem potentia comparatur ad aliquod bonum proprium sibi conveniens; sicut visus ad perceptionem coloris, intellectus ad cognitionem veri. Et ideo voluntas per modum agentis movet omnes animae potentias ad suos actus, praeter vires naturales vegetativae partis, quae nostro arbitrio non subduntur.

Q82 A3: Whether the will is a higher power than the intellect?

No. The intellect is nobler than the will because good which is understood moves the will.

Intellectus est nobilior quam voluntas quia bonum intellectum movet voluntatem.

What precedes in order of generation and time is less perfect: for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes act, and imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes potentiality. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the motive power precedes the thing movable, and as the active precedes the passive.

Illud quod est prius generatione et tempore, est imperfectius, quia in uno et eodem potentia tempore praecedit actum, et imperfectio perfectionem. Sed illud quod est prius simpliciter et secundum naturae ordinem, est perfectius, sic enim actus est prior potentia. Et hoc modo intellectus est prior voluntate, sicut motivum mobili, et activum passivo.

If therefore the intellect and will be considered with regard to themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of the will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea of appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the more abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and therefore the object of the intellect is higher than the object of the will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its order to its object, it follows that the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher and nobler than the will.

Si ergo intellectus et voluntas considerentur secundum se, sic intellectus eminentior invenitur. Et hoc apparet ex comparatione obiectorum ad invicem. Obiectum enim intellectus est simplicius et magis absolutum quam obiectum voluntatis, nam obiectum intellectus est ipsa ratio boni appetibilis; bonum autem appetibile, cuius ratio est in intellectu, est obiectum voluntatis. Quanto autem aliquid est simplicius et abstractius, tanto secundum se est nobilius et altius. Et ideo obiectum intellectus est altius quam obiectum voluntatis. Cum ergo propria ratio potentiae sit secundum ordinem ad obiectum, sequitur quod secundum se et simpliciter intellectus sit altior et nobilior voluntate.