Thomas Aquinas Study Circle

1a 2ae q62 a2: Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues? Yes.

2011-06-19T07:53:00.003-07:00

Virtutes theologicae specie distinguuntur a moralibus et intellectualibus quia habitus specie distinguuntur secundum formalem differentiam obiectorum.

The theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues because habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects.

Obiectum autem theologicarum virtutum est ipse Deus, qui est ultimus rerum finis, prout nostrae rationis cognitionem excedit. Obiectum autem virtutum intellectualium et moralium est aliquid quod humana ratione comprehendi potest.

Now the object of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason.

Licet caritas sit amor, non tamen omnis amor est caritas. Cum ergo dicitur quod omnis virtus est ordo amoris, potest intelligi vel de amore communiter dicto; vel de amore caritatis.

Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity.

Si de amore communiter dicto, sic dicitur quaelibet virtus esse ordo amoris, inquantum ad quamlibet cardinalium virtutum requiritur ordinata affectio, omnis autem affectionis radix et principium est amor, ut supra dictum est.

If it be understood of love, commonly so called, then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, insofar as each cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the root and cause of every emotion, as stated above (q27, a4; q28, a6, ad 2; q41, a2, ad 1).

Si autem intelligatur de amore caritatis, non datur per hoc intelligi quod quaelibet alia virtus essentialiter sit caritas, sed quod omnes aliae virtutes aliqualiter a caritate dependeant, ut infra patebit.

If, however, it be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show further on (q65, a2,a5; II-II, q23, a7).

1a 2ae q62 a1: Whether there are any theological virtues? Yes.

2011-05-15T14:55:00.004-07:00

Fides, spes et caritas sunt theologicae virtutes in Deum ordinantes quia oportet quod superaddantur homini divinitus aliqua principia, per quae ita ordinetur ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia ordinatur ad finem connaturalem, non tamen absque adiutorio divino.

Faith, hope, and charity are theological virtues directing us to God because it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance.

Et huiusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur theologicae: tum quia habent Deum pro obiecto, inquantum per eas recte ordinamur in Deum; tum quia a solo Deo nobis infunduntur; tum quia sola divina revelatione, in sacra Scriptura, huiusmodi virtutes traduntur.

Such like principles are called "theological virtues": first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God; secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone; thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ.

Ad Deum naturaliter ratio et voluntas ordinatur, prout est naturae principium et finis, secundum tamen proportionem naturae. Sed ad ipsum secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis supernaturalis, ratio et voluntas, secundum suam naturam, non ordinantur sufficienter.

The reason and will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to nature. But the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him insofar as He is the object of supernatural happiness.

1a 2ae q62: The theological virtues

2011-05-15T14:53:00.000-07:00

1a 2ae q61 a5: Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues? Yes.

2011-05-08T09:18:00.002-07:00

Plotinus, inter philosophiae professores cum Platone princeps, quatuor sunt, inquit, quaternarum genera virtutum: ex his primae politicae vocantur; secundae, purgatoriae; tertiae autem, iam purgati animi; quartae, exemplares, quia deserere res humanas ubi necessitas imponitur, vitiosum est; alias est virtuosum.

"Plotinus, together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The four kinds of virtue are fourfold: in the first place there are social virtues; secondly, there are cleansing virtues; thirdly, there are "clean soul" virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.'," because to neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous.

Augustinus dicit in libro de moribus Eccles., oportet quod "anima aliquid sequatur, ad hoc quod ei possit virtus innasci, et hoc Deus est, quem si sequimur, bene vivimus." Oportet igitur quod exemplar humanae virtutis in Deo praeexistat, sicut et in eo praeexistunt omnium rerum rationes. Sic igitur virtus potest considerari vel prout est exemplariter in Deo, et sic dicuntur virtutes exemplares. Ita scilicet quod ipsa divina mens in Deo dicatur prudentia; temperantia vero, conversio divinae intentionis ad seipsum, sicut in nobis temperantia dicitur per hoc quod concupiscibilis conformatur rationi; fortitudo autem Dei est eius immutabilitas; iustitia vero Dei est observatio legis aeternae in suis operibus, sicut Plotinus dixit.

As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something is God: if we follow Him we shall live aright." Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him pre-exist the formal aspects of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing foremost in God, and thus we speak of "exemplar" virtues: so that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called prudence; while temperance is the turning of God's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to reason. God's fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1).

Et quia homo secundum suam naturam est animal politicum, virtutes huiusmodi, prout in homine existunt secundum conditionem suae naturae, politicae vocantur, prout scilicet homo secundum has virtutes recte se habet in rebus humanis gerendis. Secundum quem modum hactenus de his virtutibus locuti sumus.

Again, since man by his nature is a social animal, these virtues, insofar as they are in him according to the condition of his nature, are called "social" virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now.

Sed quia ad hominem pertinet ut etiam ad divina se trahat quantum potest, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in X Ethic.; et hoc nobis in sacra Scriptura multipliciter commendatur, ut est illud Matth. V, "estote perfecti, sicut et pater vester caelestis perfectus est", necesse est ponere quasdam virtutes medias inter politicas, quae sunt virtutes humanae, et exemplares, quae sunt virtutes divinae.

But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in Ethic. x, 7, and as Scripture often admonishes us--for instance: "Be ye perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matthew 5:48), we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine.

Quae quidem virtutes distinguuntur secundum diversitatem motus et termini. Ita scilicet quod quaedam sunt virtutes transeuntium et in divinam similitudinem tendentium, et hae vocantur virtutes purgatoriae. Ita scilicet quod prudentia omnia mundana divinorum contemplatione despiciat, omnemque animae cogitationem in divina sola dirigat; temperantia vero relinquat, inquantum natura patitur, quae corporis usus requirit; fortitudinis autem est ut anima non terreatur propter excessum a corpore, et accessum ad superna; iustitia vero est ut tota anima consentiat ad huius propositi viam.

Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine likeness; and these are called "cleansing" virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow the way thus proposed.

Quaedam vero sunt virtutes iam assequentium divinam similitudinem, quae vocantur virtutes iam purgati animi. Ita scilicet quod prudentia sola divina intueatur; temperantia terrenas cupiditates nesciat; fortitudo passiones ignoret; iustitia cum divina mente perpetuo foedere societur, eam scilicet imitando. Quas quidem virtutes dicimus esse beatorum, vel aliquorum in hac vita perfectissimorum.

Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine likeness: these are called the "clean soul virtues". Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of God; temperance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by an everlasting covenant. Such are the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection.

1a 2ae q61 a4: Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another? Yes.

2011-04-24T08:13:00.002-07:00

Has quatuor virtutes sunt diversi habitus, secundum diversitatem obiectorum distincti quia determinantur ad materias speciales; unaquaeque quidem illarum ad unam materiam, in qua principaliter laudatur illa generalis conditio a qua nomen virtutis accipitur, ut supra dictum est:

These four [cardinal] virtues are distinct habits, differentiated in respect of their diverse objects because they have their special determinate matter; indeed, each of these [virtues] is determined to its [own] one [special] matter, in which special commendation is given to that general condition from which the virtue's name is taken, as stated above (I-II, 61, 3; cf. II-II, 141, 2):

"istae virtutes denominantur ab eo quod est praecipuum in unaquaque materia. Et sic sunt speciales virtutes, contra alias divisae. Dicuntur tamen principales respectu aliarum, propter principalitatem materiae: puta quod prudentia dicatur quae praeceptiva est; iustitia, quae est circa actiones debitas inter aequales; temperantia, quae reprimit concupiscentias delectationum tactus; fortitudo, quae firmat contra pericula mortis."

"they may be considered in point of their being denominated, each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter. And thus they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are called principal [i.e., cardinal] in comparison with the other virtues, on account of the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions between equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death."

1a 2ae q61 a3: Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these? No.

2011-04-17T09:08:00.002-07:00

Tullius, in sua rhetorica, ad has quatuor omnes alias reducit quia huiusmodi quatuor virtutes cardinales accipiuntur secundum quatuor formales rationes virtutis de qua loquimur.

Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De Invent. Rhet. ii) because these four are reckoned as cardinal virtues in respect of the four formal aspects of virtue about which we now shall speak:

Dicuntur principales, quasi generales ad omnes virtutes: utputa quod omnis virtus quae facit bonum in consideratione rationis, dicatur prudentia; et quod omnis virtus quae facit bonum debiti et recti in operationibus, dicatur iustitia; et omnis virtus quae cohibet passiones et deprimit, dicatur temperantia; et omnis virtus quae facit firmitatem animi contra quascumque passiones, dicatur fortitudo.

They are called the principal formal aspects, since they are general, as it were, in comparison with all the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue that causes the good of right and due in operation, be called justice; every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any passions whatever, be called fortitude.

1a 2ae q61 a2: Whether there are four cardinal virtues? Yes.

2011-04-03T09:41:00.003-07:00

Prudentia est simpliciter principalior omnibus; sed aliae ponuntur principales unaquaeque in suo genere, quia quadruplex invenitur subiectum huius virtutis de qua nunc loquimur, scilicet rationale per essentiam, quod prudentia perficit; et rationale per participationem, quod dividitur in tria; idest in voluntatem, quae est subiectum iustitiae; et in concupiscibilem, quae est subiectum temperantiae; et in irascibilem, quae est subiectum fortitudinis.

Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply; the others are principal, each in its own genus, because there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz. the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by "Prudence"; and that which is rational by participation, and is threefold: the will, subject of "Justice"; the concupiscible faculty, subject of "Temperance"; and the irascible faculty, subject of "Fortitude".

Numerus aliquorum accipi potest aut secundum principia formalia, aut secundum subiecta, et utroque modo inveniuntur quatuor cardinales virtutes.

Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are, and either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.

Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., "in quatuor virtutibus tota boni operis structura consurgit".

Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of a good work is built on four virtues".

1a 2ae q61 a1: Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues? Yes.

2011-03-27T10:07:00.003-07:00

Convenienter inter virtutes morales ponuntur illae quae dicuntur principales, seu cardinales, quia perfectum est principalius imperfecto. Et ideo virtutes quae continent rectitudinem appetitus, dicuntur principales.

Those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral virtues because the perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal virtues.

Huiusmodi autem sunt virtutes morales; et inter intellectuales, sola prudentia, quae etiam quodammodo moralis est, secundum materiam, ut ex supradictis patet.

Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue, as was clearly shown above (q57 a4).

Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, exponens illud, "beati pauperes spiritu, scimus virtutes esse quatuor cardinales, scilicet temperantiam, iustitiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem". Hae autem sunt virtutes morales. Ergo virtutes morales sunt cardinales.

Ambrose in explaining the words, "Blessed are the poor in spirit" (Luke 6:20) says: "We know that there are four cardinal virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude." But these are moral virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues.

1a 2ae q61: The cardinal virtues

2011-03-27T10:03:00.002-07:00

1a 2ae q60 a5: Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions? Yes.

2011-03-20T09:32:00.003-07:00

Secundum Aristotelem, sunt decem virtutes morales circa passiones, scilicet fortitudo, temperantia, liberalitas, magnificentia, magnanimitas, philotimia, mansuetudo, amicitia, veritas et eutrapelia. Et distinguuntur secundum diversas materias vel secundum diversas passiones; vel secundum diversa obiecta. Si igitur addatur iustitia, quae est circa operationes, erunt omnes undecim, quia omnia obiecta eiusdem operationis secundum speciem, eandem habitudinem habent ad rationem; non autem omnia obiecta eiusdem passionis secundum speciem, quia operationes non repugnant rationi, sicut passiones.

According to Aristotle, there are ten moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, "philotimia," gentleness, friendship, truthfulness, and "eutrapelia," all of which differ in respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we add "justice," which is about operations, there will be eleven in all, because all objects of the same specific operation have the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same specific passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do.

Perfectio virtutis ex ratione dependet, perfectio autem passionis, ex ipso appetitu sensitivo. Unde oportet quod virtutes diversificentur secundum ordinem ad rationem, passiones autem, secundum ordinem ad appetitum.

The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason; whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite. Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their relation to reason, but the passions according to their relation to the appetite.

Obiecta igitur passionum, secundum quod diversimode comparantur ad appetitum sensitivum, causant diversas passionum species, secundum vero quod comparantur ad rationem, causant diversas species virtutum.

Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are variously related to the sensitive appetite, cause the different species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason, they cause the different species of virtues.

1a 2ae q60 a4: Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions? Yes.

2011-03-13T14:52:00.002-07:00

Non potest dici quod circa omnes passiones sit una sola virtus moralis, sunt enim quaedam passiones ad diversas potentias pertinentes; aliae namque pertinent ad irascibilem, aliae ad concupiscibilem.

It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue about all the passions, because some passions are not in the same power as other passions, since some belong to the irascible, others to the concupiscible faculty.

Nec tamen oportet quod omnis diversitas passionum sufficiat ad virtutes morales diversificandas.

On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues.

1a 2ae q60 a3: Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations? No.

2011-03-06T07:10:00.002-08:00

Omnes virtutes morales quae sunt circa operationes, conveniunt in quadam generali ratione iustitiae, quae attenditur secundum debitum ad alterum, distinguuntur autem secundum diversas speciales rationes, quia in operationibus exterioribus ordo rationis instituitur sicut dictum est, non secundum proportionem ad affectionem hominis, sed secundum ipsam convenientiam rei in seipsa.

All the moral virtues that are about operations fit with one general, formal aspect of justice, which is in respect of something due to another, but they differ in respect of various specific formal aspects, because in external operations, the order of formal aspect is established, as we have stated (q60 a2), not according as how man is affected towards such operations, but according to the fittingness itself of the thing itself.

Secundum quam convenientiam accipitur ratio debiti, ex quo constituitur ratio iustitiae; ad iustitiam enim pertinere videtur ut quis debitum reddat. Unde omnes huiusmodi virtutes quae sunt circa operationes, habent aliquo modo rationem iustitiae.

From that fittingness we derive the formal aspect of something due, which is the formal aspect of justice; for it seems to pertain to justice that a man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the formal aspect of justice.

Sed debitum non est unius rationis in omnibus, aliter enim debetur aliquid aequali, aliter superiori, aliter minori; et aliter ex pacto, vel ex promisso, vel ex beneficio suscepto.

But the thing due is not of the same formal aspect in all these virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, in another way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises from a contract, a promise, or a favor already conferred.

Et secundum has diversas rationes debiti, sumuntur diversae virtutes: puta religio est per quam redditur debitum Deo; pietas est per quam redditur debitum parentibus vel patriae; gratia est per quam redditur debitum benefactoribus; et sic de aliis.

And corresponding to these various [specific] formal aspects of debt there are various virtues: e.g. "Religion", whereby we pay our debt to God; "Piety", whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country; "Gratitude", whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth.

1a 2ae q60 a2: Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are about passions? Yes.

2011-02-10T06:57:00.002-08:00

In quibusdam virtus est principaliter circa operationem, in quibusdam circa passionem, quia potest comparari operatio ad virtutem moralem, sicut materia circa quam est. Et secundum hoc, oportet alias esse virtutes morales circa operationes, et alias circa passiones.

In some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, in others, about passions, because operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those moral virtues which are about operations must needs differ from those which are about passions.

Cuius ratio est, quia bonum et malum in quibusdam operationibus attenditur secundum seipsas, qualitercumque homo afficiatur ad eas: inquantum scilicet bonum in eis et malum accipitur secundum rationem commensurationis ad alterum. Et in talibus oportet quod sit aliqua virtus directiva operationum secundum seipsas: sicut sunt emptio et venditio, et omnes huiusmodi operationes in quibus attenditur ratio debiti vel indebiti ad alterum.

The reason for this is that good and evil, in certain operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no matter how man may be affected towards them: viz. insofar as good and evil in them depend on the formal aspect of their being in due measure with someone else. In operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the operations in themselves: such are buying and selling, and all such operations in which there is a formal aspect of something due or undue to another.

Et propter hoc, iustitia et partes eius proprie sunt circa operationes sicut circa propriam materiam. In quibusdam vero operationibus bonum et malum attenditur solum secundum commensurationem ad operantem. Et ideo oportet in his bonum et malum considerari, secundum quod homo bene vel male afficitur circa huiusmodi. Et propter hoc, oportet quod virtutes in talibus sint principaliter circa interiores affectiones, quae dicuntur animae passiones, sicut patet de temperantia, fortitudine et aliis huiusmodi.

For this reason justice and its parts are properly about operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, in some operations, good and evil depend only on due measure with the agent. Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in which man is affected to them. And for this reason in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which are called the passions of the soul, as is evidently the case with temperance, fortitude and the like.

Contingit autem quod in operationibus quae sunt ad alterum, praetermittatur bonum virtutis propter inordinatam animi passionem. Et tunc, inquantum corrumpitur commensuratio exterioris operationis, est corruptio iustitiae; inquantum autem corrumpitur commensuratio interiorum passionum, est corruptio alicuius alterius virtutis.

It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that the good of virtue is overlooked on account of some inordinate passion of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed inasmuch as the due measure of the external act is destroyed; while some other virtue is destroyed inasmuch as the internal passions exceed their due measure.

Sicut cum propter iram aliquis alium percutit, in ipsa percussione indebita corrumpitur iustitia; in immoderantia vero irae corrumpitur mansuetudo. Et idem patet in aliis.

Thus when through anger, one man strikes another, justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the immoderate anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues.

Philosophus ponit iustitiam circa operationes; temperantiam autem et fortitudinem et mansuetudinem, circa passiones quasdam.

The Philosopher reckons justice to be about operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions (Ethic. ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq.).

1a 2ae q60 a1: Whether there is only one moral virtue? No.

2011-02-06T06:50:00.003-08:00

Virtutes morales sint diversae secundum speciem, et non una tantum, quia appetibilia secundum motionem rationis constituuntur in diversis speciebus, secundum quod diversimode se habent ad rationem.

Moral virtues are of various species and are not one only, because objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong to various species, according to their various relations to reason.

Manifestum est autem quod in moralibus ratio est sicut imperans et movens, vis autem appetitiva est sicut imperata et mota. Non autem appetitus recipit impressionem rationis quasi univoce, quia non fit rationale per essentiam, sed per participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic.

Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved. But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say, because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation (Ethic. i, 13).

Sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales sunt habitus quidam appetitivae partis. Habitus autem specie differunt secundum speciales differentias obiectorum, ut supra dictum est. Species autem obiecti appetibilis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, attenditur secundum formam specificam, quae est ab agente.

As stated above (q58 aa1-3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as stated above (q54 a2). Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the agent.

Obiectum rationis est verum. Est autem eadem ratio veri, in omnibus moralibus, quae sunt contingentia agibilia. Unde est una sola virtus in eis dirigens, scilicet prudentia.

The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence.

Obiectum autem appetitivae virtutis est bonum appetibile. Cuius est diversa ratio, secundum diversam habitudinem ad rationem dirigentem.

On the other hand, the object of the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in formal aspect according to its various relations to reason, the directing formal aspect.

Moralia non habent speciem a fine ultimo sed a finibus proximis, qui quidem, etsi infiniti sint numero, non tamen infiniti sunt specie.

Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends, and these, although they be infinite in number, are not infinite in species.

1a 2ae q60: How the moral virtues differ from one another

2011-02-06T06:47:00.001-08:00

1a 2ae q59 a5: Whether there can be moral virtue without passion? No.

2011-02-05T09:39:00.003-08:00

Quanto virtus fuerit perfectior, tanto magis passionem causat, quia fiet redundantia usque ad appetitum sensitivum, secundum quod vires inferiores sequuntur motum superiorum, ut supra dictum est.

The more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion, because it will overflow into the sensitive appetite, insofar as the lower powers follow the movement of the higher, as stated above (q17 a7; q24 a3).

Si passiones dicamus inordinatas affectiones, sicut Stoici posuerunt, sic manifestum est quod virtus perfecta est sine passionibus. Si vero passiones dicamus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic planum est quod virtutes morales quae sunt circa passiones sicut circa propriam materiam, sine passionibus esse non possunt.

If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions.

Cuius ratio est, quia secundum hoc, sequeretur quod virtus moralis faceret appetitum sensitivum omnino otiosum. Non autem ad virtutem pertinet quod ea quae sunt subiecta rationi, a propriis actibus vacent, sed quod exequantur imperium rationis, proprios actus agendo.

The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle. Whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts.

"Nullus iustus est qui non gaudet iusta operatione", ut dicitur in I Ethic.

"No man is just who rejoices not in doing justice", as stated in Ethic. i, 8.

Passiones inordinatae inducunt ad peccandum, non autem si sunt moderatae.

It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin.

Virtus passiones inordinatas superat; moderatas autem producit.

Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate passion.

1a 2ae q59 a4: Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions? No.

2011-01-28T08:20:00.002-08:00

Non omnis virtus moralis est circa passiones, sed quaedam circa passiones, quaedam circa operationes, quia circa omne id quod contingit ratione ordinari et moderari, contingit esse virtutem moralem.

Not all the moral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some about operations, because there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason's direction and moderation.

Ratio autem ordinat non solum passiones appetitus sensitivi, sed etiam ordinat operationes appetitus intellectivi, qui est voluntas, quae non est subiectum passionis, ut supra dictum est.

Now reason directs, not only the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a passion, as stated above (q22 a3).

Non omnis virtus moralis est circa delectationes et tristitias sicut circa propriam materiam, sed sicut circa aliquid consequens proprium actum. Omnis enim virtuosus delectatur in actu virtutis, et tristatur in contrario.

The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and pains, as being their proper matter, but as being something resulting from their proper acts. For every virtuous man takes pleasure in acts of virtue, and is pained by the contrary.

Rationale per participationem non solum est appetitus sensitivus, qui est subiectum passionum, sed etiam voluntas, in qua non sunt passiones, ut dictum est.

Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where there are no passions.

1a 2ae q59 a3: Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue? Yes.

2011-01-26T07:34:00.002-08:00

Tristitia potest esse cum virtute quia ad virtutem pertinet quod tristetur moderate in quibus tristandum est, sicut etiam philosophus dicit in II Ethic.

Sorrow is compatible with virtue because moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful is a mark of virtue, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6,7).

Et hoc etiam utile est ad fugiendum mala: sicut enim bona propter delectationem promptius quaeruntur, ita mala propter tristitiam fortius fugiuntur.

Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow.

Tristitia impedit operationem de qua tristamur, sed adiuvat ad ea promptius exequenda per quae tristitia fugitur.

Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful, but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.

De his quae quocumque modo repugnant virtuti, virtus moderate tristatur.

Virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how.

Tristitia immoderata est animae aegritudo, tristitia autem moderata ad bonam habitudinem animae pertinet, secundum statum praesentis vitae.

Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind, but moderate sorrow, in the present state of life, is the mark of a mind that is in a good state of affairs.

In beatis, in quibus nullum impedimentum sapientiae esse potest, tristitia locum non habet.

There is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom.

1a 2ae q59 a2: Whether there can be moral virtue with passion? Yes.

2011-01-25T06:43:00.002-08:00

Virtutes non esse impassibilitates quia passio praeveniens iudicium rationis, si in animo praevaleat ut ei consentiatur, impedit consilium et iudicium rationis. Si vero sequatur, quasi ex ratione imperata, adiuvat ad exequendum imperium rationis.

Virtue is not freedom from passion because when a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and the judgment of reason; but when it follows that judgment, as though being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of reason's command.

Circa hoc fuit discordia inter Stoicos et Peripateticos, sicut Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei. Stoici enim posuerunt quod passiones animae non possunt esse in sapiente, sive virtuoso, Peripatetici vero, quorum sectam Aristoteles instituit, ut Augustinus dicit in IX de Civ. Dei, posuerunt quod passiones simul cum virtute morali esse possunt, sed ad medium reductae.

The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man, whereas the Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral virtue, if they be directed to the mean.

Haec autem diversitas, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, magis erat secundum verba, quam secundum eorum sententias. Quia enim Stoici non distinguebant inter appetitum intellectivum, qui est voluntas, et inter appetitum sensitivum, qui per irascibilem et concupiscibilem dividitur; non distinguebant in hoc passiones animae ab aliis affectionibus humanis, quod passiones animae sint motus appetitus sensitivi, aliae vero affectiones, quae non sunt passiones animae, sunt motus appetitus intellectivi, qui dicitur voluntas, sicut Peripatetici distinxerunt, sed solum quantum ad hoc quod passiones esse dicebant quascumque affectiones rationi repugnantes.

This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one of words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, through not discriminating between the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, and the sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the passions from the other affections of the human soul, in the point of their being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other emotions of the soul, which are not passions, are movements of the intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions being, as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason.

Quae si ex deliberatione oriantur, in sapiente, seu in virtuoso, esse non possunt. Si autem subito oriantur, hoc in virtuoso potest accidere, "eo quod animi visa quae appellant phantasias, non est in potestate nostra utrum aliquando incidant animo; et cum veniunt ex terribilibus rebus, necesse est ut sapientis animum moveant, ita ut paulisper vel pavescat metu, vel tristitia contrahatur, tanquam his passionibus praevenientibus rationis officium; nec tamen approbant ista, eisque consentiunt"; ut Augustinus narrat in IX de Civ. Dei, ab Agellio dictum.

These emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose deliberately, while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man, if they arose suddenly, because, in the words of Aulus Gellius [Noct. Attic. xix, 1, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), "it is not in our power to call up the visions of the soul, known as its fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs disturb the mind of a wise man, so that he is slightly startled by fear, or depressed with sorrow," insofar as "these passions forestall the use of reason without his approving of such things or consenting thereto."

Sic igitur, si passiones dicantur inordinatae affectiones, non possunt esse in virtuoso, ita quod post deliberationem eis consentiatur, ut Stoici posuerunt. Si vero passiones dicantur quicumque motus appetitus sensitivi, sic possunt esse in virtuoso, secundum quod sunt a ratione ordinati.

Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them deliberately, as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous man, insofar as they are subordinate to reason.

Unde Aristoteles dicit, in II Ethic., quod non bene quidam determinant virtutes impassibilitates quasdam et quietes, quoniam simpliciter dicunt, sed deberent dicere quod sunt quietes a passionibus quae sunt ut non oportet, et quando non oportet.

Hence Aristotle says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the assertion should be qualified": they should have said virtue is freedom from those passions "that are not as they should be as to manner and time."

Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, "si perversa est voluntas, perversos habebit hos motus", scilicet passionum, si autem recta est, "non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt".

Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): "If the will is perverse, these movements," viz. the passions, "are perverse also: but if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy."

1a 2ae q59 a1: Whether moral virtue is a passion? No.

2011-01-24T07:29:00.002-08:00

Moralis non potest esse passio, quia passio est motus quidam appetitus sensitivi, ut supra dictum est. Virtus autem moralis non est motus aliquis, sed magis principium appetitivi motus, habitus quidam existens.

Moral virtue cannot be a passion because a passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (q22 a3), whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a kind of habit.

Passiones ex seipsis non habent rationem boni vel mali. Bonum enim vel malum hominis est secundum rationem: unde passiones, secundum se consideratae, se habent et ad bonum et ad malum, secundum quod possunt convenire rationi vel non convenire. Nihil autem tale potest esse virtus, cum virtus solum ad bonum se habeat, ut supra dictum est.

Passions do not in themselves have the formal aspect of good or evil. For man's good or evil is something in reference to formal aspect: wherefore the passions, considered in themselves, are referable both to good and evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with formal aspect. Now nothing of this sort can be a virtue, since virtue is referable to good alone, as stated above (q55 a3).

Dato quod aliqua passio se habeat solum ad bonum, vel solum ad malum, secundum aliquem modum, tamen motus passionis, inquantum passio est, principium habet in ipso appetitu, et terminum in ratione, in cuius conformitatem appetitus tendit. Motus autem virtutis est e converso, principium habens in ratione et terminum in appetitu, secundum quod a ratione movetur.

Granted that some passions are, in some way, referable to good only, or to evil only, even then the movement of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite, and ends in the reason, since the appetite tends to conformity with reason. On the other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the appetite, inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason.

Unde in definitione virtutis moralis dicitur, in II Ethic., quod est "habitus electivus in medietate consistens determinata ratione, prout sapiens determinabit".

Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states that it is "a habit of choosing the mean determined by reason, as a prudent man would determine it".

Dicitur in II Ethic., quod "passiones neque virtutes sunt neque malitiae".

It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that "passions are neither virtues nor vices".

1a 2ae q59: Moral virtue in relation to the passions

2011-01-24T07:27:00.000-08:00

1a 2ae q58 a5: Whether there can be intellectual without moral virtue? No.

2011-01-23T08:24:00.002-08:00

Non prudentia potest esse sine virtute morali quia prudentia non solum est bene consiliativa, sed etiam bene iudicativa et bene praeceptiva: quod esse non potest, nisi removeatur impedimentum passionum corrumpentium iudicium et praeceptum prudentiae; et hoc per virtutem moralem.

Prudence cannot be without moral virtue because prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and command well: this is not possible unless the impediment of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue.

Aliae virtutes intellectuales sine virtute morali esse possunt, sed prudentia sine virtute morali esse non potest. Cuius ratio est, quia prudentia est recta ratio agibilium: non autem solum in universali, sed etiam in particulari, in quibus sunt actiones.

Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the right reason about things to be done: and this, not merely in general, but also in particulars, which constitute actions.

Recta autem ratio praeexigit principia ex quibus ratio procedit. Oportet autem rationem circa particularia procedere non solum ex principiis universalibus, sed etiam ex principiis particularibus. Circa principia quidem universalia agibilium, homo recte se habet per naturalem intellectum principiorum, per quem homo cognoscit quod nullum malum est agendum; vel etiam per aliquam scientiam practicam. Sed hoc non sufficit ad recte ratiocinandum circa particularia.

Now right reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue. And when reason argues about particular cases, it needs not only universal but also particular principles. As to universal principles of action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he understands that he should do no evil; or again by some practical science. But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases.

Contingit enim quandoque quod huiusmodi universale principium cognitum per intellectum vel scientiam, corrumpitur in particulari per aliquam passionem: sicut concupiscenti, quando concupiscentia vincit, videtur hoc esse bonum quod concupiscit, licet sit contra universale iudicium rationis.

For it happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a particular case by a passion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason.

Et ideo, sicut homo disponitur ad recte se habendum circa principia universalia, per intellectum naturalem vel per habitum scientiae, ita ad hoc quod recte se habeat circa principia particularia agibilium, quae sunt fines, oportet quod perficiatur per aliquos habitus secundum quos fiat quodammodo homini connaturale recte iudicare de fine.

Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding or of science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action, so, in order that he be rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end.

Et hoc fit per virtutem moralem: virtuosus enim recte iudicat de fine virtutis, quia "qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei", ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo ad rectam rationem agibilium, quae est prudentia, requiritur quod homo habeat virtutem moralem.

This is done by moral virtue: for the virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because "such as a man is, such does the end seem to him" (Ethic. iii, 5). Consequently the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to have moral virtue.

1a 2ae q58 a4: Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue? No.

2011-01-20T08:01:00.002-08:00

Gregorius dicit, in XXII Moral., quod "ceterae virtutes, nisi ea quae appetunt, prudenter agant, virtutes esse nequaquam possunt" quia inclinatio virtutis moralis est cum electione, et ideo ad suam perfectionem indiget quod sit ratio perfecta per virtutem intellectualem.

Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that "the other virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real virtues" because the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue.

Naturalis inclinatio ad bonum virtutis, est quaedam inchoatio virtutis, non autem est virtus perfecta. Huiusmodi enim inclinatio, quanto est fortior, tanto potest esse periculosior, nisi recta ratio adiungatur, per quam fiat recta electio eorum quae conveniunt ad debitum finem, sicut equus currens, si sit caecus, tanto fortius impingit et laeditur, quanto fortius currit.

The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more grievously will it be hurt.

Et ideo, etsi virtus moralis non sit ratio recta, ut Socrates dicebat, non tamen solum est secundum rationem rectam, inquantum inclinat ad id quod est secundum rationem rectam, ut Platonici posuerunt, sed etiam oportet quod sit cum ratione recta, ut Aristoteles dicit, in VI Ethic.

And consequently, although moral virtue be not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it "according to right reason," insofar as it inclines man to that which is, according to right reason, as the Platonists maintained [Cf. Plato, Meno xli.], but also it needs to be "joined with right reason," as Aristotle declares (Ethic. vi, 13).

Virtus moralis potest quidem esse sine quibusdam intellectualibus virtutibus, sicut sine sapientia, scientia et arte, non autem potest esse sine intellectu et prudentia.

Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding and prudence.

Sine prudentia quidem esse non potest moralis virtus, quia moralis virtus est habitus electivus, idest faciens bonam electionem. Ad hoc autem quod electio sit bona, duo requiruntur.

Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is a habit of choosing, i.e. making us choose well. Now in order that a choice be good, two things are required.

Primo, ut sit debita intentio finis, et hoc fit per virtutem moralem, quae vim appetitivam inclinat ad bonum conveniens rationi, quod est finis debitus.

First, that the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with reason, which is a due end.

Secundo, ut homo recte accipiat ea quae sunt ad finem, et hoc non potest esse nisi per rationem recte consiliantem, iudicantem et praecipientem; quod pertinet ad prudentiam et ad virtutes sibi annexas, ut supra dictum est.

Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have reference to the end: and this he cannot do unless his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it, as stated above (q57 aa5,6).

Unde virtus moralis sine prudentia esse non potest, et per consequens nec sine intellectu. Per intellectum enim cognoscuntur principia naturaliter nota, tam in speculativis quam in operativis.

Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence, and consequently neither can there be without understanding. For it is by the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident principles both in speculative and in practical matters.

Unde sicut recta ratio in speculativis, inquantum procedit ex principiis naturaliter cognitis, praesupponit intellectum principiorum, ita etiam prudentia, quae est recta ratio agibilium.

Consequently just as right reason in speculative matters, insofar as it proceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so also does prudence, which is the right reason about things to be done.

1a 2ae q58 a3: Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual? Yes.

2011-01-19T08:32:00.002-08:00

Omnis virtus humana vel est intellectualis vel moralis quia principium humanorum actuum in homine non est nisi duplex, scilicet intellectus sive ratio, et appetitus, haec enim sunt duo moventia in homine, ut dicitur in III de anima.

Every human virtue is either intellectual or moral because in man there are but two principles of human actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for these are the two principles of movement in man as stated in De Anima iii, text. 48.

Unde omnis virtus humana oportet quod sit perfectiva alicuius istorum principiorum. Si quidem igitur sit perfectiva intellectus speculativi vel practici ad bonum hominis actum, erit virtus intellectualis, si autem sit perfectiva appetitivae partis, erit virtus moralis.

Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one of these principles. Accordingly if it perfects man's speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may be good, it will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his appetite, it will be a moral virtue.

Prudentia, secundum essentiam suam, est intellectualis virtus. Sed secundum materiam, convenit cum virtutibus moralibus, est enim recta ratio agibilium, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc, virtutibus moralibus connumeratur.

Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as stated above (q57 a4).

1a 2ae q58 a2: Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue? Yes.

2011-01-18T07:40:00.002-08:00

Sicut igitur appetitus distinguitur a ratione, ita virtus moralis distinguitur ab intellectuali, quia ad hoc quod homo bene agat, per habitum virtutis intellectualis, requiritur quod non solum ratio sit bene dispositased etiam quod vis appetitiva sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis moralis.

Moral differs from intellectual virtue, even as the appetite differs from the reason, because for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of intellectual virtue, but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue.

Unde sicut appetitus est principium humani actus secundum quod participat aliqualiter rationem, ita habitus moralis habet rationem virtutis humanae, inquantum rationi conformatur.

Hence just as the appetite is the principle of human acts, insofar as it partakes of reason, so are moral habits to be considered virtues insofar as they are in conformity with reason.

Recta ratio, quae est secundum prudentiam, ponitur in definitione virtutis moralis, non tanquam pars essentiae eius, sed sicut quiddam participatum in omnibus virtutibus moralibus, inquantum prudentia dirigit omnes virtutes morales.

Right reason which is in accord with prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence, but as something belonging by way of participation to all the moral virtues, insofar as they are all under the direction of prudence.

Omnium humanorum operum principium primum ratio est, et quaecumque alia principia humanorum operum inveniantur, quodammodo rationi obediunt, diversimode tamen.

Reason is the first principle of all human acts, and whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason somewhat, but diversely, i.e., in various ways.

Nam quaedam rationi obediunt omnino ad nutum, absque omni contradictione: sicut corporis membra, si fuerint in sua natura consistentia; statim enim ad imperium rationis, manus aut pes movetur ad opus. Unde philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod anima regit corpus despotico principatu, idest sicut dominus servum, qui ius contradicendi non habet.

For some obey reason blindly and without any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of the body, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "the soul rules the body like a despot," i.e. as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel.

Posuerunt igitur quidam quod omnia principia activa quae sunt in homine, hoc modo se habent ad rationem. Quod quidem si verum esset, sufficeret quod ratio esset perfecta, ad bene agendum. Unde, cum virtus sit habitus quo perficimur ad bene agendum, sequeretur quod in sola ratione esset, et sic nulla virtus esset nisi intellectualis.

Accordingly some held that all the active principles in man are subordinate to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, since virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that there would be none but intellectual virtues.

Et haec fuit opinio Socratis, qui dixit omnes virtutes esse prudentias, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Unde ponebat quod homo, scientia in eo existente, peccare non poterat; sed quicumque peccabat, peccabat propter ignorantiam.

This was the opinion of Socrates, who said "every virtue is a kind of prudence," as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession of knowledge, he cannot sin; and that everyone who sins, does so through ignorance.

Hoc autem procedit ex suppositione falsi. Pars enim appetitiva obedit rationi non omnino ad nutum, sed cum aliqua contradictione; unde philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod ratio imperat appetitivae principatu politico, quo scilicet aliquis praeest liberis, qui habent ius in aliquo contradicendi.

Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the appetitive faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain power of opposition; wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "reason commands the appetitive faculty by a politic power," whereby a man rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of opposition.

Unde Augustinus dicit, super Psalm., quod interdum praecedit intellectus, et sequitur tardus aut nullus affectus, intantum quod quandoque passionibus vel habitibus appetitivae partis hoc agitur, ut usus rationis in particulari impediatur.

Hence Augustine says on Psalm 118 (Serm. 8) that "sometimes we understand [what is right] while desire is slow, or follows not at all," insofar as the habits or passions of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action.

Et secundum hoc, aliqualiter verum est quod Socrates dixit, quod scientia praesente, non peccatur: si tamen hoc extendatur usque ad usum rationis in particulari eligibili.

And in this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not sin: provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include the use of reason in this individual act of choice.

1a 2ae q58 a1: Whether every virtue is a moral virtue? No.

2011-01-17T07:53:00.002-08:00

Non omnis virtus dicitur moralis, sed solum illa quae est in vi appetitiva, quia omnis actus virtutis potest ex electione agi, sed electionem rectam agit sola virtus quae est in appetitiva parte animae, dictum est enim supra quod eligere est actus appetitivae partis.

Not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are in the appetitive faculty, because every act of virtue can be done from choice, but no virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive part of the soul, for it has been stated above that choice is an act of the appetitive faculty (q13 a1).

Ad huius evidentiam, considerare oportet quid sit mos, sic enim scire poterimus quid sit moralis virtus. Mos autem duo significat. Quandoque enim significat consuetudinem, sicut dicitur Act. XV, "nisi circumcidamini secundum morem Moysi, non poteritis salvi fieri".

In order to answer this question clearly, we must consider the meaning of the Latin word "mos"; for thus we shall be able to discover what a "moral" virtue is. Now "mos" has a twofold meaning. For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read (Acts 15:1): "Except you be circumcised after the manner (morem) of Moses, you cannot be saved."

Quandoque vero significat inclinationem quandam naturalem, vel quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum, unde etiam et brutorum animalium dicuntur aliqui mores; unde dicitur II Machab. XI, quod "leonum more irruentes in hostes, prostraverunt eos". Et sic accipitur mos in Psalmo LXVII, ubi dicitur, "qui habitare facit unius moris in domo".

Sometimes it means a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action, in which sense the word is applied to dumb animals. Thus we read (2 Maccabees 1:2) that "rushing violently upon the enemy, like lions [leonum more, i.e. as lions are in the habit of doing], they slew them": and the word is used in the same sense in Psalm 67:7, where we read: "Who maketh men of one manner [moris] to dwell in a house."

Et hae quidem duae significationes in nullo distinguuntur, apud Latinos, quantum ad vocem. In Graeco autem distinguuntur, nam ethos, quod apud nos morem significat, quandoque habet primam longam, et scribitur per eta, Graecam litteram; quandoque habet primam correptam, et scribitur per epsilon.

For both these significations there is but one word in Latin; but in the Greek there is a distinct word for each, for the word "ethos" is written sometimes with a long, and sometimes a short "e".

Dicitur autem virtus moralis a more, secundum quod mos significat quandam inclinationem naturalem, vel quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum. Et huic significationi moris propinqua est alia significatio, qua significat consuetudinem, nam consuetudo quodammodo vertitur in naturam, et facit inclinationem similem naturali.

Now "moral" virtue is so called from "mos" in the sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. And the other meaning of "mos," i.e. "custom," is akin to this: because custom becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination similar to a natural one.

Manifestum est autem quod inclinatio ad actum proprie convenit appetitivae virtuti, cuius est movere omnes potentias ad agendum, ut ex supradictis patet.

But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs properly to the appetitive power, whose function it is to move all the powers to their acts, as explained above (q9 a1).

1a 2ae q58: The difference between moral and intellectual virtues

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1a 2ae q57 a6: Whether "eubulia, synesis, and gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence? Yes.

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Convenienter adiungantur prudentiae eubulia, synesis et gnome, quia eubulia est habitus quo bene consiliamur, ut dicitur in VI Ethic, synesis est bene iudicativa, et sicut diversa sunt ea de quibus est iudicandum, ita etiam diversa sunt ea de quibus est consiliandum.

Euboulia, synesis, and gnome are fittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence because "euboulia" is "a habit whereby we take good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9), "synesis" enables us to judge well, and just as there are various matters to pass judgment on, so are there different points on which one has to take counsel ("gnome").

Iudicium de unaquaque re fit per propria principia eius. Inquisitio autem nondum est per propria principia: quia his habitis, non esset opus inquisitione, sed iam res esset inventa. Et ideo una sola virtus ordinatur ad bene consiliandum, duae autem virtutes ad bene iudicandum, quia distinctio non est in communibus principiis, sed in propriis.

Judgment of anything should be based on that thing's proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper principles: because, if we were in possession of these, we should need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, whereas there are two virtues for good judgment, because difference is based not on common but on proper principles.

Unde et in speculativis, una est dialectica inquisitiva de omnibus; scientiae autem demonstrativae, quae sunt iudicativae, sunt diversae de diversis.

Thus even in speculative matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce judgment, differ according to their different objects.

Distinguuntur autem synesis et gnome secundum diversas regulas quibus iudicatur: nam synesis est iudicativa de agendis secundum communem legem; gnome autem secundum ipsam rationem naturalem, in his in quibus deficit lex communis, sicut plenius infra patebit.

"Synesis" and "gnome" differ in respect of the different rules on which judgment is based: for "synesis" judges of actions according to the common law; while "gnome" bases its judgment on the natural formal aspect, in those cases where the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on (II-II q51 a4).

In omnibus potentiis ordinatis, illa est principalior, quae ad principaliorem actum ordinatur. Circa agibilia autem humana tres actus rationis inveniuntur: quorum primus est consiliari, secundus iudicare, tertius est praecipere.

Wherever several powers are subordinate to one another, that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest act. Now there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done by man: the first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the third, command.

Primi autem duo respondent actibus intellectus speculativi qui sunt inquirere et iudicare, nam consilium inquisitio quaedam est. Sed tertius actus proprius est practici intellectus, inquantum est operativus; non enim ratio habet praecipere ea quae per hominem fieri non possunt. Manifestum est autem quod in his quae per hominem fiunt, principalis actus est praecipere, ad quem alii ordinantur.

The first two correspond to those acts of the speculative intellect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel is a kind of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical intellect, insofar as this is ordained to operation; for reason does not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it is evident that in things done by man, the chief act is that of command, to which all the rest are subordinate.

1a 2ae q57 a5: Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man? Yes.

2011-01-11T09:54:00.002-08:00

Prudentia est virtus necessaria ad bene vivendum quia necesse est in ratione esse aliquam virtutem intellectualem, per quam perficiatur ratio ad hoc quod convenienter se habeat ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Et haec virtus est prudentia.

Prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life because an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence.

Prudentiae bonum attenditur in ipso agente, cuius perfectio est ipsum agere.

The good of prudence is in the active principle, whose activity is its perfection.

Cum homo bonum operatur non secundum propriam rationem, sed motus ex consilio alterius, nondum est omnino perfecta operatio ipsius, quantum ad rationem dirigentem, et quantum ad appetitum moventem. Unde si bonum operetur, non tamen simpliciter bene; quod est bene vivere.

When a man does a good deed, not of his own reason, but moved by the counsel of another, his deed is not yet quite perfect, as regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him. Wherefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well simply; and yet this is required in order that he may lead a good life.

Verum autem intellectus practici accipitur per conformitatem ad appetitum rectum. Quae quidem conformitas in necessariis locum non habet, quae voluntate humana non fiunt, sed solum in contingentibus quae possunt a nobis fieri, sive sint agibilia interiora, sive factibilia exteriora. Et ideo circa sola contingentia ponitur virtus intellectus practici, circa factibilia quidem, ars; circa agibilia vero prudentia.

The truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite. This conformity has no place in necessary matters, which are not affected by the human will, but only in contingent matters which can be effected by us, whether they be matters of interior action, or the products of external work. Hence it is only about contingent matters that an intellectual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect, viz. art, as regards things to be made, and prudence, as regards things to be done.

Dicitur de divina sapientia, "sobrietatem et prudentiam docet, iustitiam et virtutem, quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus".

It is written (Wisdom 8:7) of Divine Wisdom: "She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life."

1a 2ae q57 a4: Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art? Yes.

2011-01-10T07:37:00.004-08:00

Philosophus distinguit prudentiam ab arte, in VI Ethic, quia ars facit solum facultatem boni operis, quia non respicit appetitum; prudentia autem non solum facit boni operis facultatem, sed etiam usum: respicit enim appetitum, tanquam praesupponens rectitudinem appetitus.

The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art (Ethic. vi, 5) because art confers the mere aptness for good work, since it does not regard the appetite; whereas prudence confers not only aptness for a good work, but also the use: for it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the rectitude thereof.

Ars est recta ratio factibilium; prudentia vero est recta ratio agibilium.

Art is the "right aspect of things to be made"; whereas prudence is the "right aspect of things to be done".

Diversa genera artificialium omnia sunt extra hominem: et ideo non diversificatur ratio virtutis. Sed prudentia est recta ratio ipsorum actuum humanorum: unde diversificatur ratio virtutis.

The various kinds of things made by art are all external to man: hence they are not constituted by a different formal aspect of virtue. But prudence correctly sees the formal aspect about human acts themselves: hence it is constituted by a unique formal aspect of virtue.

Prudentia est bene consiliativa de his quae pertinent ad totam vitam hominis, et ad ultimum finem vitae humanae. Sed in artibus aliquibus est consilium de his quae pertinent ad fines proprios illarum artium. Unde aliqui, inquantum sunt bene consiliativi in rebus bellicis vel nauticis, dicuntur prudentes duces vel gubernatores, non autem prudentes simpliciter: sed illi solum qui bene consiliantur de his quae conferunt ad totam vitam.

Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man's entire life, and the end of human life. But in some arts there is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts. Hence some men, in so far as they are good counselors in matters of warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots, but not simply prudent: only those are simply prudent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life.

Perfectio autem et rectitudo rationis, in speculativis, dependet ex principiis, ex quibus ratio syllogizat; sicut dictum est quod scientia dependet ab intellectu, qui est habitus principiorum, et praesupponit ipsum. In humanis autem actibus se habent fines sicut principia in speculativis, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.

Perfection and rectitude of aspect, in speculative matters, depends on principles, by which the formal aspect structures syllogisms; thus we have said above (q57 a2 ad 2) that science depends on understanding, which is the habit of principles, and presupposes it. But in human acts, the ends stand as the principles do in speculative matters, as stated in Ethic. vii, 8.

Et ideo ad prudentiam, quae est recta ratio agibilium, requiritur quod homo sit bene dispositus circa fines: quod quidem est per appetitum rectum. Et ideo ad prudentiam requiritur moralis virtus, per quam fit appetitus rectus.

Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, which is right aspect about things to be done, that man be well disposed with regard to the ends: and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence there is need of moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite.

1a 2ae q57 a3: Whether the intellectual habit, art, is a virtue? Yes.

2011-01-09T09:16:00.002-08:00

Eo modo ars habet rationem virtutis, sicut et habitus speculativi, quia ars, nec habitus speculativus, faciunt bonum opus quantum ad usum, quod est proprium virtutis perficientis appetitum, sed solum quantum ad facultatem bene agendi.

Art has the formal aspect of a virtue in the same way as the speculative habits, because neither art nor speculative habit makes a good work as regards the use of the habit, which is the property of a virtue that perfects the appetite, but only as regards the aptness to work well.

Ars, proprie loquendo, habitus operativus est. Et tamen in aliquo convenit cum habitibus speculativis, quia etiam ad ipsos habitus speculativos pertinet qualiter se habeat res quam considerant, non autem qualiter se habeat appetitus humanus ad illas.

Art, properly speaking, is an operative habit. And yet it has something in common with the speculative habits, since the quality of the object considered by the latter is a matter of concern to them also, but not how the human appetite may be affected towards that object.

Sicut scientia se habet semper ad bonum, ut dictum est, ita et ars; et secundum hoc dicitur virtus. In hoc tamen deficit a perfecta ratione virtutis, quia non facit ipsum bonum usum, sed ad hoc aliquid aliud requiritur, quamvis bonus usus sine arte esse non possit.

Just as science has always a relation to good, as stated above (q57 a2 ad 3), so it is with art; and it is on account of this that it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of the perfect formal aspect of virtue, because it does not make its possessor to use it well, for which purpose something further is requisite, although there cannot be a good use without the art.

Quia ad hoc ut homo bene utatur arte quam habet, requiritur bona voluntas, quae perficitur per virtutem moralem; ideo philosophus dicit quod artis est virtus: scilicet moralis, inquantum ad bonum usum eius aliqua virtus moralis requiritur. Manifestum est enim quod artifex per iustitiam, quae facit voluntatem rectam, inclinatur ut opus fidele faciat.

In order that man may make good use of the art he has, he needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for this reason the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art: namely, a moral virtue, insofar as the good use of art requires a moral virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully.

Etiam in ipsis speculabilibus est aliquid per modum cuiusdam operis: puta constructio syllogismi aut orationis congruae aut opus numerandi vel mensurandi. Et ideo quicumque ad huiusmodi opera rationis habitus speculativi ordinantur, dicuntur per quandam similitudinem artes, sed liberales, ad differentiam illarum artium quae ordinantur ad opera per corpus exercita, quae sunt quodammodo serviles, inquantum corpus serviliter subditur animae, et homo secundum animam est liber.

Even in speculative matters there is something by way of operation: e.g., the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to such like operations of the speculative reason, are, by a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but "liberal" arts, in order to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained to works done by the body, which arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the body is in servile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free [liber].

Illae vero scientiae quae ad nullum huiusmodi opus ordinantur, simpliciter scientiae dicuntur, non autem artes.

On the other hand, those sciences which are not ordained to any such like work, are simply called sciences, and not arts.

1a 2ae q57 a2: Whether there are only three habits of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding? Yes.

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Secundum diversa genera scibilium, sunt diversi habitus scientiarum, cum tamen sapientia non sit nisi una, quia sapientia est quaedam scientia, inquantum habet id quod est commune omnibus scientiis (ut scilicet ex principiis conclusiones demonstret), sed quia habet aliquid proprium supra alias scientias, inquantum scilicet de omnibus iudicat, et non solum quantum ad conclusiones, sed etiam quantum ad prima principia, ideo habet rationem perfectioris virtutis quam scientia.

According to the different kinds of knowable matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge, whereas there is but one wisdom, because wisdom is a kind of science, insofar as it has that which is common to all the sciences (viz., to demonstrate conclusions from principles), but since it has something proper to itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, not only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore it has the formal aspect of a more perfect virtue than science.

Quando ratio obiecti sub uno actu refertur ad potentiam vel habitum, tunc non distinguuntur habitus vel potentiae penes rationem obiecti et obiectum materiale.

When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a power or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit or power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object.

Principia vero demonstrationis possunt seorsum considerari, absque hoc quod considerentur conclusiones. Possunt etiam considerari simul cum conclusionibus, prout principia in conclusiones deducuntur. Considerare ergo hoc secundo modo principia, pertinet ad scientiam, quae considerat etiam conclusiones; sed considerare principia secundum seipsa, pertinet ad intellectum.

Yet the principles of a demonstration can be considered apart, without the conclusion being considered at all. Still, they can be considered together with the conclusions, since the conclusions can be deduced from them. Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second way, belongs to science, which considers the conclusions also; while to consider the principles in themselves, belongs to understanding.

Scientia dependet ab intellectu sicut a principaliori. Et utrumque dependet a sapientia sicut a principalissimo, quae sub se continet et intellectum et scientiam, ut de conclusionibus scientiarum diiudicans, et de principiis earundem.

Science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and both of these depend on wisdom, as obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the conclusions of science, and of the principles on which they are based.

Sapientia considerat altissimas causas, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Unde convenienter iudicat et ordinat de omnibus, quia iudicium perfectum et universale haberi non potest nisi per resolutionem ad primas causas.

Wisdom considers the highest causes, as stated in Metaph. i, 1,2. Wherefore it fittingly judges all things and sets them in order, because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is not resolvable to the first causes.

1a 2ae q57 a1: Whether the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues? Yes.

2011-01-07T07:51:00.002-08:00

Habitus intellectuales speculativi sunt virtutes quia habitus speculativus habet ordinem ad interius opus intellectus, quod est speculari verum. Et secundum hoc est habitus operativus.

The habits of the speculative intellect are virtues because the speculative habit is ordained to the interior act of the intellect which is to consider the truth. And in this way it is an operative habit.

Cum omnis virtus dicatur in ordine ad bonum, sicut supra dictum est, duplici ratione aliquis habitus dicitur virtus, ut supra dictum est: uno modo, quia facit facultatem bene operandi; alio modo, quia cum facultate, facit etiam usum bonum. Et hoc, sicut supra dictum est, pertinet solum ad illos habitus qui respiciunt partem appetitivam, eo quod vis appetitiva animae est quae facit uti omnibus potentiis et habitibus.

Since every virtue is ordained to some good, as stated above (q55 a3), a habit, as we have already observed (q56 a3), may be called a virtue for two reasons: first, because it confers aptness in doing good; secondly, because besides aptness, it confers the right use of it. The latter condition, as above stated (q55 a3), belongs to those habits alone which affect the appetitive part of the soul, since it is the soul's appetitive power that puts all the powers and habits to their respective uses.

Cum igitur habitus intellectuales speculativi non perficiant partem appetitivam, nec aliquo modo ipsam respiciant, sed solam intellectivam, possunt quidem dici virtutes inquantum faciunt facultatem bonae operationis, quae est consideratio veri (hoc enim est bonum opus intellectus); non tamen dicuntur virtutes secundo modo, quasi facientes bene uti potentia seu habitu.

Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect the appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only the intellective part, they may indeed be called virtues insofar as they confer aptness for a good work, viz. the consideration of truth (since this is the good work of the intellect); yet they are not called virtues in the second way, as though they conferred the right use of a power or habit.

Ex hoc enim quod aliquis habet habitum scientiae speculativae, non inclinatur ad utendum, sed fit potens speculari verum in his quorum habet scientiam; sed quod utatur scientia habita, hoc est movente voluntate. Et ideo virtus quae perficit voluntatem, ut caritas vel iustitia, facit etiam bene uti huiusmodi speculativis habitibus.

For if a man possess a habit of speculative science, it does not follow that he is inclined to make use of it, but he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which he has scientific knowledge; but that he make use of the knowledge which he has, is due to the motion of his will. Consequently a virtue which perfects the will, as charity or justice, confers the right use of these speculative habits.

Et secundum hoc etiam, in actibus horum habituum potest esse meritum, si ex caritate fiant, sicut Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod "contemplativa est maioris meriti quam activa".

And in this way too there can be merit in the acts of these [speculative] habits, if they be done out of charity: thus Gregory says (Moral. vi) that "the contemplative life has greater merit than the active life".

Virtus est aliquorum dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut obiectorum. Et sic huiusmodi virtutes speculativae non sunt eorum per quae homo fit beatus; nisi forte secundum quod ly per dicit causam efficientem vel obiectum completae beatitudinis, quod est Deus, quod est summum speculabile.

Virtue is about certain things in two ways. In the first place a virtue is about its object. And thus these speculative virtues are not about those things whereby man is made happy; except perhaps, insofar as the word "whereby" indicates the efficient cause or object of complete happiness, i.e. God, Who is the supreme object of contemplation.

Alio modo dicitur virtus esse aliquorum sicut actuum. Et hoc modo virtutes intellectuales sunt eorum per quae homo fit beatus. Tum quia actus harum virtutum possunt esse meritorii, sicut dictum est. Tum etiam quia sunt quaedam inchoatio perfectae beatitudinis, quae in contemplatione veri consistit, sicut supra dictum est.

Secondly, a virtue is said to be about its acts: and in this sense the intellectual virtues are about those things whereby a man is made happy; both because the acts of these virtues can be meritorious, as stated above, and because they are a kind of beginning of perfect bliss, which consists in the contemplation of truth, as we have already stated (q3 a7).

1a 2ae q57: The intellectual virtues

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1a 2ae q56 a6: Whether the will can be the subject of virtue? Yes.

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Virtus est in voluntate sicut in subiecto quia cum per habitum perficiatur potentia ad agendum, ibi indiget potentia habitu perficiente ad bene agendum, qui quidem habitus est virtus, ubi ad hoc non sufficit propria ratio potentiae.

Virtue is subjected in the will because since the habit perfects the power in reference to act, then does the power need a habit perfecting it unto doing well, which habit is a virtue, when the power's own proper formal aspect does not suffice for the purpose.

Omnis autem potentiae propria ratio attenditur in ordine ad obiectum. Unde cum, sicut dictum est, obiectum voluntati sit bonum rationis voluntati proportionatum, quantum ad hoc non indiget voluntas virtute perficiente.

Now the proper formal aspect of a power is seen in its relation to its object. Since, therefore, as we have said above (q19 a3), the object of the will is the good of reason proportionate to the will, in respect of this the will does not need a virtue perfecting it.

Sed si quod bonum immineat homini volendum, quod excedat proportionem volentis, sive quantum ad totam speciem humanam, sicut bonum divinum, quod transcendit limites humanae naturae, sive quantum ad individuum, sicut bonum proximi, ibi voluntas indiget virtute. Et ideo huiusmodi virtutes quae ordinant affectum hominis in Deum vel in proximum, sunt in voluntate sicut in subiecto: ut caritas, iustitia et huiusmodi.

But if man's will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, whether as regards the whole human species, such as Divine good, which transcends the limits of human nature, or as regards the individual, such as the good of one's neighbor, then does the will need virtue. And therefore such virtues as those which direct man's affections to God or to his neighbor are subjected in the will: i.e., charity, justice, and such like.

Quaedam virtutes ordinantur ad bonum passionis moderatae, quod est proprium huius vel illius hominis: et in talibus non est necessarium quod sit aliqua virtus in voluntate, cum ad hoc sufficiat natura potentiae, ut dictum est. Sed hoc solum necessarium est in illis virtutibus quae ordinantur ad aliquod bonum extrinsecum.

Some virtues are directed to the good of moderated passion, which is the proper good of this or that man: and in these cases there is no need for virtue in the will, for the nature of the power suffices for the purpose, as we have said. This need exists only in the case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good.

Rationale per participationem non solum est irascibilis et concupiscibilis, sed "omnino, idest universaliter, appetitivum", ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sub appetitivo autem comprehenditur voluntas. Et ideo, si qua virtus est in voluntate, erit moralis, nisi sit theologica, ut infra patebit.

Not only the irascible and concupiscible powers are rational by participation but "the appetitive power altogether," i.e. in its entirety (Ethic. i, 13). Now the will is included in the appetitive power. And therefore whatever virtue is in the will must be a moral virtue, unless it be theological, as we shall see later on (q62 a3).

1a 2ae q56 a5: Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension are the subject of virtue? No.

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Nulla virtus est in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis interius quia in homine tamen id quod ex consuetudine acquiritur in memoria, et in aliis viribus sensitivis apprehensivis, non est habitus per se, sed aliquid annexum habitibus intellectivae partis, ut supra dictum est.

There is no virtue in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension because in man, that which he acquires by use, in his memory and other sensitive powers of apprehension, is not a habit properly so called, but something annexed to the habits of the intellective faculty, as we have said above (q50, a4, ad 3).

Sed tamen si qui sunt habitus in talibus viribus, virtutes dici non possunt. Virtus enim est habitus perfectus, quo non contingit nisi bonum operari, unde oportet quod virtus sit in illa potentia quae est consummativa boni operis.

Nevertheless even if there be habits in such powers, they cannot be virtues. For virtue is a perfect habit, by which it never happens that anything but good is done: and so virtue must needs be in that power which consummates the good act.

Cognitio autem veri non consummatur in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis: sed huiusmodi vires sunt quasi praeparatoriae ad cognitionem intellectivam. Et ideo in huiusmodi viribus non sunt virtutes, quibus cognoscitur verum; sed magis in intellectu vel ratione.

But the knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension: for such powers prepare the way to the intellective knowledge. And therefore in these powers there are none of the virtues, by which we know truth; these are rather in the intellect or reason.

Appetitus sensitivus se habet ad voluntatem, quae est appetitus rationis, sicut motus ab eo. Et ideo opus appetitivae virtutis consummatur in appetitu sensitivo. Et propter hoc, appetitus sensitivus est subiectum virtutis.

The sensitive appetite is related to the will, which is the rational appetite, through being moved by it. And therefore the act of the appetitive power is consummated in the sensitive appetite: and for this reason the sensitive appetite is the subject of virtue.

Virtutes autem sensitivae apprehensivae magis se habent ut moventes respectu intellectus, eo quod phantasmata se habent ad animam intellectivam, sicut colores ad visum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Et ideo opus cognitionis in intellectu terminatur. Et propter hoc, virtutes cognoscitivae sunt in ipso intellectu vel ratione.

Whereas the sensitive powers of apprehension are related to the intellect rather through moving it; for the reason that the phantasms are related to the intellective soul, as colors to sight (De Anima iii, text. 18). And therefore the act of knowledge is terminated in the intellect; and for this reason the cognoscitive virtues are in the intellect itself, or the reason.

1a 2ae q56 a4: Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers are the subject of virtue? Yes.

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Irascibilis vel concupiscibilis potest esse subiectum virtutis humanae, quia est principium humani actus, inquantum participat rationem. Et in his potentiis necesse est ponere virtutes.

The irascible or concupiscible power can be the subject of human virtue because insofar as it participates in the reason, it is the principle of a human act. And to these powers we must needs assign virtues.

Irascibilis et concupiscibilis non ad nutum obediunt rationi, sed habent proprios motus suos, quibus interdum rationi repugnant, unde in eodem libro philosophus dicit quod "ratio regit irascibilem et concupiscibilem principatu politico", quo scilicet reguntur liberi, qui habent in aliquibus propriam voluntatem. Et propter hoc etiam oportet in irascibili et concupiscibili esse aliquas virtutes, quibus bene disponantur ad actum.

The irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey the reason blindly; on the contrary, they have their own proper movements, by which, at times, they go against reason, whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the "reason rules the irascible and concupiscible powers by a political command" such as that by which free men are ruled, who have in some respects a will of their own. And for this reason also must there be some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers, by which these powers are well disposed to act.

Irascibilis et concupiscibilis secundum se consideratae, prout sunt partes appetitus sensitivi, communes sunt nobis et brutis. Sed secundum quod sunt rationales per participationem, ut obedientes rationi, sic sunt propriae hominis. Et hoc modo possunt esse subiectum virtutis humanae.

The irascible and concupiscible powers considered in themselves, as parts of the sensitive appetite, are common to us and dumb animals. But insofar as they are rational by participation, and are obedient to the reason, they are proper to man. And in this way they can be the subject of human virtue.

In electione duo sunt, scilicet intentio finis, quae pertinet ad virtutem moralem; et praeacceptio eius quod est ad finem, quod pertinet ad prudentiam; ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Quod autem habeat rectam intentionem finis circa passiones animae, hoc contingit ex bona dispositione irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Et ideo virtutes morales circa passiones, sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili, sed prudentia est in ratione.

In choice there are two things, namely, the intention of the end, and this belongs to the moral virtue; and the preferential choice of that which is unto the end, and this belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, 2,5). But that the irascible and concupiscible powers have a right intention of the end in regard to the passions of the soul, is due to the good disposition of these powers. And therefore those moral virtues which are concerned with the passions are in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but prudence is in the reason.

1a 2ae q56 a3: Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue? Yes.

2011-01-03T08:18:00.003-08:00

Intellectus est subiectum virtutis quia bonum uniuscuiusque est finis eius; et ideo, cum verum sit finis intellectus, cognoscere verum est bonus actus intellectus. Unde habitus perficiens intellectum ad verum cognoscendum, vel in speculativis vel in practicis, dicitur virtus.

The intellect is the subject of virtue because the good of each thing is its end; and therefore, as truth is the end of the intellect, so to know truth is the good act of the intellect. Whence the habit, which perfects the intellect in regard to the knowledge of truth, whether speculative or practical, is a virtue.

Subiectum igitur habitus qui secundum quid dicitur virtus, potest esse intellectus, non solum practicus, sed etiam intellectus speculativus, absque omni ordine ad voluntatem, sic enim philosophus, in VI Ethic., scientiam, sapientiam et intellectum, et etiam artem, ponit esse intellectuales virtutes.

The subject of a habit which is called a virtue in a relative sense, can be the intellect, and not only the practical intellect, but also the speculative, without any reference to the will: for thus the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) holds that science, wisdom and understanding, and also art, are intellectual virtues.

Virtus est habitus quo quis bene operatur. Dupliciter autem habitus aliquis ordinatur ad bonum actum. Uno modo, inquantum per huiusmodi habitum acquiritur homini facultas ad bonum actum, sicut per habitum grammaticae habet homo facultatem recte loquendi. Non tamen grammatica facit ut homo semper recte loquatur, potest enim grammaticus barbarizare aut soloecismum facere. Et eadem ratio est in aliis scientiis et artibus. Alio modo, aliquis habitus non solum facit facultatem agendi, sed etiam facit quod aliquis recte facultate utatur, sicut iustitia non solum facit quod homo sit promptae voluntatis ad iusta operandum, sed etiam facit ut iuste operetur.

A virtue is a habit by which we work well. Now a habit may be directed to a good act in two ways. First, in so far as by the habit a man acquires an aptness to a good act; for instance, by the habit of grammar man has the aptness to speak correctly. But grammar does not make a man always speak correctly: for a grammarian may be guilty of a barbarism or make a solecism: and the case is the same with other sciences and arts. Secondly, a habit may confer not only aptness to act, but also the right use of that aptness: for instance, justice not only gives man the prompt will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly.

Et quia bonum, sicut et ens, non dicitur simpliciter aliquid secundum id quod est in potentia, sed secundum id quod est in actu; ideo ab huiusmodi habitibus simpliciter dicitur homo bonum operari, et esse bonus, puta quia est iustus vel temperatus; et eadem ratio est de similibus. Et quia virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit, huiusmodi habitus simpliciter dicuntur virtutes, quia reddunt bonum opus in actu, et simpliciter faciunt bonum habentem. Primi vero habitus non simpliciter dicuntur virtutes, quia non reddunt bonum opus nisi in quadam facultate, nec simpliciter faciunt bonum habentem. Non enim dicitur simpliciter aliquis homo bonus, ex hoc quod est sciens vel artifex, sed dicitur bonus solum secundum quid, puta bonus grammaticus, aut bonus faber. Et propter hoc, plerumque scientia et ars contra virtutem dividitur, quandoque autem virtutes dicuntur, ut patet in VI Ethic.

And since good, and, in like manner, being, is said of a thing simply, in respect, not of what it is potentially, but of what it is actually: therefore from having habits of the latter sort, man is said simply to do good, and to be good; for instance, because he is just, or temperate; and in like manner as regards other such virtues. And since virtue is that "which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise," these latter habits are called virtuous simply: because they make the work to be actually good, and the subject good simply. But the first kind of habits are not called virtues simply: because they do not make the work good except in regard to a certain aptness, nor do they make their possessor good simply. For through being gifted in science or art, a man is said to be good, not simply, but relatively; for instance, a good grammarian or a good smith. And for this reason science and art are often divided against virtue; while at other times they are called virtues (Ethic. vi, 2).

Subiectum vero habitus qui simpliciter dicitur virtus, non potest esse nisi voluntas; vel aliqua potentia secundum quod est mota a voluntate. Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas movet omnes alias potentias quae aliqualiter sunt rationales, ad suos actus, ut supra habitum est, et ideo quod homo actu bene agat, contingit ex hoc quod homo habet bonam voluntatem. Unde virtus quae facit bene agere in actu, non solum in facultate, oportet quod vel sit in ipsa voluntate; vel in aliqua potentia secundum quod est a voluntate mota.

But the subject of a habit which is called a virtue simply, can only be the will, or some power insofar as it is moved by the will. And the reason of this is, that the will moves to their acts all those other powers that are in some way rational, as we have said above (9, 1; 17, A1,5; I, 82, 4): and therefore if man do well actually, this is because he has a good will. Therefore the virtue which makes a man to do well actually, and not merely to have the aptness to do well, must be either in the will itself; or in some power as moved by the will.

Contingit autem intellectum a voluntate moveri, sicut et alias potentias, considerat enim aliquis aliquid actu, eo quod vult. Et ideo intellectus, secundum quod habet ordinem ad voluntatem, potest esse subiectum virtutis simpliciter dictae. Et hoc modo intellectus speculativus, vel ratio, est subiectum fidei, movetur enim intellectus ad assentiendum his quae sunt fidei, ex imperio voluntatis; nullus enim credit nisi volens. Intellectus vero practicus est subiectum prudentiae. Cum enim prudentia sit recta ratio agibilium, requiritur ad prudentiam quod homo se bene habeat ad principia huius rationis agendorum, quae sunt fines; ad quos bene se habet homo per rectitudinem voluntatis, sicut ad principia speculabilium per naturale lumen intellectus agentis. Et ideo sicut subiectum scientiae, quae est ratio recta speculabilium, est intellectus speculativus in ordine ad intellectum agentem; ita subiectum prudentiae est intellectus practicus in ordine ad voluntatem rectam.

Now it happens that the intellect is moved by the will, just as are the other powers: for a man considers something actually, because he wills to do so. And therefore the intellect, in so far as it is subordinate to the will, can be the subject of virtue absolutely so called. And in this way the speculative intellect, or the reason, is the subject of Faith: for the intellect is moved by the command of the will to assent to what is of faith: for "no man believeth, unless he will" [Augustine: Tract. xxvi in Joan.]. But the practical intellect is the subject of prudence. For since prudence is the right reason of things to be done, it is a condition thereof that man be rightly disposed in regard to the principles of this reason of things to be done, that is in regard to their ends, to which man is rightly disposed by the rectitude of the will, just as to the principles of speculative truth he is rightly disposed by the natural light of the active intellect. And therefore as the subject of science, which is the right reason of speculative truths, is the speculative intellect in its relation to the active intellect, so the subject of prudence is the practical intellect in its relation to the right will.

1a 2ae q56 a2: Whether one virtue can be in several powers? No.

2011-01-02T09:47:00.003-08:00

Una virtus non potest esse in pluribus potentiis animae quia idem actus non potest aequaliter, et eodem ordine, pertinere ad diversas potentias, sed secundum diversas rationes, et diverso ordine.

One virtue cannot be in several powers of the soul because one act cannot belong to several powers equally, and in the same degree, but only according to different formal aspects, and in various degrees.

Diversitas potentiarum attenditur secundum generales conditiones obiectorum, diversitas autem habituum secundum speciales; unde ubicumque est diversitas potentiarum, est diversitas habituum, sed non convertitur.

Diversity of powers follows the generic conditions of the objects, while diversity of habits follows the specific conditions thereof; and so wherever there is diversity of powers, there is diversity of habits, but not vice versa.

Una virtus pertinere potest ad plures potentias; ita quod in una sit principaliter, et se extendat ad alias per modum diffusionis, vel per modum dispositionis: secundum quod una potentia movetur ab alia, et secundum quod una potentia accipit ab alia.

One virtue can belong to several powers; so that it is in one chiefly, while it extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way of a disposition: insofar as one power is moved by another, and one power receives from another.

Scire praeexigitur ad virtutem moralem, inquantum virtus moralis operatur secundum rationem rectam. Sed essentialiter in appetendo virtus moralis consistit.

"To know" is a condition required for moral virtue, inasmuch as moral virtue works according to the correct assessment of formal aspect (i.e., essence). But moral virtue is essentially in the appetite.

Prudentia realiter est in ratione sicut in subiecto, sed praesupponit rectitudinem voluntatis sicut principium.

Prudence is really subjected to formal aspect, but it presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will.

1a 2ae q56 a1: Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul? Yes.

2010-12-28T08:21:00.003-08:00

Virtus est in potentia animae quia perfectio est in eo cuius est perfectio.

Virtue is in a power of the soul because perfection is in that which it perfects.

Omnis operatio est ab anima per aliquam potentiam.

All operation proceeds from the soul through a power.

Disponit ad optimum: optimum autem est finis, qui vel est operatio rei, vel aliquid consecutum per operationem a potentia egredientem.

Virtue disposes to that which is best: for the best is the end, which is either a thing's operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the thing's power.

Unde virtus humana est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto.

Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue.

1a 2ae q56: The subject of virtue

2010-12-13T20:31:00.001-08:00

1a 2ae q55 a4: Whether virtue is suitably defined? Yes.

2010-12-12T06:53:00.002-08:00

"Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur," quia contra est auctoritas Augustini, ex cuius verbis praedicta definitio colligitur, et praecipue in II de libero arbitrio.

"Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us," because we have the authority of Augustine from whose words this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii, 19.

Ista definitio perfecte complectitur totam rationem virtutis. Perfecta enim ratio uniuscuiusque rei colligitur ex omnibus causis eius. Comprehendit autem praedicta definitio omnes causas virtutis.

This definition comprises perfectly the whole aspect of virtue, because the perfect aspect of anything is gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue.

Causa namque formalis virtutis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, accipitur ex eius genere et differentia, cum dicitur qualitas bona, genus enim virtutis qualitas est, differentia autem bonum. Esset tamen convenientior definitio, si loco qualitatis habitus poneretur, qui est genus propinquum.

For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as "a good quality": for "quality" is the genus of virtue, and the difference, "good." But the definition would be more suitable if for "quality" we substitute "habit," which is the proximate genus.

Virtus autem non habet materiam ex qua, sicut nec alia accidentia, sed habet materiam circa quam; et materiam in qua, scilicet subiectum. Materia autem circa quam est obiectum virtutis; quod non potuit in praedicta definitione poni, eo quod per obiectum determinatur virtus ad speciem; hic autem assignatur definitio virtutis in communi. Unde ponitur subiectum loco causae materialis, cum dicitur quod est bona qualitas mentis.

Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has matter "about which" it is concerned, and matter "in which" it exits, namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is concerned is its object, and this could not be included in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality "of the mind."

Finis autem virtutis, cum sit habitus operativus, est ipsa operatio. Sed notandum quod habituum operativorum aliqui sunt semper ad malum, sicut habitus vitiosi; aliqui vero quandoque ad bonum, et quandoque ad malum: sicut opinio se habet ad verum et ad falsum; virtus autem est habitus semper se habens ad bonum. Et ideo, ut discernatur virtus ab his quae semper se habent ad malum, dicitur, qua recte vivitur, ut autem discernatur ab his quae se habent quandoque ad bonum, quandoque ad malum, dicitur, qua nullus male utitur.

The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to evil, as vicious habits; others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil: for instance, opinion is referred both to the true and to the untrue, whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good. And so the distinction of virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in the words "by which we live righteously", and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, "of which no one makes bad use."

Causa autem efficiens virtutis infusae, de qua definitio datur, Deus est. Propter quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae quidem particula si auferatur, reliquum definitionis erit commune omnibus virtutibus, et acquisitis et infusis.

Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this definition applies; and this is expressed in the words "which God works in us without us." If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or infused.

Id quod primo cadit in intellectu, est ens, unde unicuique apprehenso a nobis attribuimus quod sit ens; et per consequens quod sit unum et bonum, quae convertuntur cum ente.

That which is first seized by the intellect is be-ing: wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as be-ing, and consequently as one, and as good, which are convertible with being.

Unde dicimus quod essentia est ens et una et bona; et quod unitas est ens et una et bona; et similiter de bonitate.

Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and that oneness is being and one and good: and likewise goodness.

Non autem hoc habet locum in specialibus formis, sicut est albedo et sanitas, non enim omne quod apprehendimus, sub ratione albi et sani apprehendimus. Sed tamen considerandum quod sicut accidentia et formae non subsistentes dicuntur entia, non quia ipsa habeant esse, sed quia eis aliquid est; ita etiam dicuntur bona vel una, non quidem aliqua alia bonitate vel unitate, sed quia eis est aliquid bonum vel unum. Sic igitur et virtus dicitur bona, quia ea aliquid est bonum.

But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the aspect of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they themselves had be-ing, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct goodness or oneness, but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something is good.

Bonum quod ponitur in definitione virtutis, non est bonum commune, quod convertitur cum ente, et est in plus quam qualitas, sed est bonum rationis, secundum quod Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., "quod bonum animae est secundum rationem esse".

Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further than quality, but the good as fixed by formal aspect, with regard to which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "that the good of the soul is to be in accord with formal aspect".

Virtus non potest esse in irrationali parte animae, nisi inquantum participat rationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Et ideo ratio, sive mens, est proprium subiectum virtutis humanae.

Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except insofar as this participates in formal aspect (Ethic. i, 13). And therefore formal aspect, i.e., the mind, is the proper subject of virtue.

Virtus infusa causatur in nobis a Deo sine nobis agentibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus. Et sic est intelligendum quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae vero per nos aguntur, Deus in nobis causat non sine nobis agentibus, ipse enim operatur in omni voluntate et natura.

Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the words, "which God works in us without us." As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature.

1a 2ae q55 a3: Whether human virtue is a good habit? Yes.

2010-12-11T09:27:00.003-08:00

Virtus humana, quae est habitus operativus, est bonus habitus, et boni operativus, quia virtus importat perfectionem potentiae, unde virtus cuiuslibet rei determinatur ad ultimum in quod res potest.

Human virtue, which is an operative habit, is a good habit, productive of good works, because virtue implies a perfection of power, wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the telos of its power.

Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., "nemo autem dubitaverit quod virtus animam facit optimam".

Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): "No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul be at its best".

Et philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod "virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit".

And the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work likewise good".

1a 2ae q55 a2: Whether human virtue is an operative habit? Yes.

2010-11-21T19:57:00.003-08:00

De ratione virtutis humanae est quod sit habitus operativus quia virtus humana, de qua loquimur, non potest pertinere ad corpus; sed pertinet tantum ad id quod est proprium animae. Unde virtus humana non importat ordinem ad esse, sed magis ad agere.

It is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit because human virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore human virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act.

Potentia ad esse se tenet ex parte materiae, quae est ens in potentia, potentia autem ad agere se tenet ex parte formae, quae est principium agendi, eo quod unumquodque agit inquantum est actu.

Power in reference to being is on the part of matter, which is potential being, whereas power in reference to act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since everything acts insofar as it is in act.

Modus actionis sequitur dispositionem agentis, unumquodque enim quale est, talia operatur. Et ideo, cum virtus sit principium aliqualis operationis, oportet quod in operante praeexistat secundum virtutem aliqua conformis dispositio. Facit autem virtus operationem ordinatam. Et ideo ipsa virtus est quaedam dispositio ordinata in anima, secundum scilicet quod potentiae animae ordinantur aliqualiter ad invicem, et ad id quod est extra.

Mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent: for such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since virtue is the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, insofar as, to wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another, and to that which is outside.

Virtus quae est ad esse, non est propria hominis, sed solum virtus quae est ad opera rationis, quae sunt propria hominis.

Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man, but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which are proper to man.

Cum Dei substantia sit eius actio, summa assimilatio hominis ad Deum est secundum aliquam operationem. Unde, sicut supra dictum est, felicitas sive beatitudo, per quam homo maxime Deo conformatur, quae est finis humanae vitae, in operatione consistit.

As God's substance is His act, the highest likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as we have said above (q3 a2), happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in an operation.

1a 2ae q55 a1: Whether human virtue is a habit? Yes.

2010-11-13T15:31:00.002-08:00

Virtutes humanae habitus sunt quia potentia dicitur esse perfecta, secundum quod determinatur ad suum actum.

Human virtues are habits because power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act.

Sunt autem quaedam potentiae quae secundum seipsas sunt determinatae ad suos actus; sicut potentiae naturales activae. Et ideo huiusmodi potentiae naturales secundum seipsas dicuntur virtutes.

Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues.

Potentiae autem rationales, quae sunt propriae hominis, non sunt determinatae ad unum, sed se habent indeterminate ad multa, determinantur autem ad actus per habitus.

But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determinate to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are determinate to acts by means of habits.

Quandoque virtus dicitur id ad quod est virtus, scilicet vel obiectum virtutis, vel actus eius, sicut fides dicitur quandoque id quod creditur, quandoque vero ipsum credere, quandoque autem ipse habitus quo creditur.

Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act: for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe.

1a 2ae q55: The virtues, as to their essence

2010-11-12T19:29:00.001-08:00

1a 2ae q54 a4: Whether one habit is made up of many habits? No.

2010-11-09T17:50:00.002-08:00

Si consideremus habitum secundum ea ad quae se extendit, sic inveniemus in eo quandam multiplicitatem, sed quia illa multiplicitas est ordinata ad aliquid unum, ad quod principaliter respicit habitus, inde est quod habitus est qualitas simplex, non constituta ex pluribus habitibus, etiam si ad multa se extendat, quia non unus habitus se extendit ad multa, nisi in ordine ad unum, ex quo habet unitatem.

If we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall find a certain multiplicity therein; but since this multiplicity is directed to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it is that a habit is a simple quality, not composed from several habits, even though it extend to many things, because a habit does not extend to many things save in relation to one, whence it derives its unity.

Ille qui in aliqua scientia acquirit per demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis unius, habet quidem habitum, sed imperfecte. Cum vero acquirit per aliquam demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis alterius, non aggeneratur in eo alius habitus; sed habitus qui prius inerat fit perfectior, utpote ad plura se extendens; eo quod conclusiones et demonstrationes unius scientiae ordinatae sunt, et una derivatur ex alia.

In any science, he who acquires, by demonstration, scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet imperfectly. And when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in him: but the habit which was in him previously is perfected, inasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the conclusions and demonstrations of one science are coordinate, and one flows from another.

1a 2ae q54 a3: Whether habits are divided into good and bad? Yes.

2010-11-04T19:22:00.002-07:00

Distinguuntur specie habitus bonus et malus, quia habitus bonus dicitur qui disponit ad actum convenientem naturae agentis; habitus autem malus dicitur qui disponit ad actum non convenientem naturae.

A good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit because a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable to nature.

Sicut actus virtutum naturae humanae conveniunt, eo quod sunt secundum rationem, actus vero vitiorum, cum sint contra rationem, a natura humana discordant.

Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they are against reason.

Et sic manifestum est quod secundum differentiam boni et mali, habitus specie distinguuntur.

Hence it is clear that habits are distinguished specifically by the difference of good and bad.

1a 2ae q54 a2: Whether habits are distinguished by their objects? Yes.

2010-11-03T07:43:00.002-07:00

Habitus distinguuntur secundum diversa obiecta quia habitus importat ordinem ad aliquid; omnia autem quae dicuntur secundum ordinem ad aliquid, distinguuntur secundum distinctionem eorum ad quae dicuntur.

Habits also are distinguished according to the diversity of objects because habits imply order to something; and all things that imply order to something, are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained.

In distinctione potentiarum, vel etiam habituum, non est considerandum ipsum obiectum materialiter, sed ratio obiecti differens specie, vel etiam genere.

In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which may differ in species or even in genus.

1a 2ae q54 a1: Whether many habits can be in one power? Yes.

2010-11-01T08:42:00.000-07:00

Contingit unius potentiae esse habitus plures quia subiectum habitus est potentia passiva, ut supra dictum est; potentia enim activa tantum non est alicuius habitus subiectum, ut ex supradictis patet.

There may be several habits in one power because the subject of a habit is a passive power, as stated above (q51 a2); for it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was clearly shown above (q51 a2).

1a 2ae q54: The distinction of habits

2010-10-12T22:02:00.001-07:00

1a 2ae q53 a3: Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act? Yes.

2010-10-11T19:16:00.002-07:00

Hoc modo cessatio ab actu causat corruptionem vel diminutionem habituum, inquantum scilicet removetur actus qui prohibebat causas corrumpentes vel diminuentes habitum, quia habitus per se corrumpuntur vel diminuuntur ex contrario agente; unde quorumcumque habituum contraria subcrescunt per temporis tractum, quae oportet subtrahi per actum ab habitu procedentem: huiusmodi habitus diminuuntur, vel etiam tolluntur totaliter, per diuturnam cessationem ab actu, ut patet et in scientia et in virtute.

The destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act, insofar, to wit, as we cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened that habit because habits are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency; consequently all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue.

Cum igitur homo cessat ab usu intellectualis habitus, insurgunt imaginationes extraneae, et quandoque ad contrarium ducentes; ita quod, nisi per frequentem usum intellectualis habitus, quodammodo succidantur vel comprimantur, redditur homo minus aptus ad recte iudicandum, et quandoque totaliter disponitur ad contrarium. Et sic per cessationem ab actu diminuitur, vel etiam corrumpitur intellectualis habitus.

When man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in opposition to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary. And thus the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act.

Pars intellectiva animae secundum se est supra tempus, sed pars sensitiva subiacet tempori. Et ideo per temporis cursum, transmutatur quantum ad passiones appetitivae partis et etiam quantum ad vires apprehensivas. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Physic., quod tempus est causa oblivionis.

The intellectual part of the soul, considered in itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and therefore in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget.

Philosophus, in libro de Longit. et Brevit. vitae, dicit quod corruptio scientiae non solum est deceptio, sed etiam oblivio. Et in VIII Ethic. dicitur quod multas amicitias inappellatio dissolvit.

The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of science." Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse has dissolved many a friendship."

1a 2ae q53 a2: Whether a habit can diminish? Yes.

2010-10-10T06:28:00.002-07:00

Habitus diminuuntur, sicut et augentur, quia sicut ex eadem causa augentur ex qua generantur, ita ex eadem causa diminuuntur ex qua corrumpuntur.

Habits diminish, just as they increase, because since they increase through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they diminish by the same cause as that which corrupts them.

Quaedam diminutio essentiae habitus non habet principium ab habitu, sed a participante.

A certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but in its subject.

Habitus secundum se consideratus, est forma simplex, et secundum hoc non accidit ei diminutio, sed secundum diversum modum participandi, qui provenit ex indeterminatione potentiae ipsius participantis, quae scilicet diversimode potest unam formam participare, vel quae potest ad plura vel ad pauciora extendi.

A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form. It is not thus that it is subject to decrease, but according to the different ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through its being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a greater or a smaller number of things.

1a 2ae q53 a1: Whether a habit can be corrupted? Yes.

2010-10-06T08:12:00.003-07:00

Per iudicium rationis in contrarium moventis quocumque modo, scilicet sive ex ignorantia, sive ex passione, vel etiam ex electione, corrumpitur habitus virtutis vel vitii.

A habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion, or deliberate choice.

Sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., habitus similitudinem habet naturae, deficit tamen ab ipsa. Et ideo, cum natura rei nullo modo removeatur ab ipsa, habitus difficile removetur.

As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while the nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty.

Scientia non removetur per motum corporalem quantum ad ipsam radicem habitus, sed solum quantum ad impedimentum actus, inquantum intellectus indiget in suo actu viribus sensitivis, quibus impedimentum affertur per corporalem transmutationem.

Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove an obstacle to the act of science, insofar as the intellect, in its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by corporal transmutation.

Sed per intelligibilem motum rationis potest corrumpi habitus scientiae, etiam quantum ad ipsam radicem habitus.

But the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the habit.

Et similiter etiam potest corrumpi habitus virtutis. Tamen quod dicitur, virtutes esse permanentiores disciplinis, intelligendum est non ex parte subiecti vel causae, sed ex parte actus: nam virtutum usus est continuus per totam vitam, non autem usus disciplinarum.

In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. Nevertheless when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning" this must be understood in respect, not of the subject or cause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning does not.

1a 2ae q53: How habits are corrupted or diminished

2010-10-06T08:11:00.000-07:00

1a 2ae q52 a3: Whether every act increases its habit? No.

2010-10-05T07:51:00.002-07:00

Non omnis actus habitum auget quia vero usus habituum in voluntate hominis consistit, ut ex supradictis patet: sicut contingit quod aliquis habens habitum non utitur illo, vel etiam agit actum contrarium; ita etiam potest contingere quod utitur habitu secundum actum non respondentem proportionaliter intensioni habitus.

It is not every act that increases a habit because use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above (q50 a5): just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit.

Si igitur intensio actus proportionaliter aequetur intensioni habitus, vel etiam superexcedat, quilibet actus vel auget habitum, vel disponit ad augmentum ipsius (ut loquamur de augmento habituum ad similitudinem augmenti animalis).

Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or disposes to an increase thereof (if we may speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal).

Si vero intensio actus proportionaliter deficiat ab intensione habitus, talis actus non disponit ad augmentum habitus, sed magis ad diminutionem ipsius.

If, however, the act falls short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.

"Similes actus similes habitus causant", ut dicitur in II Ethic.

"Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2).

Sed, sicut dicitur in II Ethic., aliqui actus ab habitu procedentes diminuunt ipsum, utpote cum negligenter fiunt.

But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly.

1a 2ae q52 a2: Whether habits increase by addition? No.

2010-10-04T07:32:00.003-07:00

Augmentum habituum non fiat per additionem quia augmentum habituum et aliarum formarum, non fit per additionem formae ad formam, sed fit per hoc quod subiectum magis vel minus perfecte participat unam et eandem formam.

The increase of habits is not by way of addition because the increase of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to form, but by the subject participating more or less perfectly, one and the same form.

1a 2ae q52 a1: Whether habits increase? Yes.

2010-09-27T08:14:00.002-07:00

Dupliciter potest intensio et remissio in habitibus et dispositionibus considerari quia habitus et dispositiones dicantur secundum ordinem ad aliquid (ut dicitur in VII Physic.).

In two ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and dispositions because we speak of habits and dispositions in respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. 17).

Uno modo, secundum se, prout dicitur maior vel minor sanitas; vel maior vel minor scientia, quae ad plura vel pauciora se extendit.

First, in respect of the habit itself: thus, for instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science, which extends to more or fewer things.

Alio modo, secundum participationem subiecti, prout scilicet aequalis scientia vel sanitas magis recipitur in uno quam in alio, secundum diversam aptitudinem vel ex natura vel ex consuetudine. Non enim habitus et dispositio dat speciem subiecto, neque iterum in sui ratione includit indivisibilitatem.

Secondly, in respect of participation by the subject: insofar as equal science or health is participated more in one than in another, according to a diverse aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and disposition do not give species to the subject: nor again do they, in their formal aspect, imply indivisibility.

1a 2ae q52: The increase of habits

2010-09-27T08:08:00.001-07:00

1a 2ae q51 a4: Whether any habits are infused in man by God? Yes.

2010-09-17T09:48:00.003-07:00

Aliqui habitus homini a Deo infunduntur, quia aliqui habitus sunt quibus homo bene disponitur ad finem excedentem facultatem humanae naturae, qui est ultima et perfecta hominis beatitudo, ut supra dictum est.

Some habits are infused by God into man, because there are some habits by which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above (q5 a5).

Et quia habitus oportet esse proportionatos ei ad quod homo disponitur secundum ipsos, ideo necesse est quod etiam habitus ad huiusmodi finem disponentes, excedant facultatem humanae naturae. Unde tales habitus nunquam possunt homini inesse nisi ex infusione divina, sicut est de omnibus gratuitis virtutibus.

And since habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in man except by Divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues.

Alia ratio est, quia Deus potest producere effectus causarum secundarum absque ipsis causis secundis, ut in primo dictum est. Sicut igitur quandoque, ad ostensionem suae virtutis, producit sanitatem absque naturali causa, quae tamen per naturam posset causari, ita etiam quandoque, ad ostendendam suam virtutem, infundit homini illos etiam habitus qui naturali virtute possunt causari. Sicut apostolis dedit scientiam Scripturarum et omnium linguarum, quam homines per studium vel consuetudinem acquirere possunt, licet non ita perfecte.

The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second causes, without these second causes, as we have said in S.T. I, 105, 6. Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His power, He causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power, He infuses into man even those habits which can be caused by a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by custom, but not so perfectly.

Hoc quod Deus in omnibus operatur secundum modum eorum, non excludit quin Deus quaedam operetur quae natura operari non potest, sed ex hoc sequitur quod nihil operatur contra id quod naturae convenit.

That God works in all according to their mode, does not hinder God from doing what nature cannot do, but it follows from this that He does nothing contrary to that which befits nature.

Actus qui producuntur ex habitu infuso, non causant aliquem habitum, sed confirmant habitum praeexistentem, sicut medicinalia remedia adhibita homini sano per naturam, non causant aliquam sanitatem, sed sanitatem prius habitam corroborant.

Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a certain habit, but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the remedies of medicine given to a man who is naturally healthy, do not cause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he had before.

1a 2ae q51 a3: Whether a habit can be caused by one act? No.

2010-09-16T07:57:00.002-07:00

Habitus virtutis, et eadem ratione alius habitus, non causatur per unum actum, quia habitus per actum generatur inquantum potentia passiva movetur ab aliquo principio activo; ad hoc autem quod aliqua qualitas causetur in passivo, oportet quod activum totaliter vincat passivum.

A habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused by one act, because a habit is generated by act inasmuch as a passive power is moved by some active principle; but in order that some quality be caused in that which is passive, the active principle must entirely overcome the passive.

Manifestum est autem quod principium activum quod est ratio, non totaliter potest supervincere appetitivam potentiam in uno actu, eo quod appetitiva potentia se habet diversimode et ad multa; iudicatur autem per rationem, in uno actu, aliquid appetendum secundum determinatas rationes et circumstantias.

Now it is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot entirely overcome the appetitive power in one act: because the appetitive power is inclined variously, and to many things; while the reason judges in a single act, what should be willed in regard to various aspects and circumstances.

Unde ex hoc non totaliter vincitur appetitiva potentia, ut feratur in idem ut in pluribus, per modum naturae, quod pertinet ad habitum virtutis. Et ideo habitus virtutis non potest causari per unum actum, sed per multos.

Wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely overcome, so as to be inclined like nature to the same thing, in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by many.

In apprehensivis autem potentiis considerandum est quod duplex est passivum, unum quidem ipse intellectus possibilis; aliud autem intellectus quem vocat Aristoteles passivum, qui est ratio particularis, idest vis cogitativa cum memorativa et imaginativa.

But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two passive principles: one is the "possible" [See I, 79, 2 ad 2] intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De Anima iii, text. 20) calls "passive," and is the "particular reason," that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination.

Respectu igitur primi passivi, potest esse aliquod activum quod uno actu totaliter vincit potentiam sui passivi, sicut una propositio per se nota convincit intellectum ad assentiendum firmiter conclusioni; quod quidem non facit propositio probabilis. Unde ex multis actibus rationis oportet causari habitum opinativum, etiam ex parte intellectus possibilis, habitum autem scientiae possibile est causari ex uno rationis actu, quantum ad intellectum possibilem.

With regard then to the former passive principle, it is possible for a certain active principle to entirely overcome, by one act, the power of its passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, so that it gives a firm assent to the conclusion, but a probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many acts of the reason, even on the part of the "possible" intellect: whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act of the reason, so far as the "possible" intellect is concerned.

Sed quantum ad inferiores vires apprehensivas, necessarium est eosdem actus pluries reiterari, ut aliquid firmiter memoriae imprimatur. Unde philosophus, in libro de memoria et reminiscentia, dicit quod meditatio confirmat memoriam. Habitus autem corporales possibile est causari ex uno actu, si activum fuerit magnae virtutis, sicut quandoque medicina fortis statim inducit sanitatem.

But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same acts need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. 1) that "meditation strengthens memory." Bodily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle is of great power: sometimes, for instance, a strong dose of medicine restores health at once.

Philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod "una hirundo ver non facit, nec una dies, ita utique nec beatum nec felicem una dies, nec paucum tempus".

The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): "As neither does one swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a short time make a man blessed and happy."

Sed "beatitudo est operatio secundum habitum perfectae virtutis", ut dicitur in I Ethic.

But "happiness is the activity of a habit of perfect excellence" (Ethic. i, 7,10,13).

1a 2ae q51 a2: Whether any habit is caused by acts? Yes.

2010-09-15T08:15:00.002-07:00

Invenitur autem aliquod agens in quo est principium activum et passivum sui actus, sicut patet in actibus humanis, quia actus appetitivae virtutis procedunt a vi appetitiva secundum quod movetur a vi apprehensiva repraesentante obiectum, et ulterius vis intellectiva, secundum quod ratiocinatur de conclusionibus, habet sicut principium activum propositionem per se notam.

A certain agent is to be found, in which there is both the active and the passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts, because the acts of the appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and further, the intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a self-evident proposition.

Unde ex talibus actibus possunt in agentibus aliqui habitus causari, non quidem quantum ad primum activum principium, sed quantum ad principium actus quod movet motum. Nam omne quod patitur et movetur ab alio, disponitur per actum agentis.

Wherefore by such acts habits can be caused in their agents, not indeed with regard to the first active principle, but with regard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover moved. For everything that is passive and moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agent.

Idem, secundum idem, non potest esse movens et motum. Nihil autem prohibet idem a seipso moveri secundum diversa, ut in VIII Physic. probatur.

The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself as to different respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text. 28,29.

Unde ex multiplicatis actibus generatur quaedam qualitas in potentia passiva et mota, quae nominatur habitus. Sicut habitus virtutum moralium causantur in appetitivis potentiis, secundum quod moventur a ratione, et habitus scientiarum causantur in intellectu, secundum quod movetur a primis propositionibus.

Wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit: just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in the appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science are caused in the intellect, according as it is moved by first propositions.

1a 2ae q51 a1: Whether any habit is from nature? Yes.

2010-09-13T07:28:00.002-07:00

Intellectus principiorum dicitur esse habitus naturalis, quia ex ipsa natura animae intellectualis, convenit homini quod statim, cognito quid est totum et quid est pars, cognoscat quod omne totum est maius sua parte, et simile est in ceteris.

The understanding of first principles is called a natural habit, because it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part, and in like manner with regard to other such principles.

Sed quid sit totum, et quid sit pars, cognoscere non potest nisi per species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus acceptas. Et propter hoc philosophus, in fine posteriorum, ostendit quod cognitio principiorum provenit nobis ex sensu.

Yet what is a whole, and what is a part--this he cannot know except through the intelligible species which he has received from phantasms: and for this reason, the Philosopher at the end of the Posterior Analytics shows that knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses.

Sed habitus qui est dispositio ad operationem, cuius subiectum est potentia animae, ut dictum est, potest quidem esse naturalis et secundum naturam speciei, et secundum naturam individui. Secundum quidem naturam speciei, secundum quod se tenet ex parte ipsius animae, quae, cum sit forma corporis, est principium specificum. Secundum autem naturam individui, ex parte corporis, quod est materiale principium.

The habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is a power of the soul, as stated above (q50 a2), may be natural whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the individual nature: in respect of the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the specific principle; but in respect of the individual nature, on the part of the body, which is the material principle.

Sed tamen neutro modo contingit in hominibus esse habitus naturales ita quod sint totaliter a natura. In Angelis siquidem contingit, eo quod habent species intelligibiles naturaliter inditas, quod non competit animae humanae, ut in primo dictum est.

Yet in neither way does it happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen, since they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which cannot be said of the human soul, as we have said in S.T. I, 55, 2; I, 84, 3.

Sicut in Angelis non potest pertinere ad ipsam potentiam intellectivam quod sit per se cognoscitiva omnium, quia oporteret quod esset actus omnium, quod solius Dei est. Id enim quo aliquid cognoscitur, oportet esse actualem similitudinem eius quod cognoscitur, unde sequeretur, si potentia Angeli per seipsam cognosceret omnia, quod esset similitudo et actus omnium.

With regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the intellective power itself capable of knowing all things: for thus it would have to be the act of all things, which belongs to God alone. Because that by which something is known, must needs be the actual likeness of the thing known: whence it would follow, if the power of the angel knew all things by itself, that it was the likeness and act of all things.

Unde oportet quod superaddantur potentiae intellectivae ipsius aliquae species intelligibiles, quae sunt similitudines rerum intellectarum, quia per participationem divinae sapientiae, et non per essentiam propriam, possunt intellectus eorum esse actu ea quae intelligunt.

Wherefore there must needs be added to the angels' intellective power, some intelligible species, which are likenesses of things understood: for it is by participation of the Divine wisdom and not by their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those things which they understand.

Sic igitur si loquamur de habitu secundum quod est dispositio subiecti in ordine ad formam vel naturam, quolibet praedictorum modorum contingit habitum esse naturalem. Est enim aliqua dispositio naturalis quae debetur humanae speciei, extra quam nullus homo invenitur. Et haec est naturalis secundum naturam speciei.

If we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either of the foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by the human species, so that no man can be without it. And this disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature.

Sed quia talis dispositio quandam latitudinem habet, contingit diversos gradus huiusmodi dispositionis convenire diversis hominibus secundum naturam individui. Et huiusmodi dispositio potest esse vel totaliter a natura, vel partim a natura et partim ab exteriori principio.

But since such a disposition has a certain latitude, it happens that different grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of the individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle.

In VI Ethic., inter alios habitus ponitur intellectus principiorum, qui est a natura, unde et principia prima dicuntur naturaliter cognita.

In Ethic. vi, 6, among other habits, place is given to understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature, wherefore also first principles are said to be known naturally.

1a 2ae q51: The cause of habits, as to their formation

2010-09-13T07:25:00.000-07:00

1a 2ae q50 a6: Whether there are habits in the angels? Yes.

2010-09-12T07:02:00.003-07:00

Quidam posuerunt in Angelis non esse habitus, sed inquantum invenitur in eis de potentia, intantum in eis possunt habitus inveniri, quia, licet in Angelis non sit potentia materiae, est tamen in eis aliqua potentia (esse enim actum purum est proprium Dei).

Some have thought that there are no habits in the angels, but as far as potentiality is found to be in them, so far may habits be found in them, because, though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone).

Quantum ad hoc quod convenit Angelis per suam essentiam, non indigent habitu. Sed quia non ita sunt per seipsos entes, quin participent sapientiam et bonitatem divinam, ideo inquantum indigent participare aliquid ab exteriori, intantum necesse est in eis ponere habitus.

As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of themselves, as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far do they need to have habits.

In Angelis non sunt partes essentiae, sed sunt partes secundum potentiam, inquantum intellectus eorum per plures species perficitur, et voluntas eorum se habet ad plura.

In angels there are no essential parts, but there are potential parts, insofar as their intellect is perfected by several species, and insofar as their will has a relation to several things.

Sed quia potentia materiae et potentia intellectualis substantiae non est unius rationis, ideo per consequens nec habitus unius rationis est utrobique. Unde Simplicius dicit, in commento praedicamentorum, quod "habitus intellectualis substantiae non sunt similes his qui sunt hic habitibus, sed magis sunt similes simplicibus et immaterialibus speciebus quas continet in seipsa".

Since the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the same kind, habits do not have one and the same aspect on both sides. Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments that: "The habits of the intellectual substance are not like the habits here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial species which [the angel] contains in itself."

Circa huiusmodi tamen habitum aliter se habet intellectus angelicus, et aliter intellectus humanus. Intellectus enim humanus, cum sit infimus in ordine intellectuum, est in potentia respectu omnium intelligibilium, sicut materia prima respectu omnium formarum sensibilium; et ideo ad omnia intelligenda indiget aliquo habitu.

The angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with regard to a habit of this sort. For the human intellect, being the lowest in the intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible things, just as primal matter is in respect of all sensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit.

Sed intellectus angelicus non se habet sicut pura potentia in genere intelligibilium, sed sicut actus quidam; non autem sicut actus purus (hoc enim solius Dei est), sed cum permixtione alicuius potentiae: et tanto minus habet de potentialitate, quanto est superior.

But the angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order of intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for this belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less potentiality it has.

Et ideo, ut in primo dictum est, inquantum est in potentia, indiget perfici habitualiter per aliquas species intelligibiles ad operationem propriam; sed inquantum est actu, per essentiam suam potest aliqua intelligere: ad minus seipsum, et alia secundum modum suae substantiae (ut dicitur in Lib. de causis), et tanto perfectius, quanto est perfectior.

And therefore, as we said above (in S.T. I, 55, 1), so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard to its proper operation; but so far as it is in act, through its own essence it can understand some things: at least itself, and other things according to the mode of its substance (as stated in De Causis), and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand.

Sed quia nullus Angelus pertingit ad perfectionem Dei, sed in infinitum distat; propter hoc, ad attingendum ad ipsum Deum per intellectum et voluntatem, indigent aliquibus habitibus, tanquam in potentia existentes respectu illius puri actus. Unde Dionysius dicit habitus eorum esse deiformes, quibus scilicet Deo conformantur.

But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order to attain to God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, being as it were in potentiality in regard to that Pure Act. Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are "deiform", that is to say, that by them they are conformed to the likeness of God.

Habitus autem qui sunt dispositiones ad esse naturale, non sunt in Angelis, cum sint immateriales.

But those habits that are dispositions to natural being are not in angels, since they are not material.

Dionysius dicit, VII cap. Cael. Hier., quod "Angeli primae hierarchiae nominantur calefacientes et throni et effusio sapientiae, manifestatio deiformis ipsorum habituum".

Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that "the angels are of the first hierarchy are called Fire-bearers and Thrones and Outpouring of Wisdom, by which is indicated the deiformity of their habits".

1a 2ae q50 a5: Whether any habit is in the will? Yes.

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Oportet in voluntate aliquem habitum ponere, quo bene disponatur ad suum actum, quia voluntas, cum sit potentia rationalis, diversimode potest ad agendum ordinari.

In the will we must admit the presence of a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act because, since the will is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act.

Necesse est quod in voluntate, et in aliis viribus appetitivis, sint quaedam qualitates inclinantes, quae dicuntur habitus.

It is necessary that, in the will and in the other appetitive powers, there be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits.

Sicut in intellectu est aliqua species quae est similitudo obiecti, ita oportet in voluntate, et in qualibet vi appetitiva, esse aliquid quo inclinetur in suum obiectum; cum nihil aliud sit actus appetitivae virtutis quam inclinatio quaedam, ut supra dictum est.

Even as in the intellect there is a species which is the likeness of the object, so in the will, and in every appetitive power, there must be something by which the power is inclined to its object; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing but a certain inclination, as we have said above (q6 a4; q22 a2).

1a 2ae q50 a4: Whether there is any habit in the intellect? Yes.

2010-09-10T07:53:00.002-07:00

Ipse intellectus possibilis est in quo est habitus scientiae quo potest considerare etiam cum non considerat, quia intelligere et considerare est proprius actus intellectus.

The possible intellect itself is the subject of the habit of science, by which the intellect, even though it be not actually considering, is able to consider, because to understand and to consider is the proper act of the intellect.

Potentia ad esse sensibile convenit materiae corporali, ita potentia ad esse intelligibile convenit intellectui possibili. Unde nihil prohibet in intellectu possibili esse habitum, qui est medius inter puram potentiam et actum perfectum.

As potentiality to sensible being belongs to corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the possible intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the possible intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and perfect act.

Vires apprehensivae interius praeparant intellectui possibili proprium obiectum, ideo ex bona dispositione harum virium, ad quam cooperatur bona dispositio corporis, redditur homo habilis ad intelligendum. Et sic habitus intellectivus secundario potest esse in istis viribus. Principaliter autem est in intellectu possibili.

Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the possible intellect, therefore it is by the good disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of the body cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand. And so in a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But principally it is in the possible intellect.

Ipsum autem intelligere non dicitur commune esse animae et corpori, nisi ratione phantasmatis, ut dicitur in I de anima. Patet autem quod phantasma comparatur ad intellectum possibilem ut obiectum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde relinquitur quod habitus intellectivus sit principaliter ex parte ipsius intellectus, non autem ex parte phantasmatis, quod est commune animae et corpori.

Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body, except by the aspect of the phantasm, as is stated in De Anima, text. 66. But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the passive intellect (De Anima iii, text. 3,39). Whence it follows that the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself, and not on the part of the phantasm, which is common to soul and body.

Et ideo dicendum est quod intellectus possibilis est subiectum habitus, illi enim competit esse subiectum habitus, quod est in potentia ad multa; et hoc maxime competit intellectui possibili. Unde intellectus possibilis est subiectum habituum intellectualium.

And therefore we must say that the possible intellect is the subject of habit, which is in potentiality to many, and this belongs, above all, to the possible intellect. Wherefore the possible intellect is the subject of intellectual habits.

Philosophus, in VI Ethic., ponit scientiam et sapientiam et intellectum, qui est habitus principiorum, in ipsa intellectiva parte animae.

The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10) puts science, wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first principles, in the intellective part of the soul.

1a 2ae q50 a3: Whether there can be any habits in the powers of the sensitive parts? Yes.

2010-09-09T06:25:00.002-07:00

Vires sensitivae natae sunt obedire imperio rationis, et ideo in eis esse possunt aliqui habitus, quia secundum quod obediunt rationi, quodammodo rationales dicuntur, ut in I Ethic. dicitur.

The sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore habits can be in them, because insofar as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational, as stated in Ethic. i, 13.

Vires nutritivae partis non sunt natae obedire imperio rationis, et ideo non sunt in eis aliqui habitus.

The powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no habits in them.

Appetitus sensitivus natus est moveri ab appetitu rationali, ut dicitur in III de anima, sed vires rationales apprehensivae natae sunt accipere a viribus sensitivis. Et ideo magis convenit quod habitus sint in viribus sensitivis appetitivis quam in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis, cum in viribus sensitivis appetitivis non sint habitus nisi secundum quod operantur ex imperio rationis.

The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 57: but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is more suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since in the powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they act at the command of the reason.

Quamvis etiam in ipsis interioribus viribus sensitivis apprehensivis possint poni aliqui habitus, secundum quos homo fit bene memorativus vel cogitativus vel imaginativus, unde etiam philosophus dicit, in cap. de memoria, quod "consuetudo multum operatur ad bene memorandum", quia etiam istae vires moventur ad operandum ex imperio rationis.

And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby man has a facility of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii) that "custom conduces much to a good memory": the reason of which is that these powers also are moved to act at the command of the reason.

Vires autem apprehensivae exteriores, ut visus et auditus et huiusmodi, non sunt susceptivae aliquorum habituum, sed secundum dispositionem suae naturae ordinantur ad suos actus determinatos; sicut et membra corporis, in quibus non sunt habitus, sed magis in viribus imperantibus motum ipsorum.

On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing and the like, are not susceptible of habits, but are ordained to their fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just as the members of the body, for there are no habits in them, but rather in the powers which command their movements.

1a 2ae q50 a2: Whether the soul is the subject of habit in respect of its essence? No.

2010-09-08T07:31:00.002-07:00

Si accipiatur habitus secundum quod habet ordinem ad naturam, sic non potest esse in anima, si tamen de natura humana loquamur, quia ipsa anima est forma completiva humanae naturae; unde secundum hoc, magis potest esse aliquis habitus vel dispositio in corpore per ordinem ad animam, quam in anima per ordinem ad corpus.

If we take habit as having a relation to nature, it cannot be in the soul--that is, if we speak of human nature: because the soul itself is the form completing the human nature; so that, regarded in this way, habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation to the soul, than in the soul by reason of its relation to the body.

Sed si loquamur de aliqua superiori natura, cuius homo potest esse particeps, secundum illud II Petr. I, ut simus consortes naturae divinae, sic nihil prohibet in anima secundum suam essentiam esse aliquem habitum, scilicet gratiam, ut infra dicetur.

But if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a partaker, according to 2 Peter 1, "that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature": thus nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in the soul in respect of its essence, as we shall state later on (q110 a4).

Si vero accipiatur habitus in ordine ad operationem, sic maxime habitus inveniuntur in anima, inquantum anima non determinatur ad unam operationem, sed se habet ad multas, quod requiritur ad habitum, ut supra dictum est. Et quia anima est principium operationum per suas potentias, ideo secundum hoc, habitus sunt in anima secundum suas potentias.

If we take habit in its relation to operation, it is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: insofar as the soul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, which is a condition for a habit, as we have said above (q49 a4). And since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore, regarded in this sense, habits are in the soul in respect of its powers.

Essentia animae pertinet ad naturam humanam, non sicut subiectum disponendum ad aliquid aliud, sed sicut forma et natura ad quam aliquis disponitur.

The essence of the soul belongs to human nature, not as a subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a form and nature to which someone is disposed.

Philosophus, in I Ethic., ponit diversos habitus in diversis partibus animae.

The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits in the various powers of the soul.

1a 2ae q50 a1: Whether there is a habit in the body? Yes.

2010-09-07T06:13:00.002-07:00

Supra dictum est, habitus est quaedam dispositio alicuius subiecti existentis in potentia vel ad formam, vel ad operationem. Secundum ergo quod habitus importat dispositionem ad operationem, nullus habitus est principaliter in corpore sicut in subiecto. Omnis enim operatio corporis est aut a naturali qualitate corporis, aut est ab anima movente corpus.

As we have said above (q49 a2 seqq.), habit is a certain disposition of a subject existing in a state of potentiality either to form or to operation. Therefore insofar as habit implies disposition to operation, no habit is principally in the body as its subject. For every operation of the body proceeds either from a natural quality of the body, or from the soul moving the body.

Quantum igitur ad illas operationes quae sunt a natura, non disponitur corpus per aliquem habitum, quia virtutes naturales sunt determinatae ad unum; dictum est autem quod habitualis dispositio requiritur ubi subiectum est in potentia ad multa.

Consequently, as to those operations which proceed from its nature, the body is not disposed by a habit, because the natural forces are determined to one mode of operation; and we have already said (q49 a4) that it is when the subject is in potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is required.

Operationes vero quae sunt ab anima per corpus, principaliter quidem sunt ipsius animae, secundario vero ipsius corporis. Habitus autem proportionantur operationibus, unde ex similibus actibus, similes habitus causantur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Et ideo dispositiones ad tales operationes principaliter sunt in anima. In corpore vero possunt esse secundario: inquantum scilicet corpus disponitur et habilitatur ad prompte deserviendum operationibus animae.

As to the operations which proceed from the soul through the body, they belong principally to the soul, and secondarily to the body. Now habits are in proportion to their operations: whence "by like acts, like habits are formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). And therefore the dispositions to such operations are principally in the soul. But they can be secondarily in the body: to wit, insofar as the body is disposed and enabled with promptitude to help in the operations of the soul.

Si vero loquamur de dispositione subiecti ad formam, sic habitualis dispositio potest esse in corpore, quod comparatur ad animam sicut subiectum ad formam. Et hoc modo sanitas et pulchritudo, et huiusmodi, habituales dispositiones dicuntur. Non tamen perfecte habent rationem habituum, quia causae eorum ex sua natura de facili transmutabiles sunt.

If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a habitual disposition can be in the body, which is related to the soul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and such like are called habitual dispositions. Yet they have not the formal aspect of habit perfectly, because their causes, of their very nature, are easily changeable.

Philosophus, in praedicamentis, sanitatem corporis, vel infirmitatem insanabilem, habitum nominari dicit.

The Philosopher says in the Book of Categories (De Categor. vi) that health of the body and incurable disease are called habits.

1a 2ae q50: The subject of habits

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1a 2ae q49 a4: Whether habits are necessary? Yes.

2010-08-24T23:37:00.002-07:00

Necessarium fuit habitus esse, quia habitus sunt perfectiones quaedam, ut dicitur in VII Physic, sed perfectio est maxime necessaria rei, cum habeat rationem finis.

It is necessary that there should be habits, because habits are perfections (Phys. vii, text. 17), and perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing, since it has the formal aspect of purpose.

Sicut supra dictum est, habitus importat dispositionem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, et ad operationem vel finem eius, secundum quam bene vel male aliquid ad hoc disponitur.

As we have said above (q49 a2, a3), habit implies a disposition in ordination to a thing's nature, and [a disposition] to its operation or purpose, [and], according to [this disposition], something is well- or ill-disposed to that [operative purpose].

Non idem habitus se habet ad bonum et malum, sicut infra patebit. Eadem autem potentia se habet ad bonum et malum. Et ideo necessarii sunt habitus ut potentiae determinentur ad bonum.

The same habit has not a relation to good and evil, as will be made clear further on (q54 a3): whereas the same power has a relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary that potentials be determined to the good.

1a 2ae q49 a3: Whether habit implies order to an act? Yes.

2010-08-23T07:39:00.004-07:00

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono coniugali, quod "habitus est quo aliquid agitur cum opus est", et Commentator dicit, in III de anima, quod "habitus est quo quis agit cum voluerit", quia inquantum tamen natura est principium actus, ex consequenti importat ordinem ad actum.

Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "habit is that whereby something is done when necessary", and the Commentator says (De Anima iii) that "habit is that whereby we act when we will", because insofar as nature is a principle of act, it consequently implies ordination to act.

Secundum quidem rationem habitus, convenit omni habitui aliquo modo habere ordinem ad actum. Est enim de ratione habitus ut importet habitudinem quandam in ordine ad naturam rei, secundum quod convenit vel non convenit.

In regard to the formal aspect of habit, it befits every habit to have ordination to an act. For it is formally aspectual to habit to imply some some state of affairs in ordination to a thing's nature, insofar as it is befitting or ill-befitting thereto.

Sed natura rei, quae est finis generationis, ulterius etiam ordinatur ad alium finem, qui vel est operatio, vel aliquod operatum, ad quod quis pervenit per operationem.

But a thing's nature, which is the end of generation, is further ordained to another end, which is either an operation, or the product of an operation, to which one attains by means of operation.

Unde habitus non solum importat ordinem ad ipsam naturam rei, sed etiam consequenter ad operationem, inquantum est finis naturae, vel perducens ad finem.

Wherefore habit implies ordination not only to the very nature of a thing, but also, consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or conducive to the end.

Unde et in V Metaphys. dicitur in definitione habitus, quod est dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum aut secundum se, idest secundum suam naturam, aut ad aliud, idest in ordine ad finem.

Whence also it is stated (Metaph. v, text. 25) in the definition of habit, that it is a disposition whereby that which is disposed, is well- or ill-disposed either in regard to itself, that is to its nature, or in regard to something else, that is in ordination to the end.

Sed sunt quidam habitus qui etiam ex parte subiecti in quo sunt, primo et principaliter important ordinem ad actum. Quia ut dictum est, habitus primo et per se importat habitudinem ad naturam rei.

But there are some habits, which even on the part of the subject in which they are, imply primarily and principally ordination to an act. For, as we have said, habit primarily and of itself implies a state of affairs with respect to the thing's nature.

Si igitur natura rei, in qua est habitus, consistat in ipso ordine ad actum, sequitur quod habitus principaliter importet ordinem ad actum. Manifestum est autem quod natura et ratio potentiae est ut sit principium actus. Unde omnis habitus, qui est alicuius potentiae ut subiecti, principaliter importat ordinem ad actum.

If therefore the nature of a thing, in which the habit is, consists in this very ordination to an act, it follows that the habit principally implies ordination to an act. Now it is clear that the nature and the formal aspect of power is that it should be a principle of act. Wherefore every habit, which is subjected in a power, implies principally ordination to an act.

Habitus est actus quidam, inquantum est qualitas, et secundum hoc potest esse principium operationis. Sed est in potentia per respectum ad operationem. Unde habitus dicitur actus primus, et operatio actus secundus; ut patet in II de anima.

Habit is an act, insofar as it is a quality, and in this respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in a state of potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore habit is called first act, and operation, second act; as it is explained in De Anima ii, text. 5.

Non est de ratione habitus quod respiciat potentiam, sed quod respiciat naturam. Et quia natura praecedit actionem, quam respicit potentia, ideo prior species qualitatis ponitur habitus quam potentia.

It is not the formal aspect of habit to be related to power, but to be related to nature. And as nature precedes action, to which power is related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality.

1a 2ae q49 a2: Whether habit is a distinct species of quality? Yes.

2010-08-22T08:27:00.002-07:00

Philosophus, in praedicamentis, ponit inter quatuor species qualitatis primam, dispositionem et habitum, quia natura est id quod primum consideratur in re.

The Philosopher in the Book of Categories (Categor. vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of quality, because nature is the first object of consideration in anything.

In prima specie consideratur et bonum et malum; et etiam facile et difficile mobile, secundum quod aliqua natura est finis generationis et motus.

In the first species we consider both evil and good; and also changeableness, whether easy or difficult, inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and movement.

Unde in V Metaphys. philosophus definit habitum, quod est "dispositio secundum quam aliquis disponitur bene vel male".

And so the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition whereby someone is disposed, well or ill"

Et in II Ethic. dicit quod habitus sunt secundum quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel male.

And in Ethic. ii, 4, he says that by "habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions".

Quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei, tunc habet rationem boni; quando autem non convenit, tunc habet rationem mali.

For when the mode is befitting to the thing's nature, it has the formal aspect of good; and when it is ill-befitting, it has the formal aspect of evil.

Philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod "una species qualitatis est habitus et dispositio".

The Philosopher says in the Book of the Categories (Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit and disposition".

1a 2ae q49 a1: Whether habit is a quality? Yes.

2010-08-21T07:06:00.003-07:00

Habitus est qualitas quia si sumatur habere prout res aliqua dicitur quodam modo se habere in seipsa vel ad aliud; cum iste modus se habendi sit secundum aliquam qualitatem, hoc modo habitus quaedam qualitas est, de quo philosophus, in V Metaphys., dicit quod habitus dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum se aut ad aliud, ut sanitas habitus quidam est.

We must say that habit is a quality because if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another: thus health is a habit."

Philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod "habitus est qualitas de difficili mobilis".

The Philosopher says in the Book of Categories (Categor. vi) that "a habit is a quality which is difficult to change".

Sed habere communiter sumpto est commune ad multa genera.

But "to have" in the general sense is common to many categories.

De habitu, secundum quod intelligitur aliquid medium inter habens et id quod habetur, est quoddam praedicamentum.

A habit, in the sense in which we understand it to be a medium between the haver and that which is had, is a category.

Hoc nomen habitus ab habendo est sumptum. A quo quidem nomen habitus dupliciter derivatur, uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo, vel quaecumque alia res, dicitur aliquid habere; alio modo, secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud.

This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from "habere" [to have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation [se habet] either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else.

Circa primum autem, considerandum est quod habere, secundum quod dicitur respectu cuiuscumque quod habetur, commune est ad diversa genera. Unde philosophus inter post praedicamenta habere ponit, quae scilicet diversa rerum genera consequuntur; sicut sunt opposita, et prius et posterius, et alia huiusmodi.

Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard to anything that is "had," is common to the various categories. And so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the "post-categories," so called because they result from the various categories; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like.

Sed inter ea quae habentur, talis videtur esse distinctio, quod quaedam sunt in quibus nihil est medium inter habens et id quod habetur, sicut inter subiectum et qualitatem vel quantitatem nihil est medium. Quaedam vero sunt in quibus est aliquid medium inter utrumque, sed sola relatio, sicut dicitur aliquis habere socium vel amicum.

Now among things which are had, there seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the "haver" and that which is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend.

Quaedam vero sunt inter quae est aliquid medium, non quidem actio vel passio, sed aliquid per modum actionis vel passionis, prout scilicet unum est ornans vel tegens, et aliud ornatum aut tectum, unde philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod "habitus dicitur tanquam actio quaedam habentis et habiti", sicut est in illis quae circa nos habemus.

And, further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner of action or passion: thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had"; as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves.

Et ideo in his constituitur unum speciale genus rerum, quod dicitur praedicamentum habitus, de quo dicit philosophus, in V Metaphys., quod "inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est habitus medius".

And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which are comprised under the category of "habit": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "there is a habit between clothing and the man who is clothed."

Dispositio quidem semper importat ordinem alicuius habentis partes, sed hoc contingit tripliciter, ut statim ibidem philosophus subdit, scilicet aut secundum locum, aut secundum potentiam, aut secundum speciem.

Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher goes on at once to say (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, "either as to place, or as to power, or as to species."

In quo, ut Simplicius dicit in commento praedicamentorum, comprehendit omnes dispositiones. Corporales quidem, in eo quod dicit secundum locum, et hoc pertinet ad praedicamentum situs, qui est ordo partium in loco. Quod autem dicit secundum potentiam, includit illas dispositiones quae sunt in praeparatione et idoneitate nondum perfecte, sicut scientia et virtus inchoata. Quod autem dicit secundum speciem, includit perfectas dispositiones, quae dicuntur habitus, sicut scientia et virtus complete.

"In saying this," as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Categories, "he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when he says 'as to place,'" and this belongs to the category "Position," which is the order of parts in a place: "when he says 'as to power,' he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue: "and when he says, 'as to species,' he includes perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue.

1a 2ae q49: Habits in general, as to their substance

2010-08-21T06:04:00.000-07:00

1a 2ae q48 a4: Whether anger above all causes taciturnity? Yes.

2010-08-19T08:38:00.002-07:00

Irae quandoque est usque ad impediendum rationem a cohibitione linguae; quandoque autem ultra procedit, usque ad impediendum motum linguae, et aliorum membrorum exteriorum, quia perturbatio cordis quandoque potest superabundare usque ad hoc, quod per inordinatum motum cordis impediatur motus exteriorum membrorum; et tunc causatur taciturnitas, et immobilitas exteriorum membrorum.

Anger sometimes goes so far as to hinder the reason from curbing the tongue, but sometimes it goes yet farther, so as to paralyze the tongue and other outward members, because the disturbance of the heart may sometimes superabound to the extend that the movements of the outward members are hindered by the inordinate movement of the heart; thence ensue taciturnity and immobility of the outward members.

Gregorius dicit, in V Moral., quod "ira per silentium clausa, intra mentem vehementius aestuat".

Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that "when anger does not vent itself outwardly by the lips, inwardly it burns the more fiercely".

1a 2ae q48 a3: Whether anger above all hinders the use of reason? Yes.

2010-08-18T22:08:00.002-07:00

Ira impedit iudicium rationis quia a ratione est principium irae, quantum ad motum appetitivum, qui est formalis in ira, sed perfectum iudicium rationis passio irae praeoccupat quasi non perfecte rationem audiens, propter commotionem caloris velociter impellentis, quae est materialis in ira.

Anger hinders the judgment of reason because the beginning of anger is in the reason, as regards the appetitive movement, which is the formal element of anger, but the passion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason, as though it listened but imperfectly to reason, on account of the commotion of the heat urging to instant action, which commotion is the material element of anger.

Mens vel ratio quamvis non utatur organo corporali in suo proprio actu, tamen, quia indiget ad sui actum quibusdam viribus sensitivis, quorum actus impediuntur corpore perturbato, necesse est quod perturbationes corporales etiam iudicium rationis impediant, sicut patet in ebrietate et somno.

Although the mind or reason makes no use of a bodily organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain sensitive powers for the execution of its act, the acts of which powers are hindered when the body is disturbed, it follows of necessity that any disturbance in the body hinders even the judgment of reason, as is clear in the case of drunkenness or sleep.

Iracundus dicitur esse manifestus, non quia manifestum sit sibi quid facere debeat, sed quia manifeste operatur, non quaerens aliquam occultationem. Quod partim contingit propter impedimentum rationis, quae non potest discernere quid sit occultandum et quid manifestandum, nec etiam excogitare occultandi vias. Partim vero est ex ampliatione cordis, quae pertinet ad magnanimitatem, quam facit ira: unde et de magnanimo philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod "est manifestus oditor et amator et manifeste dicit et operatur".

An angry man is said to be open, not because it is open to him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly, without thought of hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason being hindered, so as not to discern what should be hidden and what done openly, nor to devise the means of hiding; and partly to the dilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanimity which is an effect of anger: wherefore the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he is open in his hatreds and his friendships . . . and speaks and acts openly."

Concupiscentia autem dicitur esse latens et insidiosa, quia, ut plurimum, delectabilia quae concupiscuntur, habent turpitudinem quandam et mollitiem, in quibus homo vult latere. In his autem quae sunt virilitatis et excellentiae, cuiusmodi sunt vindictae, quaerit homo manifestus esse.

Desire, on the other hand, is said to lie low and to be cunning, because, in many cases, the pleasurable things that are desired, savor of shame and voluptuousness, wherein man wishes not to be seen. But in those things that savor of manliness and excellence, such as matters of vengeance, man seeks to be in the open.

1a 2ae q48 a2: Whether anger above all causes fervor in the heart? Yes.

2010-08-17T22:50:00.002-07:00

Fervor irae est cum amaritudine, ad consumendum, quia tendit ad punitionem contrarii: unde assimilatur calori ignis et cholerae, et propter hoc Damascenus dicit quod "procedit ex evaporatione fellis, et fellea nominatur".

The fervor of anger has a certain bitterness with a tendency to destroy, because it seeks to be avenged on the contrary evil: whence it is likened to the heat of fire and of the bile, and for this reason Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that it "results from an exhalation of the bile whence it takes its name chole."

1a 2ae q48 a1: Whether anger causes pleasure? Yes.

2010-08-16T07:58:00.005-07:00

Tristitia se habet ad iram sicut principium, sed delectatio sicut effectus vel terminus, quia non de eodem iratus tristatur et gaudet; sed tristatur de illata iniuria, delectatur autem de vindicta cogitata et sperata.

Sorrow is to anger as its beginning, while pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger, because the angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the same thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in the thought and hope of vengeance.

Delectatio de vindicta consequitur ipsam.

Pleasure felt in taking vengeance follows from anger.

Sicut philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., delectationes, maxime sensibiles et corporales, sunt medicinae quaedam contra tristitiam; et ideo quanto per delectationem contra maiorem tristitiam vel anxietatem remedium praestatur, tanto delectatio magis percipitur: sicut patet quod quando aliquis sitit, delectabilior fit ei potus.

As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures, chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow; and therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible are we to the pleasure which heals it: as is evident in the case of thirst which increases the pleasure of drink.

Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod motus irae insurgit ex aliqua illata iniuria contristante, cui quidem tristitiae remedium adhibetur per vindictam.

Now it is clear from what has been said (q47 a1, a3), that the movement of anger arises from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for which sorrow vengeance is sought as a remedy.

Philosophus, in eodem libro, inducit proverbium, quod "ira multo dulcior melle distillante in pectoribus virorum crescit".

The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying that anger is "Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste" (Iliad, xviii, 109 [trans. Alexander Pope]).

1a 2ae q48: The effects of anger

2010-08-16T07:58:00.001-07:00

1a 2ae q47 a4: Whether a person's defect is a reason for being more easily angry with him? Yes.

2010-08-15T07:17:00.002-07:00

Defectus vel parvitas eius contra quem irascimur, facit ad augmentum irae, inquantum auget indignam despectionem, quia indigna despectio est maxime provocativa irae.

Deficiency or littleness in the person with whom we are angry, tends to increase our anger, insofar as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised, because unmerited contempt more than anything else is provocative of anger.

Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "dives irascitur contra pauperem, si eum despiciat; et principans contra subiectum".

The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "the rich man is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in like manner the prince is angry with his subject."

Si vero parvitas vel defectus diminuat despectionem indignam, talis parvitas non auget, sed diminuit iram. Et hoc modo illi qui poenitent de iniuriis factis, et confitentur se male fecisse, et humiliantur et veniam petunt, mitigant iram, secundum illud Prov. XV, "responsio mollis frangit iram", inquantum scilicet tales videntur non despicere, sed magis magnipendere eos quibus se humiliant.

If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited contempt, then such littleness does not increase but lessens anger. In this way those who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done wrong, who humble themselves and ask pardon, mitigate anger, according to Proverbs 15:1: "A mild answer breaketh wrath": because, to wit, they seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom they humble themselves.

Etiam despectio quae est ab amicis, videtur esse magis indigna. Et ideo ex simili causa magis irascimur contra eos, si despiciant, vel nocendo vel non iuvando, sicut et contra minores.

But to be despised by one's friends seems also a greater indignity. Consequently if they despise us by hurting or by failing to help, we are angry with them for the same reason for which we are angry with those who are beneath us.

1a 2ae q47 a3: Whether a man's excellence is the cause of his being angry? Yes.

2010-08-14T07:23:00.002-07:00

Illi qui sunt in aliqua excellentia, maxime irascuntur, si parvipendantur (puta si dives parvipenditur in pecunia, et rhetor in loquendo, et sic de aliis), quia constat quod quanto aliquis est excellentior, iniustius parvipenditur in hoc in quo excellit.

Those who excel in any matter, are most of all angry, if they be slighted in that matter (for instance, a wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in his eloquence, and so forth), because the more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a slight offered him in the matter in which he excels.

Causa irae in eo qui irascitur, ex parte dispositionis quae in eo relinquitur ex tali motivo. Manifestum est autem quod nihil movet ad iram, nisi nocumentum quod contristat. Ea autem quae ad defectum pertinent, maxime sunt contristantia, quia homines defectibus subiacentes facilius laeduntur. Et ista est causa quare homines qui sunt infirmi, vel in aliis defectibus, facilius irascuntur, quia facilius contristantur.

The cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be considered on the part of the disposition produced in him by the motive aforesaid. Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a hurt that grieves him: while whatever savors of defect is above all a cause of grief, since men who suffer from some defect are more easily hurt. And this is why men who are weak, or subject to some other defect, are more easily angered, since they are more easily grieved.

Ille qui despicitur in eo in quo manifeste multum excellit, non reputat se aliquam iacturam pati, et ideo non contristatur, et ex hac parte minus irascitur. Sed ex alia parte, inquantum indignius despicitur, habet maiorem rationem irascendi. Nisi forte reputet se non invideri vel subsannari propter despectum, sed propter ignorantiam, vel propter aliud huiusmodi.

If a man be despised in a matter in which he evidently excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser thereby, and therefore is not grieved, and in this respect he is less angered. But in another respect, insofar as he is more undeservedly despised, he has more reason for being angry; unless perhaps he thinks that he is envied or insulted not through contempt but through ignorance, or some other like cause.

Philosophus, in eodem libro, dicit quod homines propter excellentiam indignantur.

The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) that excellence makes men prone to anger.

1a 2ae q47 a2: Whether the sole formal aspect of anger is slight or contempt? Yes.

2010-08-13T21:55:00.002-07:00

Omnes causae irae reducuntur ad parvipensionem quia ex quacumque alia causa aliquis iniuriam patiatur quam ex contemptu, illa causa minuit rationem iniuriae; sed solus contemptus, vel parvipensio, rationem irae auget: et ideo est per se causa irascendi.

All the causes of anger are reduced to slight because any other cause, besides contempt, through which a man suffers an injury, takes away from the formal aspect of injury; contempt or slight alone adds to the formal aspect of anger: and consequently is of itself the cause of anger.

Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod ira est appetitus cum tristitia punitionis, propter apparentem parvipensionem non convenienter factam.

The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is "a desire, with sadness, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done unbecomingly".

Licet animal brutum non appetat honorem sub ratione honoris, appetit tamen naturaliter quandam excellentiam, et irascitur contra ea quae illi excellentiae derogant.

Although a dumb animal does not seek honor in its formal aspect, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with anything derogatory thereto.

1a 2ae q47 a1: Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry? Yes.

2010-08-12T08:40:00.003-07:00

Motivum irae alicuius semper sit aliquid contra ipsum factum quia, sicut supra dictum est, ira est appetitus nocendi alteri sub ratione iusti vindicativi.

The motive of a man's anger is always something done against him because, as stated above (q46 a6), anger is the desire to hurt another under the formal aspect of just vengeance.

Vindicta autem locum non habet nisi ubi praecessit iniuria. Nec iniuria omnis ad vindictam provocat, sed illa sola quae ad eum pertinet qui appetit vindictam, sicut enim unumquodque naturaliter appetit proprium bonum, ita etiam naturaliter repellit proprium malum. Iniuria autem ab aliquo facta non pertinet ad aliquem, nisi aliquid fecerit quod aliquo modo sit contra ipsum.

Now unless some injury has been done, there is no question of vengeance; nor does any injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the person who seeks vengeance: for just as everything naturally seeks its own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by anyone does not affect a man unless in some way it be something done against him.

Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "ira fit semper ex his quae ad seipsum. Inimicitia autem et sine his quae ad ipsum, si enim putemus talem esse odimus".

The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise without anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we think him to be such and such".

Irascimur contra illos qui aliis nocent et vindictam appetimus, inquantum illi quibus nocetur, aliquo modo ad nos pertinent, vel per aliquam affinitatem, vel per amicitiam, vel saltem per communionem naturae.

If we are angry with those who harm others, and seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in some way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least because of the nature we have in common.

Id in quo maxime studemus, reputamus esse bonum nostrum. Et ideo, cum illud despicitur, reputamus nos quoque despici, et arbitramur nos laesos.

When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as though we ourselves were despised and injured.

Ira non dicitur in Deo secundum passionem animi, sed secundum iudicium iustitiae, prout vult vindictam facere de peccato. Peccator enim, peccando, Deo nihil nocere effective potest, tamen ex parte sua dupliciter contra Deum agit. Primo quidem, inquantum eum in suis mandatis contemnit. Secundo, inquantum nocumentum aliquod infert alicui, vel sibi vel alteri: quod ad Deum pertinet, prout ille cui nocumentum infertur, sub Dei providentia et tutela continetur.

We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of the soul, but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take vengeance on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any actual harm: but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against God in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments. Secondly, insofar as he harms himself or another: which injury redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an object of God's providence and protection.

1a 2ae q47: The cause that provokes anger, and the remedies of anger

2010-08-12T08:39:00.000-07:00

1a 2ae q46 a8: Whether the species of anger are suitably assigned? Yes.

2010-08-11T19:19:00.002-07:00

Damascenus convenienter assignet tres species irae, scilicet fel, maniam et furorem quia gradus illi irae distinguuntur secundum effectum irae.

Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) suitably assigns three species of anger--"wrath," "ill-will" and "rancor", because these degrees are distinguished according to various effects of anger.

Tres species irae quas Damascenus ponit, et etiam Gregorius Nyssenus, sumuntur secundum ea quae dant irae aliquod augmentum. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Uno modo, ex facilitate ipsius motus, et talem iram vocat fel, quia cito accenditur.

The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger. This happens in three ways. First, from facility of the movement itself, and he calls this kind of anger cholos [bile], because it is quickly aroused.

Alio modo, ex parte tristitiae causantis iram, quae diu in memoria manet, et haec pertinet ad maniam, quae a manendo dicitur.

Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and which dwells some time in the memory; this belongs to menis [ill-will] which is derived from menein [to dwell].

Tertio, ex parte eius quod iratus appetit, scilicet vindictae, et haec pertinet ad furorem, qui nunquam quiescit donec puniat.

Thirdly, on the part of that which the angry man seeks, viz. vengeance; and this pertains to kotos [rancor] which never rests until it is avenged.

Unde philosophus, in IV Ethic., quosdam irascentium vocat acutos, quia cito irascuntur; quosdam amaros, quia diu retinent iram; quosdam difficiles, quia nunquam quiescunt nisi puniant.

Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) calls some angry persons akrocholoi [choleric], because they are easily angered; some he calls pikroi [bitter], because they retain their anger for a long time; and some he calls chalepoi [ill-tempered], because they never rest until they have retaliated [Cf. II-II, 158, 5].

1a 2ae q46 a7: Whether anger is only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice? Yes.

2010-08-09T23:00:00.002-07:00

Ad eosdem est ira, ad quos est iustitia et iniustitia, quia inferre vindictam ad iustitiam pertinet, laedere autem aliquem pertinet ad iniustitiam.

Anger is towards those to whom we are just or unjust, because vengeance is an act of justice, and wrong-doing is an act of injustice.

Unde tam ex parte causae, quae est laesio illata ab altero, quam etiam ex parte vindictae, quam appetit iratus, manifestum est quod ad eosdem pertinet ira, ad quos iustitia et iniustitia.

Therefore both on the part of the cause, viz. the harm done by another, and on the part of the vengeance sought by the angry man, it is evident that anger concerns those to whom one is just or unjust.

1a 2ae q46 a6: Whether anger is more grievous than hatred? No.

2010-08-08T07:34:00.002-07:00

Odium est multo deterius et gravius quam ira quia odium est per applicationem mali ad malum, ira autem per applicationem boni ad malum.

Hatred is far worse and graver than anger because hatred implies application of evil to evil, whereas anger denotes application of good to evil.

Manifestum est autem quod appetere malum sub ratione iusti, minus habet de ratione mali quam velle malum alicuius simpliciter. Velle enim malum alicuius sub ratione iusti, potest esse etiam secundum virtutem iustitiae, si praecepto rationis obtemperetur; sed ira in hoc solum deficit, quod non obedit rationis praecepto in ulciscendo.

Now it is evident that to seek evil under the aspect of justice, has a lesser aspect of evil than simply to seek evil to someone. Because to wish evil to someone under the aspect of justice, may be according to the virtue of justice, if it be in conformity with the order of reason; and anger fails only in this, that it does not obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance.

Species passionis, et ratio ipsius, ex obiecto pensatur. Est autem obiectum irae et odii idem subiecto; nam sicut odiens appetit malum ei quem odit, ita iratus ei contra quem irascitur.

The species and formal aspect of a passion are taken from its object. Now the object of anger is the same in subject as the object of hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates, so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he is angry.

Sed non eadem ratione: sed odiens appetit malum inimici, inquantum est malum; iratus autem appetit malum eius contra quem irascitur, non inquantum est malum, sed inquantum habet quandam rationem boni, scilicet prout aestimat illud esse iustum, inquantum est vindicativum.

But there is a difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his enemy, inasmuch as it is evil; whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom he is angry, not inasmuch as it is evil but insofar as it has a certain aspect of good, that is, insofar as he reckons it as just, since it is a means of vengeance.

Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "iratus, si fiant multa, miserebitur, odiens autem pro nullo".

The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the angry man is appeased if many evils befall, whereas the hater is never appeased."

Odium autem provenit ex permanentiori causa quam ira. Nam ira provenit ex aliqua commotione animi propter laesionem illatam; sed odium procedit ex aliqua dispositione hominis, secundum quam reputat sibi contrarium et nocivum id quod odit.

Hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion of the soul due to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a man, according to which he considers that which he hates to be contrary and hurtful to him.

Et ideo sicut passio citius transit quam dispositio vel habitus, ita ira citius transit quam odium; quamvis etiam odium sit passio ex tali dispositione proveniens. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "odium est magis insanabile quam ira".

Consequently, as passion is more transitory than disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; although hatred itself is a passion ensuing from this disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "hatred is more incurable than anger."

1a 2ae q46 a5: Whether anger is more natural than desire? Yes.

2010-08-07T08:17:00.002-07:00

Ira est magis naturalis homini quam concupiscentia, inquantum ira est cum ratione magis quam concupiscentia.

Anger is more natural to man than desire, insofar as anger follows reason more than desire does.

Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod humanius est punire, quod pertinet ad iram, quam mansuetum esse, unumquodque enim naturaliter insurgit contra contraria et nociva.

Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "revenge" which pertains to anger "is more natural to man than meekness", for it is natural to everything to rise up against things contrary and hurtful.

Ipsa ratio pertinet ad naturam hominis. Unde ex hoc ipso quod ira est cum ratione, sequitur quod secundum aliquem modum sit homini naturalis.

Reason itself belongs to the nature of man: wherefore from the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it follows that it is, in a manner, natural to man.

1a 2ae q46 a4: Whether anger requires an act of reason? Yes.

2010-08-06T08:11:00.002-07:00

Ira est quodammodo cum ratione quia sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., ira audit aliqualiter rationem, sicut nuntiantem quod iniuriatum est ei, sed non perfecte audit, quia non observat regulam rationis in rependendo vindictam.

Anger, in a fashion, requires an act of reason, because as stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "anger listens somewhat to reason" insofar as reason denounces the injury inflicted, "but listens not perfectly," because it does not observe the rule of reason as to the measure of vengeance.

Ad iram ergo requiritur aliquis actus rationis; et additur impedimentum rationis. Unde philosophus dicit, in libro de Problemat., quod illi qui sunt multum ebrii, tanquam nihil habentes de iudicio rationis, non irascuntur, sed quando sunt parum ebrii, irascuntur, tanquam habentes iudicium rationis, sed impeditum.

Anger, therefore, requires an act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2,27) that those who are very drunk, so as to be incapable of the use of reason, do not get angry, but those who are slightly drunk, do get angry, through being still able, though hampered, to form a judgment of reason.

1a 2ae q46 a3: Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty? No.

2010-08-05T07:59:00.002-07:00

Ira non est in concupiscibili, sed in irascibili, quia ira respicit duo obiecta: scilicet vindictam, quam appetit, et eum de quo vindictam quaerit; et circa utrumque quandam arduitatem ira requirit: non enim insurgit motus irae, nisi aliqua magnitudine circa utrumque existente; "quaecumque enim nihil sunt, aut modica valde nullo digna aestimamus", ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric.

Anger is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible faculty, because anger regards two objects: viz. the vengeance that it seeks, and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness: for the movement of anger does not arise, unless there be some magnitude about both these objects; since "we make no ado about things that are naught or very minute," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2).

Ira dicitur componi ex tristitia et desiderio, non sicut ex partibus, sed sicut ex causis. Dictum est autem supra quod passiones concupiscibilis sunt causae passionum irascibilis.

Anger is said to be composed of [the concupiscible passions] pain and desire, not as though they were its parts, but because they are its causes. For it has been said above (q25 a2) that the concupiscible passions are the causes of the irascible passions.

Ira dicitur crescere in odium, non quod eadem numero passio quae prius fuit ira, postmodum fiat odium per quandam inveterationem, sed per quandam causalitatem. Ira enim, per diuturnitatem, causat odium.

Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though the same passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by becoming inveterate, but by a process of causality. For anger when it lasts a long time engenders hatred.

1a 2ae q46 a2: Whether the object of anger is an evil? No.

2010-08-04T07:17:00.003-07:00

Obiectum irae est bonum quia appetitus vindictae est appetitus boni, cum vindicta ad iustitiam pertineat.

The object of anger is a good because the desire for revenge is a desire for something good, since revenge belongs to justice.

Augustinus dicit, in II Confess., quod "ira appetit vindictam".

Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "anger craves for revenge".

Praeterea, ira semper est cum spe, unde et delectationem causat, ut dicit philosophus, in II Rhetoric. Sed spei et delectationis obiectum est bonum. Ergo et irae.

Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the object of hope and of pleasure is a good. Therefore a good is also the object of anger.

Et sic motus irae tendit in duo, scilicet in ipsam vindictam, quam appetit et sperat sicut quoddam bonum, unde et de ipsa delectatur; tendit etiam in illum de quo quaerit vindictam, sicut in contrarium et nocivum, quod pertinet ad rationem mali.

The movement of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, which it desires and hopes for as being a definite good, wherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, as to something contrary and hurtful, which bears the formal aspect of evil.

Est tamen duplex differentia attendenda circa hoc, irae ad odium et ad amorem. Quarum prima est, quod ira semper respicit duo obiecta, amor vero et odium quandoque respiciunt unum obiectum tantum, sicut cum dicitur aliquis amare vinum vel aliquid huiusmodi, aut etiam odire.

We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The first difference is that anger always regards two objects, whereas love and hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is said to love wine or something of the kind, or to hate it.

Secunda est, quia utrumque obiectorum quod respicit amor, est bonum: vult enim amans bonum alicui, tanquam sibi convenienti. Utrumque vero eorum quae respicit odium, habet rationem mali: vult enim odiens malum alicui, tamquam cuidam inconvenienti.

The second difference is, that both the objects of love are good: since the lover wishes good to someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the objects of hatred bear the formal aspect of evil: for the man who hates, wishes evil to someone, as to something disagreeable to him.

Sed ira respicit unum obiectum secundum rationem boni, scilicet vindictam, quam appetit, et aliud secundum rationem mali, scilicet hominem nocivum, de quo vult vindicari. Et ideo est passio quodammodo composita ex contrariis passionibus.

Whereas anger regards one object under the formal aspect of good, viz. the revenge which it seeks, and another object under the formal aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged. Consequently it is a passion somewhat made up of contrary passions.

1a 2ae q46 a1: Whether anger is a special passion? Yes.

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Potest ira dici passio generalis, inquantum ex concursu multarum passionum causatur, quia effectus ex congregatione multarum causarum productus, habet quandam generalitatem, inquantum continet multas causas quodammodo in actu.

Anger may be called a general passion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several passions, because an effect which is due to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain generality, inasmuch as several causes are, in a fashion, actually existing therein.

Ira includit multas passiones, non quidem sicut genus species, sed magis secundum continentiam causae et effectus.

Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a genus includes several species, but rather according to the inclusion of cause and effect.

Non enim insurgit motus irae nisi propter aliquam tristitiam illatam et nisi adsit desiderium et spes ulciscendi, quia, ut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., "iratus habet spem puniendi; appetit enim vindictam ut sibi possibilem".

The movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope of revenge: as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), "the angry man hopes to punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible."

Unde si fuerit multum excellens persona quae nocumentum intulit, non sequitur ira, sed solum tristitia, ut Avicenna dicit, in libro de anima.

Consequently, if the person who inflicted the injury excels by very much, anger does not ensue, but only pain, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv, 6).

1a 2ae q46: Anger, in itself

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1a 2ae q45 a4: Whether the daring are more eager at first than in the midst of danger? Yes.

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Dicitur in III Ethic., quod "audaces praevolantes sunt et volentes ante pericula, in ipsis autem discedunt" quia contingit quandoque quod secundum subitam apprehensionem non possunt cognosci omnia quae difficultatem in aliquo negotio afferunt: unde surgit audaciae motus ad aggrediendum periculum; unde quando iam experiuntur ipsum periculum, sentiunt maiorem difficultatem quam aestimaverunt, et ideo deficiunt.

It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that "the daring are precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the midst of dangers they stand aloof" because it happens sometimes that it is impossible for a man to take note in an instant of all the difficulties of a certain situation: hence there arises the movement of daring to face the danger; so that when he comes to experience the danger, he feels the difficulty to be greater than he expected, and so gives way.

Audacia, cum sit quidam motus appetitus sensitivi, sequitur apprehensionem sensitivae virtutis. Virtus autem sensitiva non est collativa nec inquisitiva singulorum quae circumstant rem, sed subitum habet iudicium.

Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite, follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive faculty cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into circumstances; its judgment is instantaneous.

Sed ratio est discussiva omnium quae afferunt difficultatem negotio. Et ideo fortes, qui ex iudicio rationis aggrediuntur pericula, in principio videntur remissi, quia non passi, sed cum deliberatione debita aggrediuntur. Quando autem sunt in ipsis periculis, non experiuntur aliquid improvisum, sed quandoque minora illis quae praecogitaverunt; et ideo magis persistunt.

On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a situation. Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according to the judgment of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the danger not from passion but with due deliberation. Yet when they are in the midst of danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but sometimes the difficulty turns out to be less than they anticipated; wherefore they are more persevering.

Vel etiam quia propter bonum virtutis pericula aggrediuntur, cuius boni voluntas in eis perseverat, quantacumque sint pericula. Audaces autem, propter solam aestimationem facientem spem et excludentem timorem, sicut dictum est.

Moreover, it may be because they face the danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of their will, however great the danger may prove. Whereas men of daring face the danger on account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and banishing fear, as stated above (q45 a3).

Obiectum amoris est simpliciter bonum, unde augmentatum simpliciter augmentat amorem. Sed obiectum audaciae est compositum ex bono et malo; et motus audaciae in malum, praesupponit motum spei in bonum.

The object of love is the good simply, wherefore if it be increased, love is increased simply. But the object of daring is a compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil presupposes the movement of hope towards good.

Et ideo si tantum addatur de arduitate ad periculum quod excedat spem, non sequetur motus audaciae, sed diminuetur. Si tamen sit motus audaciae, quanto maius est periculum, tanto maior audacia reputatur.

If, therefore, so much difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the movement of daring does not ensue, but fails. But if the movement of daring does ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the daring considered to be.

1a 2ae q45 a3: Whether some defect is a cause of daring? No.

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Nihil quod ad defectum pertinet, est causa audaciae quia nullus defectus causat audaciam nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet habet adiunctam aliquam excellentiam, vel veram vel aestimatam, vel ex parte sui vel ex parte alterius.

Nothing pertaining to defect is a cause of daring because no defect causes daring except accidentally, i.e. insofar as some excellence attaches thereto, real or imaginary, either in oneself or in another.

Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod causa audaciae est, "cum in phantasia spes fuerit salutarium ut prope existentium, timendorum autem aut non entium, aut longe entium".

The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that the cause of daring "is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means of safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either non-existent or far off."

Illi qui sunt inexperti periculorum, sunt audaciores, non propter defectum, sed per accidens, inquantum scilicet, propter inexperientiam, neque debilitatem suam cognoscunt, neque praesentiam periculorum.

Those who have no experience of dangers are more daring, not on account of a defect, but accidentally, i.e. insofar as through being inexperienced they do not know their own failings, nor the dangers that threaten.

Philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., "iniustum passi redduntur audaciores, quia aestimant quod Deus iniustum passis auxilium ferat".

The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) "those who have been wronged are courageous, because they think that God comes to the assistance of those who suffer unjustly."

1a 2ae q45 a2: Whether daring ensues from hope? Yes.

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Audacia, quae insequitur malum, est post spem, quae insequitur bonum, quia malum habet aliquem ordinem ad bonum, est enim posterius bono, sicut privatio habitu.

Daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which pursues good, because evil has a certain relation to good, since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit.

Prosecutio boni pertinet ad spem, fuga mali ad timorem, insecutio mali terribilis pertinet ad audaciam, fuga vero boni pertinet ad desperationem.

Pursuit of good belongs to hope, avoidance of evil to fear, the pursuit of the fearful evil belongs to daring, and the avoidance of good to despair.

Unde sequitur quod audacia consequitur ad spem, ex hoc enim quod aliquis sperat superare terribile imminens, ex hoc audacter insequitur ipsum.

It follows, therefore, that daring results from hope, since it is in the hope of overcoming the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly.

Ad timorem vero sequitur desperatio, ideo enim aliquis desperat, quia timet difficultatem quae est circa bonum sperandum.

But despair results from fear, since the reason why a man despairs is because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good he should hope for.

Audacia, licet sit circa malum cui coniunctum est bonum victoriae secundum aestimationem audacis, tamen respicit malum, bonum vero adiunctum respicit spes.

Although the object of daring is an evil to which, in the estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is conjoined, yet daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined good.

Et similiter desperatio respicit bonum directe, quod refugit, malum vero adiunctum respicit timor. Unde, proprie loquendo, audacia non est pars spei, sed eius effectus, sicut nec desperatio est pars timoris, sed eius effectus. Et propter hoc etiam audacia principalis passio esse non potest.

In like manner despair regards directly the good which it turns away from, while fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly speaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect, just as despair is an effect, not a part, of fear. For this reason, too, daring cannot be a principal passion.

1a 2ae q45 a1: Whether daring is contrary to fear? Yes.

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Audacia est timori contraria quia illud quod maxime distat a timore, est audacia: timor enim refugit nocumentum futurum, propter eius victoriam super ipsum timentem; sed audacia aggreditur periculum imminens, propter victoriam sui supra ipsum periculum.

Daring is contrary to fear because that which is farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away from the future hurt, on account of its victory over him that fears it; whereas daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that same danger.

Uni secundum idem, non sunt plura contraria; sed secundum diversa, nihil prohibet uni plura contrariari. Et sic dictum est supra quod passiones irascibilis habent duplicem contrarietatem, unam secundum oppositionem boni et mali, et sic timor contrariatur spei; aliam secundum oppositionem accessus et recessus, et sic timori contrariatur audacia, spei vero desperatio.

To one thing, in the same respect, there are not several contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one thing having several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above (q23 a2; q40 a4) that the irascible passions admit of a twofold contrariety: one, according to the opposition of good and evil, and thus fear is contrary to hope; the other, according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to fear, and despair contrary to hope.

De ratione contrariorum est quod maxime a se distent, ut dicitur in X Metaphys.

It is of the formal aspect of contraries to be "farthest removed from one another," as stated in Metaph. x, 4.

1a 2ae q45: Daring

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